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 This thesis analyzes the impact of Europeanization on the conduct of religious 
instruction within the formal education system in Turkey and in Poland. The main 
argument is that according to the accounts of the Europeanization theory, the patterns of 
this impact altered because of the historical and sociological specificities of the two 
countries. These can be traced with an accurate investigation of the historical and legal 
contexts concerning the conduct of religious education in these countries and also, by 
inspecting the contemporary situation in order to be able to make an analysis on how 
Europeanization affected the policy-making in this specific field. 
 
The research aims at explaining the shaping of domestic policy-making in a value-laden 
field such as religious education, which has always been a sensitive issue given the nature 
of the subject, under the influence of Europeanization. To measure this impact on the 
conduct of religious education has been controversial since there are plenty of factors 
which have the capacity to lead to the domestic policy change. Europeanization theories 
iv 
support the study by offering accounts to operate within this domain and come up with 
concrete observations.  
 
This study delineates the different paths of Turkey and Poland in experiencing 
Europeanization in the field of religious education and mainly argues that Turkey has 
undergone a more superficial process which can be better explained by rationalist 
institutionalism whereas Poland practiced a deeper compliance with the European norms 
that can be explicated with sociological institutionalist account of Europeanization 
theory.   
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 Bu çalışma, Avrupalılaşma’nın Türkiye ve Polonya’daki örgün eğitim sistemi 
içerisinde din eğitiminin yürütülmesi üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Anafikir, 
Avrupalılaşma teorilerinin ortaya koyduğu üzere, bu etkinin iki ülkenin kendine özgü 
tarihsel ve sosyolojik yapıları nedeniyle farklılık gösterdiğidir. Bu ülkelerde din eğitimi 
alanında tarihi ve hukuksal yapıların incelenmesi ve güncel durumun değerlendirilmesi 
ile Avrupalılaşma’nın bu özel alanda politika üretilmesine nasıl bir etkisi olduğu 
anlaşılabilmektedir. 
 
Bu araştırma, doğası gereği hassas olan değer temelli konularda iç politika üretilmesi 
sürecinin Avrupalılaşma etkisi altında nasıl şekillendiğini açıklamayı hedeflemektedir. 
Din eğitiminin yürütülmesi konusunda söz konusu etkiyi açıklamak, iç politkaların 
değişimine sebep olabilecek pek çok faktör olduğundan karmaşık bir hal almaktadır. 
Avrupalılaşma teorileri, sundukları savlarla bu alan içinde tahlil ve nesnel gözlemler 
yapabilmeyi sağlamak suretiyle bu çalışmayı desteklemektedir. 
vi 
Bu tez, din eğitimi alanında Türkiye’nin ve Polonya’nın izlediği Avrupalılaşma sürecinin 
farklılık gösterdiğini ortaya koymakta ve Türkiye’nin, rasyonalist kurumsalcılık 
yaklaşımı ile daha iyi açıklanabilen, yüzeysel bir Avrupalılaşma’yı deneyimlediğini; 
Polonya’nın ise sosyolojik kurumsalcılık ile daha iyi analiz edilebilen ve Avrupa 
normlarını derinlemesine benimsemeyi esas alan bir yol izlediğini savunmaktadır. 
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State-religion relations are a particularly complex issue given that there are lots of 
intervening variables and thus several factors to be analyzed. The stance of the state 
towards religion can be investigated from very different angles where diverse indicators 
are involved. The state-religion relations can be depicted for example by determining 
whether there exists a state religion, whether there is full separation between the state and 
religion, in terms of the state funding offered to religious institutions, in means of the 
legal status of religious minorities or the settling of the moral issues like abortion or 
euthanasia. Each of these indicators may give an accurate understanding of the status of 
state-religion relations in a country. The conduct of religious education is among the most 
reliable indicators given that state’s stance in regards to religious education determines its 
position towards the status of religion itself. 
 
The issues touching upon religion and conscience are delicate by nature and thus need to 
be examined very attentively. In the globalizing world, even the most sensitive domestic 
2 
affairs are under the influence of global and regional trends. In the contemporary 
environment, no subject can be accurately investigated from a single perspective 
considering the domestic politics of a country. This is why the influence of 
Europeanization on domestic structures is a popular subject in contemporary scholarly 
work. Determining its impact on the fields where the European Union (EU) or European 
institutions do have clear criteria is a widespread way of analyzing the Europeanization 
process. However, on a subject like religious education where European institutions have 
no preset criterion but only some related norms like right to freedom of religion and 
conscience, it seems harder to determine the effect of Europeanization on domestic 
policy-making.  
 
To be precise, neither the EU nor other European institutions have a prescribed rule or 
norm concerning the conduct of state-religion relations.1 In other words, when one 
investigates the practice in the EU members in terms of these relations, it can easily be 
observed that there is no uniform procedure.2 In the absence of prescribed rules and 
common practice among European countries concerning the state-religion relations and 
the conduct of religious education, the impact of Europeanization on these fields needs be 
evaluated in terms of common norms like freedom of religion and conscience. The aim of 
                                                            
1 In some European countries (such as England, Denmark and Finland) there exists a state Church. In other 
countries a Church is considered to have privilege or a religion is accepted as the dominant religion, as is in 
the case of Greece, Austria, Ireland and Finland. In contrast, some other European countries have settled a 
neutral position towards all religions as well as religious affairs like France, Portugal, Germany and 
Benelux countries. 
2 For detailed information about the conduct of state-religion relations in the EU members please see: 
Tugba Gurcel. 2007. “Turkey’s Cultural Integration with the European Union: Religion as a Factor.” 
Unpublished Master’s Thesis. Bilkent University: Ankara, pp. 18-30. Available online at: 
http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0003467.pdf  
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this study is to investigate the effect of Europeanization in spreading the universal values 
on the conduct of religious education, which is one of the most reliable indicators of 
state-religion relations, and to explicate this influence on the selected cases of Turkey and 
Poland by Europeanization theories. 
 
Religious education3 is chosen as the specific field to analyze state-religion relations 
since in each state concrete policies are put forward for its conduct. The change in these 
policies helps to determine the turning points for process tracing and enables to measure 
the impact of different factors. The existence of the concrete policies concerning religious 
education also provides a ground for comparative study. Therefore, selecting religious 
education as the indicator of state-religion relations provided a safe corner for 
operationalizing about the impact of Europeanization. 
 
The use of the term Europeanization needs to be clarified within the scope of the study 
because in the literature it is a notion that is utilized interchangeably with the EU 
membership or European integration. The principle embraced in this work for the use of 
the term Europeanization can be summarized as: “Europeanization is more than and 
different from EU-ization” and this “covers a wider range of processes and institutions 
than just the EU” (Graziano and Vink, 2007: 12). Therefore, Europeanization within the 
                                                            
3 Religious education is called “religious” courses or religious culture and knowledge of ethics (DKAB) 
courses in the Turkish context whereas in the Polish context this education refers to “religion” courses. 
These terms are utilized in this dissertation in their widespread use in the two countries; the reason of this 
alteration which lies beneath the nature of these courses will be widely discussed in the relevant parts of 
this work.  
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scope of this study refers to the EU accession process, EU membership and integration 
with the EU, but it is certainly beyond them; Europeanization also implies the compliance 
with European norms which are indicated on international documents like European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and the reports prepared by European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI); which are binding as a result of being part of the Council of Europe, 
were considered as points of reference in determining the magnitude of the impact of 
Europeanization.  
 
As the theme is related to freedom of religion and conscience, and the right to education; 
the relevant provisions of the above-mentioned documents are taken into consideration. 
As a matter of fact, how the selected cases comply with the European norms is highly 
dependent on the historical and domestic legal contexts of the countries and displays 
great specificity. Europeanization theories provide a reliable account for making sense of 
how historical and legal legacies determine the way in which the selected countries 







1.1 Selection of the Cases 
 
As for determining the cases to be assessed comparatively, a number of factors have been 
taken into account. At first, academic works concerning secularization theories and 
worldwide religious resurgence as well as the literature on Europeanization are frequently 
putting forward Turkey and Poland as comparable cases. The literature especially dealing 
with identity, and more specifically with religion, puts these two countries on a similar 
axis (Öniş, 2004). 
 
One of the most highlighted specificities of Turkey and Poland in the scholarly work on 
Europeanization is their being religious countries. Religion is considered as a significant 
determinant of identity for both countries which indicates that national identity is very 
closely tied with religious identity. In the Turkish context; being Turkish means ipso 
facto being a Sunni Muslim and this connotation is consolidated with the “Turkish-
Islamic synthesis” which was concretely defined in the 1980s by some intellectuals in the 
country. In that way, Islamic roots of Turkish society were reminded in order to enhance 
the national and religious identities altogether. A similar relation has also existed in 
Poland for many centuries and Polish nationhood has been associated with Catholicism. 
The common term which is utilized for mentioning that a Pole is Catholic is “Polak-
Katolik.” This notion also implies that national identity is enhanced, if not shaped by, 
majority religion of these countries. That is why the religion factor has been emphasized 
during its EU membership process, not overtly for sure given that there is no criterion on 
6 
religion for membership. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, since there is no universal 
norm of state-religion relations or the level of secularization of a member state, the 
European side does not have the right to expect anything from the candidates. On that 
axis, the nature of the state-religion relations in those countries will be under scrutiny in 
order to determine whether the conduct of religious education complies with the 
European norms, not regarding the principle of secularism but freedom of religion and 
conscience.  
 
In defining Europe, Christianity has always been one of the most remarkable elements of 
identity. The EU is frequently being labeled as a Christian club; especially its reluctance 
for Turkey’s membership is generally associated with this characteristic. Nonetheless, 
literature concerning global trends of secularization and religiosity commonly considers 
Europe as an exception indicating that there is no rise of religiosity there, contrary to the 
global trend. Poland is again accepted as an exception to the general rule of secular 
Europe in the sense that Catholicism still constitutes a remarkable part of the national 
identity (Casanova, 1994). In the course of Poland’s membership to the EU, the European 
side was reluctant since they were concerned with Poland being a potential threat to the 
secularization trend of Europe. Therefore, despite the common denomination of 
Christianity, the perceived high level of religiosity of Poland has been a matter of 
discussion during the course of its integration. Having said that, “Muslim and religious”4 
                                                            
4 According to the research conducted by TESEV, the religiosity in Turkey is increasing. For the statistics 
about rise in religiosity please see: Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak. 2003. Religion, Society and Politics in 
a Changing Turkey. İstanbul: TESEV Publications, p. 11. 
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Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe is a much more controversial issue by nature. 
However, on the axis of being religious, the two countries are comparable since their 
conformity in terms of domestic policies with the European norms display a parallelism 
given their religious sensitivity. In other words, the issues which fall under the scope of 
religious and moral domains like family, abortion, euthanasia or religious education; it is 
harder for these countries to comply with European norms. 
 
The fact that Poland is among the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that 
were also evaluated according to their compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria 
during their membership process to the EU, is another factor for comparing it with 
Turkey. The EU conditionality, which is based on encouraging the candidate countries by 
external intencives in the form of rewards and sanctions, is a remarkable factor in 
determining policies both for CEECs and Turkey (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2004). As they were post-Soviet countries and possessed the characteristics of transitional 
societies, especially in terms of their experience of democracy; they had to prove that 
they could meet the political criteria. So, in determining the impact of Europeanization, 
EU membership constitutes a noteworthy reference point and a country that has become 
an EU member after the insertion of political criteria provides a sound ground of 
comparison with Turkey. The fact that Poland became a member of the EU in 2004 also 
offers an opportunity to observe the impact of Europeanization on domestic affairs before 
and after membership. In addition, given that population sizes are comparable, although 
they are very different in terms of the constitution of society in ethnic and religious terms, 
8 
the two countries were subject to similar concerns from the EU side. Therefore, Poland, 
being the biggest state among the CEECs, constitutes the most comparable case to 
Turkey among the states of the 2004 enlargement. In means of economic prosperity and 
democratic consolidation, Turkey and Poland are also comparable despite the fact that 
their experiences in terms of regime types are dissimilar. 
 
Nonetheless, the main reason for choosing these two countries to compare on the axis of 
the impact of Europeanization for the conduct of religious education is their similarity in 
terms of their religiosity; in other words, religion constituting the main vein of identity. 
Analyzing such countries known for their religious sensitivity from the perspective of 
Europeanization process is a challenging matter and therefore needs an accurate 





The research question of the study is: “What is the impact of Europeanization on 
religious courses in formal education in Poland and in Turkey?” The analysis is built 




In order to be able to measure the impact of Europeanization on any field, one should be 
acquainted with the historical and current political context of the countries to be 
examined. The main rationale behind is the assumption that how Europeanization affects 
the domestic policies and structures of a country depends upon its historical background, 
the culture and identity; whether top-down or upwards mobilization exists, and the 
position of religion in the modernization process. Historical evolution of state-religion 
relations, the significance of religion in nation-building and identity formation, with 
specific reference to religious courses in formal education are retrieved from secondary 
sources for both Turkey and Poland. 
 
As a second step, the international agreements that both countries are bound with, the 
domestic legal documents; including the constitution, laws and regulations concerning 
education and religious courses in specific are examined. The change in the status of 
religious education is presented from a perspective of process-tracing, for the purpose of 
understanding the turning points in terms of legal change and policy change, and their 
relation to the conjuncture of the day. For Poland, the impact of Europeanization starts to 
be examined with its application for EU membership right after the fall of communism 
and it constituted a landmark in the history of the country in that respect too. For Turkey, 
the decision of the ECtHR, which had general implications for the conduct of religious 
education in the country, is considered to be a milestone given that the subsequent 
developments indicated the European impact on this specific field. 
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The judgments of the ECtHR are taken into account considerately since as delineated 
above, one of the main assumptions of this work is that Europeanization is not limited to 
EU membership and its organs, but that European rules and values can be transmitted via 
other European institutions such as Council of Europe and ECtHR. The verdicts of the 
ECtHR for Poland and for Turkey are not only binding for those countries but are also 
reliable indicators in determining the level of misfit and thus give an insight about the 
nature of impact of Europeanization on those countries. 
 
These steps that provided an accurate image of the historical and legal contexts in which 
the domain of religious education was operated but the study was lacking contemporary 
information which could only be gathered from the specialists and the actors who are 
actively taking part of the policy-making, implementing or being affected by the process. 
With this motivation, as a final step, in-depth interviews were conducted in both 
countries. These in-depth interviews were aimed at gathering all crucial information 
regarding the issue. From a broader perspective, state-religion relations were explored 
while making strong emphasis on religious education and the connotation of these two 
with the process of Europeanization. 
 
The in-depth interview is selected as the method for gathering contemporary information 
because “this method is useful when the researcher has a particular topic he or she wants 
to focus on and gain information from individuals” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006: 120). 
Moreover, for the case of Poland, the lack of language skills may impede to get 
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information from the domestic media sources and it might be a necessity to refer to the 
experiences and observations of individuals. Therefore, these interviews turned out to be 
“knowledge-producing conversations” which offered the opportunity to “learn about 
social life through the perspective, experience, and language of those living it” (Hesse-
Biber and Leavy, 2006: 128). 
 
For both cases, but especially for Turkey, religious education is a field where one can 
find disadvantaged groups who are complaining about their position but not always raise 
their voice easily because of the tense environment. In that sense, the in-depth interviews 
were considered as an opportunity for “accessing the subjugated voices” within society 
(Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006: 123). In this way, different parties of the issue were 
heard. While doing so, it was important to keep a distance from subjectivity and avoid the 
feeling of the respondents that the researcher is an outsider, even though it was harder to 
do so in Poland. In Turkey, on the other hand, reflexivity was the notion to be avoided 
since as a researcher, it was important to be aware that the social background and existing 
assumptions of the interviewer may intervene in the conversation (Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2006: 141). In order to do so, the respondents were not to be intervened while 
replying the questions and they had the opportunity to put forward their point of view as 
they wished. 
 
The questions were prepared in a semi-structured form which aimed at keeping the 
conversation on the set of questions addressing the main topic of the study. Another 
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reason for selecting semi-structured interview was to “allow individual respondents some 
latitude and freedom to talk about what is of interest and important to them” (Hesse-Biber 
and Leavy, 2006: 125). In this way, contemporary issues could have revealed and the 
respondents could attract the attention to the points they considered to be significant. This 
opened up new issues to be investigated under the scope of the study and new dimensions 
were added. As a matter of fact, some of the interviews were closer to open-ended design 
where the respondents were allowed to take the conversation wherever they would like to 
and this gave a greater flexibility to put forward new themes. 
 
In both cases, the selection of the respondents was based on the purpose of providing a 
comprehensive analysis comprising different parts and aspects of the issue. In addition, a 
parallelism in terms of the selection of respondents was attained between Turkey and 
Poland while making interviews. Among the interviewees, there were both adherents of 
majority religion; Catholicism in Poland and Sunni Islam in Turkey; and the followers of 
other convictions. The practices about the religious courses for people other than the 
believers of the mainstream religion were taken into account since these records provided 
reliable indicators in determining respect for freedom of conscience and belief. It is worth 
reminding that the main concern of this work is neither to discuss minority rights nor the 
principle of secularism but to evaluate the two countries’ fit to the European values in 
terms of right to freedom of religion and conscience, in addition to the right to education. 
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Among the interviewees, there were journalists, lawyers, academicians, politicians, 
religious leaders, policy-makers, representatives of minority religions and related NGOs 
as well as people from other professions.5 Their religious convictions, political views and 
stances with regard to the specific issue of religious education altered. As already 
indicated, in the selection of the profile of interviewees it was aimed to reflect different 
dimensions and the opposite views. The current environment in both countries in terms of 
state-religion relations, with special emphasis on religious education, was displayed from 
all angles. 
 
For sure, the questions addressed to the interviewees altered in Turkey and in Poland. It 
should be stated that the queries posed also differed from one interviewee to the other 
since emphases were made regarding the field of expertise, ideological position, 
profession, and conviction. For instance, while interviewing an expert on 
Europeanization; more questions about this process and its implications were put 
forward. On the other hand, while conducting an interview with a priest or imam; the 
content, the nature and the practice of the religious education in the given country was 
inquired. While talking to a lawyer, the interview was mainly based on legal aspects of 
the issue; the judgments of the ECtHR, their execution, the compliance of domestic legal 
structures with the European ones.  
 
                                                            
5 The list and more detailed information about the interviewees are given at the Appendix. 
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In Turkey, three MPs from the main opposition party were interviewed and their opinions 
about the current policies of the government were asked. Given that the policies of ruling 
party6 can be observed since this party is in power, it was attempted to hear the voice of 
the main opposition party. In Poland, a similar logic was pursued and the position of the 
opposition party was asked.   
 
For Poland, the main headings of the questions were:  
1. Reinsertion of religious instruction to public schools and personal experiences 
2. General scope of the discussions on religion/ethics courses  
a. In specific: The third-party intervention to Grzelak Case 
3. The position of other religious denominations in religion courses in Poland: 
Muslim students of Turkish origin and their families 
4. The stance of Catholic Church on Poland’s EU membership, its impact on state-
religion relations and religion education  
5. Contemporary politics in Poland  







6 The members of the Education Commission from the ruling party were requested to be interviewed but 
they did not respond. 
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In Turkey, the interviewees were requested to share their views about: 
1. Current state of state-religion relations 
2. Compulsory religious courses 
a. Exemption requests – legal aspect; ECtHR judgment, its execution, 
domestic courts 
b. Expectation from the new Constitution 
3. New education system (4+4+4) and added optional religion courses 
4. Position of adherents of other religions and unbelievers 
5. The impact of Europeanization on freedom of religion and conscience and 
religious courses at schools; expected impact of EU membership 
 
As already mentioned, the questions altered according to the interviewees; such that some 
of the headings were discussed in a greater detail than others. Moreover, the questions 
were mostly open-ended and provided the interviewees the opportunity to express their 
opinions in the way they prefer, to emphasize the issues they wish. Lastly, most of the 
interviewees were requested to refer the researcher to other persons who they think might 
help to reveal another relevant aspect of the issue. The list of interviews was broadened 
with the guidance of interviewees but the optimal number is determined by means of 
achieving proportionality and comparability between the cases. 
 
Most of the in-depth interviews were conducted for the Polish case in Warsaw, in 
November 2012. The interviews were realized with ten people and a focus group of 
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Muslims living in Warsaw. One interview was made in Istanbul with a scholar who was 
conducting research in Turkey at that time. Another one was realized via Skype with a 
Polish political activist. The interviews were made with persons from different political 
views, religious convictions, social backgrounds, nationalities, professions and ages in 
order to make a multi-dimensional analysis. It was aimed to listen to different opinions, 
to find out common points and to get a general understanding of how state-religion 
relations, the position of the Catholic Church, the practice of religion/ethics courses and 
the impact of Europeanization on all these matters were perceived by interviewees. Not 
only Polish citizens but also Muslim people of Turkish origin living in Warsaw were 
interviewed in the form of focus groups. The questions posed varied according to the 
nationality, religious conviction, age, profession of the interviewees and the query was 
based on the information which was needed to be acquired. The common and diverging 
points on the same issue are highlighted with an objective perspective by omitting the 
personal comments of the interviewer. 
 
In sum, twelve interviews helped to a great extent to reveal the current situation in Poland 
in terms of religious education, state-religion relations and the impact of Europeanization. 
In addition to those interviews with voice records, the visit to Warsaw, meeting the 
Turkish Ambassador to Poland and attendance to the Vaticanum II Conference7 have 
given the chance of making observations. Lack of Polish language skills was overcome 
                                                            
7 Vaticanuum II Conference was held by the Centre of Thought for John Paul II on 13-14 November 2012 
at the University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, Warsaw. 
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thanks to the help of Polish researchers who provided contemporary information and 
translated them into English. 
 
The fieldwork survey in Turkey took more time given that these are very vivid issues in 
this country, especially compared to Poland. There are more aspects, parties and actors 
involved in the process. State-religion relations, the education system itself, the status of 
religious courses and their connotation to the Europeanization of the country are among 
the highly debated contemporary issues. Eleven interviews were conducted in March and 
April 2013, with the exception of two, which were made in February. Two interviews 
were realized in Istanbul whereas the rest took place in Ankara. Among the thirteen 
interviewees, two of them preferred not to make a voice record. 
 
The data which was produced out of the interviews constitute an important part of the 
whole work. The historical and the legal contexts that give important inputs for the study 
of the cases, the contemporary information that is gathered mostly via interviews enriches 
the multi-dimensional analysis by also providing occasion for counterfactual thinking. In 
this way, it is assessed how domestic policies, institutions and structures could have been 
in the absence of the impact of Europeanization. From the scope of Europeanization, both 
Turkey and Poland are assessed in terms of the misfit they constituted with regard to the 
European norms and values, and then the adaptational pressures as well as their responses 
of the state authorities are delineated. 
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This study aims at contributing to the literature by making a comparative assessment of 
the two cases, an EU-member and a candidate country, in order to analyze the different 
ways of experiencing the Europeanization phenomenon about a specific and sensitive 
issue like religious education at schools, which is tightly linked to the embracement of 
European values. The reasons of the altering paths of Europeanization in Turkey and in 
Poland in the field of religious education are examined for the purpose of providing input 
for further investigations in the field. Even though there is significant amount of studies 
conducted on state-religion relations within the scope of religious resurgence and 
analyzed according to the secularization theories, a small proportion of it is dealing with 
religious education. In addition, despite the popularity of Europeanization studies, the 
current literature focuses on the fields where the EU and other European institutions exert 
conditionality due to the existence of concrete criteria, different than state-religion 
relations. Therefore, the originality of this work will be to explain Europeanization 
phenomenon comparatively with respect to its influence on state-religion relations. This 
study targets at filling the gap at the intersection of two fields; state-religion relations and 
Europeanization impact on domestic structures, by contributing to the literature with 





CHAPTER 2  
 
 




The ‘first generation’ studies on European integration were enthusiastic about the 
creation of a European domain and they mainly focused on the functioning of this new 
system; in other words, European governance (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 183). They 
tried to define whether the mechanism was based on intergovernmental negotiations, or 
whether supranational instruments would be in charge with an understanding of multi-
level governance. These studies were all concerned about the functioning of the new 
enlarging system. However, the ‘second generation’ studies started to take into 
consideration the impact of the Europeanization on domestic policies, in other words, 
“the process of national adjustment to the EU” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 183). Even 
though there were several scholarly works concerning this side of the issue, it can still be 
argued that the Eastern Enlargement which took place in 2004 ignited the discussion on 
the adoption of European rules into the domestic politics of those states. The treatment of 
the EU towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) which were willing 
to become EU members sets an exemplar since they were faced with strict conditions 
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attached in the form of rule transfer. The “second generation” studies about 
Europeanization are mainly concerned about this phenomenon which gave EU an 
“unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire 
range of public policies in these countries” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 661). 
The transformative power of the EU has become a matter of discussion for 
Europeanization studies. This is not actually an alien concept to IR scholars given the 
“second image reversed” understanding which indicates the international sources of 
domestic change (Gourevitch, 1978). 
 
There are various understandings of Europeanization; these vary from considering it as a 
form of governance, to labeling it as a discourse but Europeanization is most commonly 
defined as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem solving that formalize interactions among actors and of policy networks 
specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (Risse, et al., 2001: 3). 
According to a definition, Europeanization can be understood in the maximalist sense 
which considers structural change as a phenomenon “exhibiting similar attributes to those 
that predominate in, or are closely identified with, ‘Europe’” (Featherstone, 2003: 3). In 
the minimalist understanding, the adaptation of domestic structures and national policies 
to the European ones as a response, is among the major assumptions (Featherstone, 2003: 
3). Institutionalization at the European level which in turn leads to domestic change is an 
essential point of Europeanization theory, which gained acceptance from scholars of the 
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field. However, this adaptation or harmonization in a broader sense, does not occur in a 
uniform manner where total convergence or divergence of national policies and 
institutions with European ones is expected; it is rather defined as “domestic adaptation 
with national colours” (Risse, et al., 2001: 1). Europeanization as discourse determines 
that “discourse helps create an opening to policy change by altering actors’ perceptions of 
the policy problems, policy legacies and ‘fit’, influencing their preferences, and, thereby, 
enhancing their political institutional capacity to change” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 
188). 
 
According to the theory, Europeanization is a process where domestic structures, 
institutions and policies do alter as a response to making of common policies and 
alignment with the institutions at the EU level. Domestic change caused by 
Europeanization takes place if and only if “some degree of ‘misfit’ or incompatibility 
between European-level processes, policies and institutions, on the one hand, and 
domestic-level processes, policies and institutions on the other” exist (Börzel and Risse, 
2000: 1). In that sense, the “penetration” of European rules, practices and norms into “the 
otherwise differentiated domestic spheres” is the ultimate cause of the domestic 
transformation throughout Europeanization (Mair, 2004: 4). The concept of “otherwise 
differentiated domestic spheres” leads to the counterfactual thinking which enhances the 
tune measuring of the Europeanization impact that can clearly be confused with other 
internal and external factors shaping national policies. It should be kept in mind that this 
is a reciprocal process where Europeanization affects policies in the member states and at 
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the same time, the trajectory of integration is shaped in accordance with the feedback 
coming from the members (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 185). To put it in another way, it 
can be stated that “activities at the domestic level affect the European level and vice 
versa” (Risse et al., 2001: 4). 
 
According to Europeanization theory, domestic change takes place in a candidate country 
if there is “misfit” which indicates that European and domestic policies, processes and 
institutions do not match with each other (Risse et al., 2001: 6). Another phenomenon 
which explains how the dose of misfit affects the Europeanization process is the 
hypothesis that the greater the misfit the greater will be the adaptational pressures (Börzel 
and Risse, 2000: 5). To put it in another way; this view can be summarized as “poor fit 
implies strong adaptational pressure; good fit implies weak pressure” (Risse, et al., 2001: 
2). In addition to the level of misfit, there are other factors shaping the nature of domestic 
change. This is why, the target countries which are subjected to similar pressures for 
adaptation do not always reply with same domestic structural change thanks to the 
existence of the mediating factors specific to each country (Risse, et al., 2001: 2). 
 
It should also be highlighted that ‘goodness of fit’ is argued to be a subjective matter as 
long as “fits and misfits are politically constructed” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 187). 
There are no definitive points of reference which determine the ‘fitness’ of any policy or 
institution and that is why “there is no absolute match or mismatch” between the 
domestic level policies and European ones (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 187). Moreover, 
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this is up to national and EU-level authorities to decide what a good fit or a misfit is. 
Here it should be taken into account that the degree of misfit can also vary according to 
the policy sector it involves (Risse et al., 2001: 8). Here, actors’ preferences play an 
important role given that the willingness of the domestic authorities to alter the national 
policies in accordance with the EU norms in the case of misfit is the determinant 
(Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 187). Though, it seems obvious that such decision about the 
misfit as well as the degree of adaptational pressures are generally given by the European 
side due to the power asymmetry which is determined by dependence of the candidate 
country on the EU (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 11). This is why “misfit” also implies 
“membership conditionality” given the transformative power of the EU, in the well-
known example of the integration of the CEECs (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 7). 
Conditionality is the most significant EU-driven source of alteration in rule adoption 
behavior of a non-member state which proposes membership as a reward of well 
complying with the European norms (Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The 
effectiveness of the principle of conditionality mainly stems from the commitment of the 
candidate country for membership, and this commitment is strongly dependent on the 
rewards of membership which should be higher than the costs of domestic adjustment 
(Avcı, 2013: 202). Therefore, the conditionality mechanism works efficiently if the 
compliance with the European norms do not endanger the power of the actors.  
 
Misfit can be observed at policy level or institutional level and as a consequence, the 
adaptations also take place at these levels. “Institutional misfit is less direct than policy 
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misfit” but these lead to domestic change if other factors supporting this change are in 
effect (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 5). The domestic change can be realized in accordance 
with “logic of consequentialism” as rationalist institutionalism embodies or in terms of 
“logic of appropriateness” like sociological institutionalism puts forward (March and 
Olsen, 1998; Risse, et al., 2001: 10; Börzel and Risse, 2000: 6-7, Featherstone, 2003: 15). 
According to “logic of consequentialism,” which determines the rational and utility-
maximizing actors’ policies, adaptation is based on obtaining additional opportunities, 
resources and power. “Logic of appropriateness” purports that adaptation can take place 
in “the existence of a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture (Risse 
et al., 2001: 10). It is worth investigating both approaches in order to provide a better 
understanding of the scope of Europeanization theory. 
 
 
2.1 Rationalist Institutionalism8  
 
There are scholarly works that put emphasis on the interest-based rationality or game-
theoretic behavior, institutional path-dependencies and historically shaped patterns of 
development as well as social constructions of culture and identity; and lately ideas and 
discourse (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 183). Some others (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004) determine the modes of rule transfer from the European side to the 
countries in question with different names but similar concepts; the external incentives 
                                                            
8 Rationalist Institutionalism is also known as; Interest-based Rationality, Rationalist Bargaining Model and 
External Incentives Model 
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model (rationalist bargaining model), social learning and lesson-drawing models. Despite 
different naming, the discrepancy between the concepts put forward by scholars is minor. 
There are basically two approaches; one is where the domestic actors act in accordance 
with the logic of consequentialism and the other where they act according to the logic of 
appropriateness. Therefore the basic divergence between the two types of rule adoption 
mainly derives from the motivation behind and the level of the responsiveness of the 
domestic authorities. The Europeanization theory anticipates a domestic change due to 
high level of “misfit” only if there are some factors that enable this change in the country. 
At the domestic level, the mediating factors which are sine qua non for a change are 
identified as: “multiple veto points in domestic structure, facilitating public institutions, a 
country’s organizational and policymaking cultures, the differential empowerment of 
domestic actors, and learning” (Risse, et al., 2001: 2). 
 
Rationalist institutionalism considers actors to be rational utility maximizers and goal-
oriented so that they act in a way to maximize their interests and in this understanding 
Europeanization is perceived as an emerging political opportunity which offers additional 
resources to those actors who would like to exert more power (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 
63). Even in cases where European values, legacies or policies do not match with the 
domestic ones, the will of the domestic political actors may resolve the opposition of 
preferences if they perceive the situation as an opportunity for their own interests 
(Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 188). Moreover, the political institutional capacity is also 
tightly linked to the political interactions such as party politics, dynamics of elections, 
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interest coalitions and so on. What matters in that context is the “single actor” system 
which functions much better given the “problem-solving capacity” of the national 
authorities (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 188). Since the executive has the “capacity to 
impose” the European norms can penetrate much easier compared to the cases of “multi-
actor systems” where there arises a need to negotiate and convince other policy actors 
(Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 188). Despite all these observations, a significant remark of 
the scholars of Europeanization is that their findings do not support the general 
impression that “Europeanization tends to strengthen state autonomy vis-à-vis society” 
(Risse et al., 2001: 2). 
 
On the other side of the coin, it can also be argued that single actor system has different 
implications for the parts of the Europeanization process. First, in countries where there 
are weaker veto points, a single-actor has the leverage to impose the European norms, 
legacies and policies only if these lead to further empowerment of that actor in the 
country. In other words, the existence of single-actor in a given country facilitates the 
penetration of the European norms and in return, Europeanization itself empowers that 
actor by legitimizing the actions in domestic politics and weakening the multiple veto 
points. This principle is called as the “differential empowerment” impact and it is 
explained that it occurs under such circumstances:  
Europeanization only leads to a redistribution of resources and differential 
empowerment at the domestic level if (1) there is significant misfit providing 
domestic actors with additional opportunities and constraints … and (2) domestic 
actors have the capacities to exploit such new opportunities and avoid constraints, 
respectively… (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64) 
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In the absence of “multiple veto points” which again fortifies the position of the single-
actor in the country, penetration of the European norms is smoother (Börzel and Risse, 
2003: 64). Conversely, the more power is dispersed in the political system of a country, 
the more it becomes harder to create a domestic consensus or a ‘winning coalition’ which 
has interest in fostering the change in line with the expectations of Europeanization 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64). However, in the single-actor system, it is much easier “to 
introduce domestic reforms which are to a large extent in line with its own political 
agenda” (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 13).  
 
The second aspect is that single-actor systems have more leverage for projecting their 
preferences on the EU which means that in case the rational single-actors play the card of 
Europeanization correctly; their position is consolidated both at the national level and vis-
à-vis the EU (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 188). In some cases, existing formal 
institutions provide domestic actors further action capacity by offering them material and 
ideational resources in order to increase their bargaining power and exploit European 
opportunities (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 65). However, it should be noted that 
Europeanization does not “systematically favor one particular group of domestic actors 
over others” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64). Thus it implies that the determination of the 




In some cases, the adaptational pressures would be so high that the “European institutions 
seriously challenge the identity, constitutive principles, core structures, and practices of 
national institutions” (Risse et al., 2001: 8). This process might be deep and it can end up 
with a “system of convergence or increasing similarity among entire political, economic 
and social systems” (Risse et al., 2001: 16). Other terms utilized by rationalist 
institutionalists to define this process are “structural isomorphism” and “structural 
convergence” and they expect a “negative integration” as Europeanization becomes more 
about market integration rather than norm internalization (Risse et al., 2001: 16). In this 
way, it is anticipated that “more adaptational pressures will lead to structural 
isomorphism” (Risse et al., 2001: 16). 
 
 
2.2 Sociological Institutionalism9  
 
According to sociological institutionalism, “Europeanization leads to a domestic change 
through a socialization and collective learning process, resulting in norm internalization 
and the development of new identities” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 59). Europeanization 
can transpose very different rules for compliance ranging from highly specified rules, to 
less specified ones, to suggested rules or to no rules at all as it is the case in mutual 
recognition (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 190). The nature of the compliance rules varies 
according to the goodness of fit of norms, policies and institutions at the domestic and 
                                                            
9 Sociological institutionalism is also known as Constructivist, Social learning and Lesson-drawing Models 
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EU levels. Whatever the rigidity of the compliance rules the penetration of those rules is 
dependent on the mediating factors which are unique to each and every country and this 
is what makes integration with national colors possible. It can be observed that ‘misfit’ 
has more potential for the empowerment of national actors as rationalist institutionalism 
puts forward whereas in cases where there is greater ‘fit,’ the options of absorption and 
social learning are more likely to occur. As long as the adaptational pressures will be low 
due to the lesser misfit, minor structural adaptation would be sufficient (Risse et al., 
2001: 8). Moreover, “actors easily incorporate EU institutions and regulations in their 
domestic ways of doing things” (Risse et al., 2001: 8). 
 
According to sociological institutionalism, actors define their goals under the effect of 
collective understandings to fulfill social expectations and in this view Europeanization is 
considered as the “emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning” 
which should be incorporated into domestic practices and structures (Börzel and Risse, 
2003: 66). For sociological institutionalists, structural convergence is anticipated for 
different reasons than the rationalist institutionalists. They expect that “institutional 
convergence occurs because institutions frequently interact or are located in similar 
environments” (Risse et al., 2001: 17). In other words, interaction among the institutions 
at domestic and European levels, will cause over time the formation of resemblances in 
“formal organizational structures, principles of resource allocation, practices, meaning 
structures, and reform patterns” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). Therefore, developing 
similar rules and structures over time is likely to happen given the similar informal 
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practices and collective understandings (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). Other than this 
institution-based approach of sociological institutionalism, there is also a more agency-
centered view where the actors learn to “internalize” the European rules and norms 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). These actors take part of the environments where those 
norms are transcended through arguing, persuasion and social learning; and as a result, 
they redefine their interests and identities (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). What makes 
possible this way of internalization is actually, the high level of resonance between the 
domestic and European norms, practices and rules. In that case Europeanization leading 
to a noticeable domestic change is less likely to occur (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). 
 
In the case of a high misfit, social learning can still be an agent for Europeanization 
which leads to a domestic change according to sociological institutionalism. In order that 
social learning takes place in case of high level of misfit, sociological institutionalist 
approach demarcates that at least one of the two mediating factors conducting 
internalization should be present. One of these mediating factors is the existence of 
‘change agents’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ who mobilize at the domestic level and 
convince the rest for redefining interests and identities (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 59). The 
second mediating factor is the presence of a political culture and other informal 
institutions which are active in consensus-building and cost-sharing (Börzel and Risse, 
2003: 59). “The internalization of norms and the development of new identities” occur if 
one of these factors is present in the domestic structure and that is why it is important to 
understand how they function (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 59). 
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Europeanization in line with the “logic of appropriateness,” foresees that change occurs 
through socialization and collective learning process (Börzel and Diez, 2003: 66). 
Therefore, whether a government adopts EU rules depends on its persuasion about the 
appropriateness of those norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 18). This 
persuasion can take place in two ways; either the EU side convinces the government or 
societal groups and organizations can convince the government for rule adoption 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 18). Norm entrepreneurs have a role in the 
internalization process of convincing the domestic actors by moral arguments and 
strategic constructions in order to make them reconsider their interests and identities. In 
“epistemic communities,” this system works by offering scientific knowledge about the 
cause-and-effect relationships about the new norms and ideas without exerting pressure 
on policy-makers (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). If there are “advocacy or principled issue 
networks” in the country bound together with shared values, “the appeal to collectively 
shared norms and identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider their goals and 
preferences” is possible (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). In addition, despite the fact that 
persuasion and social change are generally branded with policy change, they also convert 
the domestic institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67).  
 
When it comes to the second mediating factor, the political culture of the country matters 
in the sense that with the presence of additional informal institutions, consensus-building 
and cost-sharing would be possible which in the end enhance domestic change under the 
impact of Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 68). In such an environment, where 
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consensus-oriented decision making culture is present, multiple veto points can be 
contained. What is more, in a country where consensus-oriented political culture is 
rooted, the adaptational costs can be carried by many actors so that the pressure for 
adaptation diminishes; it implies that “rather than shifting adaptational costs upon a social 
or political minority, the ‘winners’ of domestic change compensate the ‘losers’” (Börzel 
and Risse, 2003: 68). 
 
The sociological institutionalist account which deals with norm-based issues and 
interconnects Europeanization with the “logic of appropriateness” anticipates 
‘absorption’ of the European norms through simple institutional learning in case where 
no ‘transformation’ takes place (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 189). The “logic of 
appropriateness” foresees an institutional isomorphism which puts forward 
homogenization of organizational structures over time (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66).  
 
 
2.3 Explaining Change in the Legal Structure by Europeanization Theories 
 
The impact of Europeanization on domestic legal structures is important to analyze since 
Europeanization has remarkable implications on this structure too. Those implications 
can said to be more direct since it is easier to observe whether domestic legal structures 
comply with the European norms or not. For almost every field, norm adoption can be 
contemplated in domestic jurisdiction given that the countries under the impact of 
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Europeanization are part of the international agreements that determine the norms to be 
embraced. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) are among those agreements which determine not only European 
but also universal norms that should be followed. Compliance with the values indicated 
by those agreements is of great importance in determining internalization of 
Europeanization. However, the decisions of the ECJ and ECtHR in the specific fields 
provide more accurate views about how the countries respond to the expectations of the 
European side in the case of legal ‘misfit’. The verdicts of the ECtHR, which is not an 
EU institution, are as binding and determining in the course of Europeanization. They are 
binding for non-members and non-candidates but those judgments are vital for the EU 
candidates in measuring the level of misfit, adaptational pressures and the willingness to 
comply with the European norms. It is explained: 
Europeanization of the law places identical demands on national judges. 
However, the goodness of fit between domestic institutions and European 
requirements determines the extent to which Europeanization generates pressures 
for adaptation in national legal structures. (Conant, 2001: 100) 
 
The verdicts of the ECtHR for the country that is sued are determinant about “the 
pressures for domestic adaptation that emanate from the European legal system” as well 
as the response of domestic legal structures (Conant, 2001: 99). Given that 
“Europeanization leads to redistribution of power among a variety of domestic actors, 
from legislatures, courts, regional governments, to interest groups and companies” 
according to the rationalist institutionalist account, the compliance of national jurisdiction 
with the European ones would empower the legal structure of that country (Risse, et al., 
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2001: 11). It means that if a country is sued and the case is brought before the ECtHR, 
domestic courts are expected to embrace the principles set by the ECtHR in its judgment 
in similar cases. There are for sure monitoring mechanisms to pursue whether the 
decision of the ECtHR is executed in the country in question but it is also examined 
whether the national courts embrace the case-law and the principles set by the ECtHR. If 
the domestic legislature prefers not to comply with the decisions of the ECtHR in their 
judgments for similar cases, the existence of conflicts between national and European law 
will cause “grievances that motivate legal challenges” (Conant, 2001: 99). That is why 
the impact of Europeanization in the means of norm transfer is among the determining 
factors of the internalization of European values by the country in question. Goodness of 
fit between the European and domestic norms in the legal structure is among the 
prominent indicators of the state of Europeanization.  
 
As a matter of fact, in recent years, there are scholarly works delineating that 
Europeanization does not only involve EU membership but also a manner of rule and 
norm transfer in the form of external governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). The EU’s transformative power on the candidate 
countries is already mentioned above but what is more, the only way of integrating 
European norms is not the accession process of the candidate countries. The main 
instrument of aligning the non-member states with the EU acquis; which is based on 
European rules, norms and values, is the enlargement policy. According to the European 
Commission the EU’s most successful foreign policy is “the most prominent case of 
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external action based on the projection of the EU acquis is enlargement” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009: 791). This is why “studies of EU governance and 
‘Europeanization’ have already expanded from their previous focus on the member states 
to the accession process and the candidates for membership” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009: 793). 
 
In this context, it is plausible to define Europeanization as a concept which comprises the 
rule transfer of the EU to the member and candidate countries in terms of compliance 
with the EU acquis, but beyond that, Europeanization is a means of making the third 
countries embrace European values. To put it in another way, Europeanization aims at 
adoption of the European norms through many institutions appertaining to the EU and 
outside of the EU. In the scope of this study, while investigating the cases of Poland and 
Turkey, Europeanization will be evaluated in terms of both the theories it involves; which 
are displayed above, and as a source of European norms and values which are also 
transferred by other sources than the EU acquis. To be precise, the ECHR and other 
international agreements are taken into account; other European institutions like the 
ECtHR and the Council of Europe as well as its organs like Committee of Ministers and 
the ECRI are considered. Therefore, in analyzing the impact of Europeanization on 
religious education at schools as an indicator of state-religion relations in Poland and in 
Turkey, European institutions which do have a role in setting and diffusing norms 





CHAPTER 3  
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This chapter delineates the historical and legal contexts in which religious education 
evolved in Turkey. The historical outlook starts with the late-Ottoman era, which had 
also an impact on the Republican era. The issues concerning religion, education and 
religious education in the Republican era are also analyzed in this part in order to offer a 
framework in which contemporary developments can be investigated. The legal context 
of religious education is also taken into account for the purpose of displaying the status of 
religion and state’s stance towards the conduct of religious education which can also be 
retrieved from the domestic legal documents. With regard to the legal framework, not 
only the domestic sources but also international binding documents are delineated. In this 
sense, the impulse for Europeanization from the European institutions in the field of 
religious education can be contemplated. The relevant documents, the judgments of the 
ECtHR and the relevant reports on Turkey will be depicted in this chapter. The impact of 
Europeanization which can be better analyzed in terms of Turkey’s responses to this 
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influence in the form of policy change will be evaluated in the next part. In order to be 
able to make an accurate examination, it is worth starting with the historical framework. 
 
 
3.1 Historical Outlook to Religious Courses in Turkey 
 
3.1.1 Late-Ottoman Period  
 
As a general understanding, in evaluating how religious education was provided in 
Turkey, it would be appropriate to have a brief look into the late Ottoman period. It is 
crucial to understand religious education in the Ottoman Empire and to situate the 
education of non-Muslims in this framework in order to evaluate their reflections, if any, 
on Turkey. Mainly, four major types of schools come to the forefront regarding the scope 
of this study; medreses, mekteps (by Tanzimat reforms) minority schools and foreign 
schools. It should be highlighted that until the nineteenth century, more specifically; 
Tanzimat10 reforms (1839-1856), education was conducted in a chaotic environment 
(Sakaoğlu, 1991: 77). Medrese was the oldest institution of education in the Ottoman 
Empire where primarily religious education was provided. As this education was costly, 
it was not accessible to the most part of Ottoman Muslim society (Unan, 1998: 192). In 
that sense, medrese was unable to satisfy the need in terms of the number of educated 
people necessary both in the state affairs and in society as a whole (Kaymakcan, 2006: 
                                                            
10 Tanzimat is a period in Ottoman history which is characterized by the attempts to modernize the Empire. 
The reforms attempted to integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks within the Ottoman society by 
ameliorating their rights and granting them equality. 
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22). In the nineteenth century, with the general spread of modernization, those 
institutions became inadequate to cope with this stream especially in the field of 
education. These were the main reasons for the resurgence of a new institution of 
education; mektep. These schools were established in order to respond both to the need of 
expansion of education and to the efforts of modernization in the Tanzimat Era 
(Sakaoğlu, 1991: 71). Therefore they were settled down with a Western understanding in 
the nineteenth century. Mektep is the most similar institution to contemporary schools in 
Turkey and in the sense that it constituted the basis for the schools of the republican era. 
They were similar in means of the materials taught; they were not religious-oriented but 
included secular courses like math, science and history (Kaymakcan, 2006: 22). There 
were courses on Islam religion for sure, but they were general religious courses. Mekteps, 
with those characteristics, were even considered as the agents of the process of 
secularization (Fortna, 2000: 369). 
 
When it comes to the foreigner schools and minority schools, it would be better to 
underline the difference between the two concepts. In general terms, the concept of non-
Muslim comprises of people living on Ottoman territory, who professed religions other 
than Islam and were subjected to the legislation of the community they belonged to 
(Ertuğrul, 1998: 24). In that way they differed from Muslim citizens who were subjected 
to Islamic law. The minority concept in the Ottoman Empire meant the communities 
which were formed according to the “millet” system, on the basis of religious affiliation 
(Braude, 1978: 69). Each religious community constituted a “millet” and the assemblage 
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of them formed the “millet system” (Küçükcan, 2003: 482). But this system “was not an 
institution or even a group of institutions, but rather it was a set of arrangements, largely 
local, with considerable variation over time and place” (Braude, 1978: 74). There were 
three major millet in the system; Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Therefore when we talk 
about the minority schools, generally speaking, it is meant Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
schools (Sezer, 1999: 5). Foreigners, on the other hand, were people who came to the 
Ottoman Empire for a reason like trade and lived especially in coastal towns for a while 
(Ertuğrul, 1998, 26). These were mostly Europeans, and the Ottoman state was 
responsible to provide them security in addition to the privileges they enjoyed according 
to the treaties signed with those states. 
 
The establishment of the first minority school on Ottoman territories, which is the one 
founded by Greek community, dates back to 1454 (Ertuğrul, 1998: 98). This has taken 
place within the general environment of freedom of religion and conscience provided to 
non-Muslim minorities. At the beginning, minority schools gave primary education but in 
the following years secondary schools were also opened (Vahapoğlu, 1997: 19). All 
minority schools were established and regulated by the communities they belonged to. It 
should also be highlighted that these schools were ruled by the spiritual leaders of these 
communities which means that they were institutions where both secular and religious 
subjects were taught (Ertuğrul, 1998: 98). Even if at first these schools were founded with 
the aim of providing religious education, in the 18th century, due to the reflections of 
Enlightenment, they were converted to formal education institutions and they became the 
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centers of culture due to the substantiality of their curriculum constituting of secular 
courses (Ertuğrul, 1998: 120). However as the number of these schools increased, they 
started to be considered as threat since they remained out of the state control and were 
guided by foreign countries (Haydaroğlu, 1993: 8). This is why, especially by the late 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman state took measures to exert control over those schools. 
 
In addition to the minority schools which were founded within the understanding of 
millet, the foreign schools were established with the initiative of foreign countries on 
Ottoman territories. Those schools were increased in number especially after the 
seventeenth century. It is argued that the aim of the European countries as well as the 
United States was to establish centers of evangelical movements on Ottoman territories 
that would weaken the Ottoman Empire (Ertuğrul, 1998: 102). It should be noted once 
more that despite the efforts of the Ottoman state especially in the regression era of the 
empire, the state was unsuccessful to apply control over foreign and minority schools. 
The control could be employed only after the establishment of the Republic, when most 
minorities had anyhow disappeared. 
 
This brief information on how the Ottoman state conducted education and the educational 
rights of minorities and foreigners living on Ottoman territory is given in order to be able 
to make a comparison with the contemporary situation in Turkey. In the following parts, 
the attitude of the Turkish state will be analyzed in terms of its stance towards 
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educational rights of non-Muslims living in the country; more specifically, the attendance 
of those pupils to the religious courses.  
 
 
3.1.2 New Republican Era 
 
With the foundation of the Republic of Turkey as a new nation-state, where unity was 
one of the priorities, such diversity in education reflecting different worldviews could not 
coexist. The idea of uniting the education system was on the agenda of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, and he shared his views on the issue in some 
occasions before the declaration of republic (Gökaçtı, 2005: 127). Nonetheless, Mustafa 
Kemal did not put any emphasis on this, since such reforms would interrupt the unity 
among society which was the major source of power during the War of Independence 
(ibid.). Right after the declaration of the Republic, the reform planned for education has 
been implemented. With the Law on Unification of Education amended in 1924, 
medreses have been annulled and mekteps were declared as the only institutions of 
education (Baltacı, 1993: 14). Mustafa Kemal underlined in his speeches prior to the 
declaration of the law that every individual has to learn one’s religion; that is why there is 
need of an institution where every individual—man and woman—can learn one’s religion 
and this institution is mektep (Unan, 1999: 230). In that sense, religious education has not 
been subtracted from the education system but it was decided to provide both religious 
and secular education in the same institution by the state, under the Ministry of National 
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Education (Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). As a natural outcome of national, secular and unified 
education system, minority and foreign schools were subjected to the supervision of the 
Turkish state which means that they had to comply with the rules and restrictions set by 
the state and if not, they were going to be closed down (Sezer, 1999: 47). According to 
the legislation for foreign schools, the state expected them to emphasize the Turkish 
language and culture and to be cautious on not making religious propaganda (Sezer, 
1999: 49). 
 
The reform in the education system should be evaluated within the framework of overall 
secularization of the country. Locating religious instruction within the secular education 
system was functional in the sense that it would impede the divergence that would come 
out as a result of different sects and teachings of Islam (Ayhan, 1999: 64). In order to put 
an end to the manipulation of religion by tarikat leaders, Mustafa Kemal introduced a 
new understanding of laicism. Here it is worth emphasizing that Kemalist laicism was 
mainly based on rational thinking. In Mustafa Kemal’s perception, secularization meant 
to deprive the traditional power of ulema in order to consolidate the understanding of 
“rational religion” (Tank, 2005: 6). What is meant by “rational religion” is “to reduce the 
social significance of religious values and to eventually disestablish cultural and political 
institutions stamped by Islam” (Küçükcan, 2003: 486). The main goal was to teach 
people to refer to positivist thinking in their social lives, rather than the sayings of ulema. 
With the intention of introducing rational thinking, Mustafa Kemal had to omit the effect 
of the interpreters who used to take advantage of their impact on people. He was for 
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reducing Islam to “a personal negotiation between the self and God” whereas the 
organization and regulation of the state affairs were left to the hands of “human actors” 
(Shankland, 2005: 49). Therefore, Kemalist secularism was not “irreligion” given that 
“its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it-to end the power of religion 
and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs” as well as “to limit it to matters 
of belief and worship” (Lewis, 1968: 412). In doing so, the main aim was to introduce 
rational thinking to Turkish people, free from religious dogmas and open to 
modernization. 
 
Mustafa Kemal foresaw the need for raising religious consciousness of the Turkish 
people. One of the fundamental steps for secularization was taken in the field of 
education in order to “establish a program of functional differentiation of institutions” 
(Küçükcan, 2003: 488). The well-known outcome of this move was the Law for the 
Unification of Education of 1924, which gave an end to the bifurcated nature of the 
education where religious-oriented instruction was provided by medreses and secular one 
by mekteps. With the Law for the Unification of Education, all education institutions 
were associated to the Ministry of National Education but this was not the only initiative; 
there should have been some institutions where people could get information about their 
religion. There had been two important steps which led the country to get rid of the 
negative effect of the interpreters: Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was 
established in 1924 in order to manage the administrative affairs of religion (Berkes, 
1964: 484). Mustafa Kemal also found it necessary to train religious personnel and that it 
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should also be provided by the state. In order to realize this, İmam-Hatip Schools 
(Religious Vocational High Schools) and Faculty of Divinity (at İstanbul University) 
were established (Berkes, 1964: 484). This new faculty of divinity was going to serve “as 
the centre of a new, modernized, and scientific form of religious instruction” (Lewis, 
1968: 414). As a result, not only the state affairs got rid of the burden of religious dogmas 
but also religion has been “cleansed” due to the elimination of mysticism, saints, and 
independent religious institutions (Shankland, 1999: 23). These remarks help to 
understand Mustafa Kemal’s vision of Islam at the level of state affairs. To summarize 
the new position of religious education within the general education system, it can be 
stated that religious education in its new form mainly aimed at enhancing the formation 
of individual belief and separate schools were established to train religious personnel 
(Unan, 1999: 250-251). This was going to be held with the idea of “Islam would be 
approached through reason rather than tradition” (Berkes, 1964: 484). 
 
The one-party period in Turkey, which indicates the period between the foundation of the 
Republic and transition to multi-party politics; from 1923 to 1946, needs to be evaluated 
from different lenses. The enthusiasm during the first couple of years of the new 
Republic, the ideal model put forward by Mustafa Kemal where religious education takes 
part of the secular education system was pursued. The general climate in Turkey at that 
time was mainly focused on the implementation of reforms in the light of modernization 
and secularization (Ahmad, 1999: 71). Nevertheless, from the beginning of 1930s 
onwards, the country faced religious-oriented rebellions which can be interpreted as the 
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facts that laicism has been accepted as a principle in the transformation of society and 
that it has been inserted to the Constitution did not necessarily mean that laicism was 
embraced by all parts of society (Gözaydın, 2009: 26). These rebellions caused the 
feeling that religion still posed a threat to the principles set for the new Republic. 
 
Religious education was inevitably affected by this atmosphere and faced several 
problems (Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). All these developments ended with the closure of 
İmam-Hatip Schools (Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools) and Faculties of Religious 
Studies, and the gradual removal of religious courses at schools in the beginning of 1930s 
(Unan, 1999: 273). It is obvious that the ideal program where religious education is given 
in secular schools could not be sustained especially at the stake of laicism. Even the 
existence of religious education at schools, as well as the existence of İmam-Hatip 
Schools, were perceived as tools for the continuum or take-over of the old mentality of 
governing the state and society with religious rule; shari’a (Unan, 1999: 272). The 
measure taken by the one-party rule in order to prevent the damage that could be given by 
the old thinking was to abolish all institutions giving religious education and removing 
religious courses at schools. The reason of this severe decision is interpreted as one-party 
system being ideological and trying to rule each and every institution of the state in 




3.1.3 Transition to Multi-Party Period 
 
The political party which has been set up by Mustafa Kemal and his companions; 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP), was the only party in the 
system until 1946. There had been attempts to initiate new political parties, which were 
also supported by Mustafa Kemal himself, but they could not survive since they became 
the source of religious-oriented movements (Ahmad, 1995: 75). The opposition party 
which was established with the initiative of Mustafa Kemal in 1924 was closed down one 
year later and the proponents of religious rule were penalized severely (Ahmad, 1995: 
75). In 1946, long after this unsuccessful attempt, a new party was established; the 
Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti – DP). Unlike during the one-party system, with the 
transition to multi-party politics, people started expressing their needs more explicitly due 
to democratic environment in the country. Among their demands, expanding the place of 
religion in their daily life constituted a major issue (Ahmad, 1995: 132). In line with 
democratization steps taken where the need of society to practice its belief more liberally 
and assertively did not escape from the attention of political parties on the scene. 
Therefore, it was neither the requisites of religion nor solely the need of Turkish people 
to live their religion but the will of political parties, which wanted to make use of this 
inclination (Gözaydın, 2009: 28). The need of Turkish people for reinsertion of religion 
into daily life was so obvious that even CHP, founded by Mustafa Kemal and strongly 
attached to the principle of laicism, had to restore its discourse on religion and laicism 
and to follow a more flexible policy (Gözaydın, 2009: 28). 
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In that respect, religious education became a critical issue to be emphasized and 
discussed in the Parliament (Baltacı, 1993: 16). With the decision of the Parliament in 
1948, religious courses started to be offered in the primary schools in fourth and fifth 
grades as elective courses, apart from the ordinary school hours (Ayhan, 1999: 118). 
When the discussions in the parliament are evaluated, the reasons for including religious 
courses in the curriculum display diversity but they mostly stem from social concerns 
(Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). Among the main reasons for a positive attitude towards religious 
courses, it can be counted; teaching students respect to elderly people and utilizing the 
impact of religion against the threat of Communism (Gözaydın, 2009: 29; Kaymakcan, 
2006: 23; Ayhan, 1999: 113). Another development related to religious education is the 
foundation of a new Faculty of Divinity in Ankara University. This can also be assessed 
as the result of the policy followed by CHP for democratization and flexibility in the 
interpretation of laicism in favor of religion (Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). 
 
With the change in the leading party; DP coming into power in 1950, due to the new 
policies followed which took into account the vulnerability of society, the role of religion 
in social engineering became evidently concessive in comparison to the previous period 
(Gözaydın, 2009: 32). This was firstly reflected on the developments in religious 
education; starting from 1950, religious courses started to take part of the curriculum in 
primary schools – but they were still elective (Ayhan, 1999: 125; Gözaydın, 2009: 33). In 
1951, İmam-Hatip Schools were opened (Gökaçtı, 2005: 189). For the next step, in 1956, 
religious courses were added to the curriculum for both primary and secondary schools 
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(ilkokul-ortaokul) (Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). The insertion of elective religious courses to 
the curriculum of high schools (lise) was made in 1967 under the rule of Justice Party 
(Adalet Partisi) (Ayhan, 1999: 132). All of these steps were discussed widely in the 
Parliament and different views were raised. Nonetheless, the spread of religious 
education in almost every level; primary, secondary and high school levels, as well as the 
quantity of İmam-Hatip Schools have incremented gradually. In the following years, the 
governments enhanced religious education and in line with that, the need for courses of 
ethics (ahlak) has been considered so that in 1974 ethics courses became compulsory at 
secondary and high schools (Kaymakcan, 2006: 23). To summarize the situation in terms 
of religious education, the number of İmam-Hatip Schools increased, so did the number 
of High Islamic Institutes,11 there were elective religious and compulsory ethics courses. 
This was the general atmosphere right before the military coup of September 12, 1980. 
 
 
3.1.4 September 12, 1980 Military Coup 
 
The major idea brought up by the 1980 military coup and which had great impact on 
conduct of religious education in Turkey was that the polarization in the country in terms 
of the clash between rightist and leftist ideologies among youth was derived from the lack 
of knowledge about religion. To put in another way, lack of appropriate understanding of 
Islam caused young people in the country to be influenced by ideologies spreading from 
                                                            
11 The first one founded in 1959 in İstanbul reached the  nine at the end of the 1970s. 
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different parts of the world. General Kenan Evren, who led the coup, underlined that if 
Turkish youth had known Islam properly, they would not be affected especially by 
Marxist ideology. Heper (2006: 349) analyzed this in his work by asserting that the 
interventionists of 1980 were aware of the fact that religion is both a system of ethics and 
glue for solidarity so that they perceived religion as the antidote to social and political 
polarization. Therefore, the status of religious courses has been an important matter of 
discussion in means of making it compulsory or elective. Scholars from the Faculties of 
Divinity prepared reports on the defects of religious courses being elective and on how 
compulsory religious courses could contribute to social solidarity (Kaymakcan, 2006: 
24). 
 
The underpinnings of this thinking lie in an ideology that has been developed by some 
intellectuals, university professors mainly, starting from the 1960s. The “Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis” which was put forward by “Intellectuals’ Hearth” (Aydınlar Ocağı) was 
founded as a discussion club without political ambitions and came into being mainly as a 
reaction to the 1968 student movements (Toprak, 1990: 10). At first sight, this was an 
attempt to integrate nationalists and Islamists on the grounds to revitalize the essence of 
Turkish culture. However, the propositions they offered in seminars they organized and 
on other platforms constituted the basis of the policies followed in the post-1980 period. 
Their main thesis was that the polarization in the country in 1960s and 1970s was mainly 
dependent on the “wrong” educational policies followed by strictly secular republican 
governments who admired Western culture. According to these intellectuals, Ziya 
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Gökalp’s differentiation between culture and civilization12 should have been followed 
(Berkes, 1959: 269). For Turkish-Islamic Synthesis to be implemented, the Western 
impact on education which stuck students in a materialistic worldview should have been 
put away (Toprak, 1990: 11-12). 
 
In line with this thinking, to take a concrete step, the military rule decided to unify the 
courses of ethics and courses of religion under one course called “Religious Culture and 
Knowledge of Ethics” and make it compulsory (Ayhan, 1999: 246). This arrangement 
defining the status of religious courses at primary and secondary schools has been 
inserted to the Constitution of 1982, which was prepared under the military regime 
(ibid.). In Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution, the courses of Religious Culture and 
Knowledge of Ethics were included to the curriculum as mandatory courses in primary 
and secondary schools. Thus, the Constitution of 1982 differed from the previous one 
(1961 Constitution) in its positioning of religious courses in the related article of 
“Freedom of Religion and Conscience” (Gözaydın, 2009: 46). This step “is seen as 
reflecting the recognition by state authorities that the neglect of an Islamic upbringing 
was an important element behind the rebellious youth of the previous decades” (Toprak, 
1990: 13). At the same time, with the promulgation of the law on YÖK (Higher 
Education Council), one of the nine High Islamic Institutes was closed down and the 
remaining eight institutes were converted to Faculties of Divinity (Kaymakcan, 2006: 
24). It should be highlighted that the total number of those faculties in different 
                                                            
12 This understanding indicated that concepts of culture should be specific to nation whereas civilization 
should be regarded as universal. 
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universities was 21 in 1992, which would be a good indication for analyzing the 
increment in institutions giving academic education on religion and the overall situation 
of religious education in the country (Kaymakcan, 2006: 24). There was also an 
advantageous step taken for İHS; with the amendment of the law on education, the 
graduates of these schools were allowed to continue their studies in any field for 
university education (Bozan, 2007: 30). 
 
In the 1990s, there had been no significant change in the status of religious courses in 
formal education despite the tension between the government13 and military that peaked 
in 1997, which is known as “February 28 process” or “post-modern coup” or “soft coup”. 
The major outcome of this process for the education system was the eight-year 
compulsory primary education law14 and as a result, the role of İmam-Hatip Schools was 
reduced to train religious personnel since the secondary schools (orta kısım) of İHS were 
closed down with the decision of Ministry of Education (Bozan, 2007: 20). In addition to 
this, due to new arrangements that were made, it became harder for the graduates of İHS 
to continue their studies in the field of their preference but in Faculties of Divinity 
(Gökaçtı, 2005: 246). These two factors had a significant impact on the number of 
students who wanted to adhere to İHS which have been identified as the “backyard of 
                                                            
13 There was a coalition government at that time, which was formed by a central-right party; Doğru Yol 
Partisi and an Islamic-rooted party; being the source of the intense discussions, Refah Partisi. The military 
was concerned about the practices of this government given its religious orientation 
14 The Law for Eight-year Compulsory and Uninterrupted Education no. 4306: “The primary education 
institutions shall comprise of eight-year schools, non-stop education shall be provided by these schools and 
primary education diplomas shall be given to graduates of such schools.” Available online at: 
http://www.meb.gov.tr/Stats/apk2001ing/Section_4/CompulsoryEducation1.htm 
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political Islam” by secularists (Bozan, 2007: 5). As an extension, a secularist emphasis 
was added to the curricula of all primary and secondary schools (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 
312). As already indicated, the soft-coup did not make any change in the position of 
religious courses; they remained obligatory both in primary and secondary education. 
 
After such a brief outlook at the historical development of religious education in Turkey, 
it would be appropriate to continue with the clauses related to the status of the religious 
education in international legal documents and the legal arrangement of compulsory 
religious courses in Turkish domestic legal documents.  
 
 
3.2 Legal Context Concerning Religious Education 
 
3.2.1 International Legal Documents 
 
Rights and freedoms of individuals concerning religion and conscience as well as 
education are determined in international legal documents that are binding upon the 
international society. The discussions on the religious education are concentrated mainly 
on the articles related to freedom of religion and conscience in the legal documents that 
designate the main principles of human rights and their interpretations in terms of 
religious education at schools. Therefore, before proceeding with the contemporary 
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discussions on this matter it would be useful to highlight the relevant articles from related 
documents. 
 
3.2.1.1 Universal Declaration on Human Rights  
 
Article 1815 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 








3.2.1.2 European Convention on Human Rights  
 
Protocol 1, Article 217 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect 
                                                            
15 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 18, Available online at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18 
16 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 26, Available online at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a26 
17 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 Protocol 1. Available online at: 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Convention/euroconv8.html 
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the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religions and philosophical convictions. 
 
Regarding this article, there have been objections to compulsory religious courses which 
underlined that parents should have the right to raise their children according to their 
beliefs, given that no exceptions are indicated. The opponent view articulates that there is 
no direct opposition to the compulsory religious courses in this document and in the 
similar ones (Kaymakcan, 2006: 27). The controversy appears if in the religious courses 
one religion or sect is taken as the basis and if it is tried to make it embraced by students 
who obligatorily take the course (Kaymakcan, 2006: 27). The existence of religious 
courses – elective or compulsory – in many countries, including European Union member 
states, highlights that not necessarily the religious course itself but the way that it is 
applied can be contradictory with the article above. 
 
 
3.2.2 Domestic Legal Documents and the Case-law 
 
3.2.2.1 1982 Turkish Constitution, Article 2418 
 
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall 
be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
                                                            




education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in 
the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. 
 
As discussed in the previous part, compulsory religious education was inserted to the 
Constitution right after the military coup of 1980 with the aim of teaching students their 
religion properly. However, in the Constitution of 1961, religious education had been left 
to the will of individuals and to the legal representatives of children.19  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Basic Law of National Education No. 1739, Article 12; of date 
16.06.1983 and No. 284220 
 
Secularism shall be the basis of Turkish national education. Religious culture and 
ethics shall be among the compulsory subjects taught in primary and upper 
secondary schools, and in schools of these levels. 
 
This article is the arrangement of the related law on education in accordance with the 
principle indicated in the Constitution. 
 
Both Article 24 of the Constitution and the amendment that has been made in the Law of 
Education determine clearly that religious courses are compulsory at primary and 
secondary schools. However, with the amendment which was made on July 9th, 1990 by 
                                                            
19 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm 
20 For the English version of the Article which provided the legal basis for the decision of European Court 




the Supreme Council for Education, some exceptions were introduced to the obligation of 
this course.21 The decision adopted indicates:  
Following the proposal by the Ministry of Education, pupils of Turkish nationality 
who belong to the Christian or Jewish religions and who attend primary and 
secondary schools, with the exception of schools for minorities, are not obliged to 
follow the classes in religious culture and ethics, provided they affirm their 
adherence to those religions. If, however, such pupils wish to attend such classes, 
they must submit a written request from their legal representative. 
 
Accordingly, students who have other beliefs than Islam, in other words; Christians and 
Jews have the right to not attend these lectures but no alternative religious courses are 
provided to those students. In addition, the fact that they have to affirm their adherence to 
other religions (only Christianity and Judaism are recognized) can be considered as 
potential violation of human rights. 
 
 
3.2.2.3 The Decision of the Constitutional Court on Religious Courses 
 
In order to substantiate the fact that the existence of compulsory religious courses in the 
curriculum does not contradict but rather enhances the laic character of the state, the 
Constitutional Court had a verdict in 1998 indicating that the reason for making 
obligatory such courses is to provide religious education under state control. State 
                                                            
21 The arrangement made by Supreme Council of Education on the status of religious minorities in 
Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics courses on July 9th, 1990 can be found in English in the 
Judgment of European Court of Human Rights in the “Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey“ 




supervision was considered as the guarantee of impartiality in teaching of religion; in 
other words, under the control of the state, impartial information on religions will be 
provided so that to impede misconduct freedom of education. The Constitutional Court 
underlined that the name of the compulsory course is not “religious education” but rather 
“religious culture” and that even this nuance makes the aim of these courses clear; to 
provide impartial information about religions and make the rules of morality embraced.22 
Nonetheless, this statement that was put forward to legitimize the compulsory nature of 
the religious courses was challenged on the basis of the content of the courses. 
 
The historical and the legal contexts that have been depicted so far display that the field 
of religious education has been commensurate with the domestic political environment in 
the country. The political atmosphere had remarkable implications for the education 
system as a whole, and religious courses in particular. It is plausible to assert that 
decisions about the change in the position of religious courses; varying from totally 
removing them from the curriculum to making them compulsory, had always 
connotations with the making use of religion a tool by rational actors in the country. 
Religious courses were considered to be one of the best means of manipulating the 
religious sphere and sensitivities of people. 
 
                                                            
22 Decision of the Constitutional Court of date September 16th, 1998 and of number 52. Full text of the 
decision is available online at: 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=1420&content= 
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Current issues will be assessed in detail in the next part of the work. It should be 
reminded that the legal documents concerning religious education in Turkey which came 
out of the interpretation of the domestic structures by the rational political actors only 
reflect one part of the whole story. It is undeniable that the international environment had 
always an effect on making of domestic politics, however, in the globalizing world one 
can feel this impact in the last two or three decades more than ever. Turkey, as a new 
republic which is motivated by modernization had always an eye on the West. In the 
following parts, it will be evaluated how the conduct of religious courses has been a 
matter of controversy in the country, how European actors were involved in the process 
and how the Turkish state responded to them. The part on historical and legal contexts 
will also give an opportunity of comparison with the other case of this dissertation; 
Poland. It will be enlightening in making a comparative analysis between the two cases 
on the impact of historical and existing legal contexts on the conduct of religious courses 
before the Europeanization process started. In other words, the historical and legal 
frameworks portrayed till now do not necessarily give insights about the connection 
between Europeanization and the state of religious courses in the country; however, they 






3.3 European Institutions Imposing Norms on Turkey  
 
3.3.1 The Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: The Case-
law and the Case of Zengin vs. Turkey 
 
Within the scope of this dissertation, the Europeanization phenomenon can be perceived 
to be utilized interchangeably with the EU membership. In addition, when 
Europeanization theories are applied in order to understand the domestic impact of the 
European integration, it reminds ipso facto the integration with the Union; internalizing 
its principles and complying with its norms. This assumption is partially true given that 
the Commission Reports are determining, though it is also referred to the provisions of 
the ECHR, to the decisions of the ECtHR and less frequently, to the European 
Convention against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) reports. Given that the ECtHR is not 
an organ of the EU but of the Council of Europe, the connection between 
Europeanization and the decisions of the ECtHR should be clarified. As the CHP MP 
from Izmir, Rıza Türmen23 clearly pointed out during our interview; the decisions of the 
ECtHR are very decisive in measuring the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
given that there is no other court for human rights in Europe. Mr. Türmen alleged that 
this is the reason why the decisions of the ECtHR constitute a point of reference for 
                                                            
23 Rıza Türmen; Ambassador, judge and columnist. He is currently Izmir Deputy from CHP, during the 
61th Government of Turkish Republic. He has been charged as the Ambassador to the Council of Europe, 
and nominated as the Judge of European Court of Human Rights by the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly on 1998 where he served for ten years. He currently holds the position of Member of the 
Constitution Commission and of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission in Turkey. He was 
interviewed at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 15 April 2013, on the day where the 4th 
Jurisdiction Package (4. Yargı Paketi) was voted at the TGNA. 
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European societies in terms of compliance with the membership criteria. According to the 
MP, to be in line with the decisions of the ECtHR is the first ring of the membership 
chain which is a sine qua non for moving to other stages. This clarification makes it 
obvious why the decisions of the ECtHR are that vital in the Europeanization of a 
country; the compliance with the European norms indicated on the international 
agreements constitutes the fundamental phase of Europeanization. 
 
When it comes to the DKAB24 (Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi) courses, the case-law of the 
ECtHR is straight. There are a number of cases brought before the Court against different 
countries. The cases that are delineated below contributed to the formation of the case-
law on the grounds of breach of Article 2, Protocol 1 under which provision the 
complaints about the religious courses are evaluated. Therefore it can be stated that those 
judgments set the main principles in evaluating the case of Turkey.25  
As regards the general interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has 
set out the main principles in its case-law (see, in particular, Kjeldsen, Busk 
Madsen and Pedersen vs. Denmark, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 
23, pp. 24-28, §§ 50-54; Campbell and Cosans vs. the United Kingdom, judgment 
of 25 February 1982, Series A no. 48, pp. 16-18, §§ 36-37; Valsamis vs. Greece, 
judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, 
pp. 2323-2324, §§ 25-28; and, most recently, Folgerø and Others vs. Norway 
[GC], no. 15472/02, § 84, 29 June 2007). The two sentences of Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 must be read not only in the light of each other but also, in 
                                                            
24 DKAB is Turkish acronym for “Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics” courses. In the literature 
concerning compulsory religious courses in Turkey, the acronym “DKAB” is widely used. That is why in 
dealing with current issues, DKAB will be frequently used in this work.   




particular, of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention (see Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen 
and Pedersen, cited above, § 52) (paragraph 47).26  
 
As already mentioned, not all of these cases are about religious education but breach of 
Article 2, Protocol 1. The claims put forward in these cases vary from use of corporal 
punishment (in United Kingdom) to sex education (in Denmark) or from exemption from 
national day celebrations (in Greece) to exemption from religious courses (in Norway) 
but the common denomination is that the Court had a verdict that the right of parents to 
seek for their children to get education in accordance with their religious conviction has 
been violated. In one way or in another, the practices of the State regarding the education 
system contradicted with the religious beliefs or philosophical convictions of parents 
even if those states differ in terms of having a state religion (like Norway) or having 
compulsory religious courses (like Greece). In the case sued against Turkey, the ECtHR 
referred to these verdicts as case-law. 
 
When the cases that were brought before the ECtHR about religious education at schools 
are examined, one can observe the change of attitude of the Court in due course. Though, 
it should be reminded that the lack of uniform principle for state-religion relations among 
the European countries makes the ECtHR leave a greater margin of appreciation to the 
states in charge (Özenç, 2008: 195). Unlike the common norms on corporal punishment, 
for instance, the variety of principles in the field of religion is reflected on the decisions 
                                                            





of the ECtHR (Özenç, 2008: 195). Therefore a minimum standard is aimed to be 
embraced for religious education and that is the “prohibition of systemic indoctrination” 
(Özenç, 2008: 193). As long as there is a great cultural and doctrinal variety in the 
conduct of religious affairs and state-religion relations in the states which are part to the 
Convention, it was necessary to determine a principle that would be omnipresent. The 
prohibition of systemic indoctrination, which is decided to constitute the crux of the 
breach of Protocol 1 Article 2 of the Convention, is embraced as a universal principle. 
For the part of the ECtHR, the issues touching upon religion and conscience have always 
been delicate as they are multifaceted phenomena which also comprise the right to 
education and the rights and freedoms of (religious) minorities. That is why almost for 
forty years, since its foundation until 1993, the ECtHR omitted to deal with cases 
concerning freedom of religion and conscience thanks to the negative decision of the 
Commission about the admissibility of those cases (Özenç, 2008: 197). 
 
An important case which was decided to be inadmissible was the case of Saniewski vs. 
Poland.27 The Court found the case which was mainly about parents’ obligation to declare 
their conviction in order to get exemption from religion course for their child was found 
"manifestly ill-founded" on the grounds that in principle, the elective religion courses at 
schools or the compulsory ones, in case there exists ways to opt out, do not violate the 
Article 9 of the Convention. This judgment made it clear that the existence of the 
compulsory religion courses does not constitute a breach to the Convention if and only if 
                                                            
27 For more information about the case of Saniewski v. Poland please visit: 
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/40319.98-en-20010626/view/ 
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it is associated with the obligation to provide ways to opt out. However, the in the other 
case which is subsequently sued against Poland28 with very similar complaints and got 
the final judgment in 2010, the Court found the case admissible and had a verdict in favor 
of the applicants. This can be considered as a change in the attitude of the ECtHR in an 
emancipatory direction which might be explained with the secularization trend in Europe, 
as many scholars purport (Bruce: 1992, 1996, 2002; Davie: 2002, 2008). The reason of 
such an alteration in the case law lies beyond the scope of this work whereas the impact 
of this phenomenon on the case sued against Turkey is worth investigating. 
 
 
3.3.1.1 The Case of Folgero and Others v. Norway29  
 
Before going into detail of Zengin vs. Turkey case, it makes sense to refer to the case of 
Folgero and others vs. Norway, which set a precedent to the Turkish case. The applicants 
were complaining about the absence of the right of full exemption from compulsory 
religion course (named as “KRL” – Christianity, Religion and Philosophy). During 
reform in the education system between1993 and 1997, this subject became compulsory 
with its content comprising teaching of the Christian faith, the information of other 
religions and contribution to the enhancement of dialogue among different cultures. Only 
                                                            
28 European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Grzelak v. Poland, 15 June 2010, Application no. 
7710/02. This case is discussed in detail in this work in the part about Poland. The full text of the judgment 
is available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99384 
29 European Court of Human Rights in the case of Folgero and Others v. Norway, 29 June 2007, 
Application no. 15472/02. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-81356 
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the right to partial exemption is provided which ought to be read as “exemptions should 
be limited to parts of the subject, especially material of a confessional character and 
participation in rituals” (paragraph 15). This meant that pupils have the right to be 
exempted from religious practices but they have to learn the doctrines; in other words the 
methods of teaching might be modified but they will be responsible for the content. This 
method of education is called as “differentiated teaching” where the practice and other 
means of teaching were decomposed (paragraph 23). Parents should follow the courses 
and decide which parts contradict with their convictions and then they should write a 
petition explaining in detail why the part in question challenges their belief. If their 
request of exemption is approved by the authorities, then the pupil is exempted from 
attending the rituals about the indicated part of the course. The path to be followed for the 
partial exemption is defined in detail by laws and decrees. However there were many 
parents who were not satisfied with this application and were also suffering from the 
difficulties arising from the practice. 
 
In contrast to the case of Saniewski v. Poland, which was found inadmissible in 2001, the 
Court made a very detailed examination of the laws and practices in Norway in the 
Folgero case. The method of differentiated teaching was found inadequate for advocating 
the sufficiency of partial exemption and the ECtHR made the final judgment by stating 
that the absence of right to full exemption constitutes the breach of law. In addition, the 
Court made a special emphasis on the fact that parents are obliged to declare their 
convictions in order to get the exemption for their children. According to the ECtHR, this 
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declaration also violates the Article 9 of the Convention which enhances the right to keep 
silent about one’s own conviction. Both of these judgments were of great importance as 
they set precedent to the following cases; this can be best observed in the case of Zengin 
v. Turkey. 
 
In our interview, Mr. Rıza Türmen also made special emphasis on Folgero v. Norway 
judgment by highlighting the fact that this judgment is of great significance given that 
there exists a state religion in Norway whereas Turkey is known for its laic character. It 
means that by considering the relation of the state with religion, the ECtHR could reach 
even a more courageous decision in the Turkish case than in the Norwegian one. He 
asserted that there are two principles concerned; for one, freedom of religion and 
conscience and second, right of parents to educate their children according to their own 
convictions. In the light of these principles, the right to stay silent about one’s own 
conviction has been also a matter of investigation by the Court. Mr. Türmen stated that 
even though there is no uniformity among European countries on state-religion relations, 
these principles are to be respected according to the international treaties. He also added 
that even though in some countries like Scandinavian, where there is even no distinction 
between the state and religion, there always exists a way to opt out from religious 
education. Therefore, in a laic country like Turkey, the exemption from religious courses 
should not be that difficult, if not impossible, in the domestic law. 
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Moreover, Mr. Türmen underlined the problem of obligation of parents to declare their 
belief in order to get this exemption by making reference to the judgment of the Court in 
the case of Folgero and states that ECtHR considered this declaration as a breach of the 
freedom of religion and conscience. Another important point raised by Mr. Türmen about 
the Folgero judgment and which set an exemplar for Zengin case was that the content of 
the compulsory religion course being examined in means of providing pluralistic, 
objective and critical education that must be free from indoctrination. Therefore, even 
though the ECtHR did not declare that the existence of a compulsory religious course 
violated the relevant articles of the Convention, it made very clear that there should have 
been well functioning ways of exemption from these courses. 
 
In the light of the investigation of the case which set an exemplar to the case sued against 
Turkey; the case Zengin v. Turkey, will be better substantiated. The case-law of the 
ECtHR, thanks to the case of Folgero and Others v. Norway, has become clear. The court 
made very comprehensive examination of the teaching of religious culture and 
knowledge of ethics courses, the curriculum as well as the content of the textbooks. 
Before going into detail of the case of Zengin v. Turkey, there are few factors to be 
underlined. First of all, this is the only case where Turkey was sued at the ECtHR for its 
conduct of compulsory religious courses and finalized in favor of the applicants. Second, 
the final verdict not only was comprised of implications for the Zengin family, special 
measures in other words, but also of general measures which criticized the malpractices 
and delineated how these should be corrected in the field of religious instruction in the 
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formal education in Turkey. Third, due to those general measures which portrayed the 
practices that constitute breach of the related articles of the Convention, in the similar 
subsequent cases, organs of the domestic law embraced the principles set by the Court 
and complied in their decisions with its judgment. The execution of the ECtHR decision 
in Turkey will be investigated in the following parts but it should be highlighted that each 
and every piece of work on religious instruction in the formal education in Turkey makes 
reference to the Zengin judgment and it has been also the case for all the interviews 
conducted within the scope of this work. For all these reasons, it is worth investigating 
the Zengin v. Turkey case in detail. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 The Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey30  
 
Hasan Zengin made the application on his own and his daughter's behalf when she was 
attending seventh grade of a state school. The applicant stated that himself and his family 
were adherents of Alevism. In 2001, the applicant submitted a request to the Provincial 
Directorate of National Education at the Istanbul Governor's Office, seeking to have his 
daughter exempted from religious culture and ethics classes, indicating that under 
international treaties,31 parents had the right to choose the type of education their children 
were to receive. He also argued that the compulsory religious culture and ethics course 
                                                            
30 “Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey” ECtHR, 9 October 2007, Application no. 1448/04: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{"itemid":["001-82580"]} 
31 The reference is made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 26: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a26 
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was incompatible with the principle of secularism. Two months later, the Directorate 
responded that it was impossible to grant the exemption request due to the provision 
indicated in Article 24 of the Constitution and Article 12 of the State Education Act (Law 
no. 1739). 
 
The applicant appealed to the Istanbul Administrative Court for judicial review. “He 
alleged that the compulsory classes in religious culture and ethics were essentially based 
on the fundamental rules of Hanefite Islam and that no teaching was given on his own 
faith. He challenged, inter alia, the compulsory nature of this school subject” (paragraph 
12). The Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request stating that the dismissal 
of the plaintiff's request by the Provincial Directorate of National Education is not 
contrary to the law given the Article 24 and section 12 of Law no. 1739. 
 
Then, the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court on points of law 
against that judgment, relying, inter alia, on the Convention. The Court dismissed his 
appeal and “upheld the first-instance judgment, holding that the latter complied with the 
procedural rules and the legislation.”32 This was the last application for the request of 
exemption in the domestic law. When the ways of national law came to an end, Zengin 





In 2004, Hasan Zengin appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. The court 
examined the steps followed within the domestic law, the national legislation in the 
related issue, the binding international agreements and relevant Recommendations of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as comparative law (similar 
cases from other countries and the decisions). The ECtHR also investigated the syllabus 
of the religious culture and knowledge of ethics courses in order to decide upon the 
impartiality of the content. 
 
The Court concluded that “the instruction provided in the school subject ‘religious culture 
and ethics’ cannot be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism and, 
more particularly in the applicants' specific case, to respect the religious and 
philosophical convictions of Ms. Zengin's father, a follower of the Alevi faith, on the 
subject of which the syllabus is clearly lacking.” (paragraph 70).  
 
Furthermore, it was emphasized by the Court that given the exemption of Christian and 
Jewish pupils with the affirmation of adherence to other religions than Islam, the state 
accepts that the instruction given at school will conflict with the religious convictions of 
their parents (paragraph 72 and 74). In that sense, the Court confutes the defense of the 
State on religious culture and knowledge of ethics courses being impartial and giving 
general information about religions, as well as confirming the power of parents over the 
education of their children. Therefore, “the Court notes that, according to the 
Government, this possibility for exemption may be extended to other convictions if such 
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a request is submitted (paragraph 75). However, the Court also highlighted that the fact 
that “parents are obliged to inform the school authorities of their religious or 
philosophical convictions makes this an inappropriate means of ensuring respect for their 
freedom of conviction” (paragraph 75) The Court added that as there is no preset legal 
text, the school authorities can always refuse those request like in the case of Zengin 
family (paragraph 75). 
 
The conclusion of the Court was that the exemption procedure did not provide sufficient 
protection to the parents who are concerned about the conflict of allegiance that their 
children will be faced in the case where what they learn at school and at home will 
contradict (paragraph 76). “This is especially so where no possibility for an appropriate 
choice has been envisaged for the children of parents who have a religious or 
philosophical conviction other than that of Sunni Islam…” (paragraph 76). For these 
reasons, the Court unanimously decided that there was a violation of Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 1; that no separate question arises under Article 9 of the Convention. With that 
decision, the Court imposed on Turkey a fine to be paid to the applicants jointly for non-
pecuniary damages. 
 
The verdict of ECtHR became a landmark for Alevi families seeking to have their 
children exempted from compulsory religious courses. With this decision it has been 
made legally obvious that the presence of compulsory religious courses, with the existing 
content that has been subject to the Court, constitutes breach of law (of Article 2, 
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Protocol 1). This decision opened up a path for Alevi families to apply to the domestic 
legislation more confidently (Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Raporu, 139). Furthermore, the 
content of the religious culture and knowledge of ethics lessons was challenged by 
ECtHR indicating that it prioritized the Sunni sect of Islam and that it shall not be 
compulsory with its current substance. In that sense, the major claim of Alevis about 
these courses on not reflecting the Alevi teaching has been approved by the Court. 
Besides, the procedure that enforces Alevi families to request exemption has also been 
criticized by the Court on the grounds that such an affirmation challenges the principle of 
freedom of religion and conscience (paragraph 76). The decision of the ECtHR resonated 
greatly in Turkey, especially among the Alevi community. The media covered the issue 
widely and this contributed to the enhancement of public opinion.33 
 
In order to evaluate this decision of the ECtHR and its repercussions in the field of 
religious instruction in formal education in Turkey, the lawyer of the Zengin case; who is 
also the legal representative of most of the Alevi cases in Turkey, Mr. Kazım Genç34 was 
interviewed. His views about the prosecution process, the subsequent developments and 
the execution of the judgment were explored. He introduced the process by stating that 
they applied to the ECtHR on the year of 2004 when all the domestic legal ways were 
                                                            
33 “AİHM: Din Dersi Zorunlu Olamaz” Radikal, 10.10.2007. Available online at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=235282 
34 Mr. Kazım Genç, the lawyer of the Zengin v. Turkey case before the ECtHR was interviewed on 6 
February 2013, in his office in Ankara – Genç Hukuk Bürosu. He kindly told the process, gave information 
about the demands of Alevis in Turkey and shared the basic information about the recent cases sued in the 
domestic law by Alevi families about the religious culture and knowledge of ethics courses. Other than the 
interview, the meetings with Mr. Genç were held for the examination of the meetings of Committee of 
Ministers about the execution of the Zengin Case. 
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exhausted. Mr. Genç mentioned that there are approximately 30-35 cases of Alevi 
families that were sued in Turkey about the compulsory DKAB courses and that almost 
twenty of them were represented by his law office. As the main axis of the case was the 
content of the DKAB courses and the substance of the textbooks, Mr. Genç told that he 
sent the textbooks of all grades (fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth classes) to the 
ECtHR for detailed investigation. He said that the report prepared by the authorities and 
submitted to the Court gave the information that the textbooks of fourth, fifth, sixth, and 
eighth grades consisted only of the information about Islam; its rituals and its 
understanding of ethics, and that only the seventh grade textbook was containing 
information about the five fundamental religions. Obviously, he added, there was not 
even a word about Alevism. When this report was publicized, there had been some 
amendments in the textbook of the ninth grade, a part was added like “philosophers of 
religion who contributed to the enhancement of Islam.”35 He stated that the names of the 
prominent philosophers of Alevism were given and that it was indicated that those 
information was retrieved from a book on Alevi-Bektasi tradition. This was the only 
word of “Alevi” in the new textbook and then the newspaper declared that Alevism 
entered to the DKAB textbooks, said Mr. Genç. However, the fact that the lawyers 
defending Turkish state structured their defense on this argument and Mr. Genç admitted 
that it was not really difficult to refute this statement since Alevism was far from taking 
part of the textbook. 
 
                                                            
35 “İslamın gelişmesine katkı sunan din bilginleri” 
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Asked about the following developments about the content of the textbooks Mr. Genç 
indicated that there had been some modifications after the decision of the ECtHR and that 
Alevism was included. His criticism which is also shared with many others is that the part 
about Alevism inserted in the textbook is prepared from the Sunni perspective of Islam so 
that it did not reflect the essence of Alevi culture. In her research, Gözaydın (2009) 
examined the DKAB textbooks36 which were prepared right before the Zengin Case and 
she constantly found violations of human rights. The major deficiency she pointed out is 
the general understanding in preparing those textbooks is based on a theological 
standpoint rather than a scientific one giving objective, pluralistic and critical views. 
When Prof. Dr. İştar Gözaydın37 was interviewed, she asserted that the content of the 
DKAB textbooks which was utilized in the school year 2007-2008 explicitly embraced 
Sunni Islam as “our religion” and even the information given about other religions was 
considered as “other.” Even this stance made it clear that in the above-mentioned 
textbooks of DKAB course, a religion (Sunni Islam) had been prioritized. Prof. Dr. 
Gözaydın also approved the argument which was put forward by Mr. Genç and purported 
that Alevism was envisaged from the lenses of Sunni Islam. Other scientific reports38 also 
                                                            
36 The textbooks of all classes where DKAB is compulsory which means the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 
and 11th grades were examined in detail. 
37 Prof. Dr. İştar Gözaydın is now faculty in Doğuş University, İstanbul. She was interviewed on 
30.03.02013 about the religious education and the attitude of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, as she is 
an expert on both issues. For the book section she prepared about the new program and textbooks of the 
DKAB courses which were to be followed by 2007-2008, she has made an extensive research about the 
compatibility of those courses with human rights. 
38 Eğitim Reformu Girişimi (Education Reform Initiative) was launched within Istanbul Policy Center at 
Sabancı University in 2003, with the aim of improving education policy and decision-making through 
research, advocacy, and training. They prepare reports about the recent developments in the field of 
education. They have also reports published about the DKAB course and its textbooks. The report 
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shared the view that the change in the Program of the DKAB in 200539 and the 
modifications in the textbooks were necessary but insufficient steps for complying with 
the principles of plurality, objectivity and being critical. 
 
Nonetheless, the judgment of the ECtHR had implications on the national law and even 
while the prosecution process was moving on, the courts in Turkey started to comply 
with the decision of the ECtHR. Mr. Genç indicated that the principle embraced by the 
Council of State in few cases about DKAB could not be compulsory with the current 
content and that right of exemption should be granted to the applicants who request it; did 
not last long. The two prominent cases which were finalized in favor of the applicants by 
the Council of State are summarized below in order to give an idea about the atmosphere 







published in 2007 investigates the new program of Secondary School DKAB was prepared by Doç. Dr. 
Recep Kaymakcan. For bibliographical information, please see the References. 
39 Change in the program of “Ortaöğretim Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi” (Program of Secondary School 
Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics) by the amendment of the related law dated 31.03.2005 and 
no.16. 
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3.3.1.3 The Impact of the ECtHR Ruling on the Case of Zengin v. 
Turkey 
 
3.3.1.3.1 The Impact on the Domestic Judiciary 
 
The first case to be examined here is the one submitted by Mr. Ali Kenanoğlu40 as a 
request to Provincial Directorate of National Education at the Istanbul Governor's Office 
to have his child, who at that time was attending the fourth grade, be exempted from the 
compulsory religious course. This request was refuted by the Directorate on the grounds 
that attendance to the compulsory religious courses was an obligation indicated in the 
Constitution Article 24, Paragraph 5. The applicant appealed to İstanbul Fifth 
Administrative Court for the annulment of the decision of Provincial Directorate of 
National Education. The Administrative Court had a verdict in favor of the applicant 
asserting that the student should be exempted from the religious culture and knowledge 
of ethics course on the grounds that the compulsory nature of the course contradicts with 
the first paragraph41 of the Article 24 which delineates the protection of freedom of 
religion and conscience. The Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Council 
for Education on the exemption of non-Muslim students from religious courses and added 
that the applicant’s affirmation that the content of the religious culture and knowledge of 
                                                            
40 Hürriyet, 25.11.2006, “Zorunlu din dersi özgürlüğe aykırı.” 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5501653&tarih=2006-11-25 




ethics course does not comply with his religious and philosophical view, should be 
evaluated under the clause of freedom of religion and conscience regardless to which 
religion he adheres. In line with these arguments, the Court decided the exemption of the 
student.42 This decision was very important since it marked the first decision by the 
domestic jurisdiction taken in favor of the applicant on the exemption from the 
compulsory religious course for an Alevi student on the grounds that compulsory DKAB 
course contradicts with the principle of freedom of religion and conscience. The İstanbul 
Governor’s Office applied to the Council of State (Eighth Chamber) for judicial review 
of the decision given by the Administrative Court. The decision of the Administrative 
Court in favor of the applicant has also been approved by the Council of State. The 
significance of the judgment is that it is the first time that a case for the exemption from 
the compulsory religious course has been decided in favor of the applicant by 
Administrative Court, approved by the Council of State and was executed. 
 
In the second prominent case, Hatice Köse43 submitted her request to Provincial 
Directorate of National Education at the Istanbul Governor's Office seeking to have her 
child, attending the fourth grade, be exempted from the compulsory religious course and 
was refused by the Directorate. The applicant appealed to İstanbul 6th Administrative 
Court (on March 8th 2005) for the annulment of the decision of Provincial Directorate of 
National Education. The Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request on the 
                                                            
42 From the decision of the Council of State (Eighth Chamber) Decision No.: 7481. Decision Date: 
28.12.2007 
43 Decision of the Council of State (Eighth Chamber) Decision No.: 7481. Decision Date: 28.12.2007 
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grounds that attendance to the compulsory religious courses was an obligation stemming 
from the Constitution Article 24, Paragraph 5. 
 
Hatice Köse appealed to the Council of State (Eighth Chamber) for reversal of the 
decision of the Administrative Court the same year. The verdict of the Council of State is 
of great significance since the decision of the Administrative Court which was against the 
applicant was reversed by the Council of State. The verdict of the Council of State was 
based on several legal provisions stemming from both the Constitution and the 
international agreements, however the investigation is made on behalf of the syllabus of 
the religious culture and knowledge of ethics course and the claim is evaluated in terms 
of the compatibility of the syllabus with Alevi teaching of Islam. The Council of State 
also made reference the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey which was brought 
before ECtHR and was also taken into consideration the investigation of the syllabus of 
the course in question made by ECtHR. As already mentioned, according to this 
examination, ECtHR decided that the current syllabus of the Religious Culture and 
Knowledge of Ethics course did not comprehend and reflect religious diversity of 
society.44 In line with the verdict of the ECtHR, the Council of State made its judgment 
stating that there is no compliance to law to make this course compulsory with its current 
content and had a verdict on the annulment of the decision by İstanbul 6th Administrative 
Court. This decision is of great significance given that the incompliance of the 
                                                            
44 Judgment of European Court of Human Rights in the “Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey“ 
(Application no. 1448/04): http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
82580#{"itemid":["001-82580"]} 
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compulsory religious courses to international law with that content is confirmed by the 
Council of State. 
 
Turning back to the decisions of the Council of State, another point which has been 
highlighted is the distinction between “religious education” and “instruction of religious 
culture and ethics.”45 The difference of instruction and education is significant since 
Turkish state substantiates its defense about the compulsory nature of those courses on 
this argument. That is to say that “religious education” recalls indoctrination of a specific 
religion which also comprises the teaching of its rituals and practices whereas 
“instruction of religious culture and ethics” should give information about religions in a 
critical, pluralistic and objective manner. 
 
During the interview conducted with Prof. Dr. Mehmet Aydın,46 he emphasized the 
distinction and he asserted that giving the name of “religious culture and knowledge of 
ethics” was directly targeted at preventing this course to become a course of religious 
education. Prof. Dr. Aydın claimed that after the 1980 coup, when the Constitution was 
being prepared, he was the one who first proposed this name for the religious courses but 
that he was not the one who invented it; in the West, many countries used to utilize this 
                                                            
45 In Turkish, this is the difference between “eğitim” and “öğretim.” “Eğitim” comprises the practice of a 
religion whereas “öğretim” aims at informing pupils about religions.  
46 Prof. Dr. Mehmet Aydın, was a Minister of State in the 58th, 59th and 60th Governments and Izmir MP 
from AKP for 22th and 23th terms of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). He graduated from the 
Faculty of Divinity and conducted his doctoral studies in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He 
held many academic positions in different universities in Turkey. He is currently faculty member at the 
Department of Political Science at Bilkent University.  
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name. He determined the reason in line with the detailed ruling of the ECtHR, and 
asserted that with a content based on teaching one religion with all its practices, a religion 
course could not be made compulsory. So, the content of the course was of great 
significance. As Prof. Dr. Aydın was also among the first scholars who prepared the very 
first textbooks right after insertion of compulsory DKAB courses in the Constitution in 
1982, he underlined that they made special attention to put more emphasis on the ethics 
part of the course. He alleged that due the preparation of the new textbooks which 
focused more on Islam and the educational background of the DKAB teachers, who are 
generally graduates of Faculties of Divinity, the content of the course has been altered by 
time. 
 
Among the interviews that were conducted within the scope of this study, the one which 
shed light on how the decisions of the domestic courts would vary and how the 
application for the exemption from the DKAB course affects the individual life of 
families was the one made with an Alevi family.47 This was the only case from Ankara48, 
and it resulted in favor of the applicants in 2009. That year, the pupil was attending the 
sixth grade and he was exempted from the course for the sixth, seventh, and eighth 
grades. When he passed to the secondary school, his father did not apply for a new 
exemption decision for the rest of his school years because of the discrimination his son 
faced. The Alevi father mentioned that he realized that his son started to get confused 
                                                            
47 The father of the Alevi family was interviewed on 6 February 2013 in Ankara. No voice recording was 
made. Due to the request of privacy, their names will not be mentioned in this work.  
48 The decision was made by the Ankara 16th Administrative Court with the application no. 2008/43 and 
decision no. 2009/635. 
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because the content of the DKAB course was conflicting with the Alevi teaching which 
was taught and practiced at home. Nonetheless, as this pupil was the only one who was 
exempted from this course, he was faced with discrimination. This is the main reason 
why the Alevi father did attempt to apply for the exemption for his son for the secondary 
school. He was relieved with the idea that his son has reached a level of mental and 
psychological maturity so that he would not be influenced by others and no other religion 
would be imposed. The father emphasized the fact that Alevis prefer to hide themselves 
since they are afraid of discrimination and social exclusion. He also criticized Alevis and 
their representatives for not being courageous enough and leaving his family and his son 
alone in this struggle. 
 
This individual experience demonstrates how the system based on declaration of religion 
for the exemption from the course is malfunctioning and causing fear among adherents of 
other convictions than Sunni Islam in Turkey. In other words, in Turkish society, it seems 
difficult to solve the problem by settling a system based on making the exemption 
process easier. This interview displayed that the decision of the ECtHR which indicated 
that forcing someone to declare one’s own belief also infringes the rights protected by the 




3.3.1.3.2 The Amendments of the Textbooks of Religious Courses 
(2007-2008)  
 
As already indicated, by taking into account the criticisms and determinations of the 
ECtHR about the content of the DKAB courses, the national courts started to comply 
with the verdict of the ECtHR. In some of those cases, the administrative courts and in 
some others, the Council of State followed the judgment of the ECtHR. However, even 
during that period where the ruling of the ECtHR was so influential, not all the courts 
embraced the principles delineated by the ECtHR (Altıparmak, 2013: 13). In 2010, the 
Council of State ceased to embrace those principles and adhered to the expert opinion 
(ibid.). In the report prepared by the experts, the amendments made in the syllabi and the 
textbooks of DKAB courses were considered to be adequate and sufficient to comply 
with the norms indicated by the ECtHR in the Zengin case (Altıparmak, 2013: 13). It was 
argued that with the modifications made, the program which entered into force in 2007-
2008 school year met the criteria of pluralism; which reflected the religious plurality in 
the country, Alevism in specific, where a “supra-sectarian” (mezheplerüstü) 
understanding that does not prioritizes any conviction or applies positive discrimination 
to a religion or a sect was embraced (Altıparmak, 2013: 13). 
 
Initiating from 2010, the Council of State, started to decide in line with this report based 
on experts’ view. According to the Council of State the applications made after 2007-
2008 school year term shall not be assessed under the incompliance of the DKAB 
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program and its textbooks but rather under the Article 24 of the Constitution. This 
decision implied another landmark which consolidated in the domestic law the 
understanding that the modifications made in the DKAB program and textbooks, after the 
term of 2007-2008, were satisfactory and this closed the door for application for the 
exemption from this course. However, many scientific researches (Gözaydın 2009; Özenç 
2008; Kaymakcan 2007) pointed out that the modifications made in the DKAB program 
and textbooks were inadequate to comply with the norms laid down by ECtHR. 
Moreover, it is also argued that such an investigation about the textbooks should have 
been made by the organs of judiciary rather than theologians who were appointed as 
experts. As a matter of fact, the aim of such an examination was not to decide whether 
religion was theologically taught in the right way but whether the rights of pupils and 
their parents were protected according to the international law (Altıparmak, 2013: 15). 
 
There are still controversies between the decisions of the administrative courts and of the 
Council of State; even though some administrative courts decide in favor of the 
applicants, there is a powerful tendency of the Council of State about reversing those 
rulings.49 According to both Mr. Kazım Genç and Mr. Rıza Türmen, the reversal of this 
process is mainly based on the political environment in the country. They claim that the 
referendum on the Constitutional amendment of September 2010 and the change in 
                                                            
49 Mr. Kazım Genç shared with me two very recent decisions about the requests of exemption from DKAB 
course; one from Samsun Administrative Court and the other from the Council of State. The one from 
Samsun Administrative Court is in favor and the one from the Council of State is against the applicants’ 
requests. These rulings reflect that the decisions of the administrative courts still vary whereas the general 
attitude of the Council of State is almost constant in those cases after 2010. 
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structure and attitude of the higher judicial bodies, which is argued to be in favor of the 
Government, resulted in such a reversal of the process. They both attract the attention to 
the new judicial system where applications will directly be made to the Constitutional 
Court50 and they comment that this will have implications on the forthcoming process 
about the DKAB courses in the system. 
 
This is the general framework of how Turkish authorities responded to the judgment of 
the ECtHR by making amendments in the textbooks of religious education. Furthermore, 
the domestic courts found these amendments satisfactory and concluded that the edited 
content was in line with the expectation of the ECtHR so that no further application by 
Alevi families would be admissible. This attitude of the domestic courts ignited the 
defenders to apply to the international organs to supervise the execution of the judgment 




50 According to Mr. Rıza Türmen, the prominent outcome of the judicial reform process is making the 
Constitutional Court target of the questions about its reliability. In other words, as the way for individual 
application to the Constitutional Court is opened up, a probation period of two years is given to this Court. 
Mr. Türmen explains that ECtHR will observe for two years whether the Constitutional Court in Turkey 
complies with the principles set in the ECHRs, and if it decides so, it will recommend the applicants to 
apply to the Constitutional Court like it is the case in Germany and in Spain. 
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3.3.1.3.3 Application to the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe for the Execution of the Case of Zengin v. 
Turkey51 
 
As a fundamental rule, international law and the treaties prevail over domestic law. The 
countries that are part of international treaties like the European Convention on Human 
Rights must comply with all the norms indicated unless they put a reservation. Turkey is 
among the countries which signed the Convention without any reservation. Moreover, the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are also binding for those countries. 
The organ that is responsible for the investigation of the execution of the decisions of the 
ECtHR is the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Therefore all the 
members of the Council of Europe can be under scrutiny of the Committee of Ministers 
about the execution of the ECtHR rulings. 
 
One year later than the verdict of the ECtHR, in 2008, the lawyer of the Zengin case; Mr. 
Kazım Genç, applied to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with the 
claim that the general measures that ought to be taken by the Turkish Government have 
not been implemented. Given the fact that Eylem Zengin reached the age of university, 
no individual measures were foreseen. However the general measures were quite clear. 
There would be three options in order to comply with the norms indicated by the ECtHR: 
first, DKAB courses would cease to be compulsory; second, the program, content and the 
                                                            
51 Hürriyet, 13.08.2008, “Zorunlu din dersi Avrupa Konseyi'ne şikayet edildi” 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/9651509.asp 
85 
teaching practice of the DKAB would be reorganized to comply with the norms indicated 
in the ECHR; third, adequate tools for exemption would be developed which would 
absolutely not enforce parents and pupils to declare their convictions. Turkish 
Government obviously chose the second option and made some amendments in the 
program and textbooks of the DKAB course. 
 
As already specified, according to the Council of State the amendments which were made 
for the 2007-2008 term were considered to be sufficient to comply with the norms of 
plurality, objectivity and critical thinking. That is why all the cases sued after that new 
content went into force were found ill-founded by the domestic courts. Nonetheless, the 
Turkish Government must have found the new program of 2007-2008 insufficient to 
comply with the principles indicated in ECtHR ruling since a new program was presented 
for the DKAB course starting in 2011-2012. According to a view, the Council of State 
can be criticized for falling behind the government in the implementation of the ECtHR 
decision (Altıparmak, 2013: 15). It means that the Council of State, depending on the 
experts’ report, found the 2007-2008 program of DKAB adequate to comply with the 
decision of the ECtHR whereas the government found it necessary to make further and 
deeper amendments to the DKAB program and textbooks. These were the domestic 
incidences taking place when the lawyer of the Zengin Case applied to the Committee of 
Ministers complaining about the non-execution of the ECtHR ruling. 
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The Committee of Ministers accepted to inspect the execution of the ECtHR ruling under 
“standard supervision.”52 Given that there had been a complaint about the non-execution 
of the decision, the Committee of Ministers invited the Turkish authorities “to present an 
action plan for the execution of this judgment, taking into account the European Court’s 
specific indication of an appropriate general measure.”53 The lawyer of the Zengin Case 
criticized that it took very long time for the Turkish Government to provide such an 
action plan to the Committee of Ministers and that the Committee waited without taking 
any action. He stated that the representative of the Human Rights section of the Council 
of Europe came to Turkey 2011 and wanted to meet the lawyer of the Zengin Case and 
that they talked about the contemporary situation of the execution of two cases; Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin and Sinan Işık.54 Mr. Genç affirmed that they have applied to the 
Committee of Ministers for both cases as long as the general measures were not executed 
in Turkey. He admitted to the representative that for the Zengin Case, the application to 
the Committee of Ministers was made in 2008 and that they did not get any response yet; 
                                                            
52 The Committee of Ministers can inspect the cases in two ways; with “standard supervision” and 
“enhanced supervision.” Enhanced supervision is needed (1) for the judgments requiring urgent individual 
measures; (2) for the pilot judgments; (3) for the judgments disclosing major structural and/or complex 
problems as identified by the Court and/or the Committee of Ministers and (4) for the interstate cases. For 
detailed information about the classification of the cases for standard and enhanced supervision please see 
the Ministers’ Deputies Information Documents: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1700777&Site=CM 
53 The website of the Committee of Ministers given below provides information about the current state of 
execution of the pending cases. The state of execution of the Zengin Case can be searched with the 
Application no: 1448/04 and with the “standard supervision” for the type of supervision.  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=1448
%2F04&StateCode=&SectionCode= 
54 The Case of Sinan Işık v. Turkey to ECtHR with the Application no. 21924/05. It was about the religion 
box on the Turkish identity cards. Sinan Işık, an Alevi Turkish citizen, who was also represented by Mr. 
Kazım Genç, complained about the religion section on the identity card stating that indication of Islam 
constituted a violation of the Article 9 of the Convention. The ECtHR ruled in favor of the applicant in the 
year of 2010. 
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in 2011 when this meeting was held. Mr. Genç stated that the representative made an 
investigation afterwards and let him know that no reply was given from the Turkish 
Government about the application to the Committee of Ministers and that they were 
waiting for the response to be able to proceed. The lawyer also criticized the Committee 
of Ministers for waiting so long for the response of the Government without taking any 
action. 
 
In 2011, Turkish authorities informed the Committee of Ministers that:  
a number of workshops were organized under the auspices of the relevant 
Ministry of State between June 2009 and January 2010 with the participation of 
scholars, theologians and leaders of the Alawite community. The necessity to re-
design the curriculum of the course was established in order to solve the 
problems. A commission composed of scholars and eminent Alawite intellectuals 
was founded in the Ministry of the Education, in order to specify the subjects 
related to the Alawite belief which should take place in the text books and in the 
curriculum.55 
 
Even though it is not overtly indicated in this information, the workshops that are 
mentioned are the Alevi Workshops, which will be investigated in detail in the following 
sections of this part. It is highlighted by Turkish authorities that the new content which 
aimed to comply with the ruling of the ECtHR has been prepared by addressing the 
opinions of Alevis. It is also underlined that a commission has been established within 
the Ministry of Education. These have been the main steps taken by the Turkish 
Government so far. 
                                                            




Furthermore, on 28 February 2011, the authorities submitted a CD to the Committee of 
Ministers concerning the change in the curriculum of the lessons on religious culture and 
knowledge of ethics to be followed in 2011-2012 school year. However it is not evident 
whether these were considered as an action plan or there existed a plan apart from these. 
In any case, the Committee of Ministers was expected to investigate the submitted 
materials in order to decide about the execution of the ECtHR ruling. The Committee 
ought to resume consideration at the meeting which was held on March 201156 but 
apparently the submission of the Turkish government has yet to be examined. According 
to Mr. Rıza Türmen, the former judge to the ECtHR, this delay is because of the 
multitude of the pending cases. For the time being, both the complaint of Alevis and the 
measures taken by the government are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and 
they are under scrutiny; no final evaluation is made about the execution of the ECtHR 
decision. 
 
For the process standing before the ECtHR, it might be plausible to transmit the 
supervision of the case from standard supervision to enhanced supervision, given that the 
execution is being supervised by the Committee of Ministers for more than five years 
(Altıparmak, 2013: 17). During our interview, Mr. Rıza Türmen indicated that the 
Committee is changing the status of supervision for the Zengin Case and it may imply 
that the case is now considered among “the judgments disclosing major structural and/or 
                                                            




complex problems as identified by the Court and/or the Committee of Ministers,” which 
requires enhanced supervision. 
 
Mr. Rıza Türmen expressed his aspiration from the Committee of Ministers to demand 
the opinion of Alevis about the new amendment made by the Turkish authorities since 
Alevis are the main subject of this issue. Given his expertise and experience about the 
process, Mr. Türmen was requested to comment about the expected forthcomings; the 
procedure to be followed by the Committee of Ministers. He explained the procedure by 
stating that an execution committee meets regularly with the participation of the 
president, the president of the human rights department and the ambassador of the 
relevant country. The ambassador is inquired about the state of execution of the decision; 
the individual and general measures. For the general measures, the expectations are about 
the change in law and for the individual measures, the state is expected to compensate for 
the damages. Mr. Türmen indicated that the ambassador has to delineate the current state 
of execution and may advocate the need of time if a change in law is necessary. The 
Committee reconsiders the situation in the next meeting and provides some time to the 
country in question. Mr. Türmen affirmed that if no progress is made then the Committee 
of Ministers augments the pressure incrementally. At first, letters would be written the 
Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to interrogate why no progress 
has been made yet. If no response is provided, the measures would be tightened, said Mr. 
Türmen. When he was requested to inform on the probable sanctions that would be 
applied if the authorities of the state in question omit to implement the decision, Mr. 
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Türmen indicated that for example, the presidency of the Council of Europe would not be 
given to that country, the meetings that were scheduled to be held in that country might 
be cancelled and the process may even end up with the total exclusion of that country; 
which means the withdrawal of its membership as it has been the case for Greece during 
the Regime of the Colonels. 
 
According to Mr. Türmen, the forthcoming process can be best understood by 
investigating the past incidences. There are two important decisions of the ECtHR on 
Turkey which were suspended to be executed and where Turkey was faced with 
sanctions. The first one that Mr. Türmen highlighted is about the Loizidou case57 where 
all these procedures started to be applied since Turkey refused to pay the compensation. 
At the end, Turkey had to pay much more than the initial price since the compensation 
was doubled as the time passed. The second one is the case of Hulki Güneş vs. Turkey.58 
He stated that there had been a great pressure from the side of the Council of Europe 
about the execution of the judgment of that case. While we were doing the interview at 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the fourth legislation package was being voted 
and the law of criminal procedure, which has been the target of the decision of the 
ECtHR in the case of Hulki Güneş, has been amended. As a consequence, Mr. Türmen 
emphasized that the Council of Europe makes the countries implement the decision of the 
ECtHR in one way or in another despite reluctance of the country in question. Therefore, 
                                                            
57 For the final judgment of the ECtHR for the case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) on 
28 July 1998, please see: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58007 
58 For the judgment of the ECtHR for the case of Hulki Güneş v. Turkey (Application no. 28490/95) on 19 
June 2003, please see: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61169 
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turning back to the case of Zengin v. Turkey, Mr. Türmen was quite sure that Turkish 
authorities will make the necessary amendments to comply with the general measures 
foreseen for Turkey. The question at that point was about the new program proposed to 
the Committee of Ministers, whether he believed that it would suffice to convince the 
Committee. He indicated once more that the Committee shall ask Alevis whether they 
were satisfied with the modifications in the DKAB program and textbooks or not. 
 
The examination of the Committee of Ministers on the content provided the Turkish 
authorities will be based on interrelated domains such as; the impact or the success of the 
Alevi opening; which will be evaluated in the following parts, Alevi contribution to the 
preparation of the new content of the DKAB courses and evaluation of the new program 
and textbooks in terms of their acquiescence with the norms of plurality, objectivity and 
critical thinking. The Committee may also take into account the ways of exemption, if 
they find it necessary to investigate. For the time being, there is no determinate date for 
the Human Rights Meeting where the execution of the Zengin case will be supervised. 
 
As a matter of fact, the only point of reference of Turkey for complying with the 
European norms in this specific field is not the judgment of the ECtHR. Turkey has been 
subject to many criticisms concerning religious education in the country from the 
European institutions. The next section displays other important impulses for further 
Europeanization of the country by adjusting to the European values. 
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3.3.2 The Reports by European Convention against Racism and 
Intolerance and European Commission and their Implications for 
Religious Education in Turkey 
 
As already mentioned, in line with the general understanding and the scope of this work, 
Europeanization is not only constrained to the EU membership. That is why the judgment 
of the ECtHR which is examined above and the report of the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) that will be analyzed in the next part are also 
taken into consideration. It is obvious that the responsibilities stemming from being a 
member of the Council of Europe are contributing to the Europeanization process of the 
country. The Commission Reports on Turkey’s Progress are also of great importance for 
sure, and in the previous sections there have been some references to those reports. A 
further investigation on Progress Reports will be made in the following parts. All these 
sources having an impact on Turkey’s Europeanization pace shall be analyzed in terms of 





3.3.2.1 The ECRI Reports59 
 
ECRI prepared four reports on Turkey until now and has drawn attention to the 
compulsory religious courses in Turkey. In the second report on Turkey, ECRI noted that 
“the compulsory nature of religious education is currently the subject of public debate in 
Turkey and considers that, in order to guarantee the respect of personal choice in matters 
of religion, thereby contributing to the respect of genuine plurality, religious education 
should not be compulsory” (ECRI, 2000: 9).60 In the third report, ECRI repeated that 
religious course is still compulsory in Turkey and added that “[t]he syllabus covers all 
religions and is chiefly designed to give pupils an idea of all existing religions. However, 
several sources have described these courses as instruction in the principles of the 
Muslim faith rather than a course covering several religious cultures” (2005: 19). ECRI 
noted that only Muslim pupils are required to follow these courses, while pupils 
belonging to minority religious groups can be exempted. ECRI considered the situation 
as unclear: if this is indeed a course on the different religious cultures, there is no reason 
to make it compulsory for Muslim children alone. Conversely, if the course is essentially 
designed to teach the Muslim religion, it is a course on a specific religion and should not 
be compulsory, in order to preserve children’s and their parents’ religious freedom” 
                                                            
59 The ECRI, established by the Council of Europe to work as an independent human rights monitoring 
body on questions related to racism and intolerance. This Commission monitors all members, country-by-
country in order to find out the situation of these countries in terms of racism and intolerance and then, 
draws up proposals and suggestions. ECRI Report on Turkey (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted 10 
December 2010, published on 8 February 2011: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-
country/turkey/TUR-CBC-IV-2011-005-ENG.pdf 
60 ECRI Second Report on Turkey. 15.12.2000: 
http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_02/02_CbC_eng/02-cbc-turkey-eng.pdf 
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(2005: 19-20).61 ECRI proposed to the Turkish state in the same report: “... to reconsider 
their approach to instruction in religious culture. They should take steps either to make 
this instruction optional for everyone or to revise its content so as to ensure that it 
genuinely covers all religious cultures and is no longer perceived as instruction in the 
Muslim religion” (2005: 20). This is a very strong argument which indeed falsified the 
whole argument of the Turkish state about religious courses being objective, universal 
and critical. The ECtHR made reference to this statement and recommendation of ECRI 
in the case of Zengin vs. Turkey. 
 
In its latest report on 201162 it is indicated that the instruction of compulsory religious 
education is still based on the principles of Sunni Muslim faith and that even if the 
authorities assert that the courses are given in order to provide a general insight about all 
religions, the focus is on Islam. ECRI report made reference to ECtHR decision on 
Zengin vs. Turkey case and recommended that in compliance with the judgment of 
ECtHR, Turkey shall ensure that the rights of religious minorities are protected and 
respect the will of families who do not want their children to get religious education at 
school (ECRI, 2011: 28). 
 
                                                            
61 ECRI Third Report on Turkey. 15.02.2005: 
http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/TUR-CbC-III-2005-5-ENG.pdf 




These determinations and recommendations of ECRI contributed to the cause of Alevi 
community in the sense that they substantiated their assertion that the compulsory 
religious courses, with their current contents, contradict with the rights of parents 
stemming from international agreements. It is a matter of query that to what extent these 
reports had an implication on the decision for the change in program of the DKAB 
courses which had taken place in 2011-2012 school year. It is more widespread to make 
reference to the Commission Reports while reflecting about the impact of 
Europeanization on the amendment of the religious courses given the target of EU 
membership. However, these should be evaluated altogether in order to understand the 
magnitude of this impact.  
 
 
3.3.2.2 Commission Reports on Turkey’s Progress Towards EU 
Accession 
 
In line with the Progress Reports prepared by the European Commission, it is easier to 
observe the developments in Turkey in terms of compulsory religious courses. The EU 
Progress Reports also consider the difficulties experienced by the Alevi community. 
From a broader perspective, it can be argued that despite the controversies that arise in 
the country, like the reactions of the government to the criticisms made in the Progress 
Reports, they can told to be served as pioneer of the improvement. 
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Starting from 2000, the Commission has made emphasis on the compulsory religious 
instruction each and every year, stating that the fact that Alevi pupils have to attend these 
courses causes controversy among the adherents of this conviction. It is thus plausible to 
state that Progress Reports as well as other documents delineating the position of Turkey 
in terms of religious education created a pressure to make changes (Çarkoğlu and Bilgili, 
2011: 358). 
 
In the Progress Report of 2004, the Commission noted that there was a case sued by an 
Alevi family pending before the ECtHR and that “most Alevis claim that as a secular 
state, Turkey should treat all religions equally and should not directly support one 
particular religion” (European Commission 2004). The Commission made emphasis on 
state’s privileging religion of the majority, and its reflection on the compulsory religious 
instruction in schools which “fails to acknowledge non-Sunni identities.” The 2007 
Progress Report highlighted the decision of the ECtHR on violation of Article 2 of 
Protocol No.1 and special attention has been made to the content of the religious culture 
and knowledge of ethics lessons in terms of its failure to acknowledge religious diversity 
that prevails in Turkish society (European Commission 2007). In the same report, the 
Commission provided an in-depth analysis that “the religious instruction syllabus in 
Turkey could not be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism necessary 
in a democratic society, and that there is no appropriate method to ensure respect for 
parents' convictions” (European Commission 2007). The Commission underlined the 
97 
suggestion of ECtHR on the need for Turkey to bring “its educational system and 
domestic legislation into conformity with the ECHR” (European Commission 2007). 
 
The suggestions delineated both by the ECtHR and the Commission were faced with 
reaction from the side of Turkish government (Özenç, 2005: 120). The deputies and the 
ministers of the AKP reacted to decision of the ECtHR as well as the Progress Report of 
2005, stating that religious culture education is the responsibility of the Turkish state and 
that international society should not intervene in the domestic legislation of Turkey 
especially when they do not have appropriate information on the issue.63 Abdullah Gül, 
who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time mentioned that it is just the opinion 
of the Commission and that this is up to the will of the state to comply with the 
suggestions or not.64 
 
The decisions of the Council of State in two cases for the exemption from the religious 
culture and knowledge of ethics courses in favor of the applicants have also been matter 
of controversy, especially from the side of the government. Nonetheless, the government 
has made a change in the syllabus of this course to include information about Alevism, 
effective from the school-year of 2007-2008. It should be noted that both the criticisms of 
the Commission Reports and the decision of the Council of State in line with those 
criticisms had an undeniable pressure so that the syllabus has been modified. In other 
                                                            




words, this step has been taken by the state, which would probably not have been taken 
otherwise, because of the pressures coming mainly from the EU and supported by the 
national jurisdiction. In that way, it seems that the authorities aimed to reply to the 
criticisms about the content of the religious courses in order to impede further discussions 
about changing their compulsory nature. The Minister of National Education highlighting 
that the verdicts of the Council of State were based on the previous syllabus and thus 
were not valid anymore65 signifies the rationale behind this move. However, this change 
in syllabus was not considered to be sufficient from the part of the EU and Alevi 
community did not find this initiative sincere. The government had to work more on the 
compulsory religious courses, especially regarding the complaints of Alevis in the 
country. 
 
In the Progress Report of 2011, the Commission has given credit to the Alevi workshops 
held in the context of the 2009 Alevi opening and made emphasis on the preparation of 
new religious education textbooks by the Ministry of National Education which contain 
information on the Alevi faith. The concrete step taken by the Turkish State has been 
underlined by indicating that these textbooks are to be used as of the 2011-2012 school 
year (European Commission 2011: 29). This has been a concrete outcome of Alevi 
workshops and the environment of reconciliation between the state and the Alevi 
community. The minister Faruk Çelik who took part in the process of Alevi workshops 
declared that they prepared the content of the course and the textbooks according to what 
                                                            
65 “Çelik: Zorunlu Din Dersi Mevcut Müfredatla Sürer”, Radikal, 05.03.2008. Available online at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=249280 
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has been offered in those workshops and that this step will resolve the conflicts in this 
area.66 However, the Progress Report of 2011 designates that “under Article 24 of the 
Turkish Constitution and Article 12 of the Basic Law on national education, religious 
culture and ethics classes remain compulsory in primary and secondary schools” and that 
the “2007 ECtHR judgment regarding compulsory religious education has yet to be 
implemented” (European Commission 2011: 29). It is added that “exemptions from 
attending such classes are rare and difficult to obtain, particularly if the identity card of 
the applicant does not list a religion other than Islam or if the religion entry on the card is 
blank. No alternative classes are provided for students exempted from these classes, and 
there are reports that students not attending these classes have been given lower marks” 
(European Commission 2011: 29). Therefore it seems that even the content of the course 
alters, the Commission will not be satisfied with the current application of compulsory 
religious courses. 
 
On the latest Commission Report specific emphasis is made to the new content of the 
DKAB textbooks and the positive steps taken were appreciated but the difficulties that 
non-Sunnis are encountering are also highlighted: “New religious education textbooks 
were more inclusive. In practice, though, citizens professing a faith other than that of the 
majority, or with no faith, continued to experience discrimination” (European 
Commission 2013: 14). Moreover, the new textbooks are credited for including 
                                                            




information about Alevism: “The Ministry of National Education issued new textbooks 
for religious culture and ethics courses, including information on the Alevi faith, and 
non-Muslim students were exempted from these classes” (European Commission 2013: 
55). Nonetheless, the Report took into consideration that “Alevi groups have been critical 
about the information on Alevis in the revised religious culture and ethics textbooks. 
Alevis’ perception is that they are discriminated against, including in the civil service and 
the education system” (European Commission 2013: 55). Other positive steps taken by 
the Turkish authorities about the status of non-Muslim minorities in the country are stated 
as follows:  
The Ministry also informed all Turkish schools of their obligation to respond 
positively to requests from non-Muslims to be exempted from compulsory 
religious culture and ethics lessons. As a result, the number of complaints 
dropped. Further to a Court decision that became final in August 2013, Syriacs 
can now open their own schools. In 2012, the authorities, together with 
stakeholders, started preparing textbooks and curricula so that Christian students 
can have classes on Christianity at school (European Commission 2013: 61). 
 
It is also repeated on the Report that “an ECHR compatible legal framework has yet to be 
established on matters of faith and conscientious objection” and that “the European Court 
of Human Rights’ 2007 Zengin v. Turkey judgment on religious culture and ethics 
classes, which remain compulsory in primary and secondary schools, has yet to be 
implemented” (European Commission 2013: 14, 55). 
 
The major observations of the Commission about Turkey’s progress in means of religious 
education are of great significance which created resonance in policy-making. The 
following parts will demonstrate in which terms Turkish authorities have responded to 
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those criticisms and complied with the norms indicated on these reports. As the primary 
actors of the conduct of religious education in the country, the position of non-Sunnis 
will be explored. The steps taken by the Turkish authorities in the course of 
Europeanization can be best contemplated in the operations taken for the adherents of 





CHAPTER 4  
 
 





This chapter comprises of the contemporary issues in Turkey in the field of religious 
education. This part which is substantiated with interviews primarily aims at displaying 
policy alteration and change in the attitude of domestic legislation in response to the 
impact of Europeanization. The impulses for Europeanization resulted in remarkable 
policy changes in the conduct of religious education which otherwise would not be 
altered so deeply. The findings of this chapter demonstrate that the actors in the country 
behaved rationally so that they became receptive to the demands from the European side 
in terms of complying with the norms. Nonetheless, the nature of the amendments 
determines that Europeanization is experienced relatively superficially in Turkey given 
the repercussions in the policies followed. The contemporary situation in Turkey in the 
conduct of religious education is explained by the rationalist institutionalist account of 
the Europeanization theories which foresees that goal-oriented actors in the country are 
inclined to comply with the European norms as they are in line with their interest. This 
explains why full-fledged reforms cannot be implemented in the Turkish context despite 
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its highlighted misfit with the European standards in means the conduct of religious 
education. The chapter will determine the contemporary issues in the field of religious 
education which are very dense and dynamic in Turkey. 
 
 
4.1 Alevi Question in Turkey, Alevi Opening and Alevi Workshops 
 
Before moving on with the Alevi Workshops, it might be appropriate to give brief 
information about Alevism and Alevis in Turkey. Alevism is commonly defined as a sect 
of Islam67 constituted of a community which has faith in the fourth caliph, Ali, following 
the Prophet Muhammed, and has different traditions and rituals from the Sunni sect. 
Alevi population in Turkey constitutes approximately 15 percent of the total population. 
Even if there are several Alevi associations representing the Alevi identity, it is difficult 
to talk about a consensus among those associations on the complaints and proposals for 
resolutions to those problems, though it is questionable whether such a consensus is 
reached within the other teachings of Islam. However, in that sense it is hard to state that 
“the Alevis are organizationally or politically united” (Özdalga, 2008: 187). Despite the 
EU documents that display a tendency to treat Alevi community as a religious minority, 
Alevis do not seem to have such a demand from the Turkish State; they are rather seeking 
to have recognition (Özdalga, 2008: 194). In fact, “the Lausanne Treaty grants a religious 
                                                            
67 There are variety of opinions on this issue both among Alevis and Sunnis. According to a group among 
Alevis, Alevism is the core of Islam whereas for others, Alevism is beyond Islam. Some consider it as a 
religion itself, and most of the Sunnis embrace the view that Alevism is a sect of Islam; which is also the 
official view of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı).  
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definition of minorities only for non-Muslims; no such explicit recognition can be found 
for….sectarian minority groups such as the Alevis” (Çarkoğlu and Bilgili, 2011: 351). 
That is why they are not exempted from the compulsory religious courses. Their 
complaints were about two major issues; the compulsory religious courses and places of 
worship; Cemevi. For this study, the focus will be on the religious education at schools 
which they perceive as the infringement of “their parental right to educate their children 
in accordance with their own religious beliefs…” which are protected under Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 of European Convention on Human Rights (Akbulut and Usal, 2008: 434). 
 
At first it should be noted that “Alevis consider these courses to be part of an assimilation 
policy” (Stewart, 2007: 55). The claims of Alevis about the compulsory religious courses 
revolve around three major points. For one, they want exemption from mandatory 
religious courses for Alevi students. Yet, this will oblige them to proclaim their religious 
identity which is argued to contradict with the Turkish Constitution (Article 24) and with 
the related clauses of universal treaties. In fact, this is the general rule applied for 
religious minorities (non-Muslims) for the exemption from religious courses. The 
shortcomings of such declarations seem obvious for religious minorities but this would 
have more severe consequences for Alevis who are part of the Islamic community 
(Çarkoğlu and Bilgili, 2011: 355). The second claim of Alevis is a more reconciliatory 
one in the sense that they suggest that if the DKAB course will continue to be 
compulsory because of the Constitutional provisions, then the content should be modified 
in order to comprehend accurate information on Alevism. They argue that equal stance of 
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the state to all religious convictions is a necessity that stems from both its secular 
character and international agreements it is part of. Therefore, due to its secular nature, 
Turkish State should neither prioritize one conviction nor discriminate against the other 
(Keyman, 2007: 216). For the DKAB courses, given that they are compulsory, the state is 
expected to pay much more attention to their content and give proper and adequate 
information about all religions as well as sects of Islam in order to enhance its equal 
stance. The last and the least debated issue is the total abolition of religious courses on 
the basis that state should not provide religious education in its schools so that any kind 
of religious course shall be prohibited in formal education and shall be left to the NGOs 
(Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Raporu, 2010: 140). 
 
In the Progress Report of 2009, the Commission highlighted the positive steps taken by 
the government about Alevi community: “In December 2008 the Minister of Culture 
participated in the opening of the first Alevi Institute and apologized to the Alevis for 
past sufferings caused by the State. In January 2009 the Prime Minister attended an Alevi 
fast-breaking ceremony for the second consecutive year” (Commission 2009: 21). It is 
obvious that despite the criticisms made by the government to the suggestions of the 
Commission, the urge for the “Alevi opening” which is followed by Alevi workshops can 
be considered as their most obvious outcomes. As a matter of fact, “the Alevi issue was a 
blind spot in the policy agenda of governing AKP until the second half of 2007” (Köse, 
2010: 147). The pressures of the decision of the ECtHR and the Progress Reports of the 
Commission seem to have a remarkable impact on putting this issue on Turkey’s political 
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agenda (Tekin, 2011:107). In the following year, it can be observed that the process was 
supported by the Commission; it is indicated on the Progress Report of 2010: “Opening 
to the Alevi community continued. Seven workshops were held, as initially planned, with 
different social and professional groups and with Alevi representatives” (European 
Commission 2010: 23). 
 
The “Alevi opening” process is defined as “the first systematic effort to deal with 
identity-based discontents of the Alevis” (Köse, 2010: 143). In line with “Alevi opening” 
of the AKP Government, a series of workshops were held with the participation of 
representatives of the government, presidents of the Alevi Associations who present 
diverse positions (Subaşı, 2010: 166-167). Starting from 2009, seven meetings were held 
with more than 400 participants in a two-year time (Subaşı, 2010: 166). The first 
workshop was held on 3-4 June 2009 and the last one on 28-30 January 2010 (Ön Rapor, 
2010: 6). 
 
Minister of State, Mr. Faruk Çelik was the minister in charge for those workshops. He 
indicated in the Preliminary Report (Ön Rapor) that the prominent demands of Alevis 
were to get recognition by the Turkish State, the reorganization of education to 
comprehend adequate and comprehensive information about Alevism and the 
reconsideration of the position of Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) (Ön Rapor, 
2010: 7). As already mentioned, one of the most controversial issues that widely 
discussed during Alevi Workshops was the compulsory DKAB courses. In the final 
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report of the workshops, the DKAB courses and how the religious instruction shall be 
organized were evaluated (Nihai Rapor, 2010: 133-160). 
 
Before going into detail of the debate about the religious instruction phenomenon, it 
would be worth stating the common major points declared by Alevis. The fundamental 
claim of Alevis about DKAB courses is that they should cease being obligatory. This 
compulsory nature annoys Alevis because of political and cultural underpinnings of the 
term “obligation” (Ön Rapor, 2010: 20). Moreover, the need to make amendments in the 
program and textbooks from a comprehensive perspective which is prepared with a 
supra-sectarian understanding has been declared explicitly. In order to achieve this goal, 
there had been a general consensus for the need to set commissions which would 
determine the technicalities of the new program. In addition, in the Preliminary Report, it 
is affirmed that religious education based on demand; in other words, providing religious 
education in the form of elective courses is also an option that has been assessed during 
the workshops. Therefore, it is determined that since the DKAB will continue to be 
compulsory due to the Constitutional provisions, then the focus should be on how to 
ameliorate the content so to comply with the international norms and satisfy the needs of 
Alevis. A second result derived from those workshops and indicated in the report is that 
elective courses of religious education can be provided as there is no legislative 
restriction about this. 
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The above-mentioned consequences that are retrieved from the workshops seem to 
provide the image only partially. Because first of all, on the reports the compulsory status 
of the DKAB courses are considered as given; in other words unquestionable. However 
the main argument of Alevis is that these courses should not be compulsory. When the 
debates on this issue are investigated for the individual workshops, one can remark that 
these resolutions do not totally reflect the spirit of the whole debate. On the other hand, 
for the new elective courses that would come into being the need for Alevi teachers have 
been foreseen and indicated in the reports (Ön Rapor, 2010: 22). It is even proposed that 
as a first step, Alevi specialists would teach pupils Alevism and then the necessary 
infrastructure to promote Alevi teachers would be established (Ön Rapor, 2010: 22). 
 
In order to get more information about the content and outcomes of the Alevi Workshops, 
the coordinator and moderator of the workshops, Dr. Necdet Subaşı68 was interviewed. 
Dr. Subaşı wanted to clarify one point; he stated that he is not involved anymore in this 
process. He affirmed that this was an initiative of the Ministry of the State and that his 
responsibility was to organize and conduct those workshops. Then, the first important 
remark he made is about the representation of all Alevi groups on that platform; he 
wanted to underline that from the most radical ones to the moderates, all voices have 
been raised during the Alevi Workshops. He added that all kinds of views from the Sunni 
side have been declared too. Dr. Subaşı admitted that there were those who wanted to 
                                                            
68 Dr. Necdet Subaşı was the coordinator and the moderator of the Alevi Workshops. He is currently the 
President of the Department of Strategy Development of the Directorate of Religious Affairs since 2011. 
The interview was held on 18 March 2013 at the Directorate of Religious Affairs.  
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block the process and those who wanted to provide solutions from both sides. With this 
statement, he wanted to make it clear that this was not a homogenous group like some 
argued. This view was criticized by another respondent; Mr. Hüseyin Aygün69 by stating 
that the Alevi associations mostly withdrew their support after the second workshop and 
that the ones who stayed were not eligible to have a say about the demands of Alevis. 
That is why he said, most of the Alevis were not satisfied by the final report. 
 
To get more information about the outcome of these workshops, Dr. Subaşı was 
requested to inform us about what he has proposed to the government. He stated that 
what he has suggested and also indicated in the final report was that given the DKAB 
courses are compulsory due to the Constitutional provisions, then the status of those 
courses should be reevaluated. The respondent offered that these courses shall have the 
status of real culture courses which is targeted to teach religious phenomenon with 
pedagogical concerns in mind and where a general knowledge would be provided for an 
average citizen. In that sense, no religious identity shall be imposed on the pupils. This 
was his first proposition. The second one was about the introduction of elective religious 
courses; which will depend on the demand of the parents but in a procedure where the 
parents will not have to declare their beliefs. In his view, this should only target Alevis 
but also other sects of Islam and other convictions too. He gave the example of Hanefi 
and Şafi sects of Sunni Islam, he said that these can be taught too and added that this 
                                                            
69 Mr. Hüseyin Aygün is the CHP MP from Tunceli. He was interviewed on 10 April 2013 at the TGNA, 
Ankara. He is known for his Alevi origin, his efforts to promote rights and freedoms of religion and 
conscience and for his critical stance.  
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should not be understood as a privilege provided to Alevis. In that case, an Alevi family 
will have the opportunity to choose for their pupil the elective course on Alevism and 
they can also select the course on Sunni Islam if they want to. Dr. Subaşı admitted that he 
was aware of the fact that the implementation of this formula will not be as easy as it will 
be in Istanbul compared to other provinces given that there would be discrepancy about 
the distribution of families adhering to different convictions. For example, in a province 
there can be only one Alevi family whereas there may exist only one Sunni family living 
in another city. All these obstacles can be surpassed with good will, according to Dr. 
Subaşı. 
 
Another point that was highlighted by the interviewee is about the reliable written 
sources for Alevism. He stated that Alevism is orally transmitted from generation to 
generation and there is no written source upon which Alevis agree. In his opinion, this is 
the source of many problems because anyone can interpret and determine what Alevism 
is according to one’s own view. He also thinks that because of this characteristic, 
Alevism is open to be abused by ideological concerns. In light of all these assessments, 
Dr. Subaşı defined the main aim of the Alevi Workshops as taking into consideration the 
issue with all its aspects on the basis of good will. 
 
Despite these efforts, the structural impediments are also envisaged by the Coordinator of 
the workshops. The first and maybe the most prominent one was the lack of a written 
source; a domain for Alevism, and the second one is the problem of appointing teachers 
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to teach Alevism. He mainly highlighted the difficulty of promoting Alevi teachers and 
mentioned that there should be universal means to organize this in order to cover Alevis 
living abroad. With the current setting, he says, the Alevi organizations do not want to 
give Dede70 such a responsibility; they rather prefer to keep Dede in a spiritual position 
and that is why they cannot be appointed as teachers at schools. His observation was that 
there is an indeterminate situation between Dedes and Alevi intellectuals about who 
should transmit the knowledge and how. The respondent affirmed that intellectuals have 
different interpretations of Alevism which may go hand in hand with diverse ideologies 
diverging from atheism to materialism or Marxism and these views clash with the ones of 
Dedes. Therefore he attracted attention to the source of information and the 
representation problem among Alevis. He immediately added that the difference among 
the viewpoints is not specific to Alevis but that it is also the case among Sunnis; 
intellectuals and ulema fall apart due to their diverging interpretations. 
 
On the other side of the coin, Alevis are not necessarily seeking to find out the ways to 
have an optional course on Alevism at schools. Some Alevi organizations, as Mr. Kazım 
Genç clearly pointed out, are against any kind of state intervention in the teaching of 
Alevism. So it is understandable that they might not be seeking for solutions to 
incorporate Alevism within this system. However, there are more moderate fractions who 
advocate that if the system will remain more or less the same, then the ways to protect the 
                                                            
70 Dede is spiritual leaders of Alevis who teach the essence of this belief. For detailed information please 
see: Ali Yaman, 2000. “Anadolu Aleviliği'nde Ocak Sistemi ve Dedelik Kurumu.” 
http://www.alevibektasi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=66 
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rights of Alevis is essential. However, according to Dr. Subaşı, what is controversial for 
Alevis is that due to the wide gap between interpretations, which is to be solved among 
Alevis if they find it necessary to do so, the issue was put for the first time on the table in 
such a wide range for seeking solutions to the problems that were neglected for centuries. 
As a matter of fact, this perception makes the dialogue much harder. But when all these 
theological discussions, matters of representation and all the bad experiences are put on 
the table all together, the path to the solution is narrowed. 
 
To continue with the discussion in the Alevi Workshops about the religious courses at 
schools and the proposition of introducing Alevism as an elective course, Dr. Subaşı was 
queried about whether he had a concrete suggestion. He clearly indicated that a pilot 
application can be made in provinces where there exists a greater Alevi population. 
According to his view, until the adequate settings are prepared for appointing teachers for 
the elective course on Alevism, such a transitory plan based on pilot cities can be applied 
by appointing prominent Alevis who gained recognition by the majority of the 
community. The difficulty he foresaw is again about deciding the names; the main 
question is who is eligible to teach Alevism? He admits that the state has articulated a 
means of conduct of religion; but only for Sunni Islam. There is no such context for 
Alevis; neither Alevis have such a culture of teaching their belief nor does the state have 
a mindset for the teaching of Alevism. 
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About the overall Alevi issue, Dr. Subaşı stated that the main responsibility for the 
resolution of this problem lies with the state. He indicated that there are radical Alevi 
organizations who are for totally omitting the state, and that is why they refuse all means 
of dealing with the state. However he thought that this attitude brings the issue to the 
point of irresolution. He furthermore stated that the Alevi question will become the first 
issue on the agenda in a few months. He was then requested to make it clear how the state 
can resolve this issue and what were the main outcomes of the Alevi Workshops. His 
duty was over with the preparation of the Final Report on Alevi Workshops.  
 
When it comes to the outcomes, the first demand was to convert the Madımak Hotel,71 
which had a symbolic meaning for Alevis, into a museum72 and this was realized. 
Secondly, the content of the DKAB courses were modified in order to insert adequate 
information about Alevism into the program and textbooks (is being followed since the 
2011-2012 school year). About the legal status of Dedes, which was another demand of 
Alevis, no amendment could be made due to the related laws.73 Actually, no consensus 
was reached among Alevis about the request on this specific issue, indicated lawyer Mr. 
Kazım Genç, since some Alevi organizations wanted Dedes to have a legal status 
                                                            
71 “Madımak Olayı” is the event that took place in Sivas, on 2 July 1993. During the festival organized by 
an Alevi association in the memory of an Alevi spiritual leader, Pir Sultan Abdal, the hotel where the 
organization took place was set to fire. 33 people, most of them were Alevi intellectuals, writers, 
journalists, artists, were died   
72 Milliyet, 30.06.2011, “Madımak Oteli Bilim ve Kültür Merkezi oldu.” 
http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/madimak-oteli-bilim-ve-kultur-merkezi-
oldu/gundem/gundemdetay/30.06.2011/1408705/default.htm 
73 Legal Commission could not solve the issue since this request was against the Revolutionary Laws of 
Turkey (Devrim Kanunları). To be specific, it is meant the law abolishing the Islamic monasteries; Tekke 
ve Zaviyelerin Kapatılması Kanunu. Law no 677 promulgated in Official Gazette on 13 December 1925. 
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whereas there are some others who defend that state shall no interference in this symbolic 
representation. 
 
To make some concluding remarks about Alevi Workshops, it can be stated that the main 
points raised during those workshops seem to be responded by the state to some extent 
but whether Alevis are satisfied with these steps is highly questionable. Though, when 
the opinion of Alevis was asked, only 14.9 percent of the respondents claimed that they 
were happy with this “Alevi opening” (Köse, 2010: 148). However the observation of the 
EU about these workshops and which was mentioned in the Progress Report of the 
Commission was quite different at the beginning of the process: “The government held 
workshops aimed at discussing openly problems and expectations of the Alevis; this 
effort was received positively by the Alevi community” (European Commission 2009: 
21). In the Commission Report of 2011, it was maintained that:  
Following seven workshops held in the context of the 2009 Alevi opening, a final 
report was issued in March 2011. The Ministry of National Education has 
prepared new religious education textbooks containing information on the Alevi 
faith, too. These are to be used as of the 2011-2012 school year. A small number 
of municipal councils have recognized de facto Cem houses as places of worship. 
The government expropriated Madimak Hotel30 in Sivas. Alevis have demanded 
that the hotel be turned into a museum (Commission Report, 2011: 29). 
 
When it comes to the latest Progress Report on Turkey, one can easily remark the change 
in perception of the Commission about the Alevi opening: “Concrete follow-up of the 
opening made in 2009 to the Alevis is lacking” (European Commission, 2012: 25). This 
determination summarizes that from the EU side the expectations from the Alevi Opening 
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and Alevi Workshops were not met. For the implementation of specific demands of 
Alevis it was stated:  
Cem houses were not officially recognized and Alevis experienced difficulties in 
establishing new places of worship. Alevis were concerned by the marking of 
many houses of Alevi citizens in a number of provinces and by incidents against 
them. Complaints were submitted to the prosecutors’ offices by Alevi 
associations; judicial and administrative investigations are continuing. [...] Some 
Alevis encountered job discrimination in the civil service (Commission Report 
2012: 25). 
 
As previously indicated, even though there was no consensus among Alevis about the 
DKAB courses, there had been two major demands which were agreed upon. First, 
Alevis want DKAB courses not to be compulsory. Second, if it is impossible to change 
their status because of the Constitutional provisions, then the content must be modified 
and should become a supra-sectarian one which is impartial and treats all religions at a 
distance. Thirdly and in conjunction with the second demand, they seek for the adequate 
means for exemption where no declaration of belief is necessary. As far as Alevis were 
not satisfied with the change in the syllabus made in the school-year of 2007-2008, they 
continued to seek more effort and sincerity. Therefore, one of the most prominent 
outcomes of the Alevi Workshops became the change in the syllabi and the textbooks 
where (relatively) extended information was added about Alevism. A brief evaluation on 





4.2 Change in Curricula and Textbooks of the Religious Courses (2011-2012) 
and the Toledo Guiding Principles 
 
The new DKAB program and the new textbooks started to be followed as of 2011-2012 
school year unquestionably came into being as a result of the ruling of the ECtHR on the 
Zengin Case, ECRI Reports and the Commission Reports on the progress of Turkey. The 
Alevi Workshops served as a means to determine what the demands of Alevis are and 
how they can be resolved. As already delineated, Turkish authorities embraced the most 
moderate form of change to comply with the judgment of the ECtHR and criticisms made 
in the Commission Reports; they decided to make amendments in the content of the 
courses. By providing an impartial content for the DKAB courses, Turkish authorities 
should have thought that no facilitating options for the exemption shall be offered. It 
seems that they focused on the enhancement of the content rather than providing facilities 
for exemption from the course. When the issue is investigated in detail, it can be seen that 
there had been almost no concrete steps taken for changing the status of these courses 
from compulsory to elective. During the Alevi Workshops, introduction of the elective 
religion courses have only been discussed additionally to the existing compulsory DKAB 
courses. 
 
Given that the Turkish Government chose to make amendments in the content of the 
DKAB courses and such a process was initiated right after the verdict of the ECtHR, Mr. 
Rıza Türmen submitted a written question to the TGNA seeking response from the 
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Ministry of Education.74 In that written question, Mr. Türmen queried what the 
government did to comply with the ruling of the ECtHR in terms of making amendments 
to the DKAB textbooks. The questions asked were mainly based on the execution of the 
ECtHR ruling on the Zengin Case; about which modifications were made, whether those 
amendments were made by asking opinions of the Alevis, and what was provided for 
pupils to be educated in accordance with the beliefs of their parents. The written question 
was submitted on October 2011 and the response was given after the legal time was 
surpassed; on January 2012. In the response by the Ministry of Education75 it is 
mentioned that prior to the judgment of the ECtHR on Zengin Case a commission was 
convened under the supervision of three academicians and specialists of DKAB courses. 
Former Minister of Education; Ömer Çelik, highlighted that while this commission was 
examining the issue, the Alevi Workshops were held by the Ministry of the State and that 
during those workshops the opinions and the suggestions were heard from the 
representatives of Alevi organizations about the program of DKAB courses. It is also 
asserted that in the new programs the main concepts of the Alevi-Bektaşi tradition have 
been explained and the information was given about prominent figures and main events 
of this tradition by placing quotations from the sayings of those persons. Minister Çelik 
also accentuated that the principle of laicism has been underlined throughout the program 
and it was this principle emphasized several times in the textbooks. It was repeated once 
again that the opinions of Alevi and Bektaşi organizations were taken into account. 
                                                            
74 For the content of the written question by Rıza Türmen on 18.10.2011 and no. 7/1000, please see: 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-1000s.pdf 
75 For the full text of the response to the written question of Rıza Türmen of no. 7/1000, please see: 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-1000sgc.pdf 
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During our interview, Mr. Rıza Türmen stated that this response from the Ministry of 
Education was not satisfactory in the sense that it did not make it apparent who took part 
in the commission which prepared that program, who the academicians are and the 
question about their eligibility is still there. Moreover, Mr. Türmen criticized that 
information on which Alevi organizations’ opinions were taken into account and whether 
or not these were sufficient efforts were lacking. Mr. Kazım Genç, the lawyer of the 
Zengin Case also highlighted the ambiguity of the process in preparing the new DKAB 
program in the sense that it is not declared which Alevi-Bektaşi organizations took part in 
that. Furthermore, Dr. Aykan Erdemir,76 mentioned that the insertion of information 
about Alevism and marking the important dates and weeks for Alevis on the curriculum 
caused greater discrimination against Alevi pupils since those insertions only served to 
make Alevi students more visible and yet target of mistreatment by both teachers and 
students. He stated that he has heard several complaints from Alevis stating that it was 
better not to have manifested in the classrooms due to the new content of the DKAB 
courses. It can be concluded that in the absence of social learning and intimidation, the 
new content inserted about Alevism led to more discrimination. 
 
As these are very recent applications, there is a very slight amount of scientific research 
conducted about the new program and the textbooks that have been followed since the 
2011-2012 school year. According to her detailed investigation, Yıldırım (2012) 
                                                            
76 Mr. Aykan Erdemir (Assoc. Prof.) is CHP MP from Bursa. He has been active in matters of religious 
freedom and rights of non-Sunni communities both as an  academician and politician. He was interviewed 
on 10 April 2013 at TGNA, Ankara.  
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determines the modifications made in almost all the textbooks at all grades. The main 
conclusion of the study is that compared to the previous program the amendments are not 
made within a holistic understanding where impartiality and objectivity are taken into 
account (Yıldırım, 2012: 2). The modifications are rather based on making some 
additions and changing the position of few sections. The insertions are primarily aimed at 
providing information about different traditions within Islam, such as the Alevi-Bektaşi 
tradition, and the terminology, practice and the sources of knowledge were offered. In 
addition, it is asserted that the main goals of the program, the general content, the values 
and concepts embraced and taught were not altered (Yıldırım, 2012: 2). One of the 
remarkable amendments is about practicing of religion; it is mentioned in the related 
part77 that the pupils will not be enforced to practice, to learn by heart the verses and 
hadiths which take part in the textbooks (Yıldırım, 2012: 4). 
 
As a matter of fact, the latest program of the DKAB courses is expected to comply with 
universal norms. In addition to the decision of the ECtHR and the emphasis of the 
Commission Reports on Turkey’s progress towards membership, the universal criteria set 
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) about the teaching 
of religion at public schools should also be taken into account. The “Toledo Guiding 
Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools”78 prepared in 2007 
                                                            
77 In the textbooks it is indicated in the part: The Principles and the Explanations about the Application of 
the Program (Programın Uygulanmasına İlişkin İlke ve Açıklamalar)  
78 In line with the OSCE’s conflict prevention role and its commitment to fostering a culture of mutual 
respect and understanding, the Advisory Council of the ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief, together with other experts and scholars, met in Toledo, Spain, in March 2007 to discuss 
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is aimed at providing regulatory guidelines for the education about religions in order to 
enhance mutual understanding and social cohesion (OSCE, 2007: 13). In that way, the 
respect to everyone’s right to freedom of religion or belief will be improved. Toledo 
Guidelines determines that the curricula being used for teaching about religions and 
beliefs should be prepared with the concerns of: “…determining whether they promote 
respect for freedom-of-religion rights and whether they are impartial, balanced, inclusive, 
age appropriate, free of bias and meet professional standards” (OSCE, 2007: 15). These 
universal principles overlap with the norms indicated in the ECHR and repeated in the 
verdict of the Zengin Case. What is more, the Toledo Guideline also emphasizes to 
addressing the views of the adherents of other convictions in a country while preparing 
the curricula. It is indicated that the authorities should “assess the process that leads to the 
development of curricula on teaching about religions and beliefs to make sure that this 
process is sensitive to the needs of various religious and belief communities and that all 
relevant stakeholders have an opportunity to have their voices heard” (OSCE, 2007: 15). 
 
The Toledo Guideline clearly determines that the courses involving teaching of religions 
and beliefs may be compulsory if and only if they are “sufficiently neutral and objective” 
(OSCE, 2007: 14). When those criteria are met, “requiring participation in such courses 
as such does not violate the freedom of religion and belief (although states are free to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
approaches to teaching about religions and beliefs in public schools in the 56-state OSCE region. The 
experts came from a wide range of backgrounds and included leading scholars, policy makers, educators, 
lawyers, and representatives of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Toledo 
meeting launched an intensive process, involving subsequent meetings in Bucharest and Vienna, and 
extensive collaboration among members of the Advisory Council, the larger Panel, and other experts, 
resulting in the formulation of the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in 
Public Schools. For the full text please see: http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154 
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allow partial or total opt-outs in these settings) (OSCE, 2007:14). Nonetheless, Toledo 
Guiding Principles also foresaw the cases where objectivity cannot be sustained for a 
compulsory course on religions and beliefs, it is mentioned that sensitive measures 
should be taken by the authorities in order to provide the right to exemption from those 
courses: 
Where a compulsory program involving teaching about religions and beliefs is not 
sufficiently objective, efforts should be made to revise it to make it more balanced 
and impartial, but where this is not possible, or cannot be accomplished 
immediately, recognizing opt-out rights may be a satisfactory solution for parents 
and pupils, provided that the opt-out arrangements are structured in a sensitive 
and non-discriminatory way (OSCE, 2007: 16). 
 
Whether the new DKAB program of 2011-2012 satisfied these principles is open to 
question but by considering the response given by the Ministry of Education to the 
written question of Mr. Rıza Türmen, one can remark that the Minister pretended to 
affirm that the new program is in line with those principles, even though no reference is 
made to the Toledo Guidelines. According to the scientific research conducted for the 
investigation of the 2011-2012 program of the DKAB courses, the amendments made are 
unsatisfactory to cope with the principles like being inclusive, free from indoctrination 
and impartial (Yıldırım, 2012: 8). Given that no opt-out facilities where parents do not 
have to declare their conviction are offered, it can be stated that the 2011-2012 DKAB 
program does not necessarily cope with the related provision of the Toledo Guiding 
Principles. On the other hand, even though the content about Alevism inserted to the 
DKAB program is questionable about whether it fits to the expectations of Alevis, it 
should be admitted that a significant improvement has been made about reflecting the 
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principle of plurality within Islam due to introduction of different traditions. Though, the 
program was not generated from the beginning but the amendments are rather made by 
adding some parts and this is far from the understanding of preparing a holistic content 
reflecting the religious pluralism. In the final analysis, despite the enhancements made in 
the program especially in including information about Alevis, it is far from being a 
course about religions and beliefs. The DKAB courses with the latest content of 2011-
2012 program are argued to be falling apart from being impartial since the terminology 
such as “our religion,” “our Holy Book” and “our Prophet” makes the course where Islam 
religion is embraced as the major religion to be taught and where limited information is 
provided about other religions and beliefs (Yıldırım, 2012: 8). In addition, this limited 
information is said to have caused further discrimination against Alevis due to the fact 
that the DKAB teachers are generally from the Sunni tradition and have no adequate 
information about Alevism. 
 
Turning back to the main question about the position of religious communities other than 
Sunni Islam, Alevis can be considered to be the most visible community having demands 
from the state about religious freedoms and this primarily emanates from their population 
size. However, other religious communities living in Turkey have also difficulties in 
means of religious education at schools since they also suffer from discrimination 
originating from the practice. This field should be analyzed from different angles; first, 
the legal status of religious minorities defined in the Lausanne Treaty is different from 
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the other religious communities79 in the sense that the latter enjoys rights and freedoms 
emanating from the Treaty. Therefore the difficulties that these two groups encounter 
should be evaluated separately. The second dimension is the religious courses taught in 
the minority schools. Even though the scope of this work is limited to the religious 
instruction in public schools, the findings of the field survey displayed that the attitude of 
state towards religious education in the minority schools is also remarkable for the 
evaluation of rights and freedoms. Although the discussion about the DKAB courses 
mainly revolves around the Alevis, in many of the interviews the question of other 
denominations and the position of religious minorities were raised. This is the main 
reason of the need to talk to those communities, to their representatives. Therefore the 
field survey was not limited to Alevis and their complaints but tried to take into account 
all the groups suffering from the current practice in Turkey. The next section will 
investigate the position of religious communities other than Alevis with regard to their 
status in religious instruction at schools. 
 
 
4.3 The Status of Non-Muslim Communities in Turkey with regard to the 
Religious Instruction at Schools 
 
According to the decision no. 1 of 9 July 1990 of the Supreme Council for Education on 
exemptions from religious culture and ethics classes: “…pupils of Turkish nationality 
                                                            
79 Atheists and agnostics are counted in this group whose status was not defined in the Lausanne Treaty. 
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who belong to the Christian or Jewish religions and who attend primary and secondary 
schools, with the exception of schools for minorities, are not obliged to follow the classes 
in religious culture and ethics, provided they affirm their adherence to those religions…” 
After this law entered into force in 1990, the religious culture and ethics courses have not 
been a major issue of controversy among non-Muslim minorities. However, the facts that 
they have to affirm their adherence to Christianity or Judaism and that no alternative 
course is provided by the state are evaluated as violation of right to religious freedom. 
With the new system of education in Turkey (“4+4+4”) and the introduction of elective 
religious courses, some steps have been taken for minority religions but this issue will be 
evaluated in the section about the new system. 
 
Even though the decision no. 1 of 9 July 1990 of the Supreme Council for Education on 
exemptions from the religious culture and ethics classes impeded the potential challenges 
for the most part, recently some complaints have been raised by Protestants about these 
courses. These complaints were mentioned in a report prepared by the Association of 
Protestant Churches in 2010.80 The president of the Association of Protestant Churches 
has also written a letter to the Ministry of Education stating that non-Muslim pupils are 
faced with difficulties about religious courses at schools even if they are legally 
exempted.81 In the letter, it is reminded as well that those students should spend that time 
                                                            
80 Protestan Kiliseler Derneği Hukuk ve İnanç Özgürlüğü İzleme Kurulu, 2010, “’Tehdit’ mi, Yoksa Tehdit 
Altında mı?: Türkiye’deki Protestanlar’ın Yasal ve Sosyal Sorunları.”  




in the library of the school which is a practice encouraged by the Ministry of Education. 
He also attracted attention to the obligation of families to declare their religious 
conviction in order to have their child to be exempted from the course and that this causes 
bias among students toward non-Muslim pupils. The letter was also sent to the 
Directorate of Human Rights at the Prime Ministry seeking for a solution. 
 
The complaints of Protestants revolve around both the implementation of the decision no. 
1 of 9 July 1990 of the Supreme Council for Education and the difficulties that pupils are 
faced with when they are exempted from religious courses. For both cases, the grievances 
of non-Muslim families started to appear more on media82 since 2011. In some cases, it is 
argued that the school administrators or teachers oblige students to attend those courses83 
and in some others, families complain about the reactions of other students and teachers 
towards non-Muslim pupils who are exempted from religious culture and knowledge of 
ethics courses. Due to the correspondence of the Association of Protestant Churches with 
the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry informed all the school administrations 
about the issue and as a result, in the report of 2013,84 it is indicated that the problems 
stemming from requests of exemption from DKAB courses. However, because of the 
decision of the Council of State indicating that after the change in syllabi of 2007-2008 
                                                            
82 “Protestanların Din Dersi Şikayeti”, Milliyet, 02.01.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/protestanlarin-din-dersi-
sikayeti/guncel/haberdetay/02.01.2011/1333649/default.htm 
83 “Hıristiyan Öğrenciye Kelime-i Şahadet Dayağı”, CNN Türk, 01.11.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/11/01/hiristiyan.ogrenciye.kelime.i.sahadet.dayagi/635272.0/index.h
tml 
84 Protestan Kiliseler Derneği Hukuk ve İnanç Özgürlüğü İzleme Kurulu, 2012 Hak İhlalleri İzleme 
Raporu.  
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there was no more need for exemption from the DKAB course, a school administration in 
Izmir and another one in Diyarbakır made the exemption difficult. Only after the 
correspondence of the Association of Protestant Churches with the Directorate of 
National Education, the problems were resolved (Protestan Kiliseler Derneği, 2013: 6).  
 
 
4.3.1 Religious Education at Minority Schools 
 
As already indicated, the status of non-Muslim minorities was determined by Lausanne 
Treaty. Non-Muslims (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) who were defined according to 
millet system, were accepted as minority and they gained some rights stemming from this 
status (Oran, 2007: 37). Religious rights of non-Muslim minorities were protected under 
Lausanne Treaty (Article 40)85 and they were given the right to establish institutions of 
education and train pupils of their community in their own language (Vahapoğlu, 1997: 
191). In those institutions86 non-Muslim minorities were also given the right to practice 
their religious convictions as well as to give religious instruction to their community. 
However, in the following years, especially with the promulgation of the law87 that 
expanded the scope of the state control over private educational institutions, Heybeliada 
                                                            
85 Lausanne Treaty, July 24th 1924. Full version of the Treaty (in Turkish and in French) is available online 
at: http://www.ttk.org.tr/templates/resimler/File/Antlasmalar/lozan/lozan30-39.pdf 
86 Currently, the status of the private schools is regulated according to “Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel 
Öğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği.” Official Gazette: 08.03.2008. Available online at: 
http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr/kategorigoster.asp?id=190 
87 8/6/1965 tarihli ve 625 sayılı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu. Available online at: 
http://www.memurlar.net/haber/1194/ 
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(Chalki) Religious Seminary which provided the means to educate Orthodox clergy was 
closed down (Grigoriadis, 2009: 172). It has been repeatedly indicated in the Commission 
Reports that the seminary should be reopened in line with the principle of freedom of 
religion and conscience (European Commission 2011: 29). Turkey’s response to this 
appeal is that the “religious nature of the school” contradicted with the secular principles 
of the state (Grigoriadis, 2009: 172). 
 
In order to understand the position of minority schools and conduct of religious education 
in those schools, two interviews were conducted. In both of the interviews, the general 
image is that the pupils attending minority schools enjoy greater freedom in terms of 
religious education. The first interviewee, Mr. Andon Parizyanos88 informed about how 
the DKAB courses are applied in minority schools. He said that like in other schools 
linked to the Ministry of Education, minority schools also follow the same curriculum 
and as the DKAB are part of that curriculum, they offer these courses as compulsory ones 
but with a totally different content. The content that is applied in the Zografyon Greek 
School for the DKAB courses is prepared autonomously by the teachers of the relevant 
course under the supervision of the school administration. Mr. Parizyanos mentioned at 
first that they were currently working on the preparation of a new program for the DKAB 
course since the Ministry of Education requested to see the program followed in those 
schools. He stated that there was an old program prepared in the 1950s and the current 
                                                            
88 Mr. Andon Parizyanos is the teacher of Literature and of Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics 
lessons at T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Zoğrafyon Rum Lisesi (Turkish Ministry of Education Private 
Zografyon Greek Highschool) in Istanbul. The interview was conducted 29.03.2013 at the Zografyon 
Greek Highshool where there are currently 50 pupils.   
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one is still under construction. Mr. Parizyanos mentioned that until today, every school 
was following its own program for DKAB but that for the first time they got together and 
prepared this draft. Both the draft program that Mr. Parizyanos kindly shared and the way 
that he explained, display that this course teaches Christianity with specific emphasis on 
the Orthodox Church, and in addition, those courses give information about other 
religions and beliefs. It can apparently be observed that the content of the DKAB courses 
is based on teaching a specific religion; Orthodox Christianity, and only in a small part of 
the curriculum information about other religions is given.89  
 
Mr. Parizyanos also indicated that they can bring pupils to the Church in order to display 
the practice but that this does not necessarily imply that they are giving religious 
education rather than religious instruction. The textbooks for the DKAB that are followed 
are the ones which have been imported from Greece in the 1970s and Mr. Parizyanos 
claimed that even though they cannot cover the whole books, they try to stick to the main 
principles indicated in those books. It was asked Mr. Parizyanos whether exemption from 
these courses is possible if the pupil or parents request so. He said that as the pupils in 
those schools are of Turkish nationality and of Greek Orthodox origin, in general all 
families want their children to attend religion courses. But in a case where one of the 
parents adhere to another origin, the pupil and his/her parents are asked whether they 
want to attend these courses. In case they would prefer not, then, a petition would be 
sufficient to provide exemption for that pupil, explained Mr. Parizyanos. According to 
                                                            
89 Information about other religions is given at the Unit 2 of the 10th class’ syllabus in the draft program 
which is not finalized and official yet.  
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Mr. Laki Vingas,90 the religious courses should be elective at schools in Turkey and in 
line with this practice; they should also be at the minority schools in order to respect 
freedom of religion.  
 
Mr. Parizyanos was also requested to give information about the evolution of the process 
and the relations; how religious courses used to be conducted and when such a change in 
attitude occurred. He started with his own studentship, and asserted that the religious 
courses were given by clergymen who were graduated from Religious Seminary but that 
in the mid-1960s those teachers were barred to teach at those schools although religious 
courses remained. Then, civil teachers, who were not priests but theologians, were 
appointed but as the Heybeliada Religious Seminary was closed down in 1971, no 
theologian remained. Later on it was decided by the state authorities that those courses 
shall be given by the teachers of literature. As one of those teachers who graduated from 
Greek Language and Literature Faculty but giving at the same time the DKAB course, 
Mr. Parizyanos finds this application unhealthy given that some literature teachers might 
have more knowledge and some less but for sure, they have no theology education 
background. This is the only problem that he can observe for the conduct of the DKAB in 
their minority schools. According to Mr. Parizyanos, the only way to overcome this 
obstacle is to open the Heybeliada Religious Seminary. 
 
                                                            
90 Mr. Laki Vingas is the Representative of the Minority Foundations. He was interviewed on 15.04.2013 in 
Ankara at the General Directorate for Foundations.  
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The turning point for the change in attitude of the Turkish state corresponds to the 
liberalization period of the country, the 1980s with the Özal government. Until that time 
Mr. Parizyanos claimed that there had been discriminations against religious minorities. 
The liberalization process had a very positive impact on respect to religious rights and 
freedoms and this trend went on slowly until the 2000s. Mr. Parizyanos underlined that 
the Europeanization process in line with the prospect of Turkey to become an EU 
member enhanced the environment of toleration and respect. 
 
Mr. Parizyanos was requested to compare the contemporary situation with the past in 
order to be able to analyze the impact of Europeanization and the EU integration on 
Turkey’s policies towards religious minorities in the specific field of religious education 
at schools. He asserted the change of attitude can be observed very clearly, he stated that 
in the past when they requested permission about an issue regarding religious education, 
the Turkish authorities used to seek for a secret agenda behind this demand whereas 
today they are faced with almost no difficulty in getting permissions. The good will of the 
state authorities can be felt, said Mr. Parizyanos, and that they cannot complain of lack of 
confidence on the part of Turkish authorities. He added that in the past they were 
subjected to strict state controls whereas now relations are based on mutual respect and 
confidence. The change of attitude can also be related to the decrease in number of 
Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox origin. Mr. Parizyanos concretizes the situation by 
giving example from their school; he says that when he graduated in 1967 there were 750 
students, when his son graduated in 1994 there were 250 pupils and today they are 50 
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students total. The decrease is not because Greek Orthodox pupils attend other schools 
but because their population is diminishing. That is one of the reasons why Greek 
Orthodox minorities are not considered as a “threat” anymore. 
 
When he was asked his opinion about the fate of Heybeliada Religious Seminary, Mr. 
Parizyanos highlighted that this issue should be evaluated separately since they have 
almost no difficulty in getting what they request from the state except for the Seminary. 
Then he concluded that there should be a rationale behind this specific issue which is 
based on the principle of reciprocity between Turkey and Greece. The best instance, 
according to the view of Mr. Parizyanos is the fact that the state has reinstated the 
properties belonging to religious minorities. Mr. Laki Vingas approved that there had 
been many positive steps taken to return the properties of minorities. Another common 
point they made is that the amelioration of the relations from the part of the state is highly 
related to the Europeanization process of the country and the pressures that emanate from 
Regular Reports on Turkey about its progress. However, the enhancement of relations 
between the religious minorities and Turkish state is a twofold process where state 
policies are modified in accordance with the general political environment of the country 
as well as the impact of Europeanization. 
 
The attitude of the state towards religious minorities is of great importance while 
analyzing state-religion relations. The respect torights of the religious minorities is one of 
the most significant indicators in determining the conduct of religious affairs by the state. 
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That is why this dimension is a good reference point in defining the impact of 
Europeanization on state-religion relations. Both the content analysis and the field survey 
displayed that theproblems that religious minorities encountered despite their legal right 
of exemption from the DKAB courses in the Turkish state schools were solved to a great 
extent with the initiative of the associations of those minorities. For the religious 
education at minority schools, the example of Greek Orthodox Zografyon High school 
displayed that they are not subjected to strict state supervision and that they are enjoying 
greater freedom.Both of the interviewees indicated that they saw a correlation between 
the Europeanization of the country, the motto of EU membership more specifically, and 
the enhancement of the relations with religious minorities. 
 
 
4.3.2 Non-Sunnis within the Formal Education System: Instances of the 
Specific Cases 
 
As already designated, the status of the religious minorities defined in the Lausanne 
Treaty is more unequivocal compared to the rest non-Sunni communities. In Turkey, 
there is variety of beliefs and convictions; both the sects of Islam and other religions are 
adhered by a remarkable part of society. Despite this fact, as some of the interviewees 
pointed out correctly, this variety is not known within the country. Prof. Dr. İştar 
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Gözaydın and a specialist91 from the Delegation of the EU Commission to Turkey as well 
as Alevis who were interviewed asserted that as in Turkey it is hard to declare one’s own 
(religious) identity especially if it is different than the majority, Turkish people are 
unaware of the religious diversity in the country. In most of the interviews, it is 
emphasized that discrimination is made against Yezidis, Caferis, Şafis who are mainly 
the adherents of the sects of Islam, is made unconsciously since their very existence is 
neglected and they are reluctant to declare their identity. They are generally not organized 
to seek their rights and this makes them unrecognized. 
 
This is also the case for atheists and agnostics in the country. It is even more difficult to 
state that one does not have any religious conviction. That might be the reason why there 
is much less cases publicly visible in media. As a matter of fact, the cases sued by atheist 
families are much rarer than the ones brought by Alevis. Given the population rates92 of 
Alevis and atheists in Turkey, the difference in numbers may explain the reason of rarity 
of the cases sued by atheist families. It should be reminded that even if the right of 
exemption from these courses for Christians and Jews can be considered as positive, the 
fact that unbelievers and adherents of other convictions do not enjoy the same rights 
constitutes a breach of Article 14 which determines discrimination on the basis of 
                                                            
91 The specialist who was interviewed did not want voice recording and reference to one’s name due to 
privacy policies of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey. The specialist provided information sources that 
constitute the basis for the preparation of the Progress Reports and contact persons from minority groups 
who also provide input for those reports.  
92 According to the surveys conducted by Toprak and Çarkoğlu (2007: 41), 6.1 percent of the respondents 
said that they are of Alevi origin and 1.6 declared that they do not have faith in any religion (Table 4.10).  
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religion of the ECHR (Özenç, 2005: 126). In one prominent case93 of an atheist family 
seeking for the exemption from the religious culture and knowledge of ethics lesson for 
their child was finalized in favor of the applicants. The parents of the pupil attending 
fourth grade requested the exemption for their child claiming that they do not have 
religious faith. The District Governorate dismissed the request of the family on the 
grounds that the Article 24 of the Constitution. Then, the family applied to the İstanbul 
8th Administrative Court for the suspension of execution. The Administrative Court made 
its decision in favor of the applicants referring to Article 24 of the Constitution, Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the decision of the Presidency of the 
Higher Council of Education (Eğitim Öğretim Yüksek Kurulu Başkanlığı) on the right to 
exemption of adherents of Christianity and Judaism. In this verdict it can be observed that 
the scope of the decision of the Presidency of the Higher Council of Education shall be 
extended to comprehend non-believers. However, it is still a matter of controversy since 
these are single cases and are dependent on the interpretation of national courts in the 
absence of a law determining the status of non-believers. 
 
That is why in a recent case94 from Antalya sued by an atheist family for the exemption 
of the pupil from religious course, the Council of State followed the case-law generated 
after the change of the DKAB curriculum which went into effect by the 2007-2008 term. 
Likewise, most of the cases that were finalized in favor of the applicants are being 
                                                            
93 “Ateist Aileden Din Dersi Davası,” Posta Gazetesi, 25.05.2010, Available online at: 
http://www.posta.com.tr/turkiye/HaberDetay/Ateist_aileden__din_dersi__davasi.htm?ArticleID=30881  
94 “Ateist Öğrenci Yargı Kararıyla Din Dersinde,” Radikal, 31.08.2012. Available oline at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1098770 
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reversed since the case-law of the Council of State has altered since 2010 due to the fact 
that it found the content of DKAB courses fitting to the universal principles laid down in 
the ECHR and underlined with the decision of the ECtHR in the Zengin Case. 
 
In comparing the position of religious minorities determined in the Lausanne Treaty and 
other non-Sunni communities in regard to the religious education at schools, it can be 
stated that both because of their legal status and the right of exemption, religious 
minorities are enjoying greater freedom in Turkey. In addition, any violation against 
religious minorities; Christian or Jewish pupils, stemming from the practice is taken into 
account seriously so to resolve the problem immediately. However, it can be observed 
that when it comes to the different sects of Islam or other religions and beliefs, it seems 
much difficult to get over them. For Alevis, it is argued that the major reason of 
irresolution of the problem is about determining the position of this belief; whether it is a 
sect of Islam or a different religion, but it seems that it should be the concern of 
theologians rather than policy-makers. From the side of the state, this is a general 
problematic of rights and freedoms of non-Sunni communities in the country. Some 
argue that the population size of Alevis is one of the reasons why they might be 
considered as threat to unitary character of the state. However, the steps taken to consider 
the complaints of Alevis, like the Alevi Workshops, make one think that the perception of 
“threat” is changing. 
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Overall, the situation of non-Sunni communities is delineated with the consideration that 
Sunnis are satisfied with the current practice or they have never been subject to 
discrimination in regards to religious education in Turkey. However, among the 
interviewees, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Aydın and Dr. Necdet Subaşı highlighted a different 
point of view and stated that Sunnis have been faced with discrimination in the field of 
religious instruction in Turkey for a long time. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Aydın attracted 
attention to the situation of the religious courses at schools prior to the 1982 Constitution 
showed up as the discrimination against pupils who attended those courses and against 
their families who wanted their children to learn their religion in a proper manner. 
Therefore, he finds it very necessary that the state provides courses teaching religion, and 
he also thinks that this course must be compulsory in order to prevent discrimination 
against pupils or parents who want their children to attend this course given that the 
majority of Turkish population is Muslim. Prof. Dr. Aydın raises this aspect of the issue 
in order to highlight the complaints of families who wanted their children to learn Islam 
religion at school prior to 1982 Constitution and to elucidate the problematic practices of 
that period. 
 
This view that appeals to consider another dimension of the issue is also raised by Dr. 
Necdet Subaşı during our interview. He even stated that one’s need to declare his/her 
religiosity and being faced with discrimination because of this religiosity has been a 
reality of this country which has been reversed in the last decade. This reversal in the 
trend of religiosity, according to his opinion, had other implications and it went to the 
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opposite direction where people tried to make their religiosity much visible. In addition, 
the fact that the content of the compulsory DKAB courses are mainly based on Sunni 
version of Islam does not necessarily mean that Sunnis are satisfied with this content and 
convinced that the proper religious education is provided for their children. This is one of 
the reasons why elective religious courses were introduced with the new system of 
education called “4+4+4” and the new debates revolving around both the remaining of 
the compulsory DKAB courses and the introduction of the elective religion lessons will 
be evaluated in the next part. Moreover, the status and the determination of these new 
elective courses, the current complications coming out of the practice of these courses 
and the contemporary environment in terms of the religious education at schools will be 
discussed with reference to the interviews conducted, new reports and the news appearing 
in the media. 
 
 
4.4 Latest Version of the Religious Courses in the New System of Education 
 
4.4.1 The New System of Education (“4+4+4” System) and the Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court 
 
With the promulgation of the new education Law95 in April 2012, the education system 
has changed fundamentally. The new system consists of four years of primary 
                                                            
95 The law on the new education system was approved by the TGNA on 30 March 2012. For details please 
see: 
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(ilköğretim), four years of secondary (ortaöğretim) and four years of highschool (lise) 
education. The “4+4+4 system,” which makes twelve-year total, is compulsory. There 
had been several discussions about the implications of this system but for the scope of 
this work, the focus will be on the religious education within this new program. However, 
it is worth noting that in addition to the pedagogical denunciations,96 most of the 
criticisms revolved around one of the outcomes of the new system which implies the 
opening of secondary schools of İmam Hatips. In line with this thinking, some argued 
that this is a project of elevating a prototypical citizen who would promote the ideology 
of the current government in Turkey. As a matter of fact, a short time before the 
declaration of a new system of education, the Turkish Prime Minister declared their 
willingness to raise a “pious generation.”97 The amendment in the education system 
which came right after this declaration is ipso facto associated with the Islamic roots of 





For the full text of the new education law, with the no: 6287, promulgated on the Official Gazette of 11 
April 2012 please see: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/04/20120411-8.htm 
96 The age of pupils for attending to the primary school has been debated since some educators as well as 
parents found the age determined by the law too early. A solution was offered ; parents who do not want 
their children to attend primary school when they reach 66 months would apply to health centers in order to 
get a report that the pupil did not reach the age of maturity mentally or physically. About this practice 
please see: http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yasam/2012/07/22/66-aya-saglik-raporu-ayari 
97 “Dindar nesil” debate stemmed from a declaration of Turkish Prime Minister where he informed about a 
nationwide project which aims at providing technology-enhanced learning in the formal education at all 
levels, is called FATİH Project. For the content of that speech please see: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19825231.asp  
For detailed information about FATİH Project please visit: http://fatihproject.com/?p=14 
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The adjustments which were made regarding religious courses within the new system of 
education strengthened the criticisms about the motto of elevating a pious youth in 
Turkey given that two elective religion courses were inserted to the curricula while 
compulsory DKAB courses remained with their modified contents. Actually, this was an 
unexpected move since “At the beginning of 2012, if one were asked to comment on the 
forthcoming policies on religious education in Turkey, one would state that more room 
for religious freedom could be expected with the preparation of the new constitution and 
an amendment of the article about compulsory religious education” (Grigoriadis and 
Gurcel, 2012: 20). The two elective courses which are “Koran” and “the Life of our 
Prophet” are determined by Law no. 6287, and the rest of the elective courses were left to 
the determination of the Board of Education and Discipline (Talim Terbiye Kurulu) under 
the Ministry of National Education. This implies that each and every school in Turkey 
has to provide the predetermined elective religion courses; in other words, lack of teacher 
or infrastructure would not be considered as an excuse for not providing these courses. 
On the other hand, there is no such obligation for the school administrations to offer the 
rest of the elective courses. The obstacles stemming from this practice will be displayed 
in the following parts. Given these instances, most of the interviewees, when they were 
questioned about the implications of the new elective religion courses, they highlighted 
that the insertion of those courses were meaningful but that this was just the tip of the 
iceberg. According to their view,98 this was just a part of a greater project of molding a 
specific type of citizen. 
                                                            
98 Mr. Rıza Türmen, Mr. Aykan Erdemir and Mr. Kazım Genç emphasized on the parallels between the aim 
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On these grounds, CHP, the main opposition party which voted against this new system 
of education, applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment and adoption of the 
stay of execution for a number of provisions of the related law on the new education 
system. Within the detailed ruling of the Constitutional Court99 the most remarkable point 
and which most attracted the attention of the media was about statements regarding the 
elective religion courses which are associated with the laic character of the state, the 
principle of laicism and the freedom of religion. In the ruling, the distinction is made 
between the two interpretations of secularism; which have also been subject of academic 
research especially in the last decade. The Constitutional Court made the difference by 
stating that according to one interpretation of secularism, religion is delimited to one’s 
own conscience and should not penetrate or be visible in daily lives; whereas in the other 
understanding, the state has the responsibility to provide a political and social 
environment where each and every belief or unbelief can live together peacefully. The 
latter understanding also expects from the state to maintain an equal distance to every 
belief and unbelief. The first version is similar to the French laicism whereas the second 
form is generally known as Anglo-Saxon tradition of secularism. It is commonly argued 
that in the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the first version which is similar to the 
French model of laicism was embraced. The distinction put forward by the Constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of raising a pious generation and the new system; and they suggested that the new elective courses is part of 
the greater program. According to Dr. Necdet Subaşı, the main target of the project of cultivating citizens is 
not religion; religion is just a means to promoting the “ideal citizen” (“makbul yurttaş”). This citizen will 
not be an unbeliever but one’s belief will not interfere with daily life but ensure moral behavior. 
99 For the detailed ruling of the Constitutional Court promulgated in the Official Gazette of 18 April 2013, 
please see: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418-10.htm 
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Court also reminds another classification such as assertive and passive secularisms (Kuru, 
2007).100  
 
The ruling makes it clear that the Court embraced the second version of secularism which 
emphasizes the role of the state in providing a political and social atmosphere where 
everyone in the country enjoys religious freedom. In the ruling the Constitutional Court 
highlighted that it is the responsibility of the state not to provide privileges to a belief or 
religion over others; in other words, not to make positive discrimination and the state 
shall protect all religious groups and unbelievers. According to the Constitutional Court, 
the separation of the state and religion is a requisite for protecting freedom of religion 
and conscience but at the same time, it is the duty of a laic state to protect religion from 
any political interference. The Court made a very detailed explanation about the 
responsibilities of a state stemming from its laic character and indicated that laicism 
encumbers both negative and positive responsibilities to the state. With negative 
responsibility, it is meant not to embrace a belief or religion as official religion and not to 
intervene to the freedom of religion and conscience of individuals except for the 
                                                            
100 A contemporary differentiation made between secularisms is based on a historical view: assertive and 
passive secularisms are determined according to the historical evolution of state-religion relations in 
countries. According to his view, assertive secularists aim to contain religion to home and private 
conscience while passive secularists are in favor of allowing a public role for religion. France and Turkey 
are the cases where we can see assertive secularism and the US is the one where passive secularism can be 
best analyzed. According to this classification, in a country what determines assertive or passive secularism 
is the consensus or conflict between religious and secular groups. The conflict or consensus is determined 
according to the existence of an ancien régime; if there was an old regime that brings together monarchy 
with hegemonic religion like the one in Ottoman Empire or France, then the hostility of secular group 
toward religious one is of greater probability if not inevitable. On the other hand, America as a new country 
of immigrants has no passé of ancien régime. Therefore, the tradition of secularism is determined as a 
result of historical heritage. 
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compelling reasons. The positive responsibility of the laic state is to provide an 
environment where people can enjoy freedom of religion and conscience peacefully and 
live according to their convictions. The Court interrelates this principle with the one 
indicated in the Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution and argues that providing 
compulsory religious culture and ethics courses is among the positive responsibilities of 
the laic state. Due to its positive responsibilities, the state cannot stay indifferent to the 
religious needs of society. The Court also made reference to the western countries by 
indicating that according to the investigation of the ECtHR in the Zengin Case, in 43 
countries among the 46 members of the Council of Europe, religious courses are provided 
at school and in 26 of them these courses are compulsory. However, the practices and the 
procedures determining the right of exemption vary from one country to another. 
According to the Constitutional Court this is a proof that the principle of secularism in 
the West, where it flourished, is not applied as negative responsibilities of the state and 
does not lead to the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. As a consequence, the 
Court delineated that the compulsory nature of the DKAB courses requirement stems 
from the positive responsibility of the laic state about religious education. 
 
When it comes to the elective religion courses, the emphasis is made on the fact that 
these courses are on a voluntary basis and in that respect; they are also related to the 
positive responsibilities of the laic state. However, in the application of CHP, it is 
mentioned that the name of the elective course itself “the life of our Prophet” directly 
creates a connection of belonging between the state and (Sunni) Islam. The Court refuted 
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this claim by stating that this course is provided for the adherents of (Sunni) Islam, 
therefore no discrimination is made. For the Koran (Kur’an-ı Kerim) course, it is the 
same. For both courses, as they aimed at the adherents of (Sunni) Islam, the Court finds it 
plausible to utilize the words that display their sacredness. 
 
It is remarkable that the Constitutional Court admitted ties of the state with Islam despite 
its laic character. It is mentioned that there exists an institutional tie between the state and 
Islam religion and that the best instance of such connection is the existence of Directorate 
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), determined by the Article 136 of the 
Turkish Constitution. Therefore, the Court concludes that the principle of laicism 
indicated in Turkish Constitution both prevents regulating state affairs according to 
religion and provides the opportunity to the state to offer religious services including 
religious instruction and education. According to the Court, the state providing Koran 
courses in formal education does not challenge the principle of “unity in education” 
consolidated by the Law on Unification of Education, as claimed by CHP by making 
reference to the Koran courses organized by Diyanet.101 The Court held that the practices 
of these two educations are different and that one education is offered within the formal 
education and the other is within non-formal education. So, according to the Court this 
does not violate the principle of unity in education. As a result, there is no challenge in 
the state to provide religion courses which aims at teaching Islam as elective courses. The 
                                                            
101 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı provides Koran courses after the school hours and in the summer time in 
almost all provinces in Turkey. It is a very widespread application where great number of pupils and 
grownups attend. There are currently approximately 11.000 Koran courses under the supervision of 
Diyanet. For statistical data please visit: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/tanitimistatistik.asp 
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Court also highlighted that there is no restriction about offering new elective courses 
where other religions would be taught; this is upon the decision of the Ministry of 
National Education. Therefore the Court ruled that no discrimination is made against the 
non-Muslims in the country. 
 
 
4.4.2 The Position of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı-DİB) about Religious Courses  
 
As a matter of fact, DİB is an institution which has no autonomy to comment on matters 
especially touching upon state policies; it rather declares the requirements of Islam 
religion and makes determinations according to Islam and its traditions. That is why, as 
Dr. Necdet Subaşı clearly indicated, DİB has no responsibility and autonomy to comment 
on the position of the religious courses unless it is asked by the state authorities. As a 
state institution, DİB is not eligible to make such determinations given the principle of 
laicism. However, it is known that DİB is for the compulsory nature of the DKAB 
courses and supportive on the insertion of new elective religion courses on Sunni Islam. 
 
The position of the DİB in mandatory religious courses matters even if the existence of 
the institution itself is a matter of controversy especially among Alevi community as well 
as for non-Muslims (Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Raporu, 2010). From a very brief outlook it 
can be asserted that DİB perceives the requests of Alevi families for the exemption of 
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their children from compulsory religious courses as a threat.102 In its strategic plan for the 
period of 2009-2013, DİB considered the request of some communities for the annulment 
of compulsory religious education among “threats.”103 This statement makes the position 
of DİB clear about the compulsory religious courses. However, along with the 
government’s attitude towards Alevi community and in line with Alevi opening, DİB 
started to take concrete steps. For instance, it prepared a program for commemoration of 
religious leaders of Alevis and Shi’ites104 for the first time the Head of DİB attended this 
program.105 Even if the Sunni sect of Islam recognizes Husain Ibn Ali as one of the most 
important religious leaders, the DİB had not taken part of commemoration ceremonies 
previously. It would be appropriate to evaluate this step within the overall environment 
where ministers of the AKP Government attended traditional ceremonies of Alevis and 
gave messages of unity and solidarity among Muslims.106  
 
This rapprochement gives a clue about the position of the DİB; it is parallel with the 
state’s attitude towards other religions and sects. Since Alevis are seeking the 
                                                            
102 Özgür Mumcu, “Aleviler Tehdit mi?”, Radikal, 17.01.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1036784&Yazar=ÖZGÜR 
MUMCU&Date=02.11.2011&CategoryID=97 
103 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Stratejik Plan (2009-2013). Available online at: 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/strateji/dokumanlar/diyanet_stratejik_plan.pdf 
104 The ceremony of commemoration for martyrs of Karbala is held every year by Alevis and Shi’ites. The 
grandson (Husain Ibn Ali) of the prophet Mohammad was killed in the Battle of Karbala with his family 
and followers since he refused to follow Yazid I as caliph.  
105“Diyanet’ten Bir İlk”, TRT Haber, 04.12.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.trthaber.com.tr/haber/turkiye/diyanetten-bir-ilk-18743.html 
106 “Kerbela Şehitleri Ankara’da Anıldı”, TRT Haber, 04.12.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.trthaber.com.tr/haber/turkiye/kerbela-sehitleri-ankarada-anildi-18738.html 
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abolishment of both the DİB and of the religious courses,107 DİB perceives the requests 
of annulment of the religious courses not only as wrong but also as threatening. Hence, 
the DİB even though it criticized the decision of the Council of State about exemption of 
an Alevi pupil from religious course in 2008,108 it seems that the stance of DİB is in 
compliance with state’s policies on religious courses. Lastly, on the strategic plan of the 
DİB for the period 2012-2016, it is indicated that the DİB should enhance the education 
program within formal education (Stratejik Plan 2012-2016: 57). 
 
 
4.4.3 The New Elective Religion Courses and the Current Debates  
 
As already delineated, two elective religion courses have been inserted to the curricula to 
be followed by the 2012-2013 term, in the secondary level and high schools. “The life of 
our Prophet” and “Kur’an-ı Kerim” are the elective courses that are determined by the 
law which introduced the new system of education (4+4+4). However, there is a third 
elective religion course which has not been determined by law but introduced to the 
curricula by the Ministry of Education named “Basic Religious Information” (Temel Dini 
Bilgiler). The difference in the status of this latter course with the former is that as it is 
                                                            
107 Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Association which is a foundation that defends the rights of Alevi community will 
give its report concerning their views on the DİB and religious courses to one of the sub-commissions for 
preparing the Constitution with reconciliation. Their view is the total withdrawal of the DİB, which they 
criticize for not being impartial. They also argue for the abolishment of religious courses. Available online 
at: http://www.anayasa2011.com/?p=7744 
108 “Diyanet’ten Danıştay’ın Zorunlu Din Dersi ile İlgili Kararına Sert Tepki,” 06.03.2008. Available online 
at: http://www.haberler.com/diyanet-ten-danistay-in-zorunlu-din-dersi-ile-haberi/ 
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determined by the Ministry of Education, it can be removed or altered by the Ministry 
and the schools are not obliged to provide this course. It is the case for the rest of all 
elective courses, if the school proves to lack infrastructure or teacher it is not an 
obligation to offer these optional courses. However, for the elective religion courses 
determined by law, the schools are obliged to offer these two courses. 
 
The problems arising from this principle during the 2012-2013 term have not been widely 
publicized yet, there are only minor reflections of the debate on media.109 According to 
the interview held by a specialist from the EU Delegation to Turkey, it is obvious that in 
the forthcoming progress report on Turkey, complaints about the practice of the new 
elective courses will be included. However, there are also positive developments for the 
recognition of religious rights and freedoms within the context of the elective religion 
courses. On September 2012, the Ministry of National Education asked the religious 
communities to prepare the relevant content for the elective course “Basic Religious 
Information.”110 The Association of Protestant Churches perceives this step taken by the 
state as a very positive move towards further enhancements of rights and freedoms of 
non-Muslim communities in Turkey. It is highly probable that this initiative will also take 
part in the Progress Report of 2013. There had been widespread debates about those 
courses mostly for the reasons delineated above within the context of application of CHP 
                                                            
109 For the article that depicted the issue from different sides and which overlaps with the content of this 
study please see: Milliyet, 15.01.2013, “Türkiye’de Alevilik: ‘seçmeli Din Dersinde Dışlanacağım’ 
Kaygısı” http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-de-alevilik-secmeli-din-dersi-nde-dislanacagim-kaygisi-
/gundem/gundemdetay/15.01.2013/1655403/default.htm 
110Radikal, 19.09.2012, “Seçmelide Tarihi Adım.” 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/secmelide_tarihi_adim-1100843 
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to the Constitutional Court arguing that two main principles of the Constitution have been 
breached; the principle of laicism (Articles 2 and 24), impartiality of the state regarding 
religious freedom, the principle of unity in education (Article 174) and the principle of 
equality before law (Article 10). 
 
Dr. Aykan Erdemir, as an MP from CHP emphasizes the situation about religious 
education in Turkey had been a regression with the introduction of the elective courses. 
He stated that at the beginning of his political career he was fighting for the change in the 
Article 24 of the Constitution that makes the DKAB courses compulsory but that now, 
there are two more “compulsory elective” religion courses, as he calls them, which 
infringe on human rights according to his opinion. Mr. Erdemir provides an example 
from his electoral district, Bursa, and stated that he had seen a form for elective courses 
where an Alevi pupil had to attend three religion courses since no other elective courses 
are offered. Such examples and complaints were also expressed by Mr. Hüseyin Aygün. 
He further alleged that he was worried that the policies of assimilation and discrimination 
would turn into physical violence directed at Alevis. 
 
A similar complaint about the “compulsory nature of the elective religion courses” came 
from Diyarbakır. In the report of the Association of Protestant Churches, it is mentioned 
that the daughter of the Pasteur of Diyarbakır Protestant Church had to attend one of the 
elective religion courses since no other elective course was offered. In the report, it is 
indicated that the school administration did not enforce the pupil to attend those courses 
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but as there is no other optional course, if she does not attend one of those courses she 
was going to fail since she would not be able to fulfill the credit to pass to the next grade. 
The reason for not offering other elective courses is explained by the school 
administration by the fact that other students did not want to attend any other course. The 
request of the parents for their child to attend other elective courses in another school 
nearby is refuted by the school administration. After many meetings with the Provincial 
Directorate of National Education, it was decided to change the school of the pupil. 
However, the problems that the pupil can face due to changing his/her school because of 
such a reason are still matters of question, as it is indicated on the report. This problem 
arising from local practices, which does not seem to be unique, is also taken into account 
in the latest progress report on Turkey for 2013. Nonetheless, the Report indicated that 
non-Muslim students are faced with lesser difficulties in getting exemption and that a 
new content is being prepared for Christian pupils by the Christian authorities. 
 
A matter of debate has been again about the practice of Koran courses. With the new 
system of education there had also been an amendment about school dress codes. The 
standard clothing for pupils attending all grades used to be uniforms but with the 
amendments made, the obligation to wear uniforms was annulled. This implied that 
female students were going to be able, if not expected, to attend Koran courses with 
headscarf. As a matter of fact, this is a sensitive issue in Turkey and such a debate 
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concerning the religious symbols in primary, secondary and high schools seem to cause 
very fervent debates in Turkey.111 
 
Another important debate about the religious courses that Dr. Erdemir expressed his 
concerns is the insertion of the questions concerning religion in the university entrance 
exam (Yüksek Öğretime Geçiş Sınavı – YGS).112 During our interview, he was requested 
to inform about his rejection to the question and argument for the cancellation of one 
question among DKAB questions; the one concerning Alevism.113 Dr. Erdemir pointed 
out that his main criticism is directed to the very existence of such courses in the 
university entrance exam. He attracts attention to the fact that it is indicated on the 
questionnaire that the questions on DKAB are only to be responded by pupils who are 
legally obliged to take those courses, the students and graduates of İmam Hatip Schools. 
For those who are not obliged to attend DKAB courses or the ones who take them with a 
different curriculum, five alternative questions on philosophy were offered. However, in 
the view of Dr. Erdemir, with this indication on the questionnaire it gives the impression 
that the questions are not “compulsory” but “elective.” He stated that given the difficulty, 
if not impossibility in the recent years, of the exemption from DKAB courses, many 
students who are obliged to attend those courses as long as they could not be legally 
exempted are also obliged to answer those questions.  
                                                            
111 NTVMSNBC, 27 November 2012, “Kıyafet Zorunluluğu Kalktı.” Please see: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25401220 
112 The questions concerning the DKAB courses are inserted for the first time to the university entrance 
exam (YGS) in the year of 2013. Five questions were asked based on the content of the DKAB courses. 
113 For the statements of Dr. Aykan Erdemir about the YGS question concerning Alevism, please see the 
related part his personal webpage: http://www.aykanerdemir.net/basindaki-yankilar/731/ 
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About the course concerning Alevism, Dr. Erdemir affirmed that he perceives the 
insertion of this question among other religion questions as again aimed at giving the 
impression that the questions on religion were asked from a supra-sectarian perspective. 
Nonetheless, when the question on Alevism is examined, Dr. Erdemir indicated that it is 
based on a Sunni understanding of an Alevi notion. According to his view, as this 
question determines a different understanding (Sunni version) for the Alevi notion than 
what Alevi pupils learn at home, it causes discrimination. In addition, due to this 
discrepancy of interpretation, the question can be considered as distractor for Alevi 
students. For these reasons, Dr. Erdemir argued that the question concerning Alevism 
should be cancelled and the authorities owe an apology to Alevis. Moreover, during the 
interview he mentioned that the alternative questions on philosophy proposed for the 
pupils who are not legally obliged to attend the DKAB courses, were mainly based on 
philosophy of religion. Therefore the aim of all those questions is to indoctrinate the 
Turkish youth in accordance with the teachings of Sunni Islam. According to his view, 
this general attitude cannot be solved only with an amendment to the Constitution or by 
making new laws concerning religious education in the country. Dr. Erdemir highlighted 
that creating “otherness” and discrimination against the “other” as well as the feelings of 




4.4.4 The View of the Opposition Parties on the Religious Education in 
Turkey 
 
The main position of CHP about religious instruction in formal education is that they 
should not be compulsory. Leaving aside this principle embraced by all CHP MPs, it is 
argued that there are discrepancies among CHP deputies about how to conduct religious 
education. In order to have an understanding about the issue, Dr. Erdemir was requested 
to inform us about whether the main opposition party, had concrete proposals for the 
religious education in Turkey. Especially, given the sensitivity of the party for Alevis in 
the country, he was queried about whether they were going to propose content for a new 
elective religion course on Alevism, whether they engaged in such a preparation and or 
for the elevation of Alevi teachers who would teach those courses. Dr. Erdemir replied 
that their concrete policy about religious education they put forward is the annulment of 
the Constitutional provision concerning compulsory DKAB courses. In addition, despite 
different views within the party, as Dr. Erdemir is against the idea of providing religious 
education by the state but rather argues that it should be left to individuals and religious 
communities, he has no proposal that would be integrated within the current system 
which he opposes.  
 
Mr. Hüseyin Aygün, shared this view with Dr. Erdemir and stated during our interview 
that religious affairs should be left to the individuals and communities with only limited 
state supervision in terms of protecting rights and freedoms. However, Mr. Türmen 
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indicated during our interview that he perceives state control on religious education in 
terms of determining its principles as necessary to protect the laic character of the state 
since some religious communities may pose a threat to that principle. At the end of the 
day, it seems that the reasons for CHP of not offering concrete policies are first, the lack 
of consensus among the MPs on how to conduct religious education and secondly, their 
rejection to offer any kind of proposal that would be integrated to the existent system to 
which they are commonly against. This stance of CHP can be observed in the draft 
Constitution they have prepared; it is suggested that religious courses should not be 
compulsory in order to strengthen the emphasis on laicism.114 
 
As a rightwing political party, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) defends that religious 
culture and ethics courses should keep their compulsory status and in addition, the 
obstacles before religious education should be removed.115 The Independence and 
Democracy Party (BDP) is also for the compulsory religious courses. Furthermore, as 
Mr. Türmen and Dr. Erdemir highlighted during the interviews, the law on the new 
system of education has been approved with consensus between AKP, MHP and BDP 
despite the strict opposition of CHP. At the end of 2011,  a commission of reconciliation 
was established to prepare the new Constitution with the participation of representatives 
                                                            
114 “CHP laikliği değiştirecek”, Radikal, 17.03.2011. Available online at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1043196&Date=03.11.2011
&CategoryID=77 
115 “Eğitimde hak, özgürlük ve saygı”, Radikal, 08.06.2011. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/egitimde_hak_ozgurluk_ve_saygi-1052095 
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from all political parties.116 In such an environment of diverse opinions, it is questionable 
to what extent these political parties will reach a consensus on the status of religious 
education and instruction in the new Constitution.117 
 
 
4.4.5 Preparation of the New Constitution and Religious Courses 
 
As already mentioned in the above sections, prior to the introduction of the new system 
of education, the discussion about religious instruction in formal education revolved 
around the compulsory nature of the DKAB courses and the matter of the question was 
whether they would become elective in the new Constitution. Due to the change in the 
system and the insertion of elective religion courses, some118 argued that this was a step 
back and that reversing the process, which made religious education provided by the 
state, has become much difficult. Mr. Türmen, who is also member of the Parliamentary 
Commission for the preparation of the new Constitution, stated that he was very 
pessimistic about annulment of the compulsory DKAB courses from the Constitution. Dr. 
Erdemir also highlighted that given the Sunni majority in the country both as voters and 
as political parties in the parliament (AKP, MHP and BDP), it is almost impossible to 
                                                            
116 “Anayasa uzlaşma komisyonu toplantısı sona erdi”, Cumhuriyet, 19.10.2011. Available online at: 
http://cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=286656 
117 Prof. Dr. Levent Köker is currently employed at Atılım University, the Department of Law. He has 
taken part of the Alevi Workshops and is involved in the process of Constitution-making. He was 
interviewed on 22 March 2013 at Atılım University, Ankara. 
118 Among the interviewees; Dr. Aykan Erdemir, Mr. Rıza Türmen, Mr. Hüseyin Aygün and Mr. Kazım 
Genç. 
155 
think of the annulment of the compulsory DKAB courses from the Constitution. Such a 
movement would come into being only with an understanding of “doing a favor” for non-
Sunni communities in Turkey, according to Dr. Erdemir, and not as a result of the 
enhancement of rights and freedoms; a very low probability. 
 
However, Prof. Dr. Levent Köker, as a member of the Constitutional Commission, 
commented that the introduction of the elective religion courses can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the intention for the annulment of the compulsory DKAB courses. He argued 
that given that the electorate of AKP would not accept total abolishment of the DKAB 
courses without a replacement and that the insertion of the elective religion courses 
would be commented as a prerequisite of the abolishment of compulsory nature of the 
DKAB courses with the new Constitution. Therefore, he was optimistic about this move 
which would give an end to the challenges arising from the compulsory nature of the 
DKAB courses and at the same time, would lead to a smooth transition from compulsory 
to elective courses. However, given the general atmosphere in the country, it seems that 
the need for a course within formal education which informs about religions from 
objective and pluralistic perspectives without prioritizing any of them and free from any 
kind of indoctrination would still be a matter of feverish debate. 
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Mr. Ayhan Bilgen,119 who is also taking an active role in the Constitution making process 
on the part of the NGOs, expects just small steps about the position of the DKAB courses 
in the new Constitution. He stated during our interview that the best indicators to 
understand the intention of the government about the position of the DKAB courses were 
Alevi Workshops, where the needs and expectations of Alevis were clearly put forward. 
Given that Alevis agreed that the compulsory nature of those courses should be abolished 
but no step has been taken yet by the government, it seems that this status will be kept in 
the new Constitution. The best option in his opinion is not to make religious courses 
elective, which means that the ones who would like to attend those courses will affirm it. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Bilgen foresees that at best, the margin for exemption can be expanded 
and this practice which will still be based on negative affirmation contradicts the very 
essence of rights and freedoms. 
 
Mr. Hüseyin Aygün was also pessimistic about the new Constitution, in the sense that he 
was not expecting more space for rights and freedoms in a general sense. For the specific 
issue of religious courses, he indicated that the attitude of the state was based on further 
emphasis on the Sunni version of Islam rather than a comprehensive understanding which 
embraces other beliefs than Sunni Islam. With the insertion of these new elective courses, 
Mr. Aygün claimed, Alevi students are facing more discriminatory practices. The new 
Constitution will not annul the existing provision about the compulsory DKAB course, in 
                                                            
119 Mr. Ayhan Bilgen is human rights activist who has been head of MAZLUM-DER and had taken part of 
the formation of İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu (İHOP). He is currently taking part of the administration of 
the Human Rights Association and is actively involved in the Constitution-making process with other 
NGOs. Mr. Bilgen was interviewed on 20 February 2013 in Ankara.  
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his view. Moreover, he admitted that he is expecting more polarization in the country in 
the near future not only because of the preparation of the new Constitution but also due to 
the discriminatory policies followed by the government based on belief. Mr. Aygün also 
expressed his perception about the new environment in which the Constitution is debated 
and indicated that the Kurdish issue is considered to be so vital that no one is interested in 
Alevis. His main resentment here was that Alevis were ignored since they did not attempt 
at terrorism and violent actions despite the great population they have in this country. 
 
From a broader perspective, it seems obvious that the main focus of the discussions about 
the new Constitution for Turkey is not the position of the religious courses. The 
contemporary debates are revolving around the Presidency system, which was proposed 
by the AKP government, and the status of Kurds. Therefore, even though the specialists 
and the actors taking part of the constitution making process were questioned during the 
interviews about their projections concerning the position of religious courses in the new 
Constitution, they rightly referred to the general atmosphere in Turkey. Given the density 
of the issues on the political agenda of the country, religious education is not always a hot 
topic. Despite this fact, there are still considerable number of aspects and debates 






CHAPTER 5  
 
 
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS CONCERNING THE 




This chapter consists of two main parts which are aimed to offer an appropriate ground 
for analyzing the impact of Europeanization on religious education in Poland from the 
theoretical perspective. The first part of the chapter depicts the historical context where 
the religious education is evaluated within a broader understanding of the role of religion 
and education in the foundation of the country. The second part consists of the legal 
documents regulating religious instruction both in domestic and international law.  
 
The chapter portrays how the historical role of religion and education provides evidence 
for the sociological institutionalist approach of Europeanization theory in explaining the 
Polish case. In other words, the historical and legal contexts which give an insight on 
Poland’s path of Europeanization can be best explained by the social learning model of 
sociological institutionalism. To be precise, the investigation of the historical background 
of Poland delineates that the political culture of the country; which is counted among the 
mediating factors for the domestic change according to sociological institutionalism, has 
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been harmonious with the necessary changes emanating from Europeanization. The legal 
context also displays that the domestic legal documents concerning the conduct of 
religious education have not been subject to severe criticisms from the European 
institutions which results in smooth integration of the country. 
 
 
5.1 Historical Outlook on Religion and Education in Polish Identity 
 
The historical evaluation initiates with the 16th century, where one can start to overtly 
observe the role of religion and education within the Polish culture. For sure, it is not a 
given date and the analysis could have started with another époque. Nonetheless, in the 
literature references are made to this century while attracting attention to religious 
tolerance as one of the main characteristics of Polish history. In addition, many 
interviewees pointed at the 16th century while framing the underpinnings of contemporary 
Poland with specific reference to religion and education. Therefore, for the scope of this 






5.1.1 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1572-1795) (Also known as 
the Noble Republic (1569-1795)) 
 
By the 16th century, Poland was transformed into a decentralized state where power was 
accumulated in the hands of regional assemblies and the noble estate (Biskupski, 2000: 
11). The country was ruled at that time by an elected King and a common Sejm 
(parliament) (Davies, 1986: 296). This state was called Respublica or Rzeczpopolita, the 
united Republic of Poland-Lithuania or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Davies, 
1986: 296). “The Commonwealth was a more cumbersome federation than a unified 
state” and that is why it is difficult to consider it as a well-functioning state (Lukowski 
and Zawadzki, 2006: 86). Poland, or the Commonwealth as it was usually called, 
displayed a western inclination with the Latin alphabet it used, Catholicism and later on 
with the inclusion of Protestantism when it became widespread in Europe (Biskupski, 
2000: 11). The Royal Republic allowed one class; the szlachta to dominate the country, 
to have exclusive rights, freedoms and privileges (Biskupski, 2000: 13). This class was 
not mainly based on wealth but on nobility and they held monopoly over the law courts, 
church offices, and the legislature (Parker, 2003: 104). During the creation of Royal 
Republic in 1572, the Protestant Reformation had adherents in Poland especially among 
the szlachta and this religious heterogeneity had a positive impact on the inclusion of the 
principle of religious toleration to a nation’s constitution for the first time in a European 
country (Biskupski, 2000: 14). The existence of the szlachta which constituted itself a 
threat to the unity of the country and their having word on state affairs are highlighted 
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among the reasons that precipitated the loss of national sovereignty. The legal status of 
the szlachta was annulled when the country went into total partition at the hands of three 
states; the Russian Empire, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia in 1795 (Davies, 1986: 
331). 
 
Given the dominance of the szlachta, the education system aimed at providing instruction 
to children (sons) of nobles and was under the rule of the Roman Catholic Church, but 
specifically in the hands of Jesuits. Therefore, the education, similar to the rest of Europe; 
consisted of classical subjects like Latin, rhetoric and grammar which required less 
reasoning and more memorization (Parker, 2003: 107). With this specificity, the 
education was in line with the religious underpinnings of society. Most of the people 
living on that territory did not have the opportunity to access education and the ones who 
could get instruction were educated in a way that no practical knowledge was provided. 
Collegium Nobilium, for instance, was a school founded in Warsaw in 1740 with the aim 
of cultivating future political elites of Poland among the sons of nobles with adequate 
practical knowledge (Kloczowski, 2000: 180). Therefore, reform in the education system 
was going to serve as a vehicle for the survival of the state where nobles were going to 
actively participate in the economic production of the country. 
 
The need for educational institutions raising children, at least the sons of nobles who 
would be successful entrepreneurs, gave rise to the foundation of the first secular 
education institution in Warsaw; Szkoła Rycerska (Knight’s School) in 1765 (Parker, 
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2003: 107-8). This step was taken under the influence of the Enlightenment and the 
statesmen like Stanislaw Konarski, an educator, and Stanislaw-August, the last Polish 
King, who were impressed by that philosophy (Davies, 1986: 307). Both nobles and 
church educators have been supportive of the implementation of a more modern school 
system so that the progress in this field was made by those who were already working 
within the church system of schools (Parker, 2003: 108). In addition, the formation of a 
new model of the Church of the Catholic Enlightenment that was materialized in the 
Constitution of 1791, with the acknowledgement of Catholicism as the dominant religion, 
created a highly favorable atmosphere given that it was original in its openness to 
development (Kloczowski, 2000: 186). 
 
 
5.1.2 Progress in the Education System: The National Education 
Commission (1773) 
 
Reform in education system that took place in the eighteenth century is worth 
investigating since it can be considered as the beginning of the most prevalent mentality 
that affected the education system of Poland in the subsequent periods to this day. The 
turning point for the education system of Poland thus dates back to the 18th century where 
the Komisja Edukacji Narodowej (KEN) (National Education Commission), was 
established in 1773 as the first of its kind in Europe (Davies, 1986: 310). The foundation 
of the Commission was directly linked to the philosophy of the Enlightenment which 
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embraced a universal understanding for education indicating equal access regardless of 
class. The Commission primarily aimed at providing secular and civic education which 
would contribute to the elevation of the nation both economically and politically (Parker 
2003). KEN has been the first centrally-organized national education system in Europe 
which made particular emphasis on the importance of equal opportunity for education 
stating that education should not be in the service of one privileged class but rather work 
as an agent of overall growth of the nation. In that sense, the Commission worked as a 
kind of ministry of education which held universal control over the system of education 
including universities and parish schools (Kloczowski, 2000: 182). 
 
The Commission also acted as the driving force behind the consolidation of culture and 
nationhood. KEN asked opinion of intellectuals both in Poland and abroad for shaping 
the new system. Those opinions shared the same point about the general character of the 
education to be provided; it was expected to be useful and practical and ethics, which 
would serve as social glue for solidarity, was planned to be taught rather than religion 
which would spread spirituality (Parker, 2003: 112). All these propositions were 
incorporated in a curriculum prepared in 1794. The universality principle for education 
was consolidated with the opportunity for all children from all classes to be admitted at 
state elementary schools. Nonetheless, for the secondary school such universality could 
not be embraced given that the provision of “qualified” students was added to the 
admission criteria which implicitly meant the sons of nobles (Parker, 2003: 113). 
 
164 
However, despite the good will of the Commission, the conditions of the country were 
inadequate to actualize the plans. First of all, there was a severe material constraint in 
terms of both lack of investment and infrastructure. New schools, textbooks, preparation 
of curricula required financial resources which were scarce at that time in Poland. 
Secondly, the destruction of Jesuits, whose property constituted the material basis for the 
Commission, had a very negative impact on the schooling system (Kloczowski, 2000: 
182). Thirdly, the Church did not support this reform because anything new would be 
threatening. Lastly, Polish peasants were conservative and they had religious concerns in 
complying with these innovations (Parker, 2003: 113). Therefore, no concrete progress 
could be made in the field of education given the material and ideational constraints. 
 
 
5.1.3 Religion and Education in Poland under Partition (1795-1918) 
 
Poland under partition between the years 1795 and 1918 was subject to different legacies 
which were also reflected in the field of education. The first partition took place in 1772 
with Russian, Habsburg and Prussian invasion of the country (Biskupski, 2000: 18). With 
the second partition by Russia and Prussia, the remaining independent territory was 
condemned to disestablish in 1793 (Biskupski, 2000: 18). Lastly, “the three partitioners 
joined in a final act of extermination, and Poland disappeared from the map of Europe” in 
1795 (Biskupski, 2000: 18).  
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As the Polish population was divided among three nations, they were faced with the 
assimilation policies of these countries. Under those circumstances Polish culture should 
be credited for having survived despite the lack of national sovereignty for more than a 
century. Polish culture and language were preserved due to “both formal (via schools and 
universities) and informal (via social and religious organizations) networks of knowledge 
transmission” (Parker 2003). Therefore, the demise of Poland as a state has been a tough 
task which certainly had implications for building of the education system. 
 
Under Russian partition, Poland was faced with the most severe restrictions given the 
historical enmity between the two nations. In the field of education, particularly, there 
was a bifurcated policy followed for Poles living on the territory now acquired by 
Russians. Since the first partition took place in 1773 where the Commission of National 
Education was newly founded, the Polish lands gained in this partition by Russia were 
not affected by the reforms of the Commission. On those lands, the reign of the Church 
over education continued which was still to the advantage of the nobles (Wroczynski, 
1996 quoted in Parker, 2003: 121-2). But the schools on the territories acquired in the 
following two partitions were influenced by the reforms of the Commission and thus 
were not treated positively by the Russian authorities as they were perceived as a threat to 
Russian power. Despite this negative attitude, Polish educational tradition can be said to 
have survived under Russian rule. 
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The Prussian Partition mainly brought the Germanization effort to the lands occupied. 
Russification and Germanization efforts reached a peak in the 1870s so that the two 
nations intensified their struggles over control of the education (Davies, 1986: 170). The 
Germanization of Poles by Prussians was smoother than Russification in the sense that 
they tried to make it happen by providing progress in the fields like urbanization and 
industrialization; in fact this was the natural and painless way of doing it (Davies, 1986: 
171). In an environment of mutual respect, “Polish elementary schools continued to exist 
wherever the population was predominantly Polish” (Parker, 2003: 122). So, education of 
Polish people under Prussian rule, with a possible exception of the Ken schools, could 
preserve its status. 
 
When it comes to Austrian Partition, unlike Russians and Prussians, Austrian authorities 
aimed to gain loyalty of the Polish people “by granting them regional autonomy” 
(Davies, 1986: 171). When Austria occupied Galicia, it was the poorest region of the 
three partitions so that education was seen as a luxury (Davies, 1986: 171). Therefore, 
there was not much demand for primary and elementary schools. Given the 
heterogeneous character of Austrians, no language was dictated for Polish people and 
thanks to that, despite the economic deficiency of Austrian rule, Poles experienced a 
relative tolerance for their education and preservation of their culture. 
 
The legacy of Poland that was brought from the era of partitions can be summarized as 
the difficult but successful survival of the Polish culture. Even though the Commission of 
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National Education could not do much in the country mainly because of the partitions, it 
should be noted that education remained as a major factor of the collective memory. The 
universality principle does not seem to be applied on the lands of partition; nobles 
preserved their privileged position in society, specifically in the admission to schools. In 
addition, contrary to what has been aimed by the Commission, the conduct of the 
curriculum and the content of the subjects taught at schools were left in the hands of the 
Church and monastic orders which were in a very strong position in the country at that 
time (Kloczowski, 2000: 186). During the years of partition, providing wide access to 
education was the main purpose of Poles, while the contents and the curricula had been 
almost overlooked (Eurybase, 2010: 17). Here it is difficult to talk about religious 
education as a separate subject; religion rather seems to the factor shaping and regulating 
the overall structure of education. This highlights that the impact of religion rather than 
rational thinking reigned over education of the Polish population during the years of 
partition. It should be noted once more that Polish culture shall be given credit for having 
survived under the rule of different nations.  
 
 
5.1.4 The Second Republic 1918-1939 
 
When the First World War was terminated in 1918, there was no country as Poland; there 
were no borders, established territory, government or constitution (Davies, 1986: 115). In 
such an environment the resurgence of Poland can be correlated with the outbreak of war 
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itself, which caused the dissolution of the partitioning empires. Though another factor 
which gave rebirth to Poland was “the existence of a large concentration of Poles who 
exhibited a high degree of national consciousness” (Biskupski, 2000: 38). The reason of 
calling this period the Second Republic lies beneath in the belief of Poles that it is the 
reincarnation of the First Republic which demised at the end of the 18th century under 
partitions of various nations. The Second Republic was constituted of different nations; 
no unity of language could have been acquired among those people. The economic 
sources of the country were scarce and the wealth was dispersed among the particular 
national minorities and particular social classes (Davies, 1986: 120). The lack of financial 
resources did not impede improvements made in the fields of culture and education but 
the country was unable to support extra demarches. 
 
By the end of the First World War, Poles had to continue to fight to determine their 
frontiers in three-year time. From 1921, the country only saw political instability. Like 
most of the states in the Central and Eastern Europe, a democratic regime could not last 
long in Poland. There had been many coalition governments between 1921 and 1926 
which could not bring the country stability and prosperity (Davies, 1986: 122). In May 
1926 a military take over took place headed by Jozef Pilsudski120 and the coup took its 
name from the slogan of Sanacja, which means “a return to political health” (Davies, 
1986: 125). This is not considered a formal dictatorship since the parliament, the political 
                                                            
120 Marshal Jozef Pilsudski is an important figure in Polish history who was the first President of the 
Second Republic. He was a prominent leader who gave an end to the partitions in Poland after two 
centuries and fought for the freedom of the country. He was also a remarkable figure in European politics 
during the period between the two World Wars.    
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parties and the opposition all continued to exist. Nonetheless, the army made its power 
felt in social areas like culture and education; in order to consolidate cultural assimilation 
(Davies, 1986: 125). In line with the goal of Pilsudski, the cultural intensification, sense 
of nationality and belonging, devotion to the state were enhanced within a more clearly 
defined system of education (Davies, 1986: 125). However, the environment both within 
the country and abroad were hostile enough. Dictatorships in the neighboring countries 
posed threat for this country which was unable to consolidate its regime which struggled 
with political instability and economic scarcity (Biskupski, 2000: 7). 
 
In terms of the education system, there had been an important attempt right after the war, 
on 1919, known as the Teacher’s Assembly (Sejm Nauczycielski) (Parker, 2003: 126). 
This was a meeting held by educators to determine the appropriate methods for a 
democratic system of education regardless of class. They proposed a seven-year universal 
primary school, instead of four and five-year ones; and reduction of one-teacher schools. 
It also offered that professional educators rather than bureaucrats should have control 
over school administrations (Parker, 2003: 127). These propositions could not be 
implemented given the general atmosphere; with ongoing political and economic 
struggles in the country. To be highlighted here, however, was the willingness of the 
educators to provide a democratic and universal education for all children with the aim of 
seeding the idea of nationalism and devotion to the state. Therefore, a fair evaluation of 
the success of the Sejm shall be based on the principles it tried to purport rather than the 
extent to which those principles could be implemented. This is a remarkable point in 
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assessing the importance given to education at the foundation of the Polish nation, 
especially after very long decades of partition, even in an environment of political and 
economic frustration. “The Decree on seven-year compulsory school of 7 February 1919, 
and the Act on establishing and running common public schools of 1922 served this 
purpose” and at the end of the day, compulsory primary education has been a significant 
achievement given that it led to a considerable fall in the illiteracy rate (Eurybase, 
2010:18). The compulsory seven-year elementary education has been reaffirmed in 1921 
Constitution despite the lack of infrastructure in terms of both number of teachers and 
schools (Stachura, 2004: 104). With further major reform legislation in 1924 and 1932 
further enhancement in the education system has been achieved (Stachura, 2004: 104). 
 
Another turning point in the field of education was the introduction of a new law on 
schooling in 1932; this law is also known as “School Reform of Janusz Jedrzejewicz.”121 
As Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment (from 1931 to 1934), 
he introduced a reform of the school system. In compliance with his statist ideology, the 
reform offered a uniform seven-year primary education (Parker, 2003: 132). According to 
this law, there were different types of elementary schools; the first type (Level I Schools) 
was for rural children and because of the education it offered, the graduates were not 
eligible to continue their studies in the secondary schools (Parker, 2003: 132). 
Nonetheless, there had been an expansion in the number of the secondary schools. The 
                                                            
121 Janusz Jedrzejewicz was an important political figure who has been active in the Second Republic. He 
was deputy in the Sejm between 1928 and 1935. For more information please see:  
http://www.premier.gov.pl/en/prime_minister/history/janusz_jedrzejewicz,2039/ 
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state system where the impact of the Catholic Church was high, religious instruction 
became compulsory and crucial part of the curriculum (Stachura, 2004: 205). Only a 
small number of private ethnic minority schools could exist, especially for Germans and 
Jews, where pupils were educated according to those cultures (Stachura, 2004: 205). 
 
The law on the education reform was criticized by educators from different political 
views. The main criticism was directed at the universality of the program; in other words 
the facts that there was inequality among the different classes of society in terms of the 
education they receive at elementary school and the lack of opportunity for the admission 
to secondary schools was highlighted. The organization established by the teachers that 
shared a more libertarian view, Society for Democratic Education, indicated on their 
monthly journal that they were demanding “children to be freed from the mandatory 
school requirement, that there be established a uniform and completely free system of 
universal education in children’s native language, ... that compulsory religious education 
be stopped...” (Wroczynski, 1996: 264-5 quoted in Parker, 2003: 133). Once more, both 
the reform and the criticisms targeted the education program were overshadowed by the 
international environment where the Great Depression as well as the military threats from 
Germany and Russia were on the scene. Here what is noteworthy is that the School 
Reform of Janusz Jedrzejewicz inserted religious education to the curriculum as a 
mandatory subject. This suggests that the education had not been detached from the 
Church and its influence was still present. 
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The role of religion in the Second Republic should also be taken into consideration as it 
was a matter of fervent debates. At the end of the First World War, the controversy was 
mainly between the rightists who advocated that Catholicism was inseparable from Polish 
culture and the leftists who viewed the Catholic Church as an impediment to the 
modernization of the country (Stachura, 2004: 102). Until the 1921 Constitution state-
church relations were not determined within a legal framework. The promulgation of the 
1921 Constitution and the signing of the Concordat between Poland and the Vatican in 
1925 were the first attempts to define this relationship (Stachura, 2004: 102). The fact 
that the position of the Church was not defined properly caused ambiguity but it was a 
deliberate move of the government that primarily aimed at leaving itself more room for 
maneuver. The 1921 Constitution rejected the complete separation of church and state, 
and acknowledged close ties with Catholicism even if it did not recognize Catholicism as 
the official religion (Stachura, 2004: 103). The Constitution rather defined the status of 
the Church as primus inter pares122 among other Polish institutions (Stachura, 2004: 
103). 
 
After 1930, the Catholic Church assertively held a confrontational stance against 
Communism, atheism and non-Catholic religions in Poland and a more positive attitude 
towards the Sanacja (Stachura, 2004: 102-3). The Constitution of 1935 did not make any 
amendments for the position of the Church determined in the prior constitution. The 
Sanacja was at best distant to the Church but at the end of the day “the influence of the 
                                                            
122 First among equals 
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Catholic-patriotic ethos was felt, directly or indirectly, in many areas of cultural and 
educational activity” in the Second Republic (Stachura, 2004: 103).  
 
 
5.1.5 Preservation of Polish Culture during the Second World War (1939-
1945) 
 
Poland is among the countries which suffered the most in the Second World War and the 
wartime lasted very long in this country which resulted in a loss of six million Polish 
citizens out of thirty-five millions (Davies, 1986: 64). The war has not ended all of a 
sudden, it has rather suspended even after 1945 in Poland. During the long years of war, 
Poland had been occupied both by Nazis and the USSR and it had to fight against the 
tyranny of both on its territory. During the era of Nazi-Soviet pact (1939-1941), Polish 
priests, teachers, and political leaders were transported elsewhere or were shot (Davies, 
1986: 66). 
 
In the period of Nazi supremacy (1941-1943) more severe policies were followed against 
Polish culture and education since it saw education as the main source of the Polish ethos. 
Nazis closed down the schools in the western territories they occupied (Parker, 2004: 
138). In those schools, teachers were replaced by Germans and courses were started to be 
given in German language (Parker, 2004: 138). This was not only a change of content or 
medium of education; children of that age were compelled to work in forced labor 
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(Davies, 1986: 73). Polish people resorted to illegal ways in many fields and in education 
alike; Polish language lessons which were banned in schools above the elementary grade 
were offered by a Secret Teaching Organization in order to preserve the Polish culture 
and language (Davies, 1986: 73). One of three children was educated in this way so that 
the great numbers could learn Polish language and intellectual culture could survive 
during the occupation which also empowered the resistance forces. Therefore, contrary to 
what had been expected, under tough pressure of the Nazi regime, Polish people could 
preserve their culture through underground education. It was so successful that many 




5.1.6 Religion and Education under the Communist Rule in Poland (1945-
1989) 
 
After the war, between 1945 and 1948, Poland became part of the Soviet Bloc. In this 
period, the country went into deep political instability. None of the governments stayed in 
power for more than few a months. In 1948, the two prominent political parties decided 
to unite to form the Polish United Workers’ Party – PZPR, which had a hegemonic 
position for several years (Davies, 2005: 408). This new term was going to be the era of 
‘Stalinist Poland’ enhancing the idea of communism in the country. In 1952, a new 
constitution that was amended by Stalin himself determined the working class as the 
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‘leading class in society’ and proclaimed the foundation of the Polish People’s Republic 
(Lukowski and Zavadzki, 2006: 286). It is difficult to talk about a democratic 
environment in the country where the lists to be elected were dictated by the PZPR and 
the role of the Sejm was reduced to the approval of the decisions made by the government 
(Lukowski and Zavadzki, 2006: 286-7). All the institutions in the country were under the 
rule of the Communist Party, which left no room for democratic maneuver for them. The 
Church had been separated from the State, in fact, they have never been unified (Davies, 
2005: 436). The judicial system, trade unions, youth and student organizations and the 
press faced severe Party control (Lukowski and Zavadzki, 2006:287). 
 
This was one side of the coin and on the other side, Poland was experiencing 
homogeneity for the first time both in religious and national terms with the unfortunate 
killings of Jews by Germans and many others by the Soviets and later the expulsion of 
millions of Germans (Biskupski, 2000: 125). In addition to that extermination, the 
frontier and population changes also contributed to the homogenization of religion, in 
other words, “for the first time since the fourteenth century, Poland was now an 
overwhelmingly Catholic country” (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 283). This situation 
had an impact on the status of the Church. Even though the 1925 Concordat was annulled 
by the Soviet government in 1945, both the homogeneous society and the patriotic 
behavior of the Church enhanced the position of the Church in Polish society (Lukowski 
and Zawadzki, 2006: 283). This attitude of the Church during wartime which wasgreatly 
appreciated by Polish people led to a closer self-identification of Poles with the Church 
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even more than the period prior to 1939 (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 283). However, 
the Marxist view which is generally associated with atheism has been incorporated in the 
policies of Stalin that overtly treated the Roman Catholic Church in a very antagonistic 
way. 
 
With the intent of the change of economic structure, the need for an educated youth 
emerged more than ever after the Second World War. With a new arrangement made in 
1945, the school system has been determined to consist of three stages. The first level 
from grades 1 to 5 were going to be elementary school, the second level which means 
grades from 6 to 8 were called gimnazyum (lower secondary school) and grades between 
9-11 were going to be liceum (Parker, 2004: 142). The first two stages were planned to be 
compulsory (Fiszman, 1972: 32). The education system was shaped in accordance with 
the mentality which encouraged raising of children who were prepared and conditioned to 
further progress (Fiszman, 1972:28). Despite the shortage of the post-war economy as 
well as the lack of schools and teachers, secondary education was promoted in Poland in 
the 1950s (Levitas and Herczyski, 2002: 117). The level of education became a 
determinant in one’s status in society. 
 
In that sense, one of the most important goals of the education system was to instruct 
students parallel with the expected industrial development in the country. Another one 
was to raise the youth in line with the Marxist ideology which was going to lead the 
formation of a new intelligentsia (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 288). “Youngsters 
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from peasant and proletarian homes were encouraged, through positive discrimination, to 
enter higher education, while opportunities were narrowed for children with ‘bourgeois or 
‘reactionary’ backgrounds” (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 288). This has been another 
new mentality which seems to fit the ideology of that day. The obvious influence of the 
Marxist ideology could have been seen in the syllabi as well as the in the translation of 
many Soviet textbooks to Polish (Davies, 2005: 452). Russian became a compulsory 
subject in schools with extended political propaganda (Davies, 2005: 452). As a matter of 
fact, the education system attained high importance; the schooling rates in Poland became 
higher than in Western European countries but due to the authoritarian method of 
education, the students were alienated from the essence (Davies, 2005: 452). 
 
The election of Wladyslaw Gomulka as the first secretary of the PZPR in 1956 was a 
landmark in terms of constituting a rupture in the Stalinist regime and providing a milder 
form of communism (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 297). With many other 
developments in the country, relations with the Church were relatively ameliorated and 
religious education was restored in the schools (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 297). 
The regime under Gomulka rule gained recognition and support from the people, but this 
was not enough. The economy of the country based on autarchy was worsening and those 
who expected further liberalization and democratization in the country were disappointed 
(Davies, 2005: 441). As Gomulka could not stand behind the steps taken anymore, there 
had been a regress in the concessions made to the Catholic Church. “By 1961 religious 
instruction in schools had ended and drastic official limits had been placed on the 
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building of new churches” (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 300). By simply looking at 
the numbers, an assessment can be made about the policy followed for religious 
instruction. During the 1959-1960 school year, there were 21,500 schools where religious 
instruction was provided (out of a total of 28,000) whereas in the following year, this 
number decreased to 6,500 (Ramet, 2006: 120). The church-state relations were 
diminished to a minimum level in the period between 1965 and 1966 because of Church’s 
attempt for reconciliation between Germany and Poland, which was interpreted as 
interference to the foreign policy of the country (Davies, 2005: 445). However, 
considering the significance of the Church for the Polish people, Gomulka did not want 
to cause further confrontation with Cardinal Wyszynski (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 
301). He could not prevent political destabilization in the country, and the Soviet rule 
decided to replace Gomulka with Edward Gierek as the first secretary of the PZPR in 
1970 (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 303). 
 
Gierek tried to gain confidence by promising to improve the life standards of workers. At 
the same time, he followed a reconciliatory policy with the Church as he appreciated its 
importance in making social peace (Davies, 2005: 470). Despite the progress made in the 
economy and enhancement of the living conditions of the workers for a few years, the 
economic policy was lacking a structural plan and was associated with the external crises 
(like the 1974 oil crisis), the positive atmosphere could not keep long (Lukowski and 
Zawadzki, 2006: 305). The Soviets asked Gierek to make amendments to the Polish 
constitution to comprehend provisions about Party’s leading role in the society as well as 
179 
a reference of Polish-Russian relations dating back to 18th century and the permanent 
nature of the Soviet alliance (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006:  306). This offer was 
protested by a group headed by the Church, but they were not be effective. Nonetheless, 
the position of the Church was enhanced in the society as it contributed to the grass-roots 
movements for human rights (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 308). Here again, the 
protests of the working class gave an end to the rule of Gierek. With the formation of a 
single trade union called ‘Solidarity,’ and their gaining power against the Gierek 
government resulted in Stanislaz Kania’s coming into power (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 
2006: 311).  
 
“Solidarity represented a challenge to the communists’ monopoly of political control 
within Poland, and ultimately to the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe” (Lukowski and 
Zawadzki, 2006: 311). In the following years, the union expanded both in number of 
adherents and in terms of its impact area. The Church undertook a conciliatory role 
between the government and Solidarity but due to the attempt of the assassination of 
Cardinal Wyszynski and his death in 1981, the effort of the Church was suspended 
(Davies, 2005: 461). The new Cardinal Jozef Glemp was not such a charismatic leader 
who had a mediatory power between the two sides (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 311). 
The country underwent a crisis arising from the dichotomy between the Party and 
Solidarity as well as the economic difficulties which resulted in declaration of martial law 
on December 1981 which lasted two years (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 313). This 
was a coup d’état called Military Council of National Salvation and was headed by 
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Jaruzelski, a loyal communist general (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 313). The military 
takeover succeeded in restoring public order to some extent but political and economic 
troubles remained (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 313).  
 
 
5.1.7 Drastic Changes after the Fall of Communism 
 
Nineteeneightynine was a landmark in the history of Poland; as a result of the “round 
table” agreements between the government of the day and the representatives of the 
opposition, after which the first partially free elections were held in the country 
(Eurybase, 2010: 8). The first totally free and democratic elections took place two years 
later, in 1991. The country underwent political and economic transformation; the 
foundation of political parties, freedom of speech, independent mass media, and market 
economy with limited state intervention were all new to the Polish people (Eurybase, 
2010: 8-9). Unexpectedly, Poland started to work to reach the level of democratic 
countries so that a parliamentary democracy was established, civil rights were restored to 
a great extent, the death penalty was abolished and an incremental depoliticization of the 
armed forces has taken place (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 320). With the end of the 
authoritarian rule, many institutions were put in place and in such an environment; the 
Church could finally set its priorities (Ramet, 2006: 121). 
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Religious instruction in public schools rose as an issue on the top of the agenda so that in 
early 1990, the Church put forward its willingness for the re-insertion of religious 
education. A special subcommittee of the Joint Commission of the Government and the 
Episcopate123 declared the importance of the restoration of religious instruction (Ramet, 
2006: 123). This decree was challenged by the Ombudsman but the Constitutional Court 
held that it was in conformity with the Constitution and other existing statutes.124 In the 
following year, the hours of religion classes were increased from one hour per week to 
two hours and a new subject; ethics, was offered as an alternative to religion courses 
(Ramet, 2006: 123). At the beginning, there were concerns from the non-Catholics stating 
that their children would be faced with pressure either from teacher but most probably 
from their schoolmates, to attend Catholic religious instruction (Ramet, 2006: 123). 
However, religion classes became popular and in almost every school these classes were 
organized. 
 
As a matter of fact, religious instruction was not the only priority of the Catholic Church, 
they had been seeking for a concordat with the state. A joint governmental-ecclesiastical 
commission was held to prepare a draft concordat to submit for the approval of the Holy 
See (Ramet, 2006: 123). The Holy See rejected the draft and prepared a new one, which 
was this time submitted to the side of the state for approval. This was in conflict with 
many of the existing laws, codices and decrees; among which there was the law on liberty 
                                                            
123 Episcopate is the area of jurisdiction of a bishop. 
124 The challenge of the Ombudsman and the decision of the Constitutional Court will be assessed in detail 
in the section on the domestic legal framework. 
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of conscience and faith and the law concerning Church-state relations (Ramet, 2006: 
123). Despite those conflicts with the existing laws, the Prime Minister signed that draft 
in 1993 and then it was sent to the Parliament for approval. The Parliament did not 
approve the Concordat125 until 1997, and then approved it without reservations given that 
it was no more incompatible with the existing laws since most of them had been amended 
with the enactment of the new constitution of Poland in 1997 (Ramet, 2006: 123). 
 
The Catholic Church considered very seriously the creation of a new constitution so that 
its involvement to the process of constitution-making had a negative impact on the 
relations with the government after 1993. The concerns of the Church concentrated on 
four issues; for one, the suggested reference to God in the Preamble; secondly, they 
advocated for a constitution of ‘Polish Nation;’ thirdly, they demanded the insertion of 
‘right to life from conception to natural death,’ and finally and probably most fervently, 
they were opposed to any idea of separation between state and Church (Millard, 1999: 
48). The concerns of the Church were taken into account given that word of ‘separation’ 
was not spelled in the constitution and a reference was made to the relations between the 
state and the Church (in the Article 25 § 4) indicating that those relations are determined 
according to the Concordat (Millard, 1999: 48-49). The societal role played by the 
Catholic Church for centuries was extended to the constitution building process and even 
to the EU membership of the country. The Church has been influential in almost each and 
every important turning point in the country as well as the daily lives of Poles. The role 
                                                            
125 The full text of the Concordat is available at: http://www.concordatwatch.eu/topic-1331.843 
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5.2 Related Legal Documents 
 
In analyzing the conduct of religion education in Poland, the international agreements 
that the country is part of, are binding and thus need to be considered. The responsibility 
to comply with the provisions of these documents does not stem from EU membership 
but from just being part of the international agreements and organizations. Poland, as a 
democratic modern state, signed those agreements and embraced the standards 
determined by the international society. In 1991, right after the fall of Communism, the 
country joined the Council of Europe and bound with the norms envisaged by this 
organization. Moreover, the highest standards for the protection of human rights have 
been incorporated into the constitution and the domestic law of Poland. The international 
legal documents that guided Poland as well as the related judgments of the ECtHR and 
the domestic legal framework display the extent to which this country complies with 
these norms. The parallelism between the European norms and their transposition to the 
national law also validates the sociological institutionalist approach which foresees a 
smooth transition for the countries that have a political culture receptive to transformation 
as well as the “ongoing reform agenda” (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 9). The related 
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binding legal documents and the judgment of the ECtHR are analyzed in this part for 
better portraying the impact of Europeanization on domestic legal structures. 
 
 
5.2.1 International Legal Documents: European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
Protocol 1, Article 2:126 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religions and philosophical convictions. 
 
Article 9:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 14:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
                                                            
126 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 Protocol 1. p. 34. Available online at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf 
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5.2.2 Domestic Legal Documents 
 
The fundamental provisions of the 1952 Constitution and of the Freedom of Conscience 
and Religion Act constituted the basis for religious freedom in the country. Even though 
there have been substantial improvements in terms of the rights and freedoms within the 
legal framework after the fall of Communism, when it comes to religion, it is undeniable 
the Communist era had specificity on this matter. However, since the effort of the 
Communist regime was not to provide religious freedom but to totally abolish it, one of 
the main acquisitions of the new state was to consolidate the freedom of religion and 
conscience within the domestic legal framework. The following articles from the national 
legal documents make it evident the progress towards the consolidation of those rights 
and freedoms as well as the legal underpinnings of the contemporary legal structure. 
 
 
5.2.2.1 Article 82 of the 1952 Constitution127 
 
(retained in force by the Constitutional Act of 17 October 1992):  
1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure to its citizens freedom of conscience and 
religion. The church and other religious organizations may freely exercise their 
religious functions. Citizens shall not be compelled not to participate in religious 
practices or rites. No one shall be compelled to participate in religious practices or 
rites. 
2. The church shall be separated from the State. The principles of relations 
between the State and church and legal and financial position of religious shall be 
determined by statutes. 
                                                            
127 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. p. 6. 
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5.2.2.2 The Law of 17 May 1989 on guarantees for freedom of 
conscience and religion (“the Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
Act”)128 
 
Section 1 (relevant parts): 
1. Poland ... shall secure to its citizens freedom of conscience and religion. 
2. Freedom of conscience and religion shall include freedom to choose one's 
religion or beliefs and freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs, either alone or 
in community with others, in private and in public. ... 
Section 2 of the Act: 
In the exercise of their freedom of conscience and religion, citizens may in 
particular: ... 
(2)(a) belong, or not belong, to churches or other religious communities; 
(3) express their religious opinions; 
(4) raise their children in conformity with their religious convictions; 
(5) remain silent as to their religion or convictions ... .” 
 
After the fall of Communism, with the aim of founding a new state different from the 
previous one which is compatible with the modern world and especially with Western 
Europe, there had been attempts to create an education system that could compete with 
the most developed parts of the world. As a concrete step, a report was prepared by 
Polish experts on education. The “Report on the Condition and Directions in the 
Development of National Education in the Polish People’s Republic”, published in 1989 
by a Committee of Experts under the title of “Education—a National Priority”, 
scrutinized the Polish education system in the 1980s (Tomiak, 2000: 180). The report 
                                                            
128 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. p. 6. 
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highlighted the main deficiencies of the education system and offered alternative ways 
for reforming it. However, as the preparation of the report coincided with the abolishment 
of Polish People’s Republic and as it had been prepared with the mentality of the old 
regime, it became inadequate.  
 
A further step was taken by the Parliament, with the declaration of Strategia dla Polski 
(A Strategy for Poland) produced by the Sejm, the Lower Chamber of the Polish 
Parliament. Concurrently, the Ministry of National Education prepared a related position 
paper in 1994 which put forward the main educational priorities as “the elaboration of a 
new comprehensive law on education in the country; changing the structure of secondary 
education; modernizing the contents of education; equalizing educational opportunities 
and restoring the broader concept of upbringing of all pupils” (Tomiak, 2000: 180). In the 
following year, the Ministry of Education published a document called “Education in a 
Changing Society” and this constituted the main source for the subsequent reports of 
OECD on the education system in Poland (Tomiak, 2000: 180). Those reports prepared 
by OECD mainly highlighted the deficiencies as well as proposing future prospects so 
that these reports served as guidelines but they could not be far-reaching given that they 
overlooked the financial side of the reforms (Education and Training in Poland during the 
transformation of the Socio-Economic System of 1992; the OECD Review of Education 
Policy in Poland of 1995; and the OECD Science and Technology Policy Review: Poland 
of 1995) (Tomiak, 2000: 183). Another proposal for reform was made in 1998 and was 
presented to an audience of educators as well as the representatives of local government 
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bodies, the Church, professional unions, public bodies, and individuals who were 
interested in having a word in the future of the education policy of Poland. The 
subsequent legislation steps made by the Ministry of Education have been more or less in 
line with these reports. 
 
 
5.2.2.3 Circulars issued by the Ministry of Education (1990) 
(instrukcje)129 
 
Introduction of instruction in Roman Catholicism and other religions into State schools 
on a voluntary basis has been implemented via two circulars issued by the Ministry of 
Education. According to these circulars, parents of primary school pupils and parents 
and/or pupils in secondary schools were to make a declaration as to whether they wished 
to attend religious instruction. 
 
These circulars have been challenged by the Ombudsman in terms of their inconformity 
with the constitutional provisions and the relevant statutory law. According to the view of 
the Ombudsman, parents declaring their wish for the attendance of their child to religious 
classes constituted a public manifestation of their religious conviction and this constitutes 
a breach to the Freedom of Conscience and Religion Act. According to the decision of 
                                                            
129 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. p. 6-7. 
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the Constitutional Court, the points raised by the Ombudsman were in conformity with 
the constitution and the statutory law. The related legal documents as well as the relevant 
provisions of the 1997 Constitution will be examined in the following part. 
 
 
5.2.2.4 The 1991 Education Act 
 
This has been a turning point for situating religious instruction within in formal 
education. In 1991, the Parliament enacted the law on education (“the 1991 Education 
Act”) of which Section 12 explicitly provided that religious instruction could be given in 
State schools at the request of parents or pupils who had reached the age of maturity.  
 
 
5.2.2.5 The Ordinance of the Minister of Education (1992) Regulating 
Religious Education at Public Schools and Kindergardens 
 
The Ordinance was issued in order to determine the practice of optional religious courses 
and ethics, and the details to provide a more democratic and universal rule. On 14 April 
1992 the Minister of Education issued the Ordinance on the organization of religious 
instruction in State schools (Rozporządzenie w sprawie warunków i sposobu 
organizowania nauki religii w szkołach publicznych – “the Ordinance”). The Ordinance 
replaced the two circulars that had been issued in 1990 by the Ministry of Education. 
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The Ordinance determined religious education and ethics as optional subjects. Parents of 
pupils or pupils who reached the age of majority who wished [their children] to follow 
either of those subjects were to make a declaration to the school authorities to that effect. 
In order to organize the classes according to the number and needs of the students it is 
provided that “if the number of pupils in a given class interested in following any of these 
subjects was less than seven, then the school was to organize the relevant course for 
pupils of different classes from the same school (an inter-class group). If the inter-class 
group was smaller than seven pupils, the authorities were to offer the relevant course in 
cooperation with other schools in the municipality (inter-school group), provided that 
there was a minimum of three pupils interested in following it.”130 
 
For grading of the religion and ethics courses an arrangement was made, the Paragraph 9 
of the Ordinance indicates:131 
1. The mark for religion or ethics is placed on the school certificate directly after 
the mark for behavior. In order to eliminate any possible manifestations of 
intolerance the school certificate shall not contain any data that would indicate 
which religion (or ethics) course was followed by a pupil. 
2. The mark for religion (ethics) has no influence on whether a pupil moves up to 
the next grade. 
 
These provisions of the Ordinance directly aimed at a non-discrimination policy on the 
basis of religion. The facts that the school certificate does not indicate which religion (or 
ethics) course the pupil follows and the mark for religion having no influence on 
                                                            
130 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. p. 6-7.  
131 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. p. 6-7. 
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student’s moving to the next grade seem to be very democratic solutions. In a sense, a 
country that provides optional religious courses should be very attentive in determining 
such rules in order to impede discrimination among students. However, contemporarily 
there are still controversies for both of the provisions. 
 
In 1992 the Ombudsman challenged the conformity of numerous provisions of the 
Ordinance with the constitutional provisions and with the Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion Act. At first the Ombudsman objected to the indication of a mark for religion or 
ethics courses on school reports, which is mentioned on the paragraph 9 of the Ordinance, 
on the grounds that such an indication would be the prerogative of the Church. In 
addition, he highlighted the risk of intolerance as well as the possibility of the violation of 
the principles of separation between Church and State and State’s neutrality as specified 
in the Freedom of Conscience and Religion Act (paragraph 35). 
 
The Ombudsman also opposed to the obligation imposed on parents (pupils) to make a 
“negative declaration” to mention that they did not wish their children to attend any 
religious course in a State school (paragraph 3(3) of the Ordinance). He maintained that 
“no public authority in the State, which had a duty to remain neutral in the sphere of 
religious beliefs and philosophical convictions, could require citizens to make such 
declarations” (paragraph 36). Lastly, the Ombudsman purported his concern about 
religious symbols at schools, indicating that “paragraph 12 of the Ordinance allowed for 
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excessive display of crucifixes in other places in schools than classrooms designated for 
religious instruction” (paragraph 37). 
 
The Constitutional Court issued a verdict about the challenges raised by the Ombudsman 
in 1993 (case no. U 12/92). The Court upheld the constitutionality and legality of the 
Ordinance and concluded that “the inclusion of religious instruction in the State school 
curriculum did not infringe the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State 
and the principle of the State's secular character and neutrality” (paragraph 38). The 
Constitutional Court further stated that the principles in question required that both State 
and Church remain autonomous in their fields of activity but that their autonomy should 
not lead to isolation or even competition between them. It should rather enhance their 
cooperation in the areas like the ethical education of children. 
 
The Constitutional Court determined that the secular character of the State and its 
neutrality could not lead to a prohibition on providing religious instruction in State 
schools as long as religion/ethics courses are arranged according to the wishes of parents, 
which is also indicated on the Education Act. In addition, the Court noted that the State 
has to provide religious instruction in public schools in conformity with parents’ wishes 




What has been proposed by the Constitutional Court is to interpret the Ordinance in a 
way that it deals with the concerns of the Ombudsman. It offered that the Ordinance 
should be construed as granting each pupil the right to follow classes in both religion and 
ethics as opposed to the alternative of choosing only one of them. This aimed at impeding 
the possibility of division between believers and non-believers (paragraph 39). The Court 
also offered a solution for the insertion of marks for religious instruction in school 
reports. It is stated that indicating the mark for each and every compulsory and optional 
course is a rule emanating from the Education Act (paragraph 40). In responding to the 
Ombudsman's concerns, the Constitutional Court held as follows: 
In order to dispel possible doubts in this respect, the Constitutional Court 
indicated in the seventh point of the operative part of its judgment that a mark on 
a school report may refer not just to religious instruction alone or to ethics alone; 
in cases where a pupil follows both those courses he or she may be given a joint 
mark [for the two subjects]. The impugned provision therefore contains a dual 
safeguard. First, a mark shown on the school report does not indicate any specific 
religion, and secondly it is not known whether such a mark relates to religious 
instruction, ethics or both subjects jointly (paragraph 41). 
 
In response to the objection made by the Ombudsman about the obligation to make a 
“negative declaration”, the Constitutional Court struck down paragraph 3(3) of the 
Ordinance on the grounds of its incompatibility with the Education Act. Paragraph 3(3) 
of the Ordinance as amended and entered into force in 1993 made no reference to a 
“negative declaration” (paragraph 42). 
 
For the other concern of the Ombudsman about the place of religious symbols (crucifix) 
in schools, the Court held that the paragraph 12 of the Ordinance provided for such a 
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possibility but did not mandate the presence of the crucifix in schools so that this 
provision was compatible with Article 82 of the 1952 Constitution (paragraph 43). 
 
In this way, the Ordinance which lays down the principles for the regulation of religion 
and ethics instruction has been legitimized with the judgment of the Constitutional Court. 
In the following years, there had been other controversies arising from the practice and 
the Constitutional Court as well as the ECtHR made judgments on this issue. Before 
moving with those debates it is worth considering the current Polish Constitution and the 
articles on freedom of religion and conscience. 
 
 
5.2.2.6 The Relevant Provisions in the Constitution of 2 April 1997132 
 
Article 25: 
1. Churches and other religious organizations shall have equal rights. 
2. Public authorities in the Republic of Poland shall be impartial in matters of 
personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to 
outlooks on life, and shall ensure their freedom of expression within public 
life. 
3. The relationship between the State and churches and other religious 
organizations shall be based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and 
the mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle 
of cooperation for the individual and the common good. 
4. The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church 
shall be determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and 
by statute. 
                                                            
132 The full version of the English version of the Polish Constitution is available at: 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
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5. The relations between the Republic of Poland and other churches and religious 
organizations shall be determined by statutes adopted pursuant to agreements 
concluded between their appropriate representatives and the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Article 48 § 1: 
Parents shall have the right to raise their children in accordance with their own 
convictions. The child's upbringing shall respect his degree of maturity as well as 
his freedom of conscience and belief and also his convictions. 
 
Article 53:  
1. Freedom of conscience and religion shall be secured to everyone. 
2. Freedom of religion shall include the freedom to profess or to accept a religion 
by personal choice as well as to manifest such religion, either individually or 
collectively, publicly or privately, by worshipping, praying, participating in 
ceremonies, performing rites or teaching. Freedom of religion shall also 
include the availability of sanctuaries and other places of worship designed to 
meet the needs of believers as well as the right of individuals, wherever they 
may be, to benefit from religious services. 
3. Parents shall have the right to provide their children with a moral and religious 
upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions 
of Article 48 § 1 shall apply as appropriate. 
4. The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization 
may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and 
conscience shall not be infringed thereby. 
5. The freedom to publicly express religion may be limited only by means of 
statute and only where this is necessary for the defense of State security, 
public order, health, morals or the freedoms and rights of others. 
6. No one shall be compelled to participate or not participate in religious 
practices. 
7. No one may be compelled by organs of public authority to disclose his 
philosophy of life, religious convictions or beliefs. 
 
With these articles in the Constitution, freedom of religion and conscience was 
consolidated in Poland. It is the state’s responsibility to provide moral and religious 
education for the case in which parents want their kids to get these instructions. Despite 
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the strong presence of the Catholic Church in Poland and its overt interference to state 
affairs, it should be noted that in the Constitution, no state religion is envisaged for 
Poland. Furthermore, the relations with the Roman Catholic Church were determined by 
a statute; Concordat, and no specific reference was made to the Catholic Church in the 
Polish Constitution. The European Union or other organizations which set the universal 
norms to be attained in terms of rights and freedoms do not foresee anything about state-
religion relations but as a modern state, Poland assured freedom of religion and 





CHAPTER 6  
 
 
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON THE RELIGION 





In this chapter contemporary issues are displayed and enriched with the field survey 
conducted in Poland. The in-depth interviews envisaged the current situation of religion 
courses, the practice within the general framework of the place of Church in nation and 
identity building as well as the modernization and Europeanization processes of the 
country. This means that it is difficult to consider Poland as a case of “misfit” and 
therefore in the course of Europeanization it experienced relative ease in internalizing the 
European norms. The Church in this case can be said to work as a “norm entrepreneur” 
which convinced the domestic actors that to be part of Europe and internalizing its norms 
are in harmony with collectively shared domestic values and identities. Given that the 
modernization process of Poland after the fall of Communism is parallel with the 
country’s course of Europeanization, it can also be defended that there had been no time 
for the emergence of misfit. In that sense, the historical and the legal contexts implied 
that the case of religious education in Poland can be best explained by the sociological 
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institutionalist account of the Europeanization theory. The field study also approved this 
determination; the in-depth interviews supported that Poland cannot be considered as a 
case of misfit and that it was not faced with strong adaptational pressures in the field of 
religious education. The major issues that were highlighted during the interviews pointed 
out that the controversies on religious education in Poland are about the practical 
problems which do not give rise to a legal or institutional amendment. This smooth 
Europeanization process which is accurately delineated by sociological institutionalism is 




6.1 The Religion Education Before and After the Fall of Communism: Personal 
Experiences 
 
The fall of Communism which gave birth to the foundation of a modern state had great 
implications on the conduct of religious affairs. Religion education was one of the fields 
that was most affected by this immense transformation. Although the Communist regime 
could not abolish the religious underpinnings of the society, and religion education kept 
its presence even in times where it was removed from the state schools. During the 
Communist rule, especially while experiencing a milder form of Communism, there had 
been times where religion education was provided at state schools. However, as a general 
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practice, religion education used to be given in parishes133 as the elimination of religion 
courses from schools was realized gradually after World War II. At the beginning of the 
war, the teaching of religion was permitted in the schools but it was practiced on a 
voluntary basis. It is obvious that the Communist regime was intentionally eliminating 
such teachings from schools; the empirical data displays: “It is estimated that in 1956 
religion lessons were offered only in 20% of schools. The final elimination of religion 
lessons from schools took place in the sixties with the coming into force of a statute on 
the development of the educational system and teaching” (Written Comments by the 
HFHR, 2007: 2). The reinsertion of religion instruction into the state schools is thus a 
relatively recent phenomenon which can be adequately depicted from the experiences of 
Polish people. The interviews conducted in Warsaw highlighted some common points 
raised by the respondents about the transition from Communism to the current state. The 
issues emphasized by the interviewees constitute the framework for analyzing the impact 
of the Catholic Church on the reinsertion of religion education into the state schools. 
 
Ms. Agata Ladykowska134, an interviewee who experienced the Communist era as well as 
the fall of Communism and its aftermath, and had been a student during the transition 
time, shared her own experience. When she was in the primary school, which means 
during the Communist regime, religion education had been provided by the Catholic 
                                                            
133 A parish is a church territorial unit. 
134 Ms. Agata Ladykowska was born in 1976. She had been student in the last years of communism and 
experience of its fall and the transition period. Currently, she is a PhD student who is conducting research 
on religious education in Russia. She is currently lecturing at the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural 
Anthropology, University of Warsaw. 
200 
Church in parish. She explained that the classes in the parish were organized in the same 
way as the ones at school. Ms. Ladykowska told that all the students were going to 
Church during the regular hours, except for her best friend who did not attend religion 
course. She comments that going to Church was not a matter being religious but rather a 
manifestation of having a moral position; not for children for sure but for parents. These 
courses were taking place before or after ordinary school hours. Ms. Ladykowska stated 
that the core of this education was the religious elevation; it was organized around how to 
grow up or be admitted to certain levels of Communion.135 This is what mattered at the 
primary school, because at the age of nine, children receive the first Communion 
according to Catholic teaching. 
 
When Ms. Ladykowska started high school in 1991, Communism collapsed but she 
commented that anti-clerical movements were still visible. For her, at the primary 
education level, the religion courses were just like mathematics courses that she did not 
like them at all. She admits that she started to realize that she did not like religion courses 
at high school either and that she felt trapped into that education. Ms. Ladykowska 
commented about religious education during the Communist rule and after its fall, and 
claimed that even during the Communist regime religion education was part of the moral 
tradition and national identity. 
 
                                                            
135 Communion is the Christian rite involving the eating of bread and drinking of wine, reenacting the Last 
Supper 
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The personal experience of Ms. Ladykowska sheds light on how religious education kept 
its very presence in the society even during the Communist era but most importantly, 
displayed how a pupil attended those classes without any motivation but because of the 
societal pressure on her parents. This example also supports the point raised by other 
interviewees mainly with liberal or leftist ideologies that students would prefer not to 
attend religion classes if their parents would allow; and the parents felt obliged to send 
their children to those classes in order to display their morality. 
 
For sure there are many cases where parents did not feel such a pressure and omitted 
sending their children to the religion class. The experience of Teacher Rashid136 
differentiated from what was portrayed by Ms. Ladykowska in the sense that his parents 
were not religious people and decided to send their kid to ethics instruction. Teacher 
Rashid commented that there are several students who do not attend religion courses at 
schools, especially in the big cities. He was one of them; even though his parents were 
Catholic, they were not very religious people so they chose ethics course for their child. 
The issue raised by Teacher Rashid when he was asked about his observation about 
Catholic children and their religion education was in line with Ms. Ladykowska’s 
opinion. He said that his observation about Catholic children who attended religion 
course is that they did not like it very much since the teachers, usually priests, were very 
rigid. Therefore, he indicated that many of those students attend religion course because 
                                                            
136 Teacher Rashid is a Polish citizen who embraced Islam few years ago and now he is teaching Islam at 
the Arab Mosque. He had been graduated from the University of Warsaw, Department of Arabic language.  
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of the pressure, so if they were asked, he claimed, many of them would prefer not to 
attend. 
 
Another interview which was realized with Mr. Konstanty Gebert137 was remarkable in 
the sense that it provided a different and critical point of view about the state-religion 
relations in Poland but especially about his family’s experience with the religious 
courses. Mr. Gebert and his family are Polish Jews and that is why he had the opportunity 
to observe the transformation in the religion education from the lenses of both and 
outsider and insider. Mr. Gebert has four children; his elder daughter is 36 years old so 
she got her education under “deep communism,” the two other children had difficulties at 
public schools and he says that his youngest son was lucky enough to have the 
opportunity to attend a Jewish school. Currently, there are three Jewish schools in Poland, 
one is in Warsaw. 
 
Mr. Gebert mainly stated that they were very critical about religion education being 
brought back to schools but he underlines that not only him and the liberals but also many 
Catholic families he knows were critical about this application and he adds that the 
Catholic Church worked hard to achieve that. He stated that Catholic families were 
satisfied with the education their children used to get in the parish. He wanted to clarify a 
point; he mentioned that if Catholic children did not have an opportunity to learn religion 
                                                            
137 Mr. Konstanty Gebert is a liberal and critical Polish Jewish journalist. He has been a democratic 
opposition activist. He is the Head of European Council on Foreign Relations, Warsaw. He was 
interviewed on 14 November 2012. 
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in the previous practice, in other words; in the parish, then himself and other opponents 
would be supportive for the reinsertion of religion instruction into the state schools but as 
long as all Catholic children had the opportunity to get this education in the parish, they 
opposed it to be brought into the state schools. The law concerning religion education, 
according to Mr.Gebert is a civilized one; it does not oblige schools to open religion 
classes but asserts that they can and it also foresees that these classes should be arranged 
during the first hour or the last hour of the school day. Nevertheless he claimed that all of 
these were nonsense because in practice, almost every school organizes religion courses 
and they do not pay attention as to whether it is the first or last hour or just at the midst of 
the school day. 
 
In addition, the grade that the student gets from the religion course is part of his/her 
general cumulative and Mr. Gebert finds it a discriminatory practice. Moreover, he 
highlights that crucifixes are in each and every classroom. He perceived the religion 
education at public schools as an unhealthy practice. According to Mr. Gebert, religion 
instruction is ipso facto the teaching of Catholic religion because even though it is 
indicated in the law that if there are seven or more students of the same religion, a 
religion class will be organized, it is practically impossible to reach the number of seven 
for others given the religious homogeneity of the society. He also referred to the problem 
of the opening of the ethics classes and said that the schools do not usually organize these 
classes because they do not have enough teachers or money to hire them. He stated that 
the pupil who does not get Catholic instruction cannot get any instruction. 
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When the experience of Turkish families138 was put forward, Mr. Gebert said that the 
religious instruction of children of foreigners is not problematic in Poland since they are 
not part of the national community. But if one is a Polish citizen, by not taking the course 
on Catholicism, one deprives the consensus and there is even an expression in Polish 
“Polak-Katolik” which means that a Pole is a Catholic. Therefore, according to his view, 
being Polish is twinned with being a Catholic and it ipso facto implies to get Catholic 
instruction at school. However, Mr. Gebert admits that Polish society started to embrace 
the idea that Jews are a legitimate part of society; different but still part of the Polish 
nation. Nonetheless, he highlighted the difficulties that Polish citizens of other 
convictions than Catholicism are faced in a critical way. 
 
The experiences of the interviewees display that there had not been a sharp shift in terms 
of religion education as long as it kept its presence during the Communist era. For the 
Catholic Church on the other hand, reinsertion of religion instruction into the public 
schools has been a matter of representation of power in social affairs. As a matter of fact, 
attendance to those courses is considered as a moral stance and there is a societal pressure 
which is repeated on many occasions in this work. The notion of being Pole is entwined 
with being Catholic is manifested in receiving Catholic instruction at school and this 
strong correlation creates the very basis of the controversy on this issue. 
 
                                                            
138 The group discussions conducted with Turkish pupils and their parents will be transposed in the 
following parts. They mainly asserted that Turkish students could get religion education outside of the 
school and that they were not faced with any kind of difficulty. 
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The main point that comes out of this interview is that there is a tendency in Polish 
society to be much more demanding of Polish citizens about religious education than the 
foreigners residing in the country. This phenomenon can be explained by a general 
tendency of imposing pressure on the ones who are from “us” and relative tolerance to 
the “other” in the case where the “other” does not constitute a threat for “us.” This issue 
will be discussed once more in the following sections when the experience of Turkish 
families will be explored. 
 
 
6.2 Current Practice for the Religion and Ethics Courses 
 
The current debates about religious education mainly revolve around the marking of 
pupils’ work on school reports, which is mainly a problem stemming from their being 
overtly indicated and being part of the grade average. Specifically, the Constitutional 
Court was asked several times to examine the constitutionality of the Ordinance. In 2007, 
the Ordinance which was amended by the Minister of Education, introduced for the first 
time the rule that marks obtained for religion or ethics courses, as well as other optional 
courses, would be counted towards the “average mark” obtained by a student in a given 
school year and at the end of a given level of schooling.139 The Court was asked to 
scrutinize the constitutionality of this Ordinance in 2009 and it determined that marking 
of pupils’ work was compatible with Articles 25, 32, 48 § 1 and 53 § 3 (paragraph 47). It 
                                                            
139 European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Case of Grzelak vs. Poland”. Application no. 7710/02. 
Paragraph 46. 
206 
is also highlighted once more that recording of the marks for religion on school reports is 
a result of the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom rather than the support for 
theistic beliefs as long as the opportunity to choose between religion or ethics classes is 
provided to parents (and pupils). 
 
Furthermore, the existence of ethics classes for non-believers can be assessed as an 
indicator that the state fulfills its responsibility in respecting religious freedom of its 
citizens and ensuring opportunities to impede discrimination. The court also noted that 
given the dominant position of the Catholic faith in the country, parents or pupils may 
feel an external pressure while choosing between religion or ethics courses but that the 
“choice of the additional subject depends to a large extent on the respect for the 
principles of pluralism and tolerance for different convictions and beliefs in local 
communities” (paragraph 47). The Court further alleged that the possibility that parents 
and pupils may be faced with external pressure while making a choice may be a 
consequence of the low level of democratic culture but that this important issue lies 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
In the light of these judgments and legal amendments, the conduct of the religion and 
ethics courses has taken its contemporary format. It is worth summarizing what has been 
said so far and indicating some technicalities of the current practice in order to clarify the 
controversies arising from them. First of all, as a fundamental principle determined by the 
Ordinance, the religion courses as well as the ethics instruction are optional subjects at 
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the state schools. According to the Ordinance, religion instruction shall be given in 
primary schools and in gimnazyum by the will of parents or legal custodians, and in 
liceum, by the will of parents or pupils (Rynkowski, 2008: 265). For the students who 
reach the age of 18, the will to choose these courses only depends on the student. In the 
Ordinance it is also indicated that the request for attendance to these classes shall be very 
easy and that attending religion class shall not lead to any kind of discrimination 
(Rynkowski, 2008: 265). Moreover, due to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, on 
the school report the grade of the student is put in a way that it is impossible to determine 
whether the pupil attended religion or ethics class because it is indicated as 
“religion/ethics.” In this way, it is also impossible to estimate which religion or 
denomination the pupil adheres. According to the Ordinance, as already indicated, there 
is a threshold of seven students for opening a class for religion or ethics and if this 
number is three then an inter-school group shall be organized. 
 
The curriculum and the content of the course books for the religion instruction are 
determined by the authorities of a given religion or church and the Ministry of Education 
is informed about these (Rynkowski, 2008: 266). The teachers may both bring the pupils 
to Church during the regular school hours; during the hours of the religion class for 
practice. This is a two-hour course per week which is conducted partly at school and 
partly at Church. Whether or not religion courses are taught in accordance with the 
curriculum and the content are supervised by the school administration. The inspectors 
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who are appointed by the regional episcopate can go and inspect the religion classes 
anytime they like (Rynkowski, 2008: 266). 
 
In the widespread practice of religion education in the state schools, all the teachers of 
this course are appointed by the related Church. For the Catholic Church, this 
appointment is made by the regional episcopate (Rynkowski, 2008: 266). The teachers of 
religion are appointed according to the regulation common to all teachers and their status 
is equal with others but they cannot be a “form teacher” (Rynkowski, 2008: 266). The 
religion course is given both by secular teachers and by priests, and both are paid by the 
state (Rynkowski, 2008: 266). This is also one of the controversial issues raised by the 
interviewees since a part of the Polish society is opposed to the fact that the salaries of 
the priests who are teaching at state schools are paid from the taxes collected. 
 
In practice, as verified by the interviews conducted in the empirical part of this study, it is 
almost impossible to have seven students of the same religion or denomination at the 
same age, except for the Catholic pupils. Therefore, it is practically unachievable for 
other religions or denominations to open religion classes at public schools. Nonetheless, 
as it will be highlighted in the following parts, the adherents of other convictions can 
send their children to get religion instruction outside of the school and outside ordinary 
school hours (on Saturdays for example) so that they learn their own religion. The grade 
they get for this education is counted as the grade of religion course. Religious 
denominations are also allowed to establish private schools but they are very minor in 
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numbers140 and for example, there are no Muslim141 schools in Poland (Rynkowski, 2008: 
267). The religion education for other religions and denominations is evaluated in this 
work from the lenses of Muslim students and their parents living in Warsaw, and 
substantiated with the interviews. 
 
The practice of religion instruction is well defined in the Ordinance as displayed above. 
For the ethics instruction, it is harder to make such an assessment since the practice is not 
defined in that much detail in the related documents. Nonetheless, one can observe how 
in the field of religion education, the domestic legislation went parallel with the European 
norms indicated in the international documents to which Poland is part. The problems 
arising from the practical issues are evaluated within the context of domestic legislation. 
It is also of great significance to analyze the current status of religion education in Poland 
from the perspective of European norms. The judgment of the ECtHR is determinant in 





140 The number of religious minorities are approximately 1,75 percent of the schools in general. For 
detailed information about the statistics, please see: Michal Rynkowski, “Polonya,” in Ali Köse and Talip 
Küçükcan (eds.). AB Ülkelerinde Din-Devlet İlişkisi, p. 267.  
141 According to the official data, the number of the members of Muslim community in Poland is 
approximately 5000 out of Poland’s total population of 38 million. According to Muslims, this number is 
six times higher with the total number of Muslims who got citizenship and who are living as foreigners. For 
more information and the numbers of other communities please see: Michal Rynkowski, “Polonya,” in Ali 
Köse and Talip Küçükcan (eds.). AB Ülkelerinde Din-Devlet İlişkisi, p. 268. 
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6.2.1 Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: The Case of 
Saniewski vs. Poland and the Case of Grzelak vs. Poland (Application no. 
7710/02) 
 
The first case sued against Poland about religious courses before the ECtHR, which was 
found inadmissible, was the case of Saniewski vs. Poland.142 The applicants were 
complaining about parents’ obligation to declare their conviction in order to get 
exemption from religion course for their kid was decided "manifestly ill-founded" on the 
grounds that the elective religion courses at schools as well as the compulsory ones, in 
case there exists ways to opt out, do not violate the Article 9 of the Convention. This 
judgment was critical in the sense that it highlighted the principle that the existence of the 
compulsory religion courses does not violate the Convention if adequate ways to opt out 
are offered. 
 
In the next case which was brought before the ECtHR, the Court made a comprehensive 
judgment which shed light on the conduct religion/ethics instructions and the 
controversies arising from this. The Case of Grzelak vs. Poland is the application of Mr. 
and Ms. Grzelak and their child Mateusz Grzelak to the ECtHR in 2002, complaining that 
a mark for religion/ethics courses was absent in the school report of Mateusz Grzelak. 
The applicants applied to the Court stating that they were victims of the violation of 
Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention and the Article 2 of the Protocol No.1. The parents of 
                                                            
142 For more information about the case of Saniewski v. Poland please see: 
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/40319.98-en-20010626/view/ 
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the pupil were agnostics and in accordance with the wishes of his parents, he did not 
attend religion courses. He was the only pupil in his class who did not attend these 
courses. According to the parents of the pupil, their son was subjected to discrimination 
and physical and psychological harassment by other pupils for not attending religion 
courses. The course of religion was given in the middle of the school day, between 
compulsory courses and although the parents demanded several times for an alternative 
course on ethics, it has not been offered by the school administration. Their request for an 
alternative ethics course was rejected by the school administration on the grounds that 
without reaching the sufficient number of students and/or parents interested, they cannot 
provide ethics courses. 
 
The applicants sent a letter to the Minister of Education stating that their child was faced 
with discrimination stemming from religious intolerance. As the response from the 
Ministry was parallel with the one of the school administration, the applicants applied to 
the Ombudsman and then sent a letter to the President of the Republic. In 2004, the third 
applicant; the student started secondary education where he has right to decide on 
whether to follow religious instruction or not. During his primary education, there had 
always been a straight line against the subject “religion/ethics” on the school report and 
this continued during his secondary education. 
 
Before the ECtHR, the Government pleaded that the first two applicants; parents, were 
not victims in respect of their complaints under Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention but 
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that those issues concerned the rights of the third applicant, the pupil. The Court accepted 
the Government’s argument and took into consideration the application of Mateusz 
Grzelak. 
 
In declaring its decision, the Court made reference to the case law; cases regarding 
religious freedom.143 The court determined that “the absence of a mark for 
“religion/ethics” on the successive school reports of the third applicant falls within the 
ambit of the negative aspect of freedom of thought, conscience and religion protected by 
Article 9 of the Convention as it may be read as showing his lack of religious affiliation” 
(paragraph 88). Therefore, the Court found that Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 9 is applicable to the case. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of 
those Articles. For the application of the first two applicants on the violation of Article 2 
of Protocol No.1, the Court decided that the complaints were ill-founded and must be 
rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 and 4 of the Convention. As a result, in 2010, 
the ECtHR unanimously declared that “the third applicant’s complaint under the Article 
14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention about the absence of a mark on 
school reports was admissible” and that “the finding of a violation constitutes itself 
sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage.”  
 
This case highlights that even though the legal framework arranging the religion and 
ethics instructions in the country are promising, there are still complaints arising from 
                                                            
143 Among the cases taken into consideration, there were: Leyla Şahin vs. Turkey, Alexandridis vs. Greece, 
Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey. 
213 
practice. The judgment of the ECtHR which was concluded in favor of the applicant, 
Mateusz Grzelak, determined that the fact that no ethics class was organized and that the 
student got a straight line on the school report against the religion/ethics subject, 
constituted a violation of the Convention. Nonetheless, this judgment is worth analyzing 
from different scopes in order to shed light on the discussions revolving around the 
practice of religion/ethics instructions. In its judgment, the Constitutional Court 
determined that such discrimination that students faced because of not attending religion 
instruction does not seem to be resolved with further amendments in the legislation but 
with the consolidation of democracy in the country. The judgment which is parallel with 
this statement is criticized and the next part of the study elaborates those criticisms. 
 
 
6.2.2 Third-Party Intervention to the Case of Grzelak vs. Poland  
 
First of all, it should be noted that the judgment of the ECtHR on the case of Grzelak was 
disconcerting according to some parties involved, in the sense that the issues raised as 
well as the scope of the assessment did not seem to be reflected or replied in the final 
judgment. To put it in another way, it can be stated that the circumstances, the related 
legal documents and the domestic legislation were covered extensively in the document 
prepared for the case but the judgment was only directed to the situation of the applicant 
and seemed to lack general statements about the conduct of religion/ethics courses in 
Poland. Although de jure and de facto compliances of the religion/ethics courses were 
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widely discussed, no further comments and statements were made in the final judgment. 
It seems obvious that there has been a debate about the practice of religion and ethics 
courses during the trials, so that the conduct of religion/ethics instructions is evaluated in 
detail by the Court. Nonetheless, the Court did not foresee a legal or structural change for 
the religion/ethics courses in the country. 
 
With this question in mind, one of the lawyers of the Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights (HFHR), Dr. Dorota Pudzianowska144 who intervened to Grzelak case as the third 
party in 2007, was interviewed.145 The lawyers of the HFHR prepared a document 
concerning their comments on the case and the legal and the practical situation of 
religion/ethics courses in the country146. The Court took into account their comments in 
its final decision. 
 
Starting from this last remark, Dr. Dorota Pudzianowska was requested to comment on 
the final judgment of the Court on the Grzelak case; it was inquired whether she 
perceived any disproportionality in terms of the scope of the judgment and the final 
                                                            
144 Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights is a non-governmental organization established in 1989 by 
members of the Helsinki Committee in Poland, in order to promote human rights and rule of law in Poland 
as well as to contribute to the development of an open society in Poland. One of the activities of HFHR 
includes legal actions undertaken in the public interest, including the representation of parties and 
preparation of legal submissions to national and international courts and tribunals. The aim of such 
submissions is to influence the process of changing laws and practices that are found contrary to human 
rights. For further information about HFHR please visit: http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/5426.html 
145 Dr. Dorota Pudzianowska was interviewed on 12th of November, 2012. She is one of the four lawyers 
(Dorota Pudzianowska, Adam Bodnar, Viola Vogel and Artur Bednarski) who prepared the written 
comments on the Grzelak Case on behalf of HFHR. Dr. Pudzianowska is Assistant Professor in the 
Department of Law in the University of Warsaw. 
146 Written Comments of the HFHR for the Grzelak vs. Poland (2007) was provided by Dr. Pudzianowska 
as soft copy right after the interview. This document was not published, only submitted to the Court. 
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verdict. Dr. Pudzianowska responded that given the scope of the judgment, it was 
expected that the final verdict would comprise general determinations about the status 
and the practice of religion/ethics courses in Poland. In her view, the final decision was 
disappointing in the sense that it fell short of providing adequate feedback on the issues 
widely raised in the context of the case and also highlighted by the HFHR. In their view, 
the Court missed to mention the obligation of Poland to make structural changes 
concerning the ethics instruction. Furthermore, Dr. Pudzianowska approved that there 
was an expectation from the Polish government to look for some solutions to fill the gaps 
in the law concerning religion and ethics courses. She stressed that after the judgment it is 
still the case that a very small number of schools provide ethics instruction in Poland 
mostly because of the threshold problem. However, the main argument of the lawyers of 
the HFHR is that the structural deficits in the law on religion and ethics instruction do 
constitute violation of Article 8 and Article 9 of the Convention. 
 
In the document concerning the written comments of the HFHR, the statistics displayed 
the discrepancy between the numbers of students who attend religion course and the ones 
who attend ethics course. They refer to the data of the Ministry of Education: “out of 
32,136 schools 27,500 schools organize religious instruction lessons (including all 
religions) (only 4,636 schools do not organize religious instruction lessons). Ethics is 
taught in only 334 schools. In public schools there are 21,370 teachers of religion and 
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only 412 ethics teachers (data for 2006/7)”147. Departing from this point, in the document 
they prepared for third party-intervention, the lawyers of the HFHR aimed to display that 
such a disparity between the religion and ethics courses is not basically dependent on the 
smaller number of parents and pupils who are interested in the ethics class. They suggest 
that the main reasons behind are the discriminatory provisions in the law and lack of 
adequate regulations concerning the organization of ethics courses (Written Comments of 
the HFHR, 2007: 4). 
 
Among the discriminatory provisions they mainly deal are the threshold issue; the 
minimum number of students required to organize religion or ethics lessons in one class; 
that inter-class groups or inter-school groups is considered as an indirect discrimination 
of the religious or non-believer minorities (Written Comments of the HFHR, 2007: 4). 
They underline that an inter-school group for ethics course has never been organized in 
Warsaw (Written Comments of the HFHR, 2007: 6). So this application is not very 
widespread and when it comes to organizing religious instruction lessons for religious 
minorities, such inter-school groups are formed in an easier way. Dr. Pudzianowska 
commented on this specific issue by highlighting that the state does not attempt to 
provide the same opportunities for kids who want to attend ethics courses as the ones 
adhering to a minority religion. The position of Muslim students may shed light on this 
                                                            
147 Data was provided on 28 August 2007 by the Information Office of Ministry of Education upon the 
request of HFHR to provide access to public information. Statistics can be found in the Written Comments 
of the HFHR for the Grzelak vs. Poland case. p. 4. 
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specific issue and we will come to that point in the part where we discuss religion 
education of minorities. 
 
Another issue raised by the HFHR was the procedural deficiencies in arranging the 
teaching of ethics. The Ordinance is criticized for prioritizing the teaching of religion and 
mainly focusing on the adherents of the Catholic Church (Written Comments of the 
HFHR, 2007: 6). Dr. Pudizanowska emphasized the title of the Ordinance which is: 
“Ordinance of the Minister of Education on the organization of teaching religion in 
public kindergartens and schools,” and this makes it clear according to her view that 
ethics course is neglected even at the level of the title. Furthermore, the advocates pointed 
out the document they prepared that the pupils and parents were not informed about the 
curriculum of the ethics courses. It is not clear whether the wish of parents for their 
children to attend religion or ethics course should be made in a written or oral form of 
declaration (Written Comments of HFHR, 2007: 7). It is claimed that there is an 
ambiguity about when to make the declaration and to whom. These points are not clear in 
the Ordinance, according to the lawyers of the HFHR. 
 
When it comes to the grades of religion/ethics course on the school report, the lawyers 
claimed that even though it is not obvious whether the student attended religion or ethics 
course on the school report, they highlighted that in the case where no ethics class is 
provided, students automatically get no grade or a straight line on the report which ipso 
facto display that the pupil did not attend religion course (Written Comments of the 
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HFHR, 2007: 8). This de facto obligation of attending religion course violates Article 9, 
in their view. Again, the advocates suggest that no grade on the school report implies 
non-attendance to the religion instruction, which means that the pupil and the parents are 
not Catholic. This indirect demonstration of religious conviction on a legal document also 
constitutes a violation of Article 8, according to the third party lawyers (Written 
Comments of the HFHR, 2007: 9). 
 
In their third party intervention, the advocates of the HFHR tried to deal with the general 
framework of the laws and the organization of the religion/ethics courses and they 
stressed the deficiencies of the law and the obstacles generated by the lack of procedural 
arrangements. They mainly criticized both the legal documents arranging the practice of 
ethics courses and the discriminatory procedures. As Dr. Pudzianowska suggested, these 
comments directly called upon a systemic change where new and more concrete 
organization shall be made for the teaching of ethics at schools. Actually, this is the main 
reason of disappointment; Dr. Pudzianowska claimed, because in their view the final 
judgment of the Court in the case of Grzelak failed to address to the important issues 
which were raised especially in the third party intervention. No systemic change was 
suggested and the verdict only responded to the complaint of Mateusz Grzelak. In the 
final analysis, the judgment of the ECtHR and the judgments of Constitutional Court find 
no gap in the primary law as well as the Ordinance regulating religion/ethics instruction 
in the country and delineate that the current problems stem from the practice. The main 
opponent argument of the third party is that the malfunctioning of the system is 
219 
dependent on the ambiguity of the Ordinance especially in means of determining the 
procedures to be followed for organizing ethics classes. Therefore HFHR is seeking a 
legal amendment to clarify the organization of the ethics instruction at Polish schools in 
order to prevent discrimination. This view is shared by liberals and left-oriented part of 
the society whereas there are also opponents mainly from the more conservative side. 
 
Despite the fact that religion education is not a highly debated issue in Poland in the 
recent years, the interviewees highlighted that the scope of the liberal attitude of the state 
in religion education of the minorities is much less problematic than the organization of 
ethics classes. Among interviewees, the ones who are more religious (Prof. Dr. hab. Piotr 
Mazurkiewicz148 and Dr. Michal Gierycz149 from the University of Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński) did not mention the problem of the ethics courses. Dr. Gierycz even stated 
that there are many schools where there is no religion course arranged but only ethics 
classes. However, people who are left-oriented or liberal (Dr. Dorota Pudzianowska, Mr. 
Konstanty Gebert and Ms. Agata Ladykowska) mentioned such problems. The liberals 
emphasized the arrangement for minority religions stating that they are not faced with the 
threshold problem which is an obstacle for ethics classes. It is indicated in the third-party 
intervention to the Grzelak case: “In case of religious instruction lessons, the minority 
religious denominations make sure that pupils are informed about the option of attending 
                                                            
148 Prof. Dr. hab. Piotr Mazurkiewicz is a Priest and General Secretary of the Commission of the 
Conference of Bishops of the European Community. He was interviewed on November 13th, 2012 during 
the Conference: “Vaticanum II” held on November 13th-14th at Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University by 
the Center of Thought for John Paul II.  
149 Dr. Michal Gierycz is Assistant Professor at Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Institute of Political 
Science. He was interviewed on November 13th, 2012 during the Conference: “Vaticanum II” .  
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a given religious instruction lesson and, therefore, inter-school groups, which do not exist 
for ethics lessons, are established for minority religions.”150 Even though contemporary 
Poland is a very homogenous society, it is important how the minority religious 
denominations are treated; what kind of alternatives they are provided and how all these 
are organized are important questions for the scope of this work. It is also worth 
investigating the situation of religious minorities in terms of their access to religion 
education in order to be able to make comparison with the current position of the ethics 
instruction in the country. Interviews were made with Muslim families and the religion 
instructors of Muslim religion, for this purpose. 
 
 
6.2.3 The Position of Other Religious Denominations in Religion Courses in 
Poland: Turkish Muslim Students and their Families151 
 
As already mentioned in the relevant parts, Polish society is contemporarily experiencing 
an ethnic and religious homogeneity for the first time in its history. The current situation 
can be summarized as follows: 
…unlike the present-day Western countries, Poland has remained a virtually 
mono-religious and mono-cultural country ever since the World War II. The 
ethnic and religious minorities, which were integrated in a unique way in the era 
of Polish-Lithuanian Republic, now, following the Holocaust and the post-war 
                                                            
150 “Information provided by Ms. Krystyna Kowalczyk, an official in Mazowieckie Kuratorium Oświaty” 
quoted in the third-party intervention by HFHR, the Written Comments, 2007, p. 6.  
151 The framework for the position of religious minorities in the country and the selection of the 
interviewees were determined by the invaluable guidance of Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Turkish 
Ambassador to Poland.  
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frontier changes, make up very small proportion of society. On the other hand, 
Poland does not experience problems with any sizeable group of immigrants not 
integrated into the culture of their host country, bringing their religion and 
customs into the public sphere (Gierech and Dobrzynska, 2009: 183).  
 
The interviews conducted more or less substantiated this statement. It is worth reminding 
here that there is no legal definition of “religious minority” and given that the majority of 
Polish society is Catholic, all the remaining adherents of other religions and 
denominations are considered to be minority (Rynkowski, 2008: 269). The religious 
communities in Poland are autonomous with their internal regulations and they only 
inform the state authorities about their internal affairs (Rynkowski, 2008: 270). As 
already mentioned, there are three options for the adherents of minority religions or other 
denominations in order to get religion instruction. For one, they can settle private schools 
as is the case for Jews for example. Secondly, if there is sufficient number of pupils of 
the same conviction and of the same age willing to be educated in their own faith, a 
religion class should be organized at the state school. Thirdly, parents can send their kids 
to the institutions where they can learn their religion outside ordinary school hours. 
During the interviews made with Muslim students of Turkish origin, it is observed that 
the third option was more frequently applied given the threshold condition of the first 
option and the absence of Muslim schools in Poland. 
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The interview with Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan152 constituted the framework of the 
research on the position of minority religious denominations in the country. The two 
subsequent interviews; with a group of Muslim students of Turkish origin, their parents 
and with the Imam and religion teacher of the Arab Mosque in Warsaw, were conducted 
to understand the practice of minority religion education in the country. Prof. Dr. Özcan 
shed light on the issue by stating that had always heard good things about the religious 
education of minorities in Poland since he became Ambassador in summer 2012. He 
claimed that Turkish families feel comfortable with the current practice in Poland 
concerning the religion education. Prof. Dr. Özcan underlined that Turkish pupils could 
go to the mosque upon the wish of their parents in order to get religion education and that 
the grade they obtained was inserted to the school sheet and counted. He stated that 
almost all Turkish families in Warsaw do the same thing and none of them complained 
about the system. On the contrary, Prof. Dr. Özcan emphasized that Turkish families are 
very happy with the system and they even argue that they raise their children more 
religious than the ones in Turkey. They are satisfied with the education their children get 
and the attitude of the school authorities. At this point, it was worth talking to pupils and 
their parents153 whether they were faced with any kind of discrimination or isolation, or if 
they had difficulty in making school authorities approve the grade and let it appear on the 
school report. 
                                                            
152 Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Turkish Ambassador to Poland since July 2012. The interview was made 
on November 12th, 2012 at Turkish Embassy, Warsaw. 
153 With the aim of getting more information about the practice, Prof. Dr. Özcan kindly provided the 
opportunity to come together with Turkish families and the interview which was made in the form of 
discussion group was firstly conducted with the pupils and then, with their parents. 
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The group of pupils from different ages154 and classes were queried about the practice of 
religion education outside of the school. Here, it should be reminded that in some schools 
a class can be arranged for Muslim students upon the wish of their parents and a secular 
Muslim teacher comes to school for the two-hour religion course. This practice is not 
very widespread since there is a minimum number required to open a class. Here, the 
point made by the lawyers of HFHR, third-party intervention to the case of Grzelak vs. 
Poland, is approved by parents and they stated that parents are well-informed at the 
beginning of the school year about the options for religion education and the process is 
much easier compared to organization of the ethics classes. However, the group which 
was interviewed consisted of pupils who were going to mosques (outside of the school) to 
get religion education. When they were asked about the process, they told that at the 
beginning of the school year, parents were asked whether they want their child to attend 
religion and/or ethics course. The parents make the choice; if they do not want their child 
to attend any of these, it is accepted and they do not need to declare, in other words, no 
negative declaration is necessitated. But due to the fact that the grade that pupils get from 
religion/ethics course is counted in the cumulative, both students and their parents prefer 
that their child attend one of these courses. Turkish Muslim families commonly choose 
religion course for their child and declare to the school authorities that the pupil will get 
the religion education outside of the school. After that point no strict control is applied. 
The Ministry of Education does not control the content of the courses Muslim students 
                                                            
154 The group of Turkish students consisted of seven pupils, two girls and five boys. Five of them are 
attending primary school (six years), one is going to the secondary school (gymnasium, three years) and 
one to high school (liceum, three years). They were all born in Poland except for the older one; he came to 
Warsaw when he was two years old. All of the pupils speak Turkish fluently. 
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attend.155 It is stated by parents that the grades given by the Imam of the mosques156 
approved by the Office of the Mufti directly appear on the school sheet and counted in 
the cumulative. The religion course that is taken outside of the schools (out of the regular 
school hours) shall be organized on Saturdays and no attendance is taken. 
 
During the religion classes at school, these students are supervised by a teacher as it is 
clearly indicated in the Ordinance. What is remarkable here is that according to Turkish 
Muslim families, the school administration acts on good will and does its best to provide 
the best supervision. It is told that during these hours the teachers try to help pupils in the 
subjects they have difficulty. For example, a Turkish pupil who had difficulty in Polish 
was given lectures on that subject during the religion courses at school. Some school 
administrations seem to be renunciative whereas in some other schools those students 
who do not attend the religion course spend their time at libraries without adequate 
supervision, as it is argued to be the case for Grzelak vs. Poland. But the general sense is 
that both the Turkish pupils and their parents are satisfied with the attitude of the school 
authorities. The students also underlined that the number of Muslim Turkish students is 
so minor that it does not constitute a real problem for the system. Actually, this point 
might explain the relative ease of adherents of minority religions to get religion education 
compared to the students who would like to attend ethics course. 
 
                                                            
155 The Ministry of Education does not supervise the Catholic religion courses either. 
156 In Warsaw, there are three different mosques approved by the Office of Mufti: the Arab Mosque, 
Fethullah Gülen Mosque, and Süleyman Hilmi Ünal Mosque. This was stated during the interview with the 
Turkish Muslim pupils. 
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When it comes to the visibility of religious symbols, the pupils state that except for the 
crucifix at the entrance of the school or in the classes at some schools; there are no such 
symbols. Some of the students claimed that in their schools crucifix necklaces are 
distributed to all the students except for adherents of other religious denominations. 
When they are asked whether such practices or just the fact that they do not attend 
religion course at school, which means ipso facto that they are not Catholic, cause any 
kind of discrimination or sense of “otherness” or leads to isolation, they all replied not at 
all. 
 
Contrary to what was argued in the case of Grzelak, the pupils said that the religion 
course (for Catholic students) is not always arranged at the mid of the school day but that 
it can change according to the program in each semester. During these hours; two hours 
per week, they all say that they spend their time under the supervision of the teachers. 
They can play games, paint or just study. When they are queried about the total number 
of students in their schools who do not attend to religion course and spend time under the 
surveillance of the teacher they say there are maximum five students; for example from 
Madagascar, Ukraine, Romania. One student also claimed that Protestant and Orthodox 
students, one for each, do not attend religion course at school since only Catholicism is 
taught, and they spend those hours with pupils from other religious denominations under 
the surveillance of the teachers. So in the cases of those interviewees, none of the 
religious denominations reach the number of three in their schools, which is the minimum 
number to demand school administration to organize an inter-school group. But it should 
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be noted that the pupils interviewed did not complain at all about getting religion 
education at the mosque. 
 
Turkish Muslim pupils who were interviewed commonly said that they like the time they 
spend at mosque. They go to mosque at the weekend, on Saturdays and they attend three-
hour lecture where they are taught Arabic, Koran and the principles of Islam. After those 
hours they spend time in practicing. Some of them even state that they spend the whole 
day at mosque where they can also play games. The general sense that one gets is that 
there are no strict rules that would impose pressure on pupils. They mostly get high 
grades and as long as those grades are counted in the cumulative, the religion course they 
get at the mosque increases their cumulative. 
 
During the interview it is questioned several times with different wordings whether they 
were faced discrimination from the side of their teacher and/or their schoolmates. The 
answer has always been the same; they repeated that they were not. They even underlined 
that the teachers are very thoughtful. One of the students exemplified the situation by 
stating that when they say that they are fasting during Ramadan, the teachers pay 
attention not to eat and drink when they are with Muslim students. It is declared that it is 
also the case for the followers of other convictions, for instance, one of the parents stated 
that there is a student in the class of his son whose parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses. They 
have a more rigid stance against the practices that are done other times than the religion 
course, like coloring the Easter eggs. It is told that the wish of those parents was also 
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respected by the school authority and the student did not attend such activities. According 
to parents, such rituals do not aim at imposing the pupils the Catholic religion so they do 
not oppose their kids to attend. Moreover, it basically seems like the teachers simply do 
not want to exclude the children of different convictions. On the other hand, it is 
generally commented by Muslim parents that the Catholic religion is very visible in daily 
lives as well as at schools. Parents told that in each and every opening ceremony, you can 
see the priests at school. However, the public visibility of Catholic religion does not seem 
to bother Muslim families who were interviewed. As a general attitude, they are 
confident about their children’s attachment to the Muslim faith and are comfortable with 
the education they receive. At the end of the day, from the side of the Muslim minorities 
who have an easy access to religion education is one part of the picture. For the other side 
of the coin, teachers of Muslim religion were questioned in order to have a more accurate 
understanding on the practice. 
 
In line with the aim of evaluating the stance of the Polish state about the conduct of 
minority religion education as well as the practice of this education outside of the school, 
an interview was conducted with the Imam Nizar Sherif157 and teacher Rashid who 
educate Muslim children in the Arab Mosque in Warsaw. They gave information about 
how they organize the content and the practice of the religion courses. Imam Nizar Sherif 
                                                            
157 Imam Nizar Sherif is of Syrian origin but became a citizen of Poland. He had come to Poland in order to 
study when he was young and then he realized that there was a demand of Muslims for the teaching of 
Islam in Poland. He started to educate Muslim children in the Arab Mosque several years ago. There are 
other teachers in the Arab Mosque; for girls there are two female teachers and for boys there are Imam 
Nizar Sherif and teacher Rashid.  
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told these classes take place on Saturdays, at the mosque and that they teach for two 
hours and twenty minutes. As a principle, the students attend religious instruction at the 
mosque during the semester and when their formal schools are on holiday, they do not go 
to religion schools either. They teach Arabic, Koran and fundamentals of Islam as well as 
the practice. The number of hours and the content of the courses can vary from one 
school to the other; every school158 has its own program. The content or the hours are not 
supervised by the Ministry of Education or another state institution. Given this autonomy, 
one of the main questions that should have been asked was about the funding of these 
mosques for providing such a service and Teacher Rashid who took part in our interview 
at the mosque said that there are few communities which fund these schools. Among 
these communities, he counted Islamic League and Islamic Union, and indicated that they 
sometimes supervise the instruction given and in some cases the school property (mosque 
or mescit) is the property of these communities. He added that there are also some 
Embassies which provide funding for those schools. Imam Sherif said that as they do not 
ask for funding from the state, the state does not have a control mechanism for those 
schools. 
 
From a broader scope, the fact that the students of a minority religion have such an easy 
access to religion instruction did not necessarily imply that they did not face any kind of 
discrimination and this was overtly asked to Muslim pupils who were interviewed and the 
                                                            
158 Imam Sherif mentioned that there are two other schools in Warsaw where Islamic religion is taught. 
Both of them are managed by female teachers; one Polish woman who was once Christian but then 
embraced Islam and the other one is Muslim and comes from Sudan. In one of the schools, they teach three 
hours and in the other five hours.  
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response was negative. It was also noteworthy to query the observations of religion 
teachers and Imam Sherif shared his personal experience when he was asked about the 
attitude of Polish people towards Muslims in the society. He said that he has been living 
in Poland for thirty years and he never felt offended. Actually, he was wearing religious 
clothes and stated that his wife is in hijab and that they were never attacked or even 
discriminated but rather they were respected every place they go. That is why, he said, 
Muslim pupils in Poland should not encounter big difficulties in attending religion 
schools outside, like the Arab Mosque. 
 
As already mentioned, grading does not constitute a problem for minority religions; 
parents can bring the grade of the pupil to the school administration and it is 
automatically recorded on the school report. The grade is calculated toward the 
cumulative and this procedure is not different from the ones followed for Catholic pupils 
who attend religion class at school or the ones who take ethics instruction. For Muslim 
pupils, the grade they get outside of the school is approved by the Mufti and it is the case 
for other minority religions; in other words those grades are approved by the regional 
religious authorities before submitting to the school authority. Relying on the statements 
of Muslim families who were interviewed, it can be deduced that religious minorities are 
not encountering remarkable obstacles in practice. 
 
The religion education of minorities was very remarkable in the sense that Poland, which 
is a country known for its high level of religiosity, provides that much facility for 
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adherents of other convictions than Catholicism. During the communist rule, most of the 
churches and religious denominations were under state control and their functioning was 
limited by the National Security Agency.159 But given that after the World War II society 
became very homogenous, there was no need for excessive control on religious 
denominations in the country. In addition, as it has been stressed several times as self-
perception, toleration of different convictions is a historical tradition in Poland. Although 
the Roman Catholic Church dominates in many fields like social life or politics, the 
experience of Turkish families living in Poland sheds light on the principles of tolerance 
and respect in the field of minority religion education. Here, it is noteworthy to state that 
minorities in Poland are very small in number and therefore they do not necessarily 
constitute a threat for the Polish nation. At this point, a reference should be made to the 
discussion raised in the previous part about relative tolerance to the “other” and pressure 
on “us” to comply with the societal norms. When the experiences of the interviewees that 
will be dealt in detail in the following parts are put on one side and the affirmations of the 
Turkish students and parents on the other, it could be observed that being Polish is tightly 
associated with Catholicism and that this is the main source of perceived pressure on 
Polish people in means of religious affiliation. Relative tolerance to Turkish Muslim 
students might be rooted in different dynamics and it should be explored attentively. To 
decide on whether or not Europeanization had an impact on this tolerance, maybe one 
should first recall the position of the Catholic Church in the accession process of Poland 
                                                            
159 The statistical data about religious denominations in Poland are widely given in: Elzbieta Bilska-
Wodecka. 2009. “Secularization and Sacralization. New polarization of the Polish religious landscape in 
the context of globalization and European integration,” Geographica (1-2), pp.3-18. 
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and the current stance of religious leaders about the EU membership in relation to state-
religion relations and religion education. 
 
 
6.3 The Role of the Catholic Church in Polish Identity, Policy-making and 
Religion Education 
 
Poland in general terms is recognized with its strong ties with the Catholic Church. In the 
Polish context, national and religious identities are characterized by a sense of belonging 
to Polishness and Catholicism (Borowik, 2002: 240). Due to this character, Polonia 
semper fidelis160 worked as a motivation behind the strong ties between church and state. 
Depending on the magnitude of relations between church and state, this fidelity showed 
up occasionally as militancy or tolerance (Casanova, 1994: 92). In the ‘republic of 
nobles’ (between 1569 and 1795) which implies the reign of the szlachta, the country 
experienced frustration of both centralized absolutism of the state and the identification 
of church and state. Although this period had weakened the position of the Catholic 
Church given the popularity of Protestantism among the szlachta, it enhanced the 
environment of religious toleration in the country. This is noteworthy since the principle 
of religious tolerance could coexist with the strong presence of the Catholic Church in the 
following centuries. 
                                                            
160 Semper fidelis is Latin for "always faithful" or "always loyal". The term is used to identify Polish 
nation’s fidelity to Catholic faith. See Jose Casanova, “Poland: From Church of the Nation to Civil 
Society,” in Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 92. 
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This kind of national identity strongly tied with the religious identity was definitely 
rooted in historical circumstances, especially the partitions that devastated Polish 
nationhood for more than a century so that the political enemies were labeled with their 
religious alien-ness (Borowik, 2002: 240). Nonetheless, during the years of partition, the 
Church lost its autonomy and influence it used to exert, given that Catholic Austria, 
Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia tried to convert Churches on their lands as the 
instruments of their policies (Kloczowski, 2000: 191). Therefore, there have been times 
where Poland was 40 percent non-Catholic and included large Lutheran and Jewish 
communities (Demerath III, 2000: 128). Nonetheless, Catholic religion was strengthened 
by turning its focus on resistance to the conquerors and in that sense those partitions 
served the identification of Church and nation together, since the Church was perceived 
as the only institution capable of confronting the division (Casanova, 1994: 92). 
 
In the nineteenth century, a new Polish civil religion arose from the mixture of 
Catholicism, romantic nationalism and Slavic messianism (Casanova, 1994: 92). When 
industrialization started to spread all over the world, most of the capital was accumulated 
in foreign hands in Poland thus the church has not been perceived as the as a source of 
capitalist exploitation (Casanova, 1994: 93). As a consequence, the workers in Poland 
have neither been de-Christianized nor denationalized (Casanova, 1994: 93). However, 
after World War I, for a short period of time the Catholic Church lost its popularity as the 
nation gained its independence. Under the influence of Enlightenment and Marxist 
critiques of religion, Polish exceptionalism was interrupted (Borowik, 2002: 240). The 
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exceptionalism reappeared with the outbreak of the Second World War as the Catholic 
Church became an actor in political opposition. 
 
In the period from World War II to the collapse of the communist regime in Poland 
(1945-1989), the position of the Catholic Church could not be repaired that easily. Each 
and every time where the role of the Church was confined, the Catholic Church passed 
the test with remarkable success. Despite the secularist policies pursued by Gierek, 
especially in the economic field, the country has not ended up with an overall 
secularization as has been the case in the West (Casanova, 1994: 96). Even though 
religion could not be marginalized to the private sphere as aimed by the communist rule, 
many restrictions have been exerted on the Catholic Church. As a matter of fact, “the 
church had won the war of secularization as well as all the main battles” including the 
control of religious education, each time when there has been a confrontation between 
church and state (Casanova, 1994: 96). This undoubtedly enhanced the strength and 
prestige of the Church. Especially in the 1980s, the Church exercised extra-religious 
activities by taking an active role as defender of human rights, and a legitimizing power 
for resistance against the national political authorities (Borowik, 2002: 241). 
Furthermore, during the martial law in 1981, where the activists of Solidarity were 
imprisoned, the Church became the symbol of freedom and acted as the shelter for 
political transparency (Borowik, 2002: 241). The Church even became the source of hope 
for freedom and democratization of the country. 
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The level of religiosity of society increased under the communist regime in Poland to the 
contrary of expectations of sociologists of religion (Casanova, 1994: 96). The general 
perception among Poles was that the Church worked in the public interest (Borowik, 
2002: 242). As a matter of fact, during that period, a change in the position of the 
Catholic Church can be observed; it quitted its defensive stance and “became heavily 
involved in promoting recognition of its own past role in Poles’ struggle for 
independence” with specific reference to the partition era (Ramet, 2006: 120). The 
Church began to act as a third force which was apart from both the regime and Solidarity, 
and extended its area of influence by promoting cultural activities that would enhance 
Polish culture (Ramet, 2006: 121). In that sense, the Communist era has witnessed the 
Church gaining both institutional and popular recognition. 
 
From the perspective Mr. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz,161 who was interviewed in Warsaw, 
starting with the 1960s where Polish people, even the secularist intellectuals started to 
feel closer to the Church and indicated that by the mid-1970s; the Church became a 
refuge for the whole society. According to his observation, it is noteworthy that religious 
education at schools was partly available until 1960, even under the Communist regime. 
As a matter of fact, under the Communist rule, “the Catholic Church, in spite of 
numerous abridgements, enjoyed some level of autonomy, especially in comparison with 
other countries under Soviet domination. For example, in communist Poland, until 1961, 
religious classes were not excluded from public schools” (Daniel, 1995: 403). He 
                                                            
161 Mr. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz is researcher at the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw. 
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mentioned that the shift came around 1990, when the Church reasserted its priorities; like 
return of property that was taken away by the communist rule and like the return of 
religious education into schools. After signing the Concordat, the official diplomatic 
agreement, the return and compensation of the Church property, return of religious 
courses to schools and a compromise about the abortion issue (limited abortion) were 
regulated. Mr. Kazmierkiewicz highlighted that when the consensus within the Solidarity 
had been broken down, the secularist intellectuals in the country became alarmed because 
of the return of the Church into the public sphere. Actually, this has been an opportunity 
for the Catholic Church to remind its presence and significance for the Polish nation and 
this fact has been displayed by the opinion polls made in 1989: the Church was trusted by 
87 percent of Poles; which is followed by 70 percent for the army, 68 percent for the 
government and 66 percent for Solidarity (Ramet, 2006: 121). What is more, the Catholic 
Church did not only gather practicing Catholics but skeptical intellectuals and non-
believers as well (Daniel, 1995: 404). At the edge of a new term for Poland, the Church 
seems to have restored trust so that it held its strong position in the country. Thus it can 
be stated that what gave Polish Catholicism its exceptional position are its militant as 
well as reconciliatory characters that it maintained throughout centuries. 
 
With the fall of Communism, the Catholic Church that had secured its position in society 
started to work on increasing its influence in social affairs. Among its priorities, the 
introduction of religious education to schools, a total ban on abortion and the Concordat 
have been prominent. Given such interferences of the Catholic Church to the state 
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policies opened up the discussions about secularization of the state. The attempts of the 
Church to intervene in the constitution-making have been already depicted and its 
interference to the EU membership where we can observe the contemporary impact of the 
Catholic Church, is going to be evaluated in the following part. 
 
 
6.3.1 The Impact of the Catholic Church and Other Historical Factors on 
Poland’s Relatively Easy Membership to the EU 
 
In 1989, right after the abolishment of the Communist regime, diplomatic relations 
between Poland and the European Community (EC) were initiated and in the same year, 
an agreement on trade and economic cooperation was signed. Next year, Poland 
submitted its official application to the EC to initiate an association agreement and in 
1991 the EC and Poland signed the European Agreement (EA).162 The agreement was 
ratified by the Polish Parliament in 1992 and went into force in 1994. This created the 
legal framework according to which Poland was going to determine its internal reform 
program. The agreement also determined the principles of multilateral cooperation in 
economic, political and cultural terms (Öniş, 2004: 489). In that period, the European 
                                                            
162 Commission of the European Communities, 1997, Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union, p. 8. For detailed information please visit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op_en.pdf 
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Union mainly supported the economy of Poland by giving technical assistance and 
financing, with the program of PHARE.163  
 
In the year of 1993, the Copenhagen Summit was a milestone given that the political and 
economic criteria for membership were prescribed. Poland applied to the EU for 
membership in 1994, and one year later the Council of Ministers decided to implement 
the procedure. The Accession Negotiations were initiated in 1998 and were conducted in 
accordance with the “Strategy for Poland” that had been created in 1994 (Öniş, 2004: 
489). The negotiations were conducted between 1998 and 2004 with a relative ease. No 
major controversy was raised in the progress reports; on the contrary, the reforms which 
were expected to be realized and indicated in Agenda 2000 were accomplished. The 
accession negotiations with Poland were successfully concluded on 13 December 2002 
and the Treaty of Accession was signed on 16 April 2003. In a referendum held on 7-8 
June 2003 in Poland,164 a majority of Poles expressed their support for membership of the 
European Union. Following ratification of the Treaty of Accession, Poland joined the EU 
on 1 May 2004.165 
 
As a matter of fact, there were people who opposed to membership for different reasons. 
Among the prominent concerns of Europhobes in Poland, we can enumerate firstly the 
                                                            
163 PHARE: Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy. 
164 More than 59 percent of Poles took part of the referendum and 78 percent of the participants voted in 
favor of the accession. For more information please see: Sabrina P. Ramet. 2006. “Thy will be done: the 
Catholic Church and politics in Poland since 1989,” p. 141-2. 
165 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland’s Preparations for Membership: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf 
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communist ideology that was opposed to integration with capitalist Europe. Secondly, 
nationalist concerns, which are more or less common in most of the countries that are 
seeking membership, which primarily derive from the fear of loss of sovereignty. 
Thirdly, given the historical background of Poland, German expansionism was still 
considered as a potential threat. Lastly, the Catholic Europhobes were mainly concerned 
with the loss of religious identity in the case of integration with the EU given the secular 
character of Europe (Casanova, 2006: 69). Actually the religious concerns of the Catholic 
Europhobes were tightly associated with the position of the Catholic Church on this 
matter. 
 
The attitude of Polish bishops and clergy, which was ambiguous if not negative in the 
second half of the 1990s, turned to be positive most probably because of the fact that the 
Catholic Church wanted to be decisive in defining European values (Ramet, 2006: 137). 
The positive attitude of the Catholic Church in Poland’s membership to the EU greatly 
influenced society and created an overall support for the accession process. Obviously, 
Poles had concerns about the membership since they were afraid of losing their deep ties 
with national identity and most remarkably, with Catholicism. Those concerns were 
alleviated by most trusted religious leaders who subsequently paid visits to Poland in the 
late 1990s. Likewise, the visit of Polish Cardinal Jozef Glemp and other bishops to 
Brussels in 1997 and their useful contacts with the European Commission worked as an 
agent for stronger ties (Bilska-Wodecka, 2009: 12). Another important step was the 
decision of Archbishop Henryk Muszynski to attend the Commission of Bishops’ 
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Conferences of the European Union (COMECE)166 as an observer (Bilska-Wodecka, 
2009: 12). As a further move, Cardinal Jozef Glemp met the EU Commissioner for the 
EU Enlargement in Brussels and after that meeting, the Cardinal was totally convinced 
that the membership of Poland to the EU was a “historical necessity” (Bilska-Wodecka, 
2009: 13). The concrete step was taken by Polish bishops in November 2001, in a 
meeting where they decided to issue a communiqué indicating their support for the 
integration of Poland to the EU. 
 
With that motivation, the Polish episcopate issued the first official document on Poland’s 
potential membership to the EU in 2002 and stated that “the Church regards the EU as a 
community of the spirit” (Ramet, 2006: 139). However, a few months later the European 
Parliament called member countries as well as the candidates to legalize abortion with a 
non-binding appeal (Ramet, 2006: 139). This was in very line with the concerns of 
Catholic Europhobes and made them think that Europeanization would undermine Polish 
values (Ramet, 2006: 139).167 Although this development caused resentment, the Church 
                                                            
166 Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) is an organization of 
Roman Catholic bishops in Europe to examine European Union (EU) policy and legislation from a Catholic 
perspective. COMECE is made up of bishops delegated by the 24 Catholic bishops’conferences of the 
European Union and has a permanent Secretariat inBrussels. It was launched on 3 March 1980. The 
objectives of COMECE are: to monitor and analyze the political process of the European Union, to inform 
and raise awareness within the Church of the development of EU policy and legislation, to maintain a 
regular Dialogue with the EU Institutions (European Commission, Council of Ministers and European 
Parliament) through annual Summit meetings of religious leaders, Dialogue Seminars, various Conferences 
and by taking part in Consultations launched by the European Commission, to promote reflection, based on 
the Church's social teaching, on the challenges facing a united Europe. COMECE is funded by the Bishops' 
Conferences of the European Union. For more information about COMECE please visit their website: 
http://www.comece.org/site/en/home?ts=0.067939001389831835  
167 Polish Archbishop of the time; Arcbishop Muszynski demanded to insert a clause to the EU constitution 
guaranteeing that no interference would be made to Poland about the regulations of abortion but the 
government rejected to open abortion issue to discussion. Only Ireland and Malta put special clauses to 
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did not give up its motivation for membership. The main idea was that if Poland would 
become part of the EU, it would “restore Europe for Christianity” (Casanova, 2006: 69). 
To put it in a more concrete way, the rationale behind was a Europe-wide evangelizing 
which would even show that secularization thesis was wrong: “Let Polonia semper fidelis 
keep faith with its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its integration into 
Europe, thus becoming a ‘normal’ European country” (Casanova, 2006: 70). When the 
efforts of Poland for an explicit reference to Christianity in the Preamble of the EU 
Constitution are evaluated, one can realize the commitment to the “great apostolic 
assignment.” Nonetheless, no reference was made to Christianity in the preamble but this 
did not prevent Polish religious leaders to support the EU membership.  
 
Here, it should be noted the great influence of Pope John Paul II in Poland’s membership 
to the EU. His support can be considered as the main reason for Polish Europhobes to 
calm down. John Paul II considered Poland’s membership as an occasion for defining the 
future of Europe in relation to its Christian roots: “Europe of the future could be 
identified with Europe of the past, which appeared on the stage of history thanks to 
Christianity” (Ramet, 2006: 137). Therefore, the decisiveness of religious leaders168 in 
Poland, the Pope John Paul II being the prominent figure, led to the defining of Poland’s 
future within Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
their accession treaties for the safeguard of proscription of abortion. See : Sabrina P.Ramet. 2006. “Thy 
will be done: the Catholic Church and politics in Poland since 1989,” p. 140. 
168 Jozef Cardinal Glemp (1928-2013) was a Polish Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. He was 
Archbishop of Warsaw from 1981 to 2006 and primate of Poland. He greatly supported Poland’s EU 
membership. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek (1934-) was the executive secretary of the Episcopal Council of 
Poland until 1998. He supported the EU membership of Poland 
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The positive attitude of the Church has been an important reason for the willingness of 
Polish people for the EU membership. However, there were other factors stemming from 
the very characteristics of Polish society that caused Poland’s relative ease in its 
integration with the EU. Regarding the reforms made in compliance with the EU 
accession which went parallel with the modernization of the country, the first important 
feature to be highlighted is the homogeneous character of the society. This ethnic 
homogeneity has its underpinnings in the historical legacy of the country which has been 
delineated above. To be more specific, minorities account for only 1,3 percent of 
Poland’s population which constitutes a small number (Ramet, 2006: 118). That is why 
neither national minorities nor other religious communities than Catholicism have been a 
major area of controversy in the country.  
 
Furthermore, civil society in the country has been so unified and powerful that the 
commitment of the reformist elites for EU membership could end up with a widespread 
mobilization from below (Casanova, 2006: 70). In a sense, the homogeneity of society 
and the absence of religious and ethnic conflicts as well as the strong commitment of 
elites for EU membership have been the determining factors in relative ease of Polish 
membership. Here it should also be noted that a return to the old regime was no more an 
alternative for Polish people given their communist past and this might be the strongest 
factor why they have perceived integration to the EU as the “only game in town.” This is 
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why the process of embracing the EU norms continued even after the EU membership 
and the collective learning has undergone.169 
 
In light of these evaluations, it can be stated that factors stemming from the historical 
legacy of Poland have eased the integration process and made the country receptive of 
further Europeanization. The presence of strong and committed reformist elites, the 
capacity of mobilizing from below; which implies an influential civil society and the 
Church, which is able to guide Polish society in the direction it determines, combined 
with the eagerness for membership -though different reasons- became facilitating factors 
for the integration with the EU. That is why Poland is faced with less adaptational 
pressures during its membership (Öniş: 2004:481). From the scope of Europeanization 
theories, the presence of all these elements makes it easier to embrace European norms.   
 
 
6.3.2 Contemporary Politics in Poland: Debates on State-Religion Relations 
and Religion Education 
 
The main discussions on state-religion relations revolve around limited number of issues 
and religion education is not currently on top of the agenda. According to the observation 
                                                            
169 Among many initiatives, “Institurte of Public Affairs” (IPA) is a leading Polish think tank and an 
independent centre for policy research and analysis, established in 1995. Their mission is to contribute to 
public debate on key Polish, European and global policy issues. The main areas of study include European 
policy, social policy, civil society, migration and development policy as well as law and democratic 
institutions. For more information please see: http://isp.org.pl/ 
243 
of Turkish families in Poland, one of the recent debates on state-religion relations was 
about the pulling crucifix out of the schools; a similar debate took place about removing 
it from the Parliament. Liberals are for removing religious symbols from public spaces. 
Another important issue is about the funding of the Catholic Church. Turkish parents 
talked about their observations by stating that donations are collected in the name of the 
Church but it is done in a way that is based on the manifestation of who made the 
donation and who did not. This is done overtly, it is argued, people who collect the 
donation puts a mark on the door of the houses which give money. This is actually a way 
of displaying who is “religious” and who is not. Turkish parents think that this exerts 
pressure on Polish people. All the Turkish people who were interviewed claimed that the 
religiosity of Poles is exaggerated and the young generation is becoming less and less 
religious. According to the observations of Turkish people who were interviewed, church 
attendance is remarkably decreasing. 
 
This observation is also supported by empirical data: “95 percent of Poles identify 
themselves as Catholic; but only 41 percent attend Sunday Mass regularly. In the big 
cities of Warsaw and Krakow, only about 20 percent attend Mass regularly on Sundays, 
according to the Institute of Statistics of the Church” (Slackman, 2010). This situation of 
the self-definition of Poles as Catholic but not attending church is interpreted as “the lack 
of effective church leadership against the secular tide” (Slackman, 2010). 
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Mr. Kazmierkiewicz determined the period between 1993 and 2005 as an interesting term 
where there had been first, a left-wing prime minister and government, then in 1995 a 
president; Alexander Kwasniewski, who was an atheist was elected. The strategy of post-
Communists was to legitimize themselves in a conservative society, so the value-laden 
questions were left aside. This is a great discussion in the left wing nowadays because 
some argue that the changes would have occurred in Poland much earlier without those 
compromises. 2005 is a breaking point according to Mr. Kazmierkiewicz because a right-
wing party came into power and has been trying to undertake the fundamental reforms of 
the state and it attempted to bring a more conservative agenda, for instance in the field of 
education. For example during the time of Roman Giertych,170 uniforms for students were 
introduced and the government exerted greater control over teenage crimes. Mr. 
Kazmierkiewicz analyzed the political parties by emphasizing the diversification within 
the conservative movement; one part became pro-European (the Civic Platform) whereas 
the other part (the Law and Justice) became more and more nationalist more concerned 
with sovereignty. According to his view, it is interesting that the whole debate is going on 
among right-wing parties. He stated that he would consider Law and Justice as social 
democratic in economic terms but conservative in religious matters and the Civic 
Platform more liberal in value-laden social issues; for instance they would allow in vitro, 
settling gay partnerships and they are also more open to European integration but for the 
moment they would not go against the Church. On the other hand, according to a 
                                                            
170 Roman Giertych was Minister of Education for the term 2006-2007 
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conservative point of view171 the Civic Platform, the party in the government is gradually 
detaching from its central rightist position and shifting to a more liberal stance which 
alienated the party from the Church. Its recent policies are much more in line with the 
leftist view. 
 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz highlighted that 2004 was crucial for the liberals and left-wing 
political parties because the decision to join to the EU was also a social mandate to 
change this consensus which was drafted in the mid-1990s. It is said that the Polish 
society became much more liberal than the political system itself which was in place. A 
remarkable explanation for the current political atmosphere was to refer to the economic 
environment of the country. According to Mr. Kazmierkiewicz, Poland was experiencing 
an economic growth in the last five years and the economic questions are not divisive 
issues among the parties and that is why many more social issues are now on the table. 
The crucial question here is the place of the Catholic Church; given that 95 percent of the 
believers in Poland are Catholic and the Church has a historical role recognized in the 
public space. According to his observation, politicians are not willing to put these value-
laden issues to discussion. Mr. Kazmierkiewicz stated:  
The debate over the education has been usually about technicalities rather. There 
was nobody except for 10 to 15 percent of the voters who would want to see 
religion out of the public schools system, but there is a question: Should it be 
counted towards obligatory grade, how much do students have access to optional 
to religion classes of ethics. If we have obligatory grade in religion which some 
people believe is one of the easy courses so you could easily get an (A) and so all 
                                                            
171 Pawel Gierech, from the Centre of Thought for John Paul II, who is a sociologist and mainly focusing 
on the sociology of religion gave information about the current politics in Poland, at the Conference of 
Vaticanum II. 
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the students abstaining should have an option to go to ethics classes. Another 
question is how much should the teaching of religion be in the hands of the 
Church or how much should it be religious studies, which would show different 
belief systems.  
 
These statements about the religion education display that except for a more liberal, left-
oriented part of the society, there is a general consensus about the religion instruction at 
public schools. The main concern is about the conduct of these courses as well as the 
ethics instruction. According to Mr. Kazmierkiewicz, from a general outlook the 
contemporary issues are mostly dependent on the domestic agenda of the country rather 
than the direct impact of the EU membership. 
 
Even though Mr. Kazmierkiewicz made some references to religious education issue 
while describing the general atmosphere in the country, it seems that this is not among 
the most controversial issues. He was specifically asked to comment about why religious 
education is not on the political agenda; whether the issue is unproblematic or whether 
there are other social issues that are more important. He stated that he has a more cynical 
view about the political environment in Poland which says that politicians are basically 
preoccupied with the ratings. So the groups that tried to raise these issues declined and 
that is why the two dominant parties, the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice are still 
fighting over the middle ground. He added that the Palikot Movement was not able to 
move the discourse far to the left. It is also important to take into account the religiosity 
of the Poles; “they are more conventionally Church-goers and they are very much 
convenient looking people,” Mr. Kazmierkiewicz said that it is that simple as parents are 
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comfortable with their children learning religion at school without the need of any further 
effort. According to his opinion, the big parties do not want to raise this issue because 
they do not want to cause tension within society. As a matter of fact, it was very clear 
with the vote on abortion law which took place last month Donald Tusk (the party leader 
of the Civic Platform) lost control over his own party because this issue was brought. “In 
the times of crisis it is not a good idea to multiply the issues,” he added. 
 
The main concern of the Church is financing system right now, so Mr. Kazmierkiewicz 
reaffirmed that it does not make sense to add another issue on the agenda. The 
government is currently trying to change the financing system from the one which they 
have a lump sum donation from the state to basically a tax deduction. The problem is the 
concern that the number of people going to Church is much lower and they will be paying 
less as there is a general problem of collecting taxes. He explains that the left side is 
usually against religion education in school on the grounds that Polish people are paying 
out of state money for the salaries of the teachers. Nonetheless, it seems that the Church 
still has concerns about its authority in the social and moral affairs of the country. 
 
On the left-side, one of the most influential opposition parties is Palikot Movement, 
which recently changed its name as Your Move.172 This party is mainly criticizing the 
privileged position and the interference of the Catholic Church in Polish politics and 
                                                            
172 The Palikot Movement changed the name of the party as Your Move on 7 October 2013. A related 
article concerning this alteration and the new members is available online at: 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/26063/news 
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social life. The assistant to the MP Robert Biedron from Your Move, Ms. Paulina 
Wawrzyńczyk173 was interviewed to understand the position of the party and their agenda 
about religious issues. As the main stance of Your Movement is based on embracing 
European values and diminishing Church authority in Poland, she attracted attention to a 
controversial issue raised during the signing the Council of Europe Convention on 
Combating Violence Against Women. The Church was against the signing of this 
Convention because they mainly argued that Polish law already had "enough tools for 
resisting instances of violence, including aggression, toward women".174 The Church 
always assigned itself the guardianship of societal norms and among them; the protection 
of women is of great importance. Polish Bishops argued that no international agreement 
can protect Polish women better than the Church does. They criticized the government 
for not taking into account the views of Bishops and not making any reservations while 
signing the Convention. The ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on 
combating against violence toward women is an important implication of 
Europeanization in means of complying with the European norms. That is why it is 
remarkable in the sense that the Catholic Church started to be concerned about its 
position and authority in Poland with regard to the ratification of international agreements 
concerning societal norms. This shows that when it comes to compliance with the 
                                                            
173 Ms. Paulina  Wawrzyńczyk is member of Your Movement, left-oriented political party in opposition 
since 2011 and she works as assistant to the MP Robert Biedron, the first openly homosexual member of 
the Parliament, from Your Movement. The party was founded in 2010 and got 10 percent votes in the 
general elections of October 2011. Ms. Wawrznczyk was interviewed on Skype. 
174 For a detailed investigation of the discussion please see: 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/112369,Poland-to-sign-Convention-on-violence-against-women 
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European norms, the Catholic Church in Poland seems to have difficulties in digesting 
them. 
 
It was repeated several times during the fieldwork that religion education was not 
anymore a controversial issue in Poland but two press articles175 about the political 
debate on religion education, which were published recently, display that this subject 
needs consideration since it can be put on the agenda in the short term. One was 
published on April and the other one, just a few weeks ago. The first one was dealing 
with a new regulation on the framework of education plans that entered into force in 
September 2012, indicating what a student should learn on which education stage. The 
debate broke out in Spring 2012 by the main opposition party; the Law and Justice Party 
(right-wing) and second smaller party (Loyal Poland - Solidarna Polska). They accused 
the government for the new regulation leading to the exclusion of religion from schools 
and making it fee-paying courses financed by self-government. The government 
answered that it is not true - the new regulation only put the issues in order but most of 
them remained the same, i.e. religion like ethics, family life education and minorities 
languages still belonged to the second group of courses which are not obligatory but 
elective. Moreover, the financing was still going to be provided from the state budget. As 
it is written in the article published in Rzeczpospolita: “PiS chce posiedzenia komisji ws. 
religii”176 there are two main regulations about religion at schools; the first is the one 
                                                            
175 Dr. Adam Szymanski kindly helped to follow the media, the publications in Polish, for the discussions 
about the religious education in Poland. He translated the below mentioned articles.  
176 For the article (in Polish) published on 26 April 2012: http://www.rp.pl/artykul/866390.html 
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which is just mentioned and the other is about the religious education at schools that 
regulate practical issues like the number of hours and indicating that changes must be 
with consent of the bishop. 
 
The second press article was published in the Polish Press Agency and newspaper 
"Gazeta Wyborcza." 177 It gave information that the Polish bishops wrote a letter in which 
they call for introduction of religion subject to the matura.178 Bishops indicated that in a 
democratic country they have the right to call for this. Due to the introduction the religion 
subject into the matura, it would be equal with other subjects and would enable young 
people to develop more integrated vision of the world. The reason why this issue became 
a matter of discussion is that a new version of final examination for the secondary school 
is on the agenda for 2015, where the upcoming parliamentary elections will be held. 
 
Dr. Szymanski179 foresaw that the controversial issues between the Church and the state 
may be multiplied after a few years of silence in this area. He stated that religion 
instruction is among those issues given these recent developments and that this issue can 
become another hot issue on the political agenda, apart from in vitro and Church fund 
                                                            
177 For the article (in Polish) published on 23 November 2012 in Gazeta Wyborcza : 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,12908849,Kosciol_chce_matury_z_religii__Episkopat_nie_odpusci_.html 
178 Matura is final examination in finishing secondary school; lyceum, which is the last stage before 
attending university in Poland 
179 Dr. Adam Szymanski is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Journalism in the 
University of Warsaw. He kindly helped and guided especially for the interviews conducted in Poland. Dr. 
Szymanski conducted a comparative research on Poland and Turkey and the meeting was held during his 
stay in Turkey, in İstanbul on October 12th, 2012.  
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issues, which can ignite the tension between the Church and government. According to 
his opinion, the government is currently trying to cut off or at least diminish the subsidies 
paid to the Church and eventually, the Church wants to strengthen its position in political 
affairs. Actually, the government party was a right-oriented one, which tried to stick to 
the norms of center-right. However, its policies started to liberalize and is now more 
inclined to the left as indicated by other interviewees. 
 
Nonetheless, Dr. Szymanski gave the information that the government, Minister Michal 
Boni, co-chair of common Church-government commission said that it would be difficult 
to introduce religion as an exam subject from the legal point of view. According to Ms. 
Pudzianowska, such an act would violate the related articles of the Constitution. 
However, the problem of people who want to study theology at university must be solved 
but not by making religion an exam subject. It should be reminded that in Poland now the 
final exams in the secondary school are very important because with some exceptions, 
they are the basis for university admission. 
 
In the article, they also gave the information that there had been such plans in 2006 and 
2008. In 2008, the Church even offered the exam standards necessary for the introduction 
of religion as an exam subject. According to the article, the current government does not 
have such an intention. As a matter of fact, there seems to be general consensus that the 
religion instruction is more about faith than knowledge and therefore cannot be included 
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in the exam. The opinion poll180 conducted in 2008 displayed that a remarkable majority 
of Poles indicated that they are in favor of religion course to be taught at school with 66 
percent yes votes against 31 percent no votes. However, when it comes to the grading of 
the religion course, the research showed that Poles are skeptical about including this mark 
to final school year average and allowing students to choose religion as a subject in the 
matura. 
 
These very recent discussions about religion education at schools should be scrutinized 
very carefully to be able to make an accurate analysis on how state-religion relations are 
evolving. These developments may even provide an opportunity to comment on whether 
they are associated with general movements towards further liberalization and even 
secularization of the country. If so, then it should be followed up and examined very 
carefully in order to measure the impact of Europeanization since to focus only on the 






180 Opinion poll was conducted by Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej) 
about the “Religion in the Education System.” The findings are available online at: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2008/K_136_08.PDF. The research is in Polish and was kindly 
translated by sociologist Pawel Gierech from Centre of Thought for John Paul II, Warsaw.  
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6.3.3 The Impact of the EU Membership and Europeanization on Poland’s 
Domestic Affairs and Religion Instruction in Public Schools  
 
In line with one of the main arguments of this chapter, it should be highlighted once more 
that the formation of the new state and Europeanization are the two parallel process for 
Poland and it is difficult to differentiate the impacts of those processes on domestic 
politics and policy-making. The interview that was made with Prof. Dr. hab. Piotr 
Mazurkiewicz, who was the General Secretary of Commission of Bishops’ Conferences 
of the European Union between March 2008 and November 2012, was very enlightening 
in the sense that he made the connection between state-religion relations with specific 
reference to religion education and Europeanization. Prof. Mazurkiewicz firstly 
underlined the primary law based on the Lisbon Treaty (Article 17-Chapter I) 
determining relations between the Churches, religions and the EU. He stated that the state 
religion relations were organized under this Treaty and the main principle is the 
guarantee and the recognition of the status quo and national competence in member 
countries. That is why, he says, one should not expect a direct interference or activity 
infringing the state-religion relations in a member country. According to Prof. 
Mazurkiewicz, this is true to certain extent but there can be an indirect impact especially 
in the social sphere. For example, he highlighted the observation that after the accession 
which means in almost eight-years time, around two million Poles moved to Western 
European countries to work and this affected how people start to think and behave also in 
religious matters and about the Church. 
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During another interview, Mr. Kazmierkiewicz made a similar point and stated that EU 
membership had no direct political impact but it led to an increase in income and 
provided greater mobility. Both Prof. Mazurkiewicz and Mr. Kazmierkiewicz agreed that 
the EU membership had an indirect impact on religiosity of the Polish people. Mr. 
Kazmierkiewicz compared religiosity of Poland with Turkey and argued that Poland 
might be much less religious than Turkey. He explained the reason with the huge 
emigration; according to his view, in the countryside traditions are being eliminated day-
by-day because of high rates of emigration. So, the breakup of social ties, which has been 
going on since the 1970s and has been accelerated by the European integration ended up 
with a decrease in religiosity, especially in the countryside. Therefore as an ultimate 
outcome, “as Poland becomes more tied to the rest of Europe, its inevitable secularization 
has itself become an article of faith, at least for those who view progress as necessarily 
separate from piety” (Kulish, 2010). In that sense, the spirit of secularization can be 
considered among the impacts of Europeanization which took place mainly due to 
emigration of the young generation even though it is hard to observe a direct impact of 
this spirit on religion education at schools. 
 
Another interviewee; Dr. Gierycz also made reference to the emigration of the young 
people while commenting on the decrease in religiosity in the recent years in Poland. The 
statistical data shows that there is a comparatively low church attendance: “In 1982, 
shortly after martial law was declared by the Communist government, 57 percent of 
church members celebrated Sunday Mass, according to the Catholic Church Statistics 
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Institute” and in 2008, four years after the EU membership, this number was 40 percent 
(Kulish, 2010). It is remarkable that Poles do accept the decrease in religiosity and they 
are searching for the reasons behind of the fall in church attendance. Therefore, it seems 
that the EU has an indirect influence on ethical issues, but they are again mostly left in 
the competence of the member states and tightly related with the historical and domestic 
dynamics. 
 
When Prof. Mazurkiewicz was requested to comment about the impact of 
Europeanization and the religious education, he again highlighted the fact that there are 
no prescribed EU norms in this field but rather about professional education. He 
mentioned that the education is considered as a service from the EU side and services are 
in the competence of the EU; there is an EU law and policy which should be applied also 
in Poland. Prof. Mazurkiewicz exemplified that when we see a challenge with education 
for the Catholic Church like it has been the case for sexual education, it is organized still 
under the competence of the member state. He adds that we can see here again the 
indirect impact of the EU which comes under the form of advices, declarations; in the 
form of soft law. Another interviewee, Mr. Gebert also indicated that the EU does not 
infringe into the domestic affairs concerning belief and conscience and leave those issues 
to domestic jurisdictions of the member states, what the EU tries to prevent is the 
discrimination on the basis of religion which can be clearly seen in the case of abortion 
that were brought before the ECtHR. 
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For the religious education on the other hand, Prof. Mazurkiewicz reminded that there are 
no EU level norms or laws that member states have to comply. He stated that religion 
education is also organized under domestic competence. When we look at the Polish law, 
it describes the relationship between the Church and civil authorities concerning religious 
education in the country. Teachers of religion education must comply with the same 
criteria with other teachers so in a sense religious competence is checked by the Church 
and secular competence by the Ministry. Prof. Mazurkiewicz claims that the issues of 
non-discrimination and equal treatment are more related to the EU context; for example, 
the employment of the teachers should not be based on their convictions. There had also 
been some discussions in Poland about the Catholic teaching on sexuality but the official 
Catholic teaching, which is grounded in the Bible and in the catechesis,181 is determinant. 
 
Prof. Mazurkiewicz was also inquired on religious tolerance in relation with the position 
of other denominations in Poland and their opportunities to get the religion education 
according to their convictions. He mentioned that it was rooted in the Polish history 
rather than the country’s EU membership. He first made emphasis on the religious 
homogeneity of the society, which is an outcome of World War II, and stated that in its 
history Poland has never been homogenous until today. He also referred to the Polish 
Commonwealth in order to highlight that Poland was the first country to make reference 
to religious tolerance in its constitution in the Western world and that this principle has 
become a state tradition. 
                                                            
181 Catechesis is basic Christian education of children and adult . 
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Contemporarily, in the Polish Constitution it is indicated the notion of “proportional 
equality”, meaning that the state should treat equally all churches and other 
denominations, which also imply that all religions have the same right and opportunity to 
organize religious education at schools. But in practice, he purported, it gives different 
results because of the different proportions of the religious communities. Prof. 
Mazurkiewicz related the religious tolerance to the state tradition which was mainly 
gained during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which he defined as the union and 
the contract of the nations. According to his view, as this tradition is still alive, Poles did 
not have difficulty in integrating with the EU. 
 
As a consequence, the general sense that one gets is that the organization of religion 
education and the related practices (like religious instruction of other denominations) are 
mostly dependent on the historical underpinnings rather than the direct impact of 
Europeanization. EU membership had an indirect impact combined with the traditions 
and historical specificities of Poland on the arrangement of religion instruction in the 
country. That could be explained with the sociological institutionalism approach of 
Europeanization theories which purports that in some countries Europeanization occurs 












In examining the impact of Europeanization on religious education, the Polish and 
Turkish cases constituted two opposing examples in terms of experiencing this process. 
Not only for the field of religious education but also from a broader perspective; in terms 
of state-religion relations, the paths followed by the two countries in the Europeanization 
course differ from each other to a great extent. In this study, the relevant historical and 
legal contexts were investigated for both cases and substantiated with the field surveys 
which also aimed at portraying the contemporary situation in these countries in terms of 
religious education. This dissertation aimed to explain the altering ways in which Poland 
and Turkey responded to the impact of Europeanization. The different attitudes of these 
countries comprised good instances of the two approaches of the Europeanization theory 
which are rationalist institutionalist account and sociological institutionalism. 
 
The study displayed that the influence of Europeanization on the conduct of religious 
education in Poland can be best explained by the sociological institutionalist account of 
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the theory whereas rationalist institutionalism is the most adequate approach to elucidate 
the case of Turkey. It can be stated that the domestic change occurred in Turkey under 
the impact of Europeanization has taken place in conformity with the “logic of 
consequentialism” whereas for Poland it has been the “logic of appropriateness.” In other 
words, the rational actors in Turkey shaped their policies by calculating the outcomes; 
they intended to benefit from the process as much as they can. For example, Turkish 
actors legitimized their domestic policies by making reference to the relevant European 
norms. When it comes to Poland, actors who behaved in accordance with the logic of 
appropriateness took into consideration European values while determining their policies. 
The country embraced them in a way that those values became the point of departure in 
redefining the domestic structures.     
 
Poland is a case that envisages how enthusiasm of becoming part of the democratic and 
modern world could serve as a strong impulse for progress. In a very short time period, 
less than two decades, it could become a member of the EU by satisfying its membership 
requirements as well as undergoing a phase of transition in its domestic politics. Indeed, 
the creation of a modern democratic state is parallel with the Europeanization experience 
of the country given that right after the fall of Communism, Poland started to work for 
EU membership. This is why it is difficult to differentiate the reforms that have been 
actualized as a state-building process from the ones that have been made for integration 
to the EU. Nonetheless, it would not be an overestimation to assert that the EU works as 
an agent of reform in transitional societies like Poland and Turkey in the sense that it 
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motivates those countries located on the European periphery in terms of the material 
advantages it offers and becomes a ‘natural magnet’ with this potential (Öniş, 2004: 503). 
This phenomenon is explained by Europeanization theories as the impact of “membership 
conditionality” that encourages the candidate countries by rewards and sanctions. 
 
The advantage of Poland, with its history which is full of struggle, was to be able to 
mobilize for any kind of domestic change. The historical legacy of Poland displays a 
strong attachment to culture; and the preservation of culture has been achieved through 
education policies which have always been given high priority even in times of war. With 
this character, especially due to the existence of reforming elites in the country, Poland 
seems to have faced with less adaptational pressures from the side of the EU.  
 
In many terms, Poland is an accurate example of how Europeanization takes place with 
an understanding of sociological institutionalism in line with the logic of appropriateness. 
The historical context of the country displays how a nation could have survived under 
partitions, wars and with an experience of Communist rule for several years. The 
investigation of the history of Poland, starting with the 16th century, makes it clear that its 
identity has been preserved through the maintenance of education and religion as the two 
underpinnings of shared values and culture. In each and every period that was depicted in 
this study, it is remarked that the importance of education has been highlighted and it has 
been restructured many times in order to comply with the needs of the day. Religion has 
been another determinant part of the Polish identity, even under the Communist regime. 
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These two factors that come to the forefront in examining Polish history give significant 
clues about the political culture of the society. 
 
As a matter of fact, when such a country which has deep ties with religion was faced with 
Communism, the experience it had differed from other countries around. Nonetheless, 
departing from an extreme practice; Communism, where a total abolishment of religion is 
expected, Poland did not go to the other extreme point where the Church became the 
main actor in ruling of the state. It rather chose to modernize and return to the European 
roots and what is more, the Church supported this process. As sociological 
institutionalism purports, the relative ease of Poland’s accession to the EU, despite the 
suspicions of the European side, could take place due to the self-identification of Polish 
society with the rules, norms and values of the European Community. 
 
The education and the place of religious instruction in Polandcannot be evaluated 
separately from its past; the evidence displays that under each and every circumstance, 
Polish people have prioritized education and tried to improve and universalize it. 
Stemming from this historical characteristic, Poland did not have difficulty in making 
reform in the education system in accordance with the expectations of the European 
Union.182 Besides, the insertion of religion courses to the curriculum has been a matter of 
                                                            
182 “In July 1998 the Sejm adopted the basic principles of reform of the educational system amending the 
1991 Educational System Act. The new Act includes provisions on new school structures, the reallocation 
of management responsibilities to regional and local authorities, the redistribution of financial resources 
and the decentralization of education management.” European Commission, 1998, Regular Report from the 
Commission on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, p.26. 
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domestic politics; in the periods of rapprochement with the Catholic Church the state 
included the courses of religion in public schools. That had even been the case in the 
Communist era which is known for its rigid stance towards religion and belief. Optional 
religion/ethics courses are in line with the expectations of the EU, especially for a 
country that has such close ties with church. Therefore, as sociological institutionalism 
purports, the Polish case is a good example of Europeanization can lead to the formation 
of new domestic policies, practices and structures which are smoothly incorporated into 
the state systems. 
 
In the case of Poland, it is difficult to observe the differential empowerment effect of the 
EU, it seems rather a case like Europeanization by means of “logic of appropriateness” 
that sociological institutionalism puts forward. Instead, the change in Poland in line with 
Europeanization took place through socialization and collective learning process. This 
simply means that the reformist elites; in Polish case these were especially the religious 
leaders, who were supportive of the EU membership persuaded political authorities for 
the rule adoption.  
 
This seems to be an appropriate explanation for the case of Poland since this is not the 
commitment of the political parties or leaders for EU membership, but rather of 
reforming elites thanks to the mobilization culture of society. . Civil society of which the 
Church constituted an important part, continued to be active even after the EU 
membership in order to foster a successful integration. Several occasions have been 
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realized for strengthening ties with the EU and internalize the Europeanization process. 
This is one of the main reasons why Europeanization has taken place in Poland through a 
deep collective learning process; where civil society worked as an agent for further 
Europeanization even after membership. It also explains how Poland could reach the 
level of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria in such a short time. 
 
However, with the lack of clear definition for norms and rules, even though the rule 
exists in the EU context, its enforcement for compliance is expected to be low. This 
seems to be the case for religious instruction in member states. As a result, the discussion 
mostly revolves around the more obvious criteria of the EU such as religious freedom; 
and that is why religious education is evaluated within this scope. For the case of Poland, 
the resonance factor that is put forward by the social learning model also explicates 
relative ease of internalizing European norms. It highlights that the receptiveness of 
Poland to accept and adopt external norms has been high due to the absence of related 
domestic rules given the parallelism between the state-building and Europeanization 
processes. After the fall of Communism, there were plenty of gaps in rule-making so that 
European norms could set an exemplar for Poland to adopt. 
 
Given the fact that there are no determinate rules of the EU or other European institutions 
about the conduct of religious education, except for the Toledo Guidelines which are not 
legally binding, any practice in line with the universal norms like right to freedom of 
religion, freedom of education or parents’ right to educate their children according to 
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their philosophical conviction became the points of reference for any kind of law and 
norm-making for modern and democratic countries. The legal context of Poland 
concerning religious education is in conformity with the European norms given that the 
courses are optional and the attendance to those courses requires a positive affirmation. 
Moreover, as there exists an Ombudsman in the legal system of Poland, there had been 
enhancements in the legal arrangements on religion courses thanks to the application of 
Ombudsman. In the absence of any kind of pressure from the international environment, 
the Ordinance has been promulgated for regulation of the religious education and 
furthermore, the Constitutional Court gave a verdict in order to impede any kind of 
discrimination that would come out as a result of the practice. For those reasons, it seems 
that Poland is a good example of how in the absence of conflicting with or alternative to 
rules with the European ones, countries internalize the norms much easier. In other 
words, the reform agenda of Poland, like many other CEECs which experienced the rule 
and the collapse of Communism, specifically resonated with the European norms and the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
 
Despite the fact that the legal context and practice of religious education comply with 
European values, Poland was sued on this specific issue before the ECtHR (Case of 
Grzelak vs. Poland). However, when that case is investigated one can easily remark that 
the judgment is lacking general measures for the legal system or practice concerning the 
religion education in Poland and just comprises individual measures for the applicant. 
This judgment displayed to a great extent that there was no need for structural 
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amendment in the domestic documents regulating religion instruction in the country and 
that there is no inconsistency between the legal status of religion courses and European 
norms. This view has been substantiated with the field survey conducted given that 
adherents of another conviction were interviewed and they commonly declared that there 
is a liberal and democratic environment where everyone has the right and easy access to 
the education of one’s own belief in a country which is known for the strong presence of 
the Catholic Church. The practice for the religion instruction provided for the adherents 
of other convictions is also in line with the European norms of religious freedom and 
right to education according to one’s own belief. 
 
Here the other specificity of Poland which constitutes and exemplar for the sociological 
institutionalist account appears; the Catholic Church worked as “norm entrepreneur” in 
the Europeanization process of the country. Even though there had been some 
controversies, the Catholic Church, especially Pope John Paul II, supported the 
membership of Poland to the EU extensively by indicating that Poland is part of Europe. 
Therefore, there had been a strong consensus for the return to the European roots which 
enabled the decision-makers in the country to confute the domestic veto players. The 
interviews also supported the view that the Catholic Church in Poland has been an anchor 
of further modernization and democratization of the country. 
 
It seems very reasonable that religion education is not at the top of the political agenda in 
Poland, with the exception of some contemporary debates. As religion courses at schools 
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are provided by the Catholic Church, it sometimes attempts to widen the scope of its 
authority. A current issue which did not cause severe controversies but made it to the 
news media was about the insertion of questions on religion to the final examination 
(matura) with the proposition of the Church. However, the rightist government did not 
necessarily support such addition which would have provided a greater space, even 
though a negligible one, to the Catholic Church. The fact that there are no discussions for 
making the religion courses compulsory or to proceed in a less democratic direction is not 
an option for Poland display that the European norms were internalized to a great extent. 
 
On the other side of the coin, the Church can also be evaluated as a rational actor in the 
process of Europeanization which sought to maximize its power and enhance the scope of 
its authority in the country. The efforts of the Church mainly for the reinsertion of 
religion instruction into state schools were materialized with the promulgation of the 
Ordinance right after the fall of Communism. This can be considered as evidence to the 
aim of assuring its position in the new regime. As a matter of fact, there had been other 
priorities of the Church and they were commonly indicated during the interviews. The 
abortion issue and the funding of the Church are among the most debated subjects; so 
even though the Church could not impose its expectations on the state, it has the potential 
to ignite fervent public discussions on those matters as frequently as it wishes. 
 
Furthermore, by supporting the EU membership of Poland, the Catholic Church might be 
argued to adhere to the differential empowerment impact of Europeanization. Being a 
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pivotal actor in the integration process gave the Church an opportunity to strengthen its 
position in the country which has been already been substantiated with the previous 
experiences that can be read from Poland’s historical legacy. According to some scholars 
(Casanova 1994, 2006), the Catholic Church in Poland did not only intend to consolidate 
its position within the country but also took it as a mission to restore European religiosity 
through Poland’s membership to the EU. The Church can be assessed to have acted 
according to the “logic of consequentialism.” It also may be advocated that the 
differential empowerment impact of Europeanization among the domestic actors has been 
a motivation for the Church to support the EU membership. In consequence, the attitude 
of the Church in the EU membership of the country can also be explained by the 
rationalist institutionalist account of Europeanization theory. 
 
As another remark for Poland, it can be asserted that in cases where domestic change can 
be explained by sociological institutionalism, it is difficult to measure the impact of 
Europeanization since it is hard to observe the structures that would not have changed in 
the absence of such an impact. In other words, counterfactual thinking is not very useful 
since it is difficult to foresee how, for example, the conduct of religious education would 
be in Poland if there was no Europeanization process. As long as this approach of the 
Europeanization theory anticipates resonance or ‘goodness of fit’ with the domestic 
structures and the European ones, it becomes harder to determine the otherwise 
differentiated spheres. This is the case for Poland as is for the most of the CEECs which 
went on a transformation process after the fall of Communism and at the same time 
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applied for the EU membership. However, the cases where domestic change can be best 
explained by the rationalist institutionalism, the impact of Europeanization is much more 
visible and measurable.  
 
Turkey, in that sense, offered an invaluable material case on the issue of religious 
education for observing the impact of Europeanization. The historical context for the 
Turkish case displays how religious education has been a political matter which was 
shaped according to the interest-based policies of the political actors in the Republican 
era. Both education in a broader sense and in particular religious education, have been 
subjected to electoral concerns and thus there has been many alterations in its practice. 
The main evidence provided by the historical background of religious education in 
Turkey is about the political culture of the country and it clearly implies that Turkish 
policy-making had always an inclination towards rational actor model where actors are 
goal-oriented and purposeful; seeking to maximize their benefits. In other words, the 
conduct of religious courses, as one of the best indicators of state-religion relations in a 
country, has frequently been perceived as an opportunity for domestic actors in Turkey to 
gain power. 
 
Moreover, with the changes made in the status of religious courses, different practices 
were experienced. In evaluating those practices from the angle of European norms such 
as the right to freedom of religion and conscience as well as the right to education, it can 
be stated that the current practice of compulsory DKAB courses is the most incompatible 
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one. The evidence that the compulsory religious courses with the present practice 
constitute misfit with the European legal and practical contexts can be driven from the 
decision of the ECtHR on the Case of Zengin v. Turkey. It is also clearly indicated on the 
ECRI Reports that if these courses were free from indoctrination there would be no need 
to provide exemption for non-Muslim minorities in the country; and if these courses are 
based on teaching and practice of one religion, then it should not be compulsory. The 
Commission Reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU repeatedly 
highlight that with the current content, these courses shall not be compulsory and in 
addition those reports emphasize the complaints of non-Sunnis, especially Alevis who are 
the most populous non-Sunni community in the country. These instances display that 
although there are no determinate criteria about the status and conduct of the religious 
courses in European countries, the very existence of the article making the DKAB 
courses compulsory constitutes a misfit given the practice and complaints about the right 
to exemption. Due to this misfit, Turkey is faced with adaptational pressures from 
European institutions. 
 
Even though ECRI Reports were very clear and direct, the Commission Reports can be 
said to have a greater impact on domestic policies in this specific field. The reason lies 
beneath the differential empowerment factor of the rationalist institutionalism. The motto 
of EU membership has always been a strong card for the domestic actors but for the AKP 
government, it has also been a way to prove that the party is detached from its Islamic 
roots (Dağı, 2005:24). Other opportunities that were provided by this process were the 
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legitimization of government actions and weakening of the veto points in the country like 
the military and the opposition in the judiciary and bureaucracy. It is plausible to assert 
that the membership enthusiasm led to significant reforms in the country and gained 
momentum with the initiation of accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. 
 
In line with the motivation to acquire more power and additional resources as well as to 
enhance their position in the country and in the international arena, the government 
continued to behave as a rational actor. Some reflections of this inspiration can be 
observed in the amendments made in the content of the DKAB courses with the motto of 
complying with European norms delineated in the Progress Reports in the form of 
criticism for Turkey’s practices and (non)implementing the judgments of the ECtHR. 
Material steps, then, have been taken both at the policy level and the legal context. For 
policy change, among the concrete instances; the organization of Alevi workshops and 
various amendments in the program and the textbooks of the DKAB courses can be 
counted. In the legal context, even though the compulsory status of religious courses did 
not change, there had been an attempt at least for a few years, to facilitate exemption 
from these courses. Most of the cases sued generally by Alevi families were finalized in 
favor. The Council of State referred the verdict of the ECtHR on Zengin Case and made 
the judgments accordingly. Even though the ruling political elites in the country were not 
generally very comfortable with such decisions of the ECtHR and the criticisms made in 
the Progress Reports, which exert pressure for the domestic change, they acted as rational 
actors. Actually, they complied with these policies and legal requirements despite the fact 
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that such liberal policies and institutions may challenge government’s agenda and impose 
additional costs. An accurate analysis could be to state that despite the challenging 
expectations from the European side like change in the compulsory status of the religious 
courses or at least a fundamental alteration in their content in addition to the right to 
exemption, the differential empowerment factor has been so viable for the government 
that they accepted to comply with those norms regardless of their costs. In other words, it 
can be argued that as a rational actor it was calculated by the government that the benefits 
of complying with the expectations of the European institutions were greater than the 
costs of realizing those domestic changes. 
 
The differential empowerment impact of Europeanization has not been a constant factor 
in Turkey and in 2010, there was a change of attitude in the Turkish domestic courts in 
line with the alteration of government’s stance. The Council of State gave a verdict on a 
case of exemption from the DKAB course which indicated that due to the amendments 
made in the textbooks, the decision of the ECtHR was no longer a point of reference for 
the domestic courts. The execution of the general measures indicated in the judgment of 
ECtHR in the Zengin Case was implemented partially. This turn in the stance may be 
associated with diminishing of the electoral concerns of the government as the results of 
latest elections seem to have consolidated its position in the country.  Here, the 
Europeanization fatigue which came out of the loss of credibility of the EU about 
Turkey’s membership stems as a major reason for the reluctance to take further steps for 
domestic change in line with the European norms. This does not mean for sure that 
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Turkey would become irresponsive to the expectations of the EU; it sounds impossible 
given the accession process. However, it is obvious that it is not as easy to comply with 
the European values for the conduct of religious education as it is for the issues 
concerning fisheries, for example. Religion and religious education, as sensitive issues, 
will always remain as the fields of high cost to go for domestic change under the impact 
of Europeanization. Nevertheless, there can be an alteration in how Turkey responds to 
the impact of Europeanization; in other words it can shift from rationalist account to 
sociological institutionalism because of the temporal factors such as Eurocrisis which 
leads a further reluctance for membership. 
 
Nonetheless, it would be an overestimation to state that the policy change in the field of 
religious education under the impact of Europeanization ceased all of a sudden after the 
2010 referendum. Despite the decision of the Council of State implying that the change 
made in the DKAB textbooks in the 2007-2008 school year was sufficient, there had been 
another amendment which went into effect in the 2011-2012 term. In a sense, it was a 
way to declare that if the government decides to make a reform in this field, it will do so 
in its own manner. This is not an unfamiliar attitude given the prominent saying of the 
Prime Minister about Turkey’s membership to the EU: “Turkey should be accepted into 
the European Union. If not, we’ll change the name of the Copenhagen criteria to the 
Ankara criteria and continue with the reforms.”183 This statement purports that there 
might be a significant shift from the logic of consequentialism to the logic of 
                                                            
183 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Copenhagen criteria would become Ankara criteria.” 
Journal of Turkish Weekly, 1 July 2005. Available at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/14088 
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appropriateness and that even in the absence of EU membership motto, Turkey would 
work for further intensification of the European norms. In that case, Turkey’s 
Europeanization could be explained by sociological institutionalism but for the moment, 
it is hard to foresee whether it would be the case if Turkey ceased its membership 
journey. 
 
The contemporary developments in Turkey in the field of religious education, 
substantiated with the interviews, display a trend of retrenchment in the process of 
Europeanization. The introduction of the elective religion courses as they were not 
combined with the annulment of the compulsory DKAB courses, are evaluated by the 
non-Sunni communities as a new source of discrimination. As a matter of fact, although 
the insertion of the elective courses to the curriculum is very new, there are several 
complaints which were raised during the interviews. Moreover, there are also steps taken 
towards enhancing religious freedom in the field of education; for example, the 
government called for Christian and Jewish communities to prepare a content to be taught 
at schools. Such developments are greatly highlighted in the Commission Reports and 
that is why this move can be evaluated as an EU-driven policy. 
 
To summarize what has been concluded so far, when Turkey and Poland are evaluated 
comparatively in terms of the impact of Europeanization on the conduct of the religious 
instruction; it is determined that the Turkish case is better explained by the rationalist 
institutionalist account and the Polish case is more adequately explicated by the 
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sociological institutionalism. However, it should be noted that this is not a clear-cut 
distinction and that in both cases there are instances which can be analyzed from the 
other perspective. The concluding remarks consisted of an evaluation of the cases in 
terms of the explanatory power of different accounts of the Europeanization theory. It 
would be worth making a last comparative analysis in terms of the specific issues covered 
in the study. 
 
At first glance, the difficulty to contemplate the impact of Europeanization in the specific 
field of religious instruction in schools in Poland, mainly derived from the fact that the 
state-building process coincided with Europeanization of the country. Even though the 
main policies on religious education have not been directly influenced by 
Europeanization, the practice in this field, which has also been subject to ECtHR, is 
worth considering. There are no contemporary fervent public debates about the religion 
instruction at schools but there are still controversies mainly about the organization of 
ethics classes. It is also remarkable that the Catholic Church ignites discussions about 
religion instruction and wants it to be considered more seriously because this is one of its 
fields of authority. The main, yet indirect, impact of Poland’s EU membership on which 
many interviewees agreed is the emigration factor. It is argued that due to the emigration 
of the young generation to other European countries, Europeanization worked as a 
secularization agent and caused a decrease in religiosity of society. Turkey, on the other 
hand, with the latest amendments in the education system as well as the status of religious 
courses in public education seems to be affected by Europeanization to a greater extent. 
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The Commission Reports for Turkey which contained several criticisms about the 
conduct of DKAB courses and status of non-Sunnis in the country as well as the 
judgment of the ECtHR which envisaged structural amendments, were responded by 
remarkable domestic policy changes. The extent to which these amendments are in line 
with the core of European values is open to discussion, nonetheless, the effort should be 
credited. 
 
Another point that should be highlighted while investigating these two countries 
comparatively is the homogeneity of the society. In examining the status of the adherents 
of other convictions than the majority religion, the homogeneity of Polish is frequently 
highlighted society whereas in Turkey is heterogeneous both in ethnic and religious 
terms. This determination has remarkable implications on the conduct of religion 
education. In Poland, as long as the religion instruction is optional and based on positive 
affirmation, and adherents of minority religions have very easy access to religious 
instruction of their own conviction either within or outside of the school; they do not 
complain about discrimination. On the contrary, they defend that they are raising their 
children very pious. This can be observed at the legal context but also in practice and it is 
tightly associated with the fact that these minorities constitute such a small part of the 
population that they are not perceived as a threat to the religious identity of Poland. 
Nevertheless, the study displayed that Turkey with its heterogeneous society is 
encountering many more problems in the field of religious education. The facts that the 
religious instruction is obligatory within formal education and the negative declaration is 
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needed for getting exemption from the course, make the situation more complicated. 
Alevis constitute a notable part of the society and in addition, they are not considered as a 
religious minority so that they cannot enjoy the rights of non-Muslim minorities. The 
existence of several cases before the domestic courts by non-Sunnis also gives another 
dimension to this issue in Turkey. 
 
In the study, the Turkish case contains more detailed information and analysis concerning 
the contemporary issues, and the recent developments in the field of religious education 
under the impact of Europeanization. As it is argued, Turkey seems to be a case of misfit 
and thus is faced with greater adaptational pressures. As a response to those pressures, the 
country went through and is still undertaking plenty of amendments in terms of the 
conduct of religious instruction. The policy change and the steps taken for complying 
with the European norms indicated on the ECHR, addressed by the ECtHR in the relevant 
judgment, and mentioned on the Commission Reports; made Turkey more receptive to 
the impact of Europeanization. The domestic actors who acted rationally in terms of 
consolidating their power in the country and legitimizing their actions were mainly the 
political parties. For Poland, the practical difficulties arising from the conduct of 
religion/ethics courses did not become a matter of controversy during the membership of 
the country to the EU and thus were only discussed within the scope of the relevant 
judgment of the ECtHR and findings of the field survey. This relatively smooth 
integration of Poland with the EU constituted the core argument that the country has not 
been a case of misfit in this context. The main deficiencies about the legal arrangement of 
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the religion education has been challenged by Ombudsman and corrected by the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court. Therefore no further criticism was directed to the 
country from the European side. The main domestic actor in this framework has been the 
Catholic Church and both in the EU membership and the reinsertion of religion education 
in schools, the Church can be considered as a rational actor which sought to maximize its 
authority and consolidate its power within the country and even in the Union. 
Nonetheless, in combination with other domestic factors in the country, the Church can 
also be considered as a norm entrepreneur which incited the support of Polish society for 
the integration. Therefore, when the Church and other domestic actors are evaluated in 
conjunction with the historical legacy of the country, the goodness of fit can easily be 
observed and shed light on why this delicate issue has not led to further controversies in 
the country. 
 
Further discussions about the Koran courses, which are predetermined as elective courses 
and will probably require religious symbols, i.e. the headscarf, enter to the public schools, 
will display some parallelism with the Polish case where religious symbols have been a 
matter of controversy a few years ago. Furthermore, the possible problems that will arise 
with the new optional status of religious courses in Turkey and their grading on the axis 
of discrimination and religious freedom, constitute another field of comparison between 
the two countries given the related debate in Poland a couple of years ago. An additional 
point that has become a matter of controversy in Poland when religious instruction was 
inserted in public schools was the Ombudsman’s opposition on the grounds of 
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Constitutionality of the Ordinances. This may also become a matter of debate in Turkey 
with the recent introduction of Ombudsman in the Turkish legal system. In order to be 
able to make a projection about the forthcoming situation in Turkey regarding optional 
religious courses by looking at the Polish example, one needs to wait for the outcomes of 
the DKAB courses with the new content and the practice of elective religion courses. 
 
This study aims at contributing to the Europeanization debate by providing two cases 
where the Europeanization process has been experienced in very different ways. Poland 
constitutes the case where the domestic structures and norms were in line with the 
European ones so that no strong adaptational pressures were present as a result of misfit; 
as rationalist institutionalism foresees. Conversely, the resonance between the two 
domains, substantiated with the political culture that enables the adoption of norms as 
well as the presence of norm entrepreneurs who have the capacity to convince the 
decision-makers seems to make the Europeanization process smoother for Poland, which 
is portrayed by sociological institutionalist account. Even in a field like religious 
education where identity-based concerns are at stake, Poland complies with the European 
values. On the other hand, Turkey appears to be a case of misfit in terms of the conduct 
of religious courses and is a good test case from the perspective of rationalist 
institutionalism. The differential empowerment seems to be the most determinant factor 
for decision makers who are goal-oriented. The attitude of rational actors in Turkey for 
regulating the conduct of religious courses sets an exemplar for any other sensitive issue 
area; when the benefit of resonating with the European values is greater than the costs of 
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going into a domestic legal or policy change in a given field, the rational actors go for it. 
This can be told to create a superficial Europeanization in the sense that the norms are not 
really embraced and internalized but are just applied superficially in order make use of 
the benefits provided by the process (Grigoriadis and Gurcel, 2012). In this respect, the 
comparison of the two cases offers an accurate frame for analyzing the impact of 
Europeanization. This dissertation which intended to offer a new dimension; namely 
religious education as an indicator of state-religion relations, to Europenization studies 
for analyzing comparatively from the perspective of Europeanization theories, will 
hopefully contribute to the formation of further research at the intersection of religious 
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Interview with Mr. Rıza Türmen – CHP İzmir MP, Former Judge to the ECtHR, 
Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe  
15.04.2013, TBMM 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Görüşme ricamı kabul ettiğiniz için çok teşekkür ederim. Az önce de 
bahsettiğim gibi, Avrupalılaşma sürecinde din-devlet ilişkilerini inceliyorum, bunu da 
okullardaki din dersleri özelinde yapmaya çalışıyorum. Türkiye’de son yıllarda gözle 
görünür oranda AB’ye üyelik süreci ile ilgili olarak bir istek ve heyecan kaybı var. 
Dolayısıyla bu yöndeki çabaların düştüğü yönünde yorumlar yapılıyor ancak tam da 
Meclis’te “Dördüncü Yargı Paketi”nin tartışıldığı bugün, AİHM karalarının Türkiye için 
bağlayıcılığı ile ilgili ne söylemek istersiniz? Türkiye alyhine sonuçlanmış olan Zengin 
davasının uygulanması konusunda Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar Komitesi’nin izleyeceği yol 
ve olası yaptırımları hakkında yorumlarınızı almam mümkün mü? 
Rıza Türmen: Öncelikle şunu netleştirmek lazım; Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi bir 
Avrupa Birliği organı değil, Avrupa Konseyi’nin organı. Fakat AİHM’in kararları, tabi ki 
Kopenhag kriterlerinin gerçekleşmesi bakımından en büyük gösterge oluyor çünkü 
Avrupa’da başka insan hakları mahkemesi yok. O nedenle AİHM kararları insan hakları 
ile ilgili üyelik kriterlerinin gerçekleşmesi için Avrupa toplumlarına yol gösterici bir rol 
oynuyor. Yani bu üyelik zincirinin ilk halkasıdır. Eğe bu ilk halkasına uyamıyorsanız, o 
zaman diğer halkaları zaten gerçekleştiremezsiniz. O nedenle Türkiye’nin Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Mahkemesi’ndeki durumu elbette ki AB’ye üyelik bakımından da önemli.  
Genel durumu bir tarafa bırakacak olursak, bu din dersleri konusu iki maddeyi birden 
kapsıyor. Bir taraftan din ve vicdan özgürlüğü, öbür taraftan eğitim özgürlüğünü 
kapsayan bir konu bu. Orada bir dizi içtihat var. Zengin kararı da o içtihattaki aslında 
daha önceki kararlardaki ikilemin uygulanmasından ibaret. Folgero Kararı var mesela, 
AİHM’de Norveç’e karşı açılan davada. Ondan önce başka kararlar da var. O kararlarda 
ve Zengin kararında da hep şunu görüyoruz; bir kere Avrupa’daki uygulama bakımından 
baktığınızda, aşağı yukarı her devlette, din dersi olsa bile mutlaka bundan bir “opt out” 
kapısı açık bırakılmıştır. Yani çocuklarının din dersi görmesini istemeyen veliler bir 
şekilde bundan çıkabiliyorlar. Türkiye’de bu imkan yok. Bir de tabi baktığınız zaman 
Türkiye laik bir ülke olduğunu söylüyor, ki mesela Norveç laik bir ülke değil; İskandinav 
ülkelerinde din-devlet ayırımı bile yok. Ancak buna rağmen Avrupa’da bu din dersini 
aşağı yukarı en katı uygulayan ülke Türkiye. Bunda büyük bir problem var. Tabi bu 
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Zengin kararında birkaç önemli nokta var. Birincisi, efendim diyorlar ki bu Alevi bir aile; 
Hasan Zengin, kızı Eylem Zengin; Hasan Zengin diyor ki ben çocuğuma kendi kültürümü 
öğretemiyorum, Alevi kültürünü öğretemiyorum diyor. İkincisi tabi evde öğrendiği 
kültürle okulda öğrendiği şeyler arasında çok büyük bir fark var. Yani bu çocuk 
bakımından çok travmatik etkileri olan bir şey. Evde öğrendiği ile okuldaki öğrendiği 
farklı olunca tabi soruyor, hangisi doğru diye ve bu kadar ufak yaştaki bir çocuk neyin 
doğru olduğunu şaşırıyor haliyle. Evde söylenenler mi doğru, okulda öğretilenler mi 
doğru... Çocuğun gelişmesi bakımından çok önemli bir sorun bu. Ve hükümetin şöyle bir 
savunması var, diyor ki Musevi ve Hristiyan ailelerin çocukları için dilekçe veriyorlar ve 
biz onları bu dersten muaf tutuyoruz. Hasan Zengin de böyle bir dilekçe verse biz onu 
görüşürdük, bakardık. Ancak AİHM bunu kabul etmiyor; birisinin inancını açıklamak 
zorunda bırakılmasını da din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün ihlali olarak görüyor. Orada tabi en 
çok üzerinde durulan şey, birincisi kültürler arasında çelişme, ikincisi de pluralistik, 
objektif ve eleştirel olmaması yani bir beyin yıkama şeklinde verilmesi. Ders sırasında 
dini pratiklerin öğretilmesi, mesela namaz nasıl kılınır gibi dinsel uygulamaların 
öğretilmesi ve bütün bu nedenlerle hem din ve vicdan özgürlüğü hem de eğitim 
haklarının ihlali olduğuna karar verildi. Ve diyor ki sonunda kararın, Türkiye din dersi 
kitaplarını değiştirsin. Şimdi tabi değiştirilsin denince nasıl değiştirilecek sorusu 
gündeme geldi ve Alevi Çalıştayları yapıldı. Alevi Çalıştayları’na bazı Alevi dernekleri 
katıldı bazıları katılmadı ve ders kitaplarında da bazı değişiklikler yapıldı. Ancak bu 
değişiklikler AİHM kriterlerini karşılayacak düzeyde değil. Niçin değil; çünkü bir kere 
yapılan değişiklikler Sünni İslam açısından yapıldı yani Aleviliğe Sünni İslam açısından 
bakıldı. Böyle bir problem var. İkincisi de yapılan değişiklikler de çok geç yaşlarda 
okutulan kitaplarda. Yani çocuğun kişiliğinin zaten oluştuğu son aşamalardaki kitaplarda 
Alevilikle ilgili birtakım bilgiler veriliyor ve Aleviler bunu yetersiz buluyor. Bir kere bu 
hazırlanırken bize danışılmadı diyorlar; Diyanet İşleri’nden birileri, ilahiyatçı vatandaşlar 
bunları yapmışlar bize danışmadan bizimle ilgili birtakım şeyler konuyor diyorlar. Yani 
hem düzeltmenin yapılış şekli hem de yapılan değişikliklerin esası, özü bakımından 
Alevilikle ilgili gerçeği yansıtmadığını söylüyorlar.  
Şimdi bütün bunlar Bakanlar Komitesi’nin önünde, çünkü uygulamayı denetleyen makam 
orası. Hükümet bu değişiklikleri bildirdi sanıyorum. Bakanlar Komitesi de bu 
değişikliklerin yeterli olup olmadığına karar verecek. Buna karar verirken Alevi 
derneklerinin görüşlerini alır diye ümit ediyorum, onlar çünkü bu işin öznesi.  
Din dersi bakımından asıl problem, zorunlu olsun mu olmasın mı... Bizim CHP olarak 
Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne verdiğimiz önerilerde, din dersi zorunlu olmasın seçmeli olsun 
dedik. Ona karşı MHP ve AKP verdikleri önerilerde zorunlu olmasını istiyorlardı. 
AKP’nin kafasında hep şöyle bir ayırım var; ikiye ayıralım, bir ders din kültürü dersi 
olsun ve bu zorunlu olsun bir de İslam dinini öğreten bir ders olsun ve bu seçimlik olsun. 
Böyle bir ayırım da yetersiz kalacak çünkü din kültürü dersi de olsa, din dersi de olsa 
ikisinin de birtakım kriterlere uygun olarak yani objektif olması, eleştirel biçimde alması 
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yani beyin yıkama şeklinde olmaması gerekir. Bunun yanında diğer kültürlere de doğru 
dürüst yer vermesi lazım ve bunu yapabilecek bir zihin yapısı da var mı Türkiye’de; bu 
çok kuşkuludur. O nedenle bütün bunlara gitmktense zorunlu olmaktan çıkarılması çok 
daha sağlıklı bir yaklaşımdır. Laik bir ülkede neden zorunlu bir din dersi olsun? Ateist bir 
aile olamaz mı mesela, yani Türkiye’de ateist aile yok mu? Var. İşte ateist veya agnostik 
bir aile çocuğunun din dersi almasını istemiyor, din kültürü de öğrenmesini istemiyor, 
dinle ilgili hiçbir şey olsun istemiyor. Yaşantısında böyle bir şey yok çünkü. Böyle bir 
aile ne yapacak? Böyle bir aile diyebilmeli ki, işte Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesinin 
bir numaralı Protokolünün 2. maddesinde düzenlenen eğitim hakkı, ailelere böyle bir hak 
veriyor. Yani kendi görüşlerine göre eğitim verebilmeyi talep etme hakları olmalı. Din 
dersi ile ilgisi olmasın istiyorsa çocuğunun, böyle bir hakkı olmalı. O yüzden niçin 
zorunlu din dersinde ısrar ediliyor bilmiyorum. Yani biliyorum tabi... 
TG: Karşı görüş olarak diyorlar ki, çoğunluğu Sünni Müslüman olan bir ülkede bir aile 
çocuğunun dinini doğru şekilde öğrenmesini istiyorsa... 
RT: O zaman seçmeli olarak alacak, neticede isteyenlere öğretilsin ama istemeyenler ne 
olacak? Burada isteyenler için bir problem yok, istemeyenlerin problemi var.  
TG: Anlaşılan Türkiye AİHM kararını, “madem bu içeriğiyle din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi 
dersini zorunlu tutamıyoruz, içeriğini değiştiririz” şeklinde yorumladı. Sadece Sünni 
İslamın anlatıldığı değil, diğer din ve inanışların da anlatıldığı bir ders olarak 
kurgulanması öngörüldü. Ancak varılan noktada bunun gerçekleşmediği yönünde 
eleştiriler sürüyor. Peki Bakanlar Komitesi de yapılan değişiklikleri, yani hükümetin ders 
kitaplarında ve müfredatta yaptığı değişikliği kararın uygulanması adına tatmin edici 
bulmazsa ne olur? Avrupa Konseyi’nin Türkiye’ye ne gibi bir yaptırımı olabilir? 
RT: Şimdi şöyle, Bakanlar Komitesi her ay bunun için toplanır yani kararların 
uygulanmasını izlemek için. Orada bir “execution committee” var, AİHM kararlarının 
uygulanmasını denetleyen bir ünite var orada. Her ay toplanır ve başkanın yanında, insan 
hakları department’ının başkanı oturur. Sorarlar oradaki büyükelçiye; “böyle bir karar var 
sizinle ilgili, bu kararın uygulanması için siz ne yaptınız?” Yani genel önlemler ya da 
özel önlemler – genel önlemler yasanın değiştirilmesi, özel önlemler onun sonuçlarının 
kaldırılması – anlamında neler yapıldı ülkenizde? Orada büyükelçi de anlatır, yasayı 
değiştireceğiz biraz zaman lazım vs... Peki derler, gelecek ay bir daha konuşulur bu konu. 
Uygulama olmuyorsa, o zaman yavaş yavaş baskı artırılır. Ne yapılır? Mesela bir karar 
kabul edilir, bu kararda denir ki Türkiye şu şu kararların uygulanması için gereken 
kararda belirtilen şu şu önlemleri alsın, ya da Dışişleri Bakanlığı’na ya da Adalet 
Bakanlığı’na mektup yazılır; niye hala uygulamıyorsunuz diye. Bunlardan da hiçbir şey 
çıkmazsa, yavaş yavaş vidalar sıkıştırılır. Mesela Türkiye’ye başkanlık sırası geldiğinde 
başkanlık verilmez. Yine Türkiye’de toplantı yapılacaksa bunlar iptal edilir... Bu giderek, 
Albaylar Dönemi’nde Yunanistan’da olduğu gibi, bu Avrupa Konseyi’nden ihraca kadar 
gidebilir.  
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Türkiye bununla ilgili iki deneyim yaşadı; birisini Loizidou kararı sırasında yaşadı, 
Türkiye tazminatı ödemedi. Tazminatı ödemeyince işte bütün bu söylediklerim yavaş 
yavaş gerçekleşmeye başladı ve iki sene sonunda ödemek zorunda kaldı. Tabi ödediği 
zaman iki misli ödedi çünkü faiz işledi... 500.000 Euro iken 1.000.000 Euro oldu. İkinci 
deneyimi çok yakın bir geçmişte hatta hala şimdi bugün yaşıyoruz. Bu Hulki Güneş 
kararı; ceza muhakemesi kanunundaki bir maddeden kaynaklanıyor, o madde AİHM’den 
çıkan iptal kararlarını davanın yeniden görüşülmesi için bunu talep etmek için bir neden 
olarak sayıyor. Ama orada bir parantez var; o parantez diyor ki, bundan önce kesinleşmiş 
ve bundan sonra kesinleşecek kararlar için bu geçerlidir; bu hak vardır. Dolayısıyla, o 
sırada AİHM’de görüşülmekte olan davalar için bu hak yoktur anlamına geliyor. Şimdi 
diyorlar ki, “kardeşim böyle şey olur mu?” Çünkü zamanında Öcalan için konulmuştu bu 
madde, şimdi Öcalan bitti, kapandı fakat yüzlerce dava o paranteze girdi. Bakın Güneş 
pilot davası açıldı, diyorlar ki “yahu kardeşim öyle şey olur mu?” bir kanun çıkarıyorsun, 
sonra da bazıları için uygulanacak, bazıları için uygulanmayacak diyorsun. Bunu tabi 
savunmak imkansız ve Türkiye üzerinde bu sebeple muazzam baskı oldu. Delegeler 
Komitesi’nde kararlar kabul edildi ve işte bugun burada (Meclis’te) görüşülecek olan 4. 
Yargı Paketi’nde Hükümet bunu düzeltiyor, o parantezi kaldırıyor. Yargısal olarak 
mutlaka onu uygulatırlar.  
TG: Bu durumda Türkiye bu Zengin kararının uygulamasını ne kadar ertelerse ertelesin 
sonunda bir şekilde uygulamak zorunda kalacak, öyle mi? 
RT: Pek tabii. 
TG: Peki süreç nasıl işleyecek? Çünkü madem DKAB derslerini mevcut içeriğiyle 
zorunlu tutmak karara aykırı, içerikte düzenleme yapalım diyorlar. Ders kitaplarını ve 
içeriği değiştirdik, bir daha inceleyin diye Bakanlar Komitesi’ne sunuyorlar, diyelim ki 
yeterli görülmedi; bu durumda Hükümet öyleyse bir daha düzenleyelim tekrar bakın 
diyebilir mi? Ya da nereye kadar diyebilir, bunun bir sınırı var mı? Tekrar tekrar içerik 
değiştirilerek Bakanlar Komitesi’ne sunulabilir mi? 
RT: Hükümet bunu yapmaya çalışacak tabi, süre kazanmaya çalışacak, yeniden 
değiştiriyoruz diyecek vs... Bu içeriği kabul eden Alevi dernekleri var, Cem Vakfı falan 
var mesela ama kabul etmeyenler çoğunlukta. Alevi Bektaşi Dernegi falan reddediyor 
hep bunu, ki burada en büyük olan örgüt de bu sanırım yani Cem Vakfı daha küçük. 
Ancak bunları ileri sürecekler tabi, zaman kazanmaya çalışacaklar bir daha değiştirelim 
falan diyecekler. Fakat her şartta DKAB dersini zorunlu olmaktan çıkarmaya 
yanaşmayacak yani bir anayasa değişikliğini kabul etmeyecek. Bu hükümet zaten böyle 
bir hükümettir; böyle muhafazakar, din referanslı bir hükümettir o yüzden din referanslı 
bir toplum yaratma projeleri bakımından, bu din derslerinin mutlaka zorunlu olması 
gereklidir. Buna mazeret olarak şöyle şeyler söylüyorlar; bunu kaldırırsak veya zorunlu 
olmaktan çıkarırsak bunlar devletin denetiminin dışında kurslar olarak mantar gibi 
türeyecektir ve onlar çok daha zaralı olacaktır. Efendim denetleyin o zaman; 
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ürettirmeyin, yasaklayın. İzin vermeyin böyle kurslar açılmasına... Kurslarla ilgili yaş 
haddini kaldırdılar mesela şimdi, böyle bir yaş haddi koyabilirdiniz buysa eğer mazeret. 
Din kurslarına 55 yaşından sonra gidilsin deyin mesela... O kadar da olmaz tabi de 
(gülüyor)...  
TG: Kökten çözer o zaman diyorsunuz... (gülüşmeler) Peki siz ne düşünüyorsunuz bu 
konuda? Sizce de hala bir tehdit mi bu tür kurslar? Yani devletin din eğitimi alanından 
elini çekerek tam bir serbesti sağlaması ve din eğitiminin inanç gruplarının kendilerine 
bırakılması sizce bugün hala devletin bütünlüğü için tehlikeli mi?  
RT: Şimdi bu sizin hangi gözlükle baktığınıza bağlı. Buna Batı’dan baktığınız takdirde, 
bu bir tehdit olmamalı hatta doğru olanın bu olduğu düşünülebilir. Ama Türkiye içinden 
baktığınız zaman, bir takım inanç grupları var bir takım dini tarikatlar var, devleti ele 
geçirmeye çalışıyorlar. Sadece dinle uğraşan tarikatlar değil ki bunlar... Devletin 
hakimiyetini elinde tutmak isteyen tarikatlar var. Şimdi böyle tarikatlara bırakırsanız bu 
sefer o da yurtdışından çocuklar tamamen belirli bir amaç için yetiiştirilecekler. Sadece 
böyle saf dinsel kutsal amaçlar için değil, en başta siyasi amaçlar için... O yüzden 
Türkiye bakımından çok tehlikeli olabilirler. Bu şekilde yeni bir ordu, yeni bir gençlik 
yetiştiriliyor orada. Böyle bir gençlik Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin geleceği bakımından 
olumlu olmayacaktır.  
TG: Bu durumda siz din eğitiminin tamamen inanç gruplarına bırakılması taraftarı 
değilsiniz; devletin denetiminin şart olduğu görüşündesiniz. Doğru mu anlıyorum? 
RT: Türkiye’de laiklik böyle gelişti. Türkiye’nin gerçekleri açısından laikliğin böyle 
olması yanlış değildir bence. Din her zaman devletle içiçeydi, bu Osmanlı’da da 
böyleydi. Her devletin dinle olan ilişkisi farklı, Türkiye’de de din-devlet ilişkisi böyle. 
Yani bu Fransa’da başka türlü, İskandinav ülkelerinde başka türlü, İngiletere’de başka... 
İşte orada kraliçe aynı zamanda dini lider, bazı devletlerde din-devlet ilişkileri 
ayrılmamış, bazı devletlerde anayasada tanımlanmış; Yunanistan veya Polonya 
anayasalarında olduğu gibi... Yani din-devlet ilişkileri her devletin kendi toplumsal 
gelişmesine göre, siyasal gelişmesine göre değişiyor. Bunu anlamak lazım, toplumun 
çıkardığı şey bu; Türkiye’de de böyle bir şey gelişmiş türlü nedenlerle. Sorgulamamak 
lazım. Tabi laiklik bu mudur, laikliğin tanımı bu mudur; belki değildir ama böyle 
gelişmiş devletin dinle ilişkisi. Bir yerde yanlış tabi, devletin kurduğu ilşki de yanlış. 
Bugün Diyanet İşleri’nin sahip olduğu güç, sahip olduğu kaynak hiçbir devlet kurumunda 
yok. Yani din-devlet ilişkisi bakımından da burada büyük yanlışlar var. Mevcut sistem de 
yanlış yürüyor. Diyanet İşleri’nin başlangıçta kuruluş amacı laikliği korumak, laikliği 
yaymak iken bugün DİB’in amacı Sünni İslam’ı yaymakla sınırlı. Diyanet İşleri yeniden 
yapılandırılmalı... 
TG: Eğer bazılarının savunduğu gibi tamamen kaldırılmayacaksa; ki kaldırılmayacak gibi 
görünüyor, o zaman yeniden yapılandırılması şart diyorsunuz... Anlıyorum. Peki din 
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dersleri konusuna dönecek olursak, bu yeni seçmeli din dersleri sizce AİHM’e taşınacak 
yeni davalara konu olacak mı? Sizce süreç neleri getirecek? 
RT: Bu konu ile ilgili başka davalar da var zaten bildiğim kadarıyla... 
TG: Evet zorunlu din dersleri ile ilgili iç hukukta görülen ve farklı kararlara bağlanan çok 
sayıda dava var, seçmeli derslerle ilgili henüz yok bildiğim kadarıyla... İç hukukta da 
Zengin kararından sonra genellikle lehte verilen kararlar son dönemde yerini alehte 
verilen kararlara bırakmış gibi görünüyor. Hem yerel mahkemeler hem de Danıştay için 
durum böyle sanırım. 
RT: Çünkü Danıştay’ın yapısı değişti. Türkiye’de adalet, mahkemelerin yapısıyla 
doğrudan ilişkilidir.  
TG: Peki sizce Türkiye’deki mahkemelerin yeni yapılanması, uluslararası hukuk 
kurumlarıyla uyumu açısından değerlendirildiğinde ne durumda?  
RT: Şimdi enteresan bir şey var; Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne bireysel şikayet yolu açıldı; 
anayasal şikayet, anayasa şikayeti yolu açıldı. Anayasa ile ilgili yapılan şikayetlerde, 
Anayasa Mahkemesi karar verecek. Bu kendisi bakımından da önemli çünkü iki yıl bir 
“probation” yani deneme süresi olacak. Bu deneme süresinde AİHM bakacak, Anayasa 
Mahkemesi’nin bireysel başvurulardaki kararlarına bakacak. Eğer Anayasa Mahkemesi 
kararları insan haklarını koruyorsa, AİHS’e uygun kararlar vermişse, Mahkeme Strazburg 
Mahkemesi kararlarıyla uyum sağlamışsa, oradaki kriterleri uyguluyorsa; AİHM diyecek 
tamam bu etkili bir iç yargıdır, o yüzden bana gelmeden önce Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne 
gidin. Almanya’da İspanya’da olduğu gibi... Ama tabi bunun tersi olur, bakarsa ki bu 
mahkeme doğru dürüst kararlar veremiyor, AİHM kararları ile uyum içinde değil, o 
zaman diyecek ki bu iş olmamış. O durumda siz yazın anayasa şikayetini; bireyler 
Türkiye’de Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne gitmeden doğrudan AİHM’e gidebilecekler. Yani 
bireysel şikayet yolu aslında anlamsız hale, içi boşaltılmış hale geliyor. Tabi şimdi bu 
durumda Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin nasıl karar vereceği önemli, yani Anayasa Mahkemesi 
uyum sağlayamazsa Folgero, Zengin vb. kararlarla, o kriterleri uygulayamazsa ve ondan 
sonra AİHM’den bir ihlal kararı çıkarsa Anayasa Mahkemesi kararına karşı, tabi Anayasa 
Mahkemesi bakımından çok kötü olur. Böyle bir mesele var. Yani uluslararası 
mahkemelere uyum sağlama zorunluluğu var şimdi. Böyle bir yükümlülüğü var; 
sağlayamazsa kendi varlıkları, yani bu yeni fonksiyonu ortadan kalkacak.  
TG: Benim buradan anladığım, Türkiye’nin yeniden yapılanmakta olan iç hukuk 
düzeniyle de uluslararası hukuktan kopmadığı hatta belki daha da Avrupa normlarıyla 
uyumlanmak durumunda kaldığı... Hala AİHM kararlarının Türkiye’de ve iç hukuk 
üzerinde bağlayıcılığı olduğu söylenebilir bu durumda; hala yaptırım gücü var değil mi? 
RT: Orada olan şey şudur, AİHM altmış yıllık içtihatıyla Avrupa’da ortak bir tarih, ortak 
bir “circle;” bir ortak hukuk alanı oluşturmuştur. Bu ortak hukuk alanının içindeki bütün 
300 
devletler, bunun içinde tüm AB üyeleri var, artı Avrupa Konseyi üyeleri var – AB üyesi 
olmayan – bu toplamda 47 ülke bu ortak hukuk alanı içinde oldukları için buradaki 
kriterlere uyum sağlamaya çalışıyorlar. Yani o anlamda AİHM kararları erga omnes bir 
içtihattır. Bir dava ile sınırlı tabi, bir devlete karşı açılan dava ile sınırlı ama o karardaki 
ilkeler bütün Avrupa devletleri bakımından yol gösterici olmak durumunda. Avrupa 
ülkeleri kendi kararlarını değiştiriyorlar, kendileri ile ilgili bir dava olmasa bile, ortak 
alandaki kriterlere uyum sağlamak için yasalarını, uygulamalarını değiştiriyorlar; bunu 
görüyorsunuz pek çok Avrupa ülkesinde. Şimdi Türkiye bunu yapmıyor. Türkiye ortak 
hukuk alanına uyum sağlayamıyor. O nedenle çok sayıda dava var, o nedenle en çok ihlal 
kararı Türkiye aleyhinde çıkıyor. Görüyorsunuz uygulamaları... Tutuklama mesela; bu 
tutuklamaların neden hukuka aykırı olduğu, neden AİHM kararlarına aykırı olduğu, hangi 
konularda aykırı olduğu çok bellidir. Cahit Demirel kararında da bunu görürsünüz. 
Oralarda bu düzeltilmemiş. 4. Yargı Paketi’nde de bu düzeltilmemiş. Son derece kilit 
adımlar atılmış ama sonucu değiştirmeyecek. Yani yargıçlar, bu AİHM’i hala bir yabancı 
mahkeme gibi görüyorlar. Oysa bu kendi hukuk sistemlerinin bir parçası. Bunu hala 
anlamış değil Türk yargıçlar... Bazıları anlamamakta inat ediyorlar, bazıları yargı 
siyasallaştığı için anlamak işlerine gelmiyor. Fakat sonuç bu ki, tutklama böyle, toplantı 
yürüyüş gösteri kanunları böyle, düşünce özgürlüğü bakımından başka kısıtlamalar var 
falan. Yani oradaki kriterleri Türkiye’de uygulamıyor yargıçlar. Şimdi bu anayasa 
şikayeti devreye girince büyüyecek tabi bu sorunlar, yeni bir boyut kazanacak. Anayasa 
Mahkemesi o yüzden çok büyük bir sorumluluk yüklenecek yani ayar vermesi gerekecek, 
hukuk düzenine ayar vermesi gibi bir sorumluluk altına girecek ama bu sorumluluğu 
yerine getiremezse kendisi de cezalanacak bunun sonunda.  
TG: Öyleyse, sizin söylediklerinizden yola çıkacak olursak, Türk yargıçlar her ne kadar 
görmek istemese de Türkiye hala bu ortak hukuk alanına bağlı; öyle olmak zorunda...  
RT: Elbette, şu anda içeride görüşülmekte olan 4. Yargı Paketi tamamen bununla ilgili; 
AİHM önündeki “görünümümüzü düzeltmek” için diyorlar. Yani görünüm düzeltmek 
için yapılıyor bu... Onlar bizi iyi görsünler diye...  
TG: Aslında bu tür imaj düzeltme çabaları benim de tezimde savunmaya çalıştığım 
Avrupalılaşma teorileri içinde Akıllıı Aktör Modeli’nin benimsediği tarzda eylemler. 
Türkiye’nin bu modele uygun hareket ettiğini düşünüyorum. Yani içselleştirme ya da 
sindirme süreci yerine Avrupa normlarının “görünüme yansıtıldığı” bir model. 
RT: Tabi tabi kesinlikle. Bunu bütün insan hakları ve demokrasi meselesi için de 
söyleyebiliriz bunu. Yani insan hakları Türkiye’nin üstünde eğreti gibi duruyor hala ama 
başkaları istediği için ödünç olarak alınmış üzerimize de epeyce bol gelen bir palto gibi 
duruyor. Yani kendi öz değerimiz değil bu... O nedenle de siyasi partiler bunu bir türlü 
çözemiyorlar çünkü kimsenin böyle bir özgürlük demokrasi problemi yok gibi görünüyor 
ve halk desteklemiyor bu türlü bir mücadeleyi. Sokaktaki halk başka şeylerin peşinde 
çünkü kendi öz değeri değil bu...  
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TG: Türk insanının hak ve özgürlüklere dair bilincinin yeni oluşmaya başladığına ve 
bunun da geç bir farkındalık olduğuna ben de katılıyorum. Bu topraklarda ne yazık ki bu 
kültür pek yok... 
RT: Alttan gelen böyle bir talep olmadığı için bu hak ve özgürlükler meselesi hep 
bulutlarda dolaşan aydınların işi....  
TG: Durumu din dersleri özelinde düşünmeye çalıştığımızda da elbette ki tüm bu olup 
bitenlerin dışında bir değerlendirme yapmamız da çok mümkün görünmüyor.  
RT: Ama din dersi çok ideolojik bir şey ve tabi özellikle bütün Alevilerin hayatını 
etkileyen bir şey bu.  
TG: Evet, özellikle kendi çalışmamda bu konuyu irdelerken, Polonya’da din dersi 
konusunun kilisenin bir iktidar alanı olduğunu gördüm. Buna rağmen bu kadar koyu 
Katolik olarak bilinen bir ülkede bile bu dersler seçmeli... Öğrenciler din veya etik dersini 
seçebiliyorlar ve her iki ders için karnede tek bir not görünmesi de ayrımcılık ihtimalini 
büyük ölçüde ortadan kaldırıyor. Türkiye’de benzer bir uygulama olması gibi bir ihtimali 
öngörüyor musunuz? 
RT: Tabi bu karardaki ihlal de zaten “opt-out” sürecinin yetersiz olduğundan dolayı 
biraz. Öyle formaliteler getiriliyor ki seçmek konusuna seçmeyi zorlaştırıyor. Orada 
seçmeyi zorlaştırdığı için din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün ihlaline karar veriliyor. 
TG: Ancak bu görüşmede daha net anladım ki, AİHM sonunda vermiş olduğu kararı o ya 
da bu şekilde sonunda mutlaka uygulatır. Sürecin nasıl işleyeceği konusunda özellikle 
merak ettiğim noktalar vardı, onları da açığa kavuşturdunuz... 
RT: Elbette AİHM kararını eninde sonunda uygulatır yalnız bu ara bildiğim kadarıyla 
Bakanlar Komitesi’nde de muazzam bir birikim var, bekleyen çok dosya var ve bir türlü 
sıra gelmiyor, en büyük mesele de odur.  
TG: Hulki Güneş Davası mesela gelmiş ama Zengin Davası hala görüşülmeye 
başlanamadı... 
RT: Evet Hulki Güneş Davasının uygulanmasıyla ilgili görüşmeler sürüyor. Ama Zengin 
Davası ile ilgili olarak da orada bir öncelik verilecek davalar kategorisi var, 
zannediyorum Zengin Davasını o kategoriye aldılar, yakın zamanda görüşülür o. Hasan 
Zengin hatta mektup yazdı oraya niye görüşülmüyor diye... 
TG: Evet, sanırım sivil toplum kuruluşları da bu konu ile ilgili bir kamuoyuu oluşturmaya 
çalışıyorlar. İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu da AİHM kararlarının izlenmesi ile ilgili 
raporlar hazırlıyorlar, hatta ilk rapor Zengin kararı ile ilgili...  
RT: Alttan böyle bir hareketlenmenin olması sevindirici tabi ve gerekli... 
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TG: Zaman ayırdığınız için çok teşekkür ederim, daha fazla vaktinizi almak istemiyorum. 
4. Yargı Paketi görüşmeleri sırasında Meclisi değerli görüşlerinizden mahrum bırakmak 
istemem... 
RT: Rica ederim. Umarım çalışmanıza faydası olur...  
 
 
Interview with (Assoc. Prof. Dr.) Aykan Erdemir, CHP Bursa MP 
10.04.2013, TBMM 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Ben din-devlet ilişkilerini, Avrupalılaşma bağlamında insan hak ve 
özgürlükleri çerçevesinde değerlendirmeye çalışıyorum, çünkü sekülerlik konusunda 
Avrupa kurumlarının bir beklentisi ve yaptırımı olamayacağı için bu kapsamda 
değerlendirmek mümkün değil. Dolayısıyla, din dersleri özelinde Avrupalılaşmanın 
etkisini anlamaya çalışıyorum. Türkiye’yi Polonya ile karşılaştıryorum, okullardaki din 
derslerinin zorunlu olma durumu bu yeni Anayasa ile birlikte tartışmaya açılacak bir 
konu olduğunu düşünüyorduk ama henüz bununla ilgili bir gelişme olmadı sanırım. 
Ayrıca yeni seçmeli din dersleri eklendi, Alevilikle ilgili bir seçmeli ders yok ve YGS’de 
ilk kez olarak sorulan DKAB soruları var. Sizin bu kapsamda kendi web sitenizde de bu 
soruların iptal edilmesi ile ilgili olarak düşüncelerinizi okudum. Okullardaki din dersleri, 
hukuksal durum ve uygulama ile başlayacak olursak, sizin bu bağlamdaki görüşlerinizi 
almam mümkün mü? Nasıl gelişmeler bekliyorsunuz? CHP neler yapmayı planlıyor? Var 
mı bu konu CHP’nin gündeminde? 
Aykan Erdemir: Şöyle söyleyeyim; Türkiye’de inanç alanı Türkiye’de siayasi partiler için 
zor bir alan. İki sebepten dolayı; bir, 1983 tarihli Siyasi Partiler Yasası. Örneğin, Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı söz konusu olduğunda çok açık bir yasak getiriyor. Anayasa Mahkemesi 
de çeşitli parti kapatma davalarında doğrudan bu maddeye referans veriyor; Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı’nın yapısını dönüştürmek isteyen ya da kaldırmak isteyen partileri kapatmış. 
Dolayısıyla bu Türkiye’nin en hassas alanlarından bir tanesi, insanlar da çok haklı olarak 
girmek istemiyorlar çünkü yaptırımları çok çok ağır. İkincisi de, popülist çerçevede 
bakarsak bu çok riskli bir alan. İnsanlar da temel hak ve özgürlükler için bile olsa çok bir 
risk almak istemiyor. Genel geçer ve çoğunlukçu çerçeveden çıkmak istemiyorlar. Bu iki 
kısıtlılığı da gözönüne alırsak, benim bunlara pek uymadığım malum; çünkü hem 
akademide hem siyasette bunlar üzerine çalışıyorum ve Türkiye’de eğer temel hak ve 
özgürlükler kurumsallaşacaksa, hak ihlalleri azalacaksa, ayrımcılık son bulacaksa, 
nefretin kurumsal temelleri zayıflayacaksa, mutlaka ve mutlaka bu alanda bir şeyler 
yapmak zorundayız. Din dersleri ile ilgili olarak benim açımdan mevcut çerçeve, çok açık 
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insan hakları ihlali. Zaten AİHM’in Hasan Zengin Eylem Zengin kararında da bu çok 
açık bir şekilde ifade ediliyor ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti de ne yazık ki değişik hülleler 
yoluyla, Cumhuriyet demeyeyim; hükümet, çeşitli hülleler yoluyla... işte ne gibi hülleler; 
mesela Alevilikle ilgili bir içerik ekledik diyorlar vs vs... Dolayısıyla Türkiye’de 12 Eylül 
vesayetinin çok açık bir ürünü olan zorunlu din dersleri hala hayatımızda devam ediyor 
ve insanları da; hem öğrencileri hem velileri mağdur etmeye devam ediyor. Bu çerçevede 
gönül isterdi ki, bir; Anayasamızın üzerinde olan, uluslararası hukuk niteliğinde olan 
AİHM kararının gereği yapılabilsin. İki, gönül isterdi ki, Anayasa tartışmaları sürecinde 
temel hak ve özgürlükler ve eşitlik temelli bir tartışma hem mecliste hem de Türkiye 
kamuoyunda yaygınlaşabilsin. Üçüncüsü, gönül isterdi ki, yalnızca Aleviler değil ama 
Türkiye’de geniş toplum kesimleri hak, eşitlik ve özgürlük temelli bir talep ve çıkışla bu 
konuları gündeme getirebilselerdi... Hiçbiri olmadı. Olmayacak gibi de gözüküyor. 
Başladığımız noktanın da gerisindeyiz. Bir zorunlu din dersine karşı mücadele ederken 
siyasi kariyerimin başında, bugün ben fiili olarak seçmeli zorunlu olan üç din dersi ile 
mücadele ediyorum. Kendi seçim bölgem olan Bursa’da örneğin elime geçen bir ders 
formu var; bir kız meslek lisesinde seçmeli derslerin hiçbiri açılmadığı için Alevi bir 
öğrenci üç tane din dersi almak zorunda. Ki bu üç din dersi sadece dayatılan üç din dersi 
olması nedeniyle hak ihlali özelliği taşımıyor, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinde ilk defa 
benim bildiğim kadarıyla, “Peygamberimizin Hayatı” ifadesiyle bir yasayla bir ders 
zorunlu kılınarak devletin laik niteliği de bence çok açık bir şekilde zedelenmiş oluyor. 
Çünkü peygamberin ismi yok burada, bizim peygamberimiz olduğu iddia ediliyor fakat 
hangi yurttaşlar adına konuşulduğu malum değil. Yani Musevi, Hıristiyan ya da diğer 
inançlardan yurttaşların kendilerini doğrudan eşit hissetmeyecekleri; 
ötekileştirileştirilmiş, marjinalleştirilmiş hissedecekleri bir süreç yaşadık ne yazık ki. Ve 
yalnızca bir partinin dayatması ile de olmadı. AKP, MHP ve BDP’nin de oylarıyla geçti 
bu yasa. Yalnızca CHP karşı oy verdi, bu da Türkiye için başka bir üzücü sonuç çünkü 
demek ki Türkiye’de temel hak ve özgürlüklere, eşitliğe ve ayrımcılıkla mücadeleye 
ilişkin toplumda ya da mecliste herhangi bir irade yok. Tam bir çoğunlukçuluk var ve 
çoğunlukçuluk, sayının egemenliği söz konusu olduğunda da üç partinin çok açık bir 
işbirliği yaptığını görüyoruz. Ama ben buna rağmen bir değer siyasetinin, vicdan 
siyasetinin yükseltilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum çünkü bu kemikleşmiş yapıyı yalnızca 
vicdanlı bireyler kırabilir. Değer, eşitlik, özgürlük, hak, insancıllık temelinde siyaset 
yapan kişiler kırabilir diye düşünüyorum. O yüzden sık sık dile getirmek gerek. Yani 
izlemek gerek, raporlamak, farkındalık yaratmak, örgütlemek, koalisyonlar inşa etmek 
gerek. Bu şekilde çok genel bir çerçeve çizeyim, siz arasından ne isterseniz sorun. 
TG: Bu Zengin kararı ile ilgili olarak Bakanlar Komitesi’nin, Türkiye’den bir rapor gitti 
ve o incelenme aşamasında ama, orada Bakanlar Komitesi’nin kararı uygulatmak için 
Türkiye üzerinde bir yaptırım gücü nedir sizce? Yani Türkiye’de siyasi ortamda AB 
üyeliği, AB ile entegrasyon Avrupa değerleri de artık o kadar itici güç olma özelliğini 
kaybettiği için, bunun bir etkisi olabileceğini düşünüyor musunuz? Bunu tabi bu konuda 
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çalışmış bir akademisyen olarak soruyorum size daha çok... Avrupa tarafından herhangi 
bir baskı ile Türkiye’de bir değişim, ilerleme olabileceğine inanıyor musunuz? Diğer bir 
deyişle, sizce hala Türkiye’de Avrupa tarafından gelecek bir baskıya karşı Türkiye’de 
uyumlu politikalar oluşturmaya dair bir niyet ve irade var mı? 
AE: Türkiye’de AB sürecinde bazı aşamalarda utandırma bir yaptırım oldu. Bazı reform 
süreçlerimiz usandırma mekanizması, “conditionality” demiyorum; usandırma 
mekanizması diyorum, ile oldu. Bu Avrupa Konseyi için de sözkonusu, Avrupa Birliği 
için de sözkonusu. Bazen AGİT için de sözkonusu olabiliyor. Fakat bugünkü süreçte, 
Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğinde desteğin %25’lere düştüğü bir süreçte, başmüzakereci 
Egemen Bağış’ın AB üyeliği benim umrumda değil diye çok net bir ifadeyle pozisyonunu 
ve sorumluluk anlayışını ifade ettiği bir ülkede çok tabi gerçekçi değil. Türkiye’nin 
utanma kapasitesi çok düştü. Dolayısıyla temel hak ve özgürlüklerin ihlali noktasında çok 
da böyle bir Avrupalı bir kitlenin yaptırımından, eleştirisinden çekinen bir hükümetimiz 
yok. Dolayısıyla Zengin kararına ilişkin de tabi ben çok umutsuzum çünkü Türkiye 
Zengin kararının ne gereklerini yerine getirdi, diğer yandan da geri adım attı. Geri adım 
attı derken, meseleyi daha da içinden çıkılmaz bir hale getirdi üç din dersiyle birlikte ve 
üniversite sınavlarına da din dersi sorusu koyarak ve bu arada da yine göz boyamaya 
yönelik olarak beş din dersi sorusundan birini Alevilikle ilgili sorarak mevcut hülle 
siyasetini devam ettirdiğini gösterdi. Ki ben kendi açıklamalarımda da ifade ettim, 
Alevilikle ilgili soru her açıdan yanlış bir soru, ayrımcı bir soru, asimilasyona yönelik bir 
soru, Alevi öğrencileri çeldirecek bir soru; bütünüyle sorunlu. Yine Müslüman olmayan 
öğrenciler için sorulan beş felsefe sorusunun niteliğine baktığımız zaman neredeyse 
hemen hepsinin din felsefesi ile yakından ilgili olduğunu ve hemen hemen bütün 
sorularda da aslında biraz ilahiyat içeriği olan sorular sorulduğunu gördüğümüzde, 
Müslüman olmayan öğrencileri de irşad etmeye çalışan, onlara da Allah’ın varlığını, 
birliğini ispat etmeye çalışan bir zihniyet görüyoruz. Şöyle söyleyeyim, yani bu yalnızca 
Anayasa’yla, yasayla ya da yönetmeliklerle düzenlenebilecek bir mesele değil. Üniversite 
sınavı zaten bunu çok net gösteriyor; çünkü siz hangi anayasayı, yasayı, yönetmeliği 
yaparsanız yapın, böyle ayrımcı, ötekileştirici, asgari bir siyasi ahlaktan, bürokratik 
ahlaktan, bilimsel ahlaktan yoksun insanlar olduğu sürece bir yere varılamaz.  
Nasıl “holocaust”un tek sorumlusu Hitler değilse ve nasıl Almanya’da her şey baskıyla 
yol almadıysa, gönüllü katılım çok önemliyse, Türkiye’de de bugün ayrımcılık, nefret, 
ötekileştirme söz konusu olduğunda yoğun bir gönüllü katılım var; siyasetçilerden, 
bürokratlardan, basın mensuplarından, sivil toplum örgütlerinden, toplumun geniş 
kesimlerinden. Bunu bugün çok açık bir şekilde yaşıyoruz. Bu süreci AB de Avrupa 
Konseyi de bence zaten doğru okuyamıyor. Okuyamadığı gibi, müdahil de olamıyor, 
müdahil olamadığı gibi yaptırım gücünün de her geçen gün azaldığının da farkına 
varmıyor. Çünkü, bunu Macaristan örneğinde de görüyoruz; ekonomik krizin derinleştiği, 
siyasi krizin derinleştiği bir ortamda AB’nin gündeminde çok da temel hak ve 
özgürlükler olamıyor. Nasıl Macaristan’da bir yeni otoriterliğin, ırkçılığın, anti-
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semitizmin yükseldiğini görüyorsak, kaçınılmaz olarak Türkiye’de de aynı süreçlerin 
yükseldiğini görüyoruz. AB Macaristan örneğinde çok sessiz ve duyarsız kalmak 
durumunda kaldığı süreçlerde, Türkiye söz konusu olduğunda çok etkin bir şekilde 
mücadele edemez, etmesi de beklenilemez. Biraz böyle karamsar bir çerçeveden 
değerlendiriyorum. Ama önemli olan tarihe not düşmek, karşı çıkmak. Şunu 
önemsiyorum; nasıl Nazizme karşı çıkan Münih Üniversitesi öğrencileri, Beyaz Gül 
grubu bugün bize insanlık için umut veriyorsa, yolumuzu aydınlatıyorsa, geleceğe ilişkin 
bize güç veriyorsa, ben bugün de karşı çıkan çatlak seslerin olmasının çok önemli 
olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bir gün bu karanlık biter diye umut ediyorum. Karanlık 
bittiğinde şu önemli, geri dönüp baktığımızda; “karşı çıkılmıştı” denmesi önemli.  
TG: Somut politika anlamında herhangi bir planı var mı CHP’nin? Ben şimdi Türkiye’yi 
Polonye ile karşılaştırdığım için, Avrupalılaşma sürecinde Türkiye’nin daha çok rasyonel 
aktör modeline uygun davrandığını düşünüyorum. Yani AB entegrasyonunun ülke 
içindeki aktörlere güç kazandırdığı sürece destek gördüğünü ve buna göre politikalar 
üretildiğini görüyorum. Polonya’da durum böyle değil. Dolayısıyla AB’nin üye olmaya 
çalışan ülkelerdeki karar vericilere sağladığı gücü, doğru politikalar izlemek suretiyle 
CHP, AKP’nin elinden alamaz mı? Yani AB üyeliği yolunda rasyonel aktör modelinin ön 
gördüğü parametreleri CHP’nin uygulamaya geçirme şansı var mı? Mesela Alevilikle 
ilgili bir seçmeli dersin de müfredata eklenmesi gibi, içerik hazırlanmasına ön ayak 
olmak gibi çalışmalar var mı parti bünyesinde? Burada aslında biraz da sıklıkla dile 
getirilen “CHP muhalefet ediyor ama politika üretmiyor” eleştirisine gönderme 
yapıyorum ve konu ile ilgili somut politikalarınız var mı diye sormak istiyorum... 
AE: CHP zaten zorunlu din derslerine karşı. Dolayısıyla bizim birinci somut politika 
önerimiz, yeni Anayasa’da zorunlu din derslerinin olmaması. İkinci olarak, belki parti 
içinde değişik görüşler olsa da inanç eğitiminin yeniden yapılandırılması konusunda 
hemfikiriz. Nasıl yeniden yapılandırılacağı şüphesiz yalnız CHP ile ilgili değil, tabi 
toplumdaki müzakere ile ilgili. Ben akademide de siyasette de hep devlet alanının dışında 
ve bireye, inanç topluluklarına hak ve özgürlüklerini tanıyan bir yapıyı savunmaktayım. 
Yani inanç eğitimi, inanç topluluklarına bırakılmalı; öğretmeniyle, müfredatıyla, 
içeriğiyle, usulüyle ve devletin bu konuda herhangi bir yetkisi olması fikrine, siyaseten 
de, fikri olarak da ahlaki olarak da, inançsal olarak da karşı çıkıyorum. Devletin hangi 
yetkisi olabilir? Denetleme ve düzenleme yetkisi olabilir, hayatın her alanında olduğu 
gibi. Bu konuda AB’nin açık bir çerçevesi olmadığını düşünüyorum. 
TG: Yok evet. 
AE: Avrupa Konseyi’nin de, AİHS’den yola çıkarsak bazı genel çerçeveler koyduğunu 
biliyoruz ama yani çok net bir şey aslında. O yüzden her toplum kendi mutabakatını 
bulmak zorunda ama benim şahsi pozisyonum bu. Diğer vatandaşlarımızı ikna etmek 
istediğim pozisyon bu. Dolayısıyla ben şu anda CHP’nin bir Alevi kitabı hazırlatmasına 
da karşı çıkarım, Sünni kitabı hazırlatmasına da karşı çıkarım, Hıristiyanlık, Protestanlık, 
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Yahudilik... hepsine karşı çıkarım. Bu inanç topluluklarının kendi bileceği iş. Kitaplı da 
olabilir, kitapsız da olabilir. Ne arzu ediyorlarsa onu yapabilmeliler. Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı’nın kitap hazırlatma, ne diyeceğimi bilemiyorum artık, densizliği... ve bu 
kitabı nasıl hazırlattığını çok iyi biliyoruz. Bazı Alevileri bu sürece kattığını, bazı 
Alevileri sürecin dışında bıraktığını, onların görüşlerini en azından sürecin dışında 
bıraktığını, dayatmayla yapıldığını biliyoruz. Alevilikle ilgili haftaların öğrenciler için en 
ayrımcı haftaya dönüştüğünü biliyoruz; bu yönde şikayetler geliyor. Alevi öğrenciler en 
çok o hafta hakarete uğradığı, öğretmenleri tarafından aşağılandığı, arkadaşları tarafından 
aşağılandığı... Dolayısıyla, hiç olmasaydı daha iyiydi diyor pek çok Alevi bugün; ben de 
öyle diyorum. Keşke Alevilik konu olmasaydı da hala veli ve öğrenciler hep alışık 
oldukları ayrımcılık ve hakarete maruz kalsalardı, bir de özel bir Alevilik hakareti haftası 
yaşanmasaydı. Dolayısıyla CHP, seçim beyannamesine göz atarsanız göreceksiniz; 
ayrımcılıkla mücadele, eşitlik için çok net bir çerçeve koyuyor. Nefret suçları ile ilgili bir 
çerçeve koyuyor ve tüm inançlara eşit bir yaklaşım seçim beyannamesinde ifade ediliyor. 
Zaten yani bu temel ilkelerden nasıl bir politika çıkabileceği çok net. Mevcut ayrımcı 
politikanın bizim açımızdan devam ettirilmesi söz konusu olamaz. CHP iktidarında da 
mutlaka ve mutlaka eşit yurttaşlık temelli ve Cumhuriyet’in laik niteliğini güçlendirici 
ama bir yandan da inanç özgürlüğünü güçlendirici adımlar atılmalı. Çünkü ben bir 
geçmişe dönüş romantizminde de değilim, ben özgürlüklerin genişletilmesi taraftarıyım 
çünkü Türkiye’de inanç eğitimi söz konusu olduğunda da yani 12 Eylül öncesinde de 
işler güllük gülistanlık değildi.  
TG: Değildi evet. 
AE: Önemli olan şu; arzu eden her bir bireyin, her bir vatandaşın inanç hizmetlerine 
erişimini kolaylaştırmak. İkincisi de, çok atlanan bir konu var. Benim de açıkçası daha 
geç bir dönemde vakıf olduğum bir mesele; o da eğitimdeki artan yeterlilikler anlayışı. 
Artan yeterlilikler anlayışında, öğrencilerin, gençlerin, yaşı ilerledikçe kendi hayatları ve 
gelecekleri, kendi eğitimleri ile ilgili daha çok söz sahibi olması ilkesi vurgulanıyor. 
Dolayısıyla, on sekiz; evet reşit olmanın yaşıdır, on sekiz yaşından önce bir veli-öğrenci 
ilişkisi oluyor fakat nasıl on altı yaşında bir öğrenci kendi matematik, fizik dersini 
seçebiliyorsa, nasıl kendi kıyafetini seçebiliyorsa ynai yetişkinliğe geçen bir birey olarak 
nasıl kendi hayatıyla ilgili önemli bazı kararları veriyorsa, inanç dersi alıp almayacağına, 
hangi inancın dersini alıp almayacağına da kendisi karar vermeli. Ve belki de on dört on 
beş yaşından itibaren bir geçiş süreciyle de belki veli haklarını da tekrar gözden 
geçirilmeli. Çünkü şu anda veli gençlerin mutlak hakimi konumunda. Şöyle düşünelim, 
on yedi yaşında farklı bir inanca sahip bir kişiyi zorla annesinin ya da babasının inancına 
göre okumaya öğrenmeye zorunlu kılmak; bu kabul edilebilir bir şey değil.  
TG: Polonya’da da durum böyle yani belirli bir yaştan sonra öğrencinin kendi talebi 
doğrultusunda inanç eğitimi alıyor. Seçmeli ders olarak var ama öğrencinin velisi, belirli 
bir yaştan sonra d akendi talebi doğrultusunda bu dersi alıyor.  
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AE: Evet yani AB konusuna dönecek olursak, benim açımdan önemli; AB de önemli, 
Avrupa Konseyi de önemli hatta Avrupa Güvenlik İşbirliği Teşkilatı da kendi siyasetimin 
çok önemli pusulaları. Hem ben siyaset yaparken, hak ve özgürlük talep ederken bu 
çerçevelere referans yapıyorum, hem bu çerçevelerin, bu süreçlerin bana yüklediği 
sorumlulukları ve yükümlülükleri dikkate alıyorum, hem şahsım adına bir rasyonel aktör 
olarak hem de partim adına bir rasyonel aktör olarak hem de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ni de 
bir rasyonel aktör olarak aldığımda, her üçünün de bu süreçleri dikkate alması gereken 
aktörler olduğunu düşünüyorum, yani olmalıyız. Ben kendim olduğumu düşünüyorum 
çünkü ben o çerçevelerden bağımsız siyaset yapmıyorum. CHP de bu çerçevelere çok 
dikkat ediyor, gittikçe artan bir oranda. Umuyorum ki, CHP’nin iktidar olduğu bir 
Türkiye’de de bu çerçeveler dikkate alınır. Hem yeni AİHM kararlarına yol açılmaz hem 
hem mevcut AİHM kararlarının gerekleri yerine getirilir. AİHS’de inanç özgürlüklerine 
ilişkin tüm maddelere uygun davranırız diyelim. Bu mağduriyetleri gideririz.  
TG: Son bir şey sormak istiyorum; bu yeni Anayasa sürecinde zorunlu din dersleri ile 
ilgili olarak kaldırılması yönünde umudunuz var mı? Görüştüğüm bir akademisyen bu 
konu ile ilgili iyimser bir görüş dile getirdi de onun için soruyorum; bu iki yeni seçmeli 
din dersinin konmasının Anayasa’daki zorunlu din dersinin iktidar partisi adına seçmen 
kaybına yol açmadan kaldırılabilmesi için bir ön adım olabileceğini düşündüğünü 
söyledi. Sizin bu yönde duyumlarınız var mı kulislerde ya da böyle bir öngörünüz? 
AE: Ben kulislerde böyle bir şey duymadım. Kendim de umutlu da değilim, olumlu da 
düşünmüyorum çünkü Türkiye’de çok açık bir Sünni egemen sistem var ve bu Sünni 
egemen sistemin arkasında çok büyük bir çoğunluk var. Sünniler yok, çoğunluk var. 
Çünkü her Sünni, kendi şahsımdan da biliyorum, bu sistemi kabul etmiyor ve bu sisteme 
karşı mücadele eden Sünniler de var ama bu Sünni egemen sistemin hem mecliste üç 
partisi var, yeri geldiğinde birlikte oy veren, hem de kamuoyunda çok büyük bir desteği 
var. Bu mutlak egemenlik, bu çoğulcu, baskıcı çerçeve orada dimdik durduğu sürece 
ancak belki lütfedilebilir. Bir lütuf politikasına geçilebilir. Ben hak hukuk politikası 
yapıyorum. Türkiye’de inanç topluluklarının temel anlayışta hak ve özgürlüklerine 
kavuşabileceklerine inanmıyorum. Olsa olsa bazı onlara nefes aldıracak imkanlar, 
imtiyazlar lütfedilebilir ama bu da zaten bizleri daha ileri bir yere getirmez. O egemen 
yapıyı garip bir şekilde yeniden onarır, meşrulaştırır, belki de güçlendirir çünkü 
sürdürülemez gayrı ahlaki, gayrı hukuki, gayrı meşru, gayrı insani bir çerçeve; 
sürdürülemez bir çerçeve. Zaman zaman balans ayarı gerekmekte, utandırıcı hale 
gelmekte. Ama benim inancım o ki, bu anlık taktiksel bir pozisyon değildir bu Sünni 
egemen ve ayrımcı yapı. Bu çok derin tarihsel, kültürel kökleri olan bir anlayıştır. 
Dolayısıyla çok zor yerinden kıpırdar. Yerinden kıpırdaması için de, onu da söyleyeyim 
bari, ne gerekir; mutlaka ve mutlaka çok önemli bir toplumsal mobilizasyon gerekir ve 
ittifaklar gerekir. Ben hem Sünni yurttaşlar arasında böyle bir vicdani kalkışmayı 
görmüyorum hem de Alevi yurttaşlar arasında bu ittifakları kurabilecek bir kültürel 
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kapital olduğunu görmüyorum. Dolayısıyla bu vicdani, insani, hukuki, siyasi, ahlaki karşı 
çıkışı başarabilecek bir koalisyon göremediğim için de umutsuzum.  
TG: Çok teşekkür ediyorum, görüşlerinizi paylaştınız...  
 
 
Interview with Mr. Hüseyin Aygün, CHP Tunceli MP 
10.04.2013, TBMM  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Az önce de bahsettiğim gibi, ben tezimde din-devlet ilişkilerinin 
Avrupalılaşma sürecinde nasıl etkilendiğini anlamaya çalışıyorum ve okullardaki din 
dersleri özelinde Türkiye’yi Polonya ile karşılaştırıyorum. Sizin bu konudaki 
düşüncelerinizi almak istiyorum. CHP nasıl bi tutum sergiliyor? Burada Alevilerin, 
azınlıkların, Lozan’da azınlık kabul edilmeyen azınlıkların durumu hakkında ne 
söylemek istersiniz? Genel çerçeve olarak bu bağlamdaki görüşlerini paylaşabilir 
misiniz? 
Hüseyin Aygün: Bugün Kocaeli’de bizzat İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü’nün gözetiminde bir 
bildiri dağıtılmış. Bugün basına yansıdı; cennet için çocuklarınızı İmam Hatip’e göderin 
çağrısı yapıyor. Kocaeli EĞİTİM-SEN de bunu, sistematik olarak toplumu dinselleştirme 
daha sonra da dindar nesiller yaratma, sonuçta rejimi de laik bir rejim olmaktan çıkarıp 
dine dayalı bir rejime dönüştürme çabalarının parçalarından biri olarak nitelemiş. Bunun 
gibi sayısız olaylar oluyor her gün. Özellikle Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin bileşiminin 
değiştirilmesi, Ergenekon davası, ordunun güçsüzleştirilmesiyle hızlı bir dinselleşme 
dalgasıyla karşı karşıyayız. Bölgedeki Sünni ittifakı ile de birleşen, Amerika’nın da 
Türkiye’yi ılımlı İslam toplumuna dönüştürme çabalarıyla da bu destekleniyor.  
Din dersleri konusunda AİHM’in de çeşitli kararları var; çoğulcu olması, objektif olması 
koşulu, bütün dinlerin öğretilmesi olabileceğine hükmeden. Özellikle Alevi ailelerin 
çocuklarının bu zorunlu din derslerinden muaf tutulmasıyla ilgili açtığı davalarda bu 
kararlar çıktı. Hükümet bu derslerin içeriğini Alevilikle ilgili, kimi başka inançlarla ilgili, 
çeşitli bölümlerle zenginleştirerek tekrar etti ve muaf tutulma talebi kabul görmedi. Yine 
din hanesinin nüfus cuzdanında bulunmasını istemeyen Sınan Işık adlı bir Alevi 
vatandaşın açtığı davada lehine karar çıkmasına karşın, karar yerel otoritelerce yerine 
getirilmiyor. Sinan Işık, yine bugün basına yansıyan bir habere göre, Anayasa 
Mahkemesi’ne müracaat etmiş AİHM kararının uygulanması için. Ben Türkiye’deki 
dinselleşmeyi sadece zorunlu din dersleri etrafında devam eden bir süreç olarak görmenin 
de eksik kalacağına inanıyorum. Üç tane din dersi önümüzdeki öğretim döneminde 
okutulacak, Hz. Muhammed’in Hayatı, Kuran ve mevcut zorunlu din dersi. Bunların da 
bir süre sonra pek çok bölgede zorunlu olacağını, pek çok ailenin hükümetin baskısıyla 
bu derslerin çocukları tarafından alınmasına rıza göstereceği çok açık. 
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Daha iki gün evvel, Bursa’nın Gemlik ilçesinde, üstelik bir din dersi öğretmeni de değil, 
bir felsefe öğretmeni Alevilere ağır hakaretler eden konuşmalar yaptı. O öğretmenle ilgili 
hiçbir işlem yapılmadı çünkü bu Alevilere, Tanrı tanımazlara ve diğer pek çok gruba 
karşı bu tavrı destekleyen bir devlet otoritesi var şu anda Türkiye’de. Bu sebeple bu tür 
duygular taşıyanlar zincirlerinden boşanmışçasına harekete geçmiş durumdalar. Yine 
“Cihatçı”lar, İslami terörist grular aynı şekilde; dün Adana’da cihata çağıran bir bildiri 
dağıtıldı ve Suriye’deki rejime destek verenlerin başının gövdesinden koparılacağı 
söyleniyor orada.  
Şimdi genel tablo bu. Bu tabloda Alevilerin hakları ne, Aleviler ne hissediyor? Ve AKP 
gibi düşünmeyen diğer grupların hali nedir diye soracak olursan; yoğun bir inkar, 
asimilasyon, aşağılanma, dışlanma sözkonusu. Geçen sene 28 Temmuz’da Malatya’nın 
Sürgü beldesinde görüldüğü gibi kimi zaman katliam girişimlerine varan bir politik 
atmosfer var. İslam rejimi, İslam kardeşliği, İslama dayalı bir toplum günümüzün 
sorunlarını çözmeye yetmez ancak görüyoruz ki Kürt sorununu bile bu bağlamda 
çözmeye yönelik bir girişim var. Öcalan’ın Diyarbakır’da okunan bildirisinde bile bin 
yıllık İslam kardeşliği temeline dayanıyor. Oysa bırakın bin yılı, son yüzyılda bile 
Anadolu’da nasıl din temelinde nasıl Müslüman olmayan veya Müslüman görülmeyen 
grupların katledildiği, sürgün edildiği biliniyor. Ermeni meselesi olsun, Süryanilerin 
sorunları olsun, Koçgir’de yapılanlar olsun; bu olaylarda akıtılan kanlar din duygusuyla, 
dine referanslarla doğrudan bağlantılıdır. Dolayısıyla dine dayalı bir toplum veya rejim 
asla demokratik olamaz; kaynağını dinden alan bir rejimin başka dinlere hoşgörü 
göstermesi, çeşitliliği ve ifade hakkını savunması mümkün değil. Yine güncel bir bilgi 
vereyim; üç gündür Diyarbakır’da Dicle Üniversitesi’nde Hizbullahçılar diğer 
öğrencilerle çatışıyorlar. Türkiye’nin geleceğinde ne yazık ki bu tip olayların artacağını, 
genelleşeceğini, hükümetin yönlendirmesi ve korumasıyla ulusal çapta meydana 
geleceğini düşünüyorum ve endişe duyyuyorum. Buna uygun olarak da kamuoyunu 
uyarıyoruz. İslam kardeşliği, din kardeşliği denen şey büyük bir aldatmaca olduğunu, 
İslama dayalı bir rejimin de demokratik olamayacağını söylüyoruz. Yüzyıllar evvel 
denenmiş başarılamamış yıkılmış Osmanlı rejimi gibi bir rejimin bugün hoşgörünün, 
demokrasinin, adaletin rejimi olarak takdim edilmesini hükümet tarafından açıkça bir 
manüpülasyon ve tarihi çarpıtma olarak görüyorum. Dinin çarpıtılmaması lazım. 
Osmanlı’da farklı dini unsurlar, Hristiyanlar, Aleviler, Bektaşiler asla rahat değildiler. 
Bunların payına yalnızca katliam düştü. Yavuz’un Çaldıran Seferi’nden itibaren Aleviler 
ve Bektaşiler rahat yüzü görmemişlerdir.  
TG: Bugünkü Yargı Paketi de AİHM kararlarına sık sık referansta bulunuyor. AİHM 
kararlarının uygulanması konusunda sizce hükümet bir baskı hissediyor mu? AB üyelik 
amacı veya Avrupa Konseyi üyeliği bir hareket noktası mı? Hak ve özgürlükler 
ekseninde, AİHM kararlarına uyumlanmaya çalışılıyor mu?  
HA: Hayır oluşturmuyor zira hükümetin AB üyeliği projesi bitmiştir artık yüzünü İslam 
ülkelerine döndü, doğuya döndü oralarla birlik kurmayı amaçlıyor. Avrupa ile köprüleri 
atmaya yer arıyor. Şangay Beşlisi’ne bizi alın dedi Başbakan Putin’e. AİHM kararlarını 
da bundan daha önce AB üyeliği heyecanı varken dahi uygulamıyordu hükümet. Mesela 
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çok klasik, kökleşmiş bir şeydir AİHM içtihatlarında bir insanın en fazla tutuklu kalacağı 
süre 2 yıl 4 ay olduğu yönünde bir belirleme vardır. Türkiye’de sendikacılar, gazeteciler, 
yazarlar, akivistler, yazarlar tutukluluklarının dördüncü beşinci yılına giriyorlar. 
AİHM’in de bir baskısı da yok, madalyonun diğer tarafında da Avrupa ülkelerinin Türk 
hükümetine karşı ikiyüzlülüğü söz konusu. Tam bir demokratikleşmenin arkasında 
durmuyor. Dolayısıyla AİHM de demokratikleşme konusunda bir ölçüt olma özelliğini 
bizim için kaybetti. 
TG: Peki CHP’nin AB süreci ile ilgili heyecanı ne durumda peki? 
HA: CHP ile ilgili bir görüş belirtmeyeyim izin verirsen, çünkü CHP adına konuşmaya 
kendimi yetkili görmüyorum.  
20 yıl once Avrupa’nın denetiminde demokratikleşme adına bir şeyler söyleyebilirdik, 
şimdi öyle bir şeyden bahsedemeyiz. Avrupa adına da bu iddia çok eskimiş durumda. Her 
iki tarafın da yorulduğunu düşünüyorum. Yine de Türkiye’nin yüzünü Avrupa’dan 
doğuya dönmesini çok olumsuz bir gelişme olarak görüyorum. Ne olursa olsun, Avrupa 
büyük dönüşümlere; Rönesansa Reforma sosyalizm deneyimine dünyada en üst düzeyde 
uygulanmış batı demokrasisine ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Türkiye’nin yörüngesinin oradan 
çıkmaması lazım. İnanç özgürlüğü, ibadet hakkı, bunun önündeki sınırların kalkması, 
kuşkusuz bunlar da demokrasi için... Ama dine dayalı bir rejim dünyanın herhangi bir 
yerinde toplumların sorununu çözmemiştir. Zaten din toplumlarının, din devletlerinin ne 
rezil devletler olduğunu herhalde her gün oralarda işlenen cinayetlerden, vahşetten, bir 
erkekle gezdi diye, dışarıda saçı göründü diye kırbaçlanan kadın kardeşlerimizden 
görebiliriz. Onun karşısında durmak, onu eleştirmek lazım. O bakımdan da Batı 
demokrasisi bir ölçüt aslında. Size katılıyorum. Ondan tamamen de kopmak mümkün 
değil çünkü o içte ulaştırdı uygarlık bakımından.   
TG: Alevilerin din derslerindeki durumları konusunda iyimser değilsiniz diye 
anlıyorum… 
HA: Kesinlikle iyimser değilim. Ben bu asimilasyon, aşağılama, dışlama politikalarının 
Alevilere karşı fiziki saldırılara dönüşmesinden endişe ediyorum. Bırakın Aleviliğin 
kabullenilmesi, yasal tanınma ve korunmayı; fiziki saldırıların, katliamların meydana 
gelmesinden endişe ediyorum. Bu arada Avrupa ülkelerindeki gelişmeler çok olumlu. 4 
Avrupa ülkesinde Alevilik resmen tanındı. İsviçre’nin Basel Parlamentosu bağımsız bir 
inanç olarak tanımladı ve kimi haklar tanıdı. Avusturya’da Hızır Orucu günü Aleviler 
için resmen tatil ilan edildi. İsveç’te çeşitli kazanımlar var, şu anda süreç devam ediyor. 
Almanya’da Hamburg’da yine parlamento Alevi toplumunun liderleriyle bir sözleşme 
imzaladı. Ama Aleviler yaşadıkları topraklarda tanınmıyor, Türkiye; Anadolu, Suriye, 
Irak bölgelerinde; yerleştikleri yerlerde ağır bir asimilasyon ve yok etme politikalarıyla 
karşı karşıyalar. 500 yıldır da direnme, ayakta kalma kendilerini var etme yeteneklerini 
sergilediler, bundan sonra da sergileyeceklerinden kuşku duymuyorum. Avrupa’daki 
kazanımlar da Aleviler açısından yol gösterici ve son derece ümit verici; Avrupa 
hükümetlerine de bu yönden gerçekten teşekkür etmek lazım, dinsel çoğulculuğu ve 
hoşgörüyü yaydıkları için. Onlar İslamı sadece olumsuz uygulamalarından tanıyorlar. 
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İslam denilen fenomenin içinde, Alevilik-Bektaşilik gibi böyle çok farklı, bunun içinden 
çıkmış ama benimsediği değerler itibarı ile son derece çağdaş, 21. yüzyılın yarattığı 
değerlere uygun akımlar da var. Onların da bu akımları tanıması, onlardan öğrenmesi, 
Avrupa’da barış içinde birarada yaşama için bu akımlarla işbirliğine gitmesi bence kendi 
hayırlarına. Bu bakımdan da çok isabetli davrandıklarına inanıyorum. Yani Basel 
Kanton’undaki 8000 Alevi, Basel’deki çeşitli dini grupların kardeşçe yaşaması açısından 
da belli dersler ortaya koydular. Orada mesela kadınların ve erkeklerin birlikte ibadet 
etmesi, semah dönmesi gibi şeylere İsviçre yetkilileri Aleviler sayesinde şahit oldular ve 
çok şaşırdılar. Tanıma süreci tüm toplumları zenginleştirmenin de bir parçası anlamına 
geliyor. Bu bakımdan onlar için de Aleviler için de zengin deneyimler içeren yeni bir 
süreç ile karşıkarşıya olduğumuzu düşünüyorum.  
TG: Türkiye’de gerçekleştirilmiş olan Alevi Çalıştayları, Avrupa’da gerçekleşen bu 
açılımlara benzer bir sürece bir adım niteliğinde olabilir mi sizce? 
HA: Açıkçası Aleviler başından beri AKP’den biraz umutsuzdular çünkü hem 
demokratlığı konusunda ciddi şüpheleri var hem de İslamcılar tarih boyunca hiçbir zaman 
Alevilerle bir yüzleşme tavrı göstermediler. Çalıştaylar o yüzden çok büyük reklamlarla 
propagandalarla toplumun gündemine geldiyse de Alevi örgütlerinin çok zayıf bir desteği 
söz konusuydu. Aleviler, yanılmıyorsam, ikinci çalıştaya da katılıp taleplerini dile getirip 
çekildiler, devam etmediler. Zaten çalıştayların ardından hazırlanan sonuç bildirisi ve 
raporda da yer alan mantık çok korkunç bir mantıktı. Sivas’ta müze istemenin bile tehlike 
olarak nitelendiği bir rapor ortaya çıktı. Bunun üzerine Alevilerin AKP’den herhangi bir 
beklentisi olduğunu sanmıyorum. Zaten bütün Aleviler de uzak duruyor. Yani Alevilerin 
şu an AKP ile ilişkisi sadece kendini ondan korumak, örgütlenmek, ona karşı mücadele 
etmek, onu izlemek ve onun attığı adımlardan kendisini ve gelecek nesillerini korumak 
adına sonuçlar çıkartmak. Bu her yerde böyle.  
TG: Anladığım kadarıyla, bu yeni din derslerinin de eklenmesi ile birlikte durum, hem 
hak ve özgürlükler açısından, hem azınlıklar açısından, sizin görüşünüze göre, kötüye 
gidiyor. Bu noktada önerdiğiniz herhangi bir politika var mı? 
HA: Tabiki! Devlet din alanından elini çekmeli, Diyanet lağvedilmeli, din derslerine son 
verilmeli. Okul asla dinselleşmenin mekanı olmamalı. Bütün dinlere kör, nötr bir devlet 
kurulmalı aksi halde geri hatta hiç demokrasi kültürü olmayan bir ülkede bunun 
İslamcıların baskısına dönüşmesi, Ortaçağ’daki gibi uygulamalara gidilmesi mümkün. 
Ortaçağ’da biliyorsunuz Alevileri kazanlara atarlardı, nehirlerde boğdururlardı, 
padişahlar, Ebu Suud Efendi gibi kimseler fermanlar yayınlarlardı bunların mallarının 
bile helal olduğu yönünde. Türkiye gibi ülkelerde demokrasi kültürü, demokrasi tarihi de 
zayıf olduğundan devletin kesinlikle din alanından elini çekmesi lazım. Bunu sivil 
gruplar kendisi yapmalı. Diyelim Aleviler Cemevleri, dergahlar aracılığıyla din eğitimini 
kendi çocuklarına verebilmeli; isteyen grplar da yine kendi usullerince kendi 
örgütlenmelerinde... Türkiye’de bırakın devletin bu alandan çekilmesini, Diyanet gibi bir 
kurum var karşımızda, 8-10 bakanlığın bütçesine sahip, siyasal İslamı yayan bir kurum 
bu. Bu bakımdan gidişat bizim açımızdan oldukça karamsar. Aslında laik, demokrat, 
aydın, çağdaş düşünceli bütün insanlar için gidişat çok olumsuz. 18:00 Aleviler de bu 
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gidişata karşı direnebilecek en önemli güçlerden birisi Türkiye’de. Bu bakımdan Alevilik 
üzerinde konuşuyoruz, yoksa Sünni bir seküler yurttaşımızın da, laiklikten gelen bir 
yurttaşımızın da bu dinselleşme dalgası karşısında fikir, ifade, örgütlenme hakkının 
istediği şekilde yaşama özgürlüğünün ağır bir tehdit altında olduğunu düşünüyorum. 
Buna karşı bütün güzçlerin direnmesi lazım. Türkiye’nin İslamileşmesi sadece Alevileri 
hedef yapmaz, bütün kesimlere zarar verir.  
TG: Yeni Anayasa sürecinden, Uzlaşma Komisyonunun ortaya koyacağı ilkelerden de mi 
umutlu değilsiniz? Bunu özellikle zorunlu din derslerinin anayasadan çıkartılması ve 
Diyanet’in konumu ile ilgili soruyorum... 
HA: Yok yok. Şu an Alevilerin esamesi bile okunmuyor. Öcalan’ın mektubunda bile 10 
bin, 20 bin kişilik gruplardan bahsediliyordu, ama 10 milyon-15 milyon Alevi 
toplumunun adı bile geçmiyordu. Aleviler bunun Osmanlı’dan beri süregelen bir süreç 
olduğunu düşünüyorlar. Yani sonuç olarak ben gidişatın olumsuz olduğunu düşünüyorum 
ancak Alevilerin de buna karşı direnecek muazzam güçleri var. Aleviler aslında 
Türkiye’nin her yerinde örgütlü; 1970lerde bunu sosyalist örgütler içinde sergileme 
imkanı buldu, bugünse ilke defa kendileri için mücadele edecekler. Bambaşka bir 
deneyim yaşayacaklar eğer Türkiye birazcık demokratik, laik çizgide diredeneckse bunda 
Alevilerin muazzam rolü olacak buna inanıyorum. Yani din denen şeyin vicdanlarda 
kalması gerekir. Atatürk’ün 1920lerde, 30larda söylediği şeyleri çok kıymetli buluyorum. 
Atatürk düşmanlığının da sebebinin bu bağlamda çok net görülebileceğine inanıyorum ve 
tüm yurttaşların bunu görmesini umuyorum. 
TG: Vakit ayırdığınız için çok teşekkür ederim. 
 
 
Interview with Mr. Kazım Genç, Lawyer of Zengin vs. Turkey Case, ECtHR 
06.02.2013, Genç Hukuk Bürosu, Ankara  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Öncelikle görüşmeyi kabul ettiğiniz için çok teşekkür ederim. Size yazmış 
olduğum e-postada da bahsettiğim gibi, ben Bilkent Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi 
Bölümü’nde doktora öğencisiyim. Tezimde Türkiye’de ve Polonya’da din-devlet 
ilişkilerinin AB ile entegrasyon sürecinde nasıl etkilendiğini din dersleri özelinde 
incelemeye çalışıyorum. “Zengin Davası”na da temel teşkil eden, Türkiye’de zorunlu din 
dersleri konusu ile başlayacak olursak, neler söylemek istersiniz? 
Kazım Genç: Ben size öncelikle birkaç bilgi vereyim, bence siz bu zorunlu din dersi 
konusuna bağlı kalmayın. Bizim büromuz sizin bu çalışmanız için verisi çok olan bir ofis. 
AİHM’e götürülmüş pek çok dava, ki bunların başlangıçı 2000’li yıllara dayanıyor; 
2004’te AİHM’e gittik, 2007’de karar çıktı. 2008’de Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar 
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Komitesine başvurduk çünkü verilen kararın Türkiye’de hala bir uygulaması yok. 
Bunlardan ayrı olarak Türkiye’de açtığımız, yani zorunlu din dersine karşı açılmış 30-35 
civarında dava vardır, bunların 20 tanesi falan bu bürodan yürüdü. AİHM’in bu kararı 
çıktıktan sonra Danıştay 8. Dairesi bu kararı emsal alarak bu karar doğrultusunda kararlar 
verdi ve mahkemeler de ona bağlı kaldı. Ancak Eylül 2010 referandumundan sonra 
Türkiye’de Yüksek Yargı dokusunda AKP lehine bir değişiklik olunca, şimdi açtığımız 
davalar yoğunluklu olarak red şeklinde geliyor. Artı tabi bir de Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne 
başvuru süreci girdi araya; bundan sonra o süreci de yürüteceğiz. Zorunlu din dersleri ile 
ilgili şu anki durumumuz bu. 
Tabi bir de Cemevleri sorunu var, ibadethane meselesi ile ilgili vardı... Mesela en son 
2000’li yıllardan beri Türkiye’de derneklerin federasyonlaşması yasaktı, onun üzerine biz 
dokuz alevi derneği yanyana gelerek Alevi Bektaşi Kuruluşlar Birliği diye ikinci bir 
dernek kurduk. O hukuksal olarak onuncu bir dernek gibiydi ama bizim iç hukukumuzda 
o derneklerin işbirliği gibiydi ve o derneğin üyeleri yani kurucuları diğer dokuz derneğin 
genel başkanları konumundaydı ve onlardan denetçiler gelirdi. Onunla ilgili mesela bir 
kapatılma davası açıldı, mahkeme kapatma kararı verdi 2002’de, biz temyiz ettik. 
TG: Kapatma kararı hangi gerekçe ile verildi? 
KG: Bölücülük.  
TG: Peki, temyiz sonucu ne oldu? 
KG: Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi 3’e 2 oyla lehimize karar verdi. Biz de 2003’te Alevi-
Bektaşi Federasyonu’nu kurduk. Bununla ilgili dosyalar da incelemek isterseniz bizdedir. 
Bunun dışında Cemevleriyle ilgili verilen yoğun bir mücadele var. Bu aralar basında 
sıkça görünen Çankaya Cemevi davası var. Mahkeme lehimize karar verdi, Yargıtay 
bozdu, mahkeme direndi, direnme kararını da Savcılık temyiz etti. Mesela din ve devlet 
ilişkisi anlamında baktığımızda, ben bugün alamadım, haftaya alacağım mahkemenin 
direnme kararını, orada hukuki olarak inanç özgürlüğü korunmaya çalışılıyor. Burada 
kişinin Tanrı ile olan ilişkisine kim ne karışır deniyor aslen. O davada yine Cemevlerinin 
tarihsel geçmişi yoktur falan denildi, ben Malatya’da 800 yıl önce var olan bir Cemevi ile 
ilgili belge götürdüm.  
Yine nüfus kağıtlarındaki din hanesiyle ilgili olarak Sinan Işık, o davaya da biz baktık, 
mahkemeye diyor ki ben Aleviyim, din hanesindeki İslamı silin Alevi yazın. Mahkeme 
Diyanet’ten görüş alıyor, Diyanet diyor ki Alevilik diye bir inanç yoktur, Alevilik 
Müslümanlığın tasavvufi bir yorumudur. Mahkeme de bu görüşe göre karar verdi. Biz de 
AİHM’e gittik, bu din hanesiyle ilgili dedik ki, AİHS 9. Maddesi gereği kimse inancını 
açıklamaya zorlanamaz, Mahkeme de bu ilke gereğince uygulamayı aykırı buldu.  
TG: Ama Türkiye’de uygulanmıyor değil mi bu karar? 
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KG: Hayır uygulaması yok. Orada da bir yolunu buldular, vatandaşlık yasasını 
değiştirdiler. İsteyen gitsin muhtardan ikametgah alır gibi onunla da Kaymakamlığa 
başvursun din hanesinden İslam’ı sildirdsin, Hristiyan, Musevi, Ortodoks yazdırsın. Ama 
Alevi yazdıramaz, neden? Alevilik din değil çünkü onlara göre... O zaman o haneyi boş 
bıraksın diyorlar. İyi de ben devlet dairesine gittiğm zaman verdim nüfu kağıdımı, o hane 
boş; anlamayacak mı karşıdaki? Ne gerek var bir din hanesine? Kime ne kimin neye 
inandığından? Bu konu da Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar Komitesi’nin önünde. İki yıl önce 
Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar Komitesi İnsan Hakları Temsilcisi Türkiye’ye geldi. Benimle 
görüşmek istediler, İstanbul’da görüştük kendileriyle. Hem Zengin hem de Sinan Işık 
davaları ile ilgili görüştük; her iki dosya ile ilgili de biz dilekçemizi yazdık, bize hiçbir 
geri dönüş gelmedi dedim, nasıl olur dediler... Baktılar gerçekten geri dönüş yok. Orada 
Türk dosyalarıyla ilgilenen Türk avukatlar var onlar ilgilendiler. Beni aradılar sonrasında, 
dediler ki “tamam siz 2008’de başvurmuşsunuz ama bugüne kadar hükümetinizden cevap 
gelmemiş.” Siz söyleyin, böyle bir şey olabilir mi? Dedim ki yani hükümet on yıl cevap 
vermezse ne olacak? Siz niye orada oturuyorsunuz? Yargıya üç aylık süre tanınır, cevap 
vermedi mi bir üç aylık daha süre tanıyın sonra cevap verme hakkını kaybettin deyin.  
TG: Evet, bir yaptırımı yok mu? 
KG: Var, AİHS ve AİHM kararlarına göre yapmaları gereken, yargı kararına uyun uyun 
diye süreler verecekler, ona uyup uymadıklarına bakacaklar, ihtarlar verecekler ondan 
sonra. Üç tane ihtar verecekler, ihtarlar da çoğalabilir, sonra ilişkiyi askıya alma ve en 
sonunda da Avrupa Konseyi’nden çıkartmaya kadar gidebilir müeyyidesi. Ama ne yazık 
ki Avrupa da buu konuda çifte standartlı davranıyor. AKP’yi özellikle ilk iktidar olduğu 
dönemde AB üyeliği konusundaki istekli tutumunu da göz önünde bulundurarak liberal 
demokrat olarak görüyorlardı ve sempatik davranıyorlardı. Ancak bunlar yeni yeni işin iç 
yüzünü görmeye başladılar. Mesela vicdani redçilerle ilgili AİHM’de verilen kararın 
uygulanmaması ile ilgili yedi kere ihtar olmasına rağmen hala müeyyide uygulamıyorlar.  
TG: Siz kararın uygulanmaması ile ilgili şikayet başvurunuzu Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar 
Komitesi’ne yapıyorsunuz değil mi?  
KG: Evet her ülkenin Dışişleri Bakanları’ndan oluşan Komite’ye yapıyoruz 
başvurumuzu. 
TG: Peki Avrupa Konseyi Bakanlar Komitesi’nin tutumuyla Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği 
süreci arasında bir bağlantı görüyor musunuz? Komisyon’un Türkiye ile ilgili ilerleme 
raporlarında bu kararların uygulanmayışına atıfta bulunuluyor mesela... 
KG: Tabi burada Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu Türkiye Delegasyonu var mesela, Sema 
Hanım var mesela bizim yakinen görüştüğümüz, Türkiye’nin hazırladığı raporlarda bu 
konulara yer verirler ve bizi arayıp sorarlar şu şu AİHM kararlarının uygulaması ne oldu 
diye. Biz de deriz ki, çok şükür hiçbir ilerleme olmadı!  
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TG: Bu da tabi hazırlanan raporlara yansıyor. Zorunlu din dersi meselesine dönecek 
olursak, aslında ben bu konuyu incelemeye başladığımda sadece zorunlu din dersleri 
vardı şimdi bir de irdelenmesi gereken seçmeli din dersleri var. Bu 4+4+4 formülü ilk 
çıktığında öyle bir hava vardı ki, sanki zorunlu DKAB dersleri kaldırılacak, din dersleri 
artık seçmeli olacak gibi. Ama öyle olmadı, malum... Hem zorunlu DKAB dersleri 
devam ediyor hem de seçmeli din dersleri eklendi yasayla. 
KG: Yo, siz kaldırılacağını düşünmekte son derece haklısınız. Bu AİHM kararından 
sonra, o dönemki Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hüseyin Çelik’ti, o çıktı dedi ki, biz bu dersi 
seçmeli yapacağız. Tunceli’de çok güzel bir söz vardır: “Ben senin hilelerinle yalan 
dolanlarınla baş edemedim, bu bana ders oldu. Ben de senin önünde diz çökmedim, bu da 
sana ders olsun.” Bu Osmanlıcıkla ilgili söylenmiş bir söz ama aynı zamanda Türk-İslam 
sentezine de yönelik söylenmiş bir şeydir.  
AİHM’den bu Zengin kararıı çıktı, dediler ki, iptal kararı yok, Sözleşme’ye aykırılık yok. 
Biz sadece müfredatı biraz değiştiririz, biz zaten buna bir formül bulacağız. Ne yaptılar, 
DKAB dersini zorunlu olarak tutuyorlar, bunun yanında Kur’an ve Hz. Peygamberin 
Hayatı diye seçmeli ve tamamen İslam dini içerikli birkaç ders koydular. Ama seçmelilik 
de şöyle bir şey, ben bu derse gireceğim demiyorsunuz da ben bu derse girmek 
istemiyorum diye beyan etmek zorunda kalıyorsunuz. Negatif beyan üzerinden iş 
yürümez. İşten izin alırken şehir dışına çıkacağım diye haber verirsin, şehir dışına 
gitmiyorum diye beyan eder misin? Ben bunu Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda birine 
anlatmıştım, anlayamadı sonra da inanamadı.....  
TG: Son dönemde AB’ye üyelik süreci ile ilgili olarak bir tavır değişikliği var malum... 
Hem yorgunluk hem de “üyeliği artık önemsemiyoruz” diye hükümetin üst kademeleri 
neredeyse açık açık ilan ediyorlar. Hem Türk halkında hem de yöneticilerde bu konuda 
bir motivasyon düşmesi olunca, Avrupa da biraz yaptırım gücünü kaybetti gibi 
görünüyor. Yani biz zaten artık üyeliği önemsemiyoruz, niye beklentilerinizi karşılamaya 
çalışalım gibi bir hava var mı yoksa AB hala bir itici güç mü? Ne dersiniz? 
KG: İktidar ile AB arasındaki durum böyle, evet. Ancak AB bastırsa mesela, şunu 
yapacaksın yoksa ben sana yoğun olarak vize uygulayacağım diye, o zaman dediğini 
yaptırır. AB de kendi içinde sağlam ve stabil duramıyor ki, iflas eden ülkeler peşpeşe... 
AB’nin kendi içinde de o coşku kayboldu aslına bakarsanız.  
TG: Yine de Zengin kararı sonrasında özellikle Türkiye’deki Alevi toplumunu 
ilgilendiren gelişmeler yaşandı. ‘Alevi Açılımı’ kapsamında çalıştaylar düzenlendi, 
burada Alevilerin sorunları tam anlamıyla yansıtıldı mı, ortaya konanlar doğrultusunda 
politikalar geliştirildi mi? Nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
KG: Bu yolda bu mücadelenin içinde yıllardır olanlar bu adımların samimiyeti 
konusunda kuşkulu davrandılar. “Demokrasi amaç değil, araçtır” görüşü mü hakim diye 
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sorguladılar ister istemez. AB ile entegrasyonun da iktidarın kendisine daha fazla bir 
hareket alanı yaratmak için olduğunu düşünenler çoğunluktaydı. AB’nin gözünde de 
bunlar somut adımlar olarak görülüyor ki, mesela Avrupa’dan heyetler geldiğinde bize 
soruyorlar, hükümet Alevi iftarı düzenlemiş sizleri davet etmiş, niye gitmediniz diye... 
Biz de cevap veriyoruz, çünkü bu bizim geleneğimizde yok. Benim evimin dışında kimse 
bilmez ki benim oruç tuttuğumu, ne zaman niyetlendiğimi, hangi zamanda orucumu 
açtığımı kimse bilmez ki. 2008’in Ocak ayında bizim iyi bir karşı duruşumuz oldu, 300 
Alevi örgütünden iki örgüt gitti sadece.  
TG: Bir de şöyle bir eleştri getiriliyor Alevi çalıştaylarından bir sonuç çıkmadığını 
söyleyenlere; Aleviler ortak bir duruş sergilemediler. Örneğin DKAB dersleri ile ilgili 
ortak bir öneride bulunamadılar. 
KG: Niye ortak bir şey söyleyelim? Ne zorunluluğumuz var bizim? Nurcular, 
Nakşibendiler, Aczimendiler ortak bir söylemde mi bulunuyorlar? Bizim ortak olarak 
söylediğimiz tek bir şey var, devlet tüm inançları özgür bıraksın. Her inanç kendisini 
yaşamakta, her inanç sahibi kendi ibadetini yapmakta, ve başka inanç sahiplerinin de 
haklarına hukuklarına saygı göstermekte eşitve objektif olacaktır. Burada tabi Diyanet’in 
varlığı sorgulanmalıdır; sadece İslam dinin Sunni yorumunu benimseyen bir yapının onca 
cami yaptırması doğal mıdır? Buna karşılık Cemevi’ne izin verilmiyor. Ne hakla? 
Alevilerin içinde farklı görüşlerin olması neden özgürlüklerinin verilmemesi için bir 
neden olarak görülsün?  
TG: Peki DKAB dersleri özelinde, Alevilerin bu dersin zorunlu olmaması konusunda 
fikirbirliği içinde olduğunu söyleyebilir miyiz? 
KG: Bakınız ilk Alevi Çalıştayı’nda 25 tane Alevi örgüt ve uzmanlar biraraya geldi ve 
yedi temel sorun ortaya konuldu. Bu yedi sorunun beş tanesinde ortaklaştılar. 
Ortaklaşamadıkları iki temel sorun kalmıştı; biri sanıyorum Alevi dedelerine maaş 
konusuydu. Orada da bir kısmımız devletin inancı finanse etmesini doğru bulmadığımız 
içindir, benim vergimle senin inancın senin verginle benim inancım neden finanse 
edilsin? Üzerinde anlaşılan diğer beş konudan hangisi hayata geçirildi? Ama Alevilerin 
tarihsel olarak şöyle bir hassas noktaları var; geçmişten beri hep bir mazlumiyet ve 
mağduriyet yaşadıkları için güce bir tapınma var. Bu da AKP’nin Alevi nüfusundan 
aldığı oyların temel nedenidir bence.  
TG: Hazır konu Alevilerin siyasi partilerle ilişkilerine gelmişken, CHP ile Alevilerin 
uzun yıllardır bir organik bağı olduğu söylenegelir. Öncelikle sizce böyle bir şey var mı? 
Bir de bu Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu’nda mesela, CHP milletvekilleri Aleviler ile 
görüş alışverişinde bulunuyorlar mı? Görüş ve önerileriniz alınıyor ve sürece yansıtılıyor 
mu? Bildiğim kadarıyla Alevilik ile ilgili bir seçmeli ders sunulması ile ilgili bir öneride 
bulunulmadı, CHP’den böyle bir adım bekler misiniz? 
317 
KG: Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu Anayasa değişikliği ile ilgili iki günlük bir sempozyum 
yaptı ve önerilerini tüm partilerin guplarına sundu. Bundan sonrası siyasi partilerin 
sorumluluğudur. Ancak ben meseleyi 4+4+4 sistemini çok büyük çaplı bir dönüştürme 
projesi olarak görüyorum ve İmam Hatipler’le çok yakından ilişki kuruyorum.... 
Biraz da yeni eğitim sistemi ve seçmeli din dersleri sonrası bu konu ile ilgili açılmış 
davalar var mı diye sormak istiyorum ama öncelikle, Zengin kararı sonrasına dönecek 
olursak, DKAB dersleri ile ilgili olarak açılmış olan 30-35 dava var dediniz 
yanılmıyorsam, ben bunlardan sadece Danıştay’a taşınmış olanlar ile ilgili bilgiye 
ulaşabiliyorum Danıştay’ın internet sayfasından... Siz diğer davalar ile ilgili de bilgi 
verebilir misiniz? 
KG: Danıştay’da Hatice Köse ve Ali Kenanoğlu davaları olması lazım, onlara da ben 
baktım. İç hukukta lehimize sonuçlanmış davalardır. 
TG: Hemen AİHM kararı sonrası iç hukuk da AİHM ile uyumlu kararlar verdi değil mi? 
Bu tavır devam ediyor mu? Mesela şimdi bir Ateist ailenin davası var gündemde... 
KG: Yok o hava tamamen değişti. Bu Eskişehir’deki davayı diyorsunuz değil mi? Onu 
reddettiler şimdi Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne gidecek. Kararı düzeltmeye gitti, sanırım Serap 
Hanım bakıyor o davaya. Sonrasında da AİHM’e taşınacağını düşünüyorum. Bundan 
sonra yapılacak tek şey o olacaktır. 
Aslına bakarsanız bence AİHM bu dosyada bir yanlışlık yaptı. AİHS’ne göre DKAB 
derslerinin objektif, eleştirel ve nesnel olmadığına karar verdi ama manevi 5000 TL’lik 
bir tazminata da hükmetmedi. Yani bir tazminata hükmetmiiş olsaydı, Türkiye’de bir 
milyon dava açılırdı. Böylede hem devlet içinde hem AİHM üzerinde çok önemli bir 
baskı olurdu.  
TG: Bir de ders kitaplarının içeriğinde bu karar sonrası değişiklik yapılması konusu var. 
Alevilerin istek ve beklentilerini karşılamadığı söyleniyor... 
KG: Aman orada siz de hataya düşmeyin! Olayın iç yüzü şöyle: AİHM’de dava devam 
ederken, ben incelenmesi üzere DKAB kitaplarını gönderdim. İnceleme sonunda bir 
rapor verdiler: “4., 5., 6., 7., 8. Sınıf ders kitaplarının incelenmesinde 4-5-6 ve 8. Sınıf 
kitaplarının tamamı ile 7. Sınıf ders kitabının 15 sayfalık bölümü hariç geri kalan 
kısmının tamamı, İslam dininin eğitimine, ritüellerine ve genel ahlaka ilişkin olup, 7. sınıf 
ders kitabının 15 sayfalık bölümünde beş temel din hakkında resimleriyle beraber küçük 
bir bilgilendirme yapıldığı...” diyor. Alevilikle ilgili tek kelime yoktur diyor. Bu rapor 
gelince hükümet de “İslamın gelişmesine katkı sunan din bilginleri” diye bir sayfa açtılar, 
sanıyorum 6. sınıf ders kitabında, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli’yi orada saydılar, Yunus Emre’yi 
saydılar ve altına da bir not düştüler; şu şu kişinin Alevilik ve Bektaşilik adlı kitabından 
alıntıdır diye. Sonra da gazeteler manşet attı: “Alevilik din dersi kitaplarına girdi!” diye...  
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Hiç unutmuyorum, tarih 3 Ekim 2006, AİHM’deyiz. Davanın tarafları olarak bir tarafta 
ben varım, rahmetli oldu Fransız bir düşünür vardı yanımda Alevilik konusunda önemli 
çalışmalar yapmış, Alevi Bektaşi Konfederasyonu Genel Başkanı var, ve Fransa’da 
avukatlık yapan bir Türk arkadaş var. Türkiye tarafında da Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Din 
Öğretimi Genel Müdürü var, Dışişleri Bakanlığı’ndan AİHM’e yolladığı 7-8 avukat 
arkadaş var, Fransa’da görevli olan Türk Büyükelçisi de var. Herkes yarımşar saat sunum 
yaptı sonra o sunuşlara cevaplar doğdu. Karşı taraf dedi ki yeni ders kitaplarında Alevilik 
var. Ben de dedim ki “ben bu türlü savunma yapacağınıza hiç ihtimal vermemiştim ama 
yine de tedbirli davranıp saydım; bir kelime falan sayfada yazıyor... Başka varsa ben 
davadan çekilip gideceğim” dedim. Siz düşünün artık... Bir de bunun üzerine savunma 
kuruyorlar. Bir yargıç da şeyi sordu, “peki ateistlerle ilgili ne yapıyorsunuz” dedi. 
Türkiye tarafı da dedi ki “bize ateistlerle ilgili başvuru olmadı!”  
TG: Peki sonrasında? Yani davadan sonra? 
KG: Bu davadan sonra ders kitaplarında değişiklik yaptılar. Liseleri 4 yıla çıkartıp 12 yıl 
oldu ya eğitim, 12. Sınıf ders kitabının son bölümüne biraz Alevilik yazdılar, ders 
kitaplarında Alevilik var diyorlar şimdi. Fakat bu Alevilik de bizim Aleviliğimiz değil 
yani... Mesela Düldül Alevilerde Hz. Ali’nin atıdır ve mistik bir kutsaliyeti vardır. Bunu 
kitapta şöyle açıklıyorlar: “Düldül Hz. Muhammed’in Hz. Ali’ye hediye ettiği attır.” Hacı 
Bektaş-ı Veli’yi adında “Hacı” geçiyor diye Hacca götürüyorlar, halbuki aslen “Hace”dir, 
söylene söylene öyle alışılagelmiştir. Yani kendi bildikleri Aleviliği anlatıyorlar. 
TG: Yine de bir çaba olmuş gibi görünüyor, bunda AB üyeliğinin motivasyonu da var 
sanırım... 
KG: Tamamen o. İktidarın ilk yıllarında bu müktesebata uyma gayretleri falan hep o 
dönem. Avrupa’ya karşı gösterilmek istenen liberal demokrat imajı için biraz da. Şimdi 
öyle bir gayret de yok. 
TG: Son olarak, din-devlet ilişkisi ve din derleri ile ilgili genel görüşlerinizi alabilir 
miyim? 
KG: Eğer bir din eğitimi verilecekse, bir; kesinlikle vatandaşın “ben çocuğuma din 
eğitimi verilmesini istiyorum” iradesinin alınması gerekir. İkincisi, bu da yeterli değil, 
vatandaş diyecek ki “ben çocuğuma İslam dininin Hanefi mezhebi, Nakşi tarikatına göre 
eğitim verilmesini istiyorum,” devlet de buna saygı gösterecek. Veya “ben çocuğuma din 
eğitimi verilmesini istiyorum ama Aleviliğin İslamın dışında olduğunu savunan Pir 
Sultan çizgisinde bir Alevilik eğitimi verilmesini istiyorum” diyecek. Bir diğeri de 
“Alevilik İslamın özüdür fikrini savunan Cem Vakfı çizgisinde eğitim verilmesini 
istiyorum” demesi gerekir. Artı bu kesimlerin hepsinin kendi din bilgisi kitaplarını kendi 
din bilginlerine yazdırması, kendi din dersi hocalarını ataması ve devletin onun maaşını 
vermesi gerekiyor. Eğitimde inanç özgürlüğü ancak böyle sağlanabilir.  
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Bununla birlikte, devlet dinden kesinlikle elini çekmelidir. Devlet bir dinin lehine bir 
diğer dinin alehine olmamak için Diyanet İşleri derhal lağvedilmeli, elbetteki personeli 
mağdur edilmeden... Ben Aleviyim burada iş yerim var vergi ödüyorum, devlet din 
adamına o vergiyle maaş ödüyor, o din adamı da Aleviliği sapkın bir inanç olarak 
tanımlıyor; böyle bir şey olabilir mi? Bunun bir kere ortadan kalkması gerek, Diyanet 
bütçesi öyle devasa ki mesela... yedi-sekiz bakanlığın bütçesinden büyük. Devlet, dini 
finanse etmekten de elini çekmelidir. Hiçbir dini nanca bir lira bile aktarmamalıdır. Biri 
diyebilmeli ki mesela ben ateistim benden din vergisi kesmeyin. Öbürü desin ki benden 
din vergisi kesin ve Cem Vakfı’na aktarın. Diyanet İşleri’nin kadro olarak da bu kadar 
kalabalık olması çok dikkat çekici. Sonuç olarak devlet dinden elini çekmeli, dini finanse 
etmemeli ve dini şekillendirmemeli. Din-devlet ilişkilerinde esas alınması gereken üç 
prensip bunlar. Bununla birlikte devlet dini eğitim yapmamalı. Bunlar çağdaş, 
demokratik, laik devletin olmazsa olmazları.  
TG: Karşıt bir görüş de diyor ki laiklik ilkesi doğrultusunda din eğitiminin tarafsız olarak 
verilebilmesi için devlet tarafından verilmesi gerekir. 
KG: Niye tarafsız olması gereksin ki?  
TG: Cumhuriyetin kurulduğu ilk yıllarda benimsenen prensip doğrultusunda... 
KG: O çok farklı bir şey... Devletin ilk kuruluşunda değişim dönüşüm anlamında belki 
buna ihtiyaç duyulmuş olabilir ama bugünkü dünya düzeninde artık geçerliliği yok. Çok 
dinli ve çok kültürlü bir yaşam şeklini oturtmak zorunda artık dünya. Bunun en güzel 
örneği de Amerika. Devletin ancak denetleme görevi olabilir. Nedir o denetleme görevi; 
mesela Nakşi tarikatı kendi ortamında dini eğitim mi veriyor yoksa devletin temeline 
dinamit koyma eğitimi mi veriyor? Ancak bu şekilde bir denetleme görevi olabilir.  
TG: Çok teşekkür ederim Kazım Bey verdiğiniz bilgiler için. 
 
 
Interview with Dr. Necdet Subaşı, Head of Strategy Development Department of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Daire 
Başkanı); Moderator of Alevi Workshops 
18.03.2013, Ankara, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Size sormak istediğim çok soru var aslında... Öncelikli olarak Alevi 
Çalıştayları ve Alevilerin din dersleri ile ilgili beklentileri ile başlayacak olursak, ben en 
son AİHM’e götürülen Zengin Davasının avukatı Kazım Genç ile görüştüm. Mesela 
Alevilerin bir kısmı, Kazım Bey’in de içinde olduğu bir grup, devletin din alanından 
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tamamen elini çekmesini ve bunun bir uzantısı olarak da din derslerinin tamamen 
kaldırılmasını savunuyor. Elbette farklı görüşler de var... 
Necdet Subaşı: Siz Çalıştay kayıtlarını okudunuz mu? 
TG: Evet, incelemeye çalıştım.  
NS: Hepsini mi okudunuz? 
TG: Hayır. 
NS: Din eğitimi ile ilgili yerleri okudunuz... 
TG: Evet, şu ana kadar o kısmına yoğunlaştım. 
NS: Nasıl buldunuz oradaki diyalogları? 
TG:  Açıkçası, Alevi Çalıştayları ile ilgili genel olarak söylenen şey din dersleri 
konusunda da geçerli; Aleviler tek bir söylem etrafında birleşmiyor.  
NS: Ama metinlerde şunu yakalamış olmalısınız, Alevi söyleminin bütün tarafları orada 
kendi görüşlerini ifade ediyor; uçlar, kısmen sert, kısmen yumuşak, liberal... hepsi var. 
Aynı zamanda onlara karşı Sünni taraftaki her türlü yaklaşım da var. Yani sorunu bloke 
etmek isteyenler de var açmak isteyenler de var. Yani kamuoyunda özellikle bazı 
çevrelerin bir şekilde yaygınlaştırdığı gibi böyle çok homojen bir oluşum değildi toplantı. 
Toplantılarda çok büyük bir zoru başardığımızı düşündüğüm için iddialı konuşuyorum; 
herkesi dinledik herkese kulak verdik ve raporda da oradaki toplamın beklentilerini 
karşılayacak ve Türkiye’nin neye hazır olduğunu da bilerek... Böyle şey gibi gitmiyor bu 
işler, markete gidip de çikolata istiyorum der gibi değil bu işler, bambaşka bir şey. Ben 
talepkarlığın sert olduğunu bilirim, insanlar bir şeyi istedikleri zaman onu en uç noktada 
söylerler yankı yapsın karşılık bulsun isterler. Bunu normal karşılıyorum. Dolayısıyla 
ılımlı ve sert olmak üzere bu iki perspektifi de anlarım. Biri alttan alarak diğeri vuruşarak 
gider, ikisinin de enerjisi ayrıdır, bunları anlarım ve bunlardan rahatsız olmam. Bu işlerle 
uğraşanlar bunlara pek fazla takılmaz, normal vatandaş korkar ama bunlar normaldir. 
Fakat şu var; benim raportör olarak çalıştaylar sonunda Alevilere önerdiğim, daha 
doğrusu hükümete önerdiğim şey şuydu: Devlet Anayasal laiklik ilkesi doğrultusunda 
“din dersi zorunludur” ilkesinden vazgeçmiyor, o zaman din derslerinin statüsünü 
hakikaten olmazsa olmaz bir yere çekelim; örneğin bu dersler doğrudan kültür dersi 
olsun, yani bu coğrafyada yaşayıp da bir yarışma programında bile başarılı olamayan, bu 
konularda yaya kalan bir algı kabul edilemez. Din dersi ortalama her vatandaşın zorunlu 
olarak alması gereken bir ders olsun ama onun da “zorunlu” ifadesi yerine böyle 
matematik, fizik, kimya gibi algılayarak, din dediğimiz fenomeni anlamaya yönelik, 
pedagojik ilkelere dikkat eden bir çalışma. Mesela bu olsun. İslam nedir, Hristiyanlık 
nedir, Alevilik nedir, din neye karşılıktır... Ama yani doğrudan şey olmasın, insanların o 
dinde doğrudan kendini buldukları, o derste kendini buldukları bir kimlik donanımı, bir 
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kimlik üretimi olmasın, dedim. İkinci olarak da seçmeli dersleri önerdim; isteğe bağlı din 
dersi. Onda da velilerin onayına bağlı kalarak, ancak velilerin inanç ve kimliklerini 
açıklamak zorunda olmadıkları bir düzenek içinde her ders açılsın, örneğin Sünni İslam, 
Hanefilik, Şafilik, Türkiye’de hepsi var; olsun, Alevilik olsun, Nusayrilik olsun; bu 
Alevilere tanınmış bir imtiyaz olmasın, Sünnilere tanınmış özel bir imtiyaz olmasın. 
Türkiye’de farklı inanç grupları için bir ders programı uygulayalım. Mesela Alevi isterse 
seçmeli Alevilik dersini alsın, isterse onun yanında Sünniliği de alsın. Ama bu 
coğrafyada en azından kimliğin korunması için öğrenilmesi gereken dinsel aidiyetler ders 
programına katılsın diye önerdim. Tabi ki bu işler mesela İstanbul’daki kadar kolay 
olmaz; Bingöl’deki bir tane Alevi’nin durumu trajiktir veya mesela Tunceli’de bir tane 
Sünni ailenin durumu trajiktir. Bunlarda hem pedagojiye dikkat ederek, hem bölgesel 
sorunlara... Yani iyi niyetli olduktan sonra hepsi olur...  
Alevilik uygulamada böyle şifahi gelenekten beslenen bir şey. Teolojisi yok, belli bir 
kitabı yok dolayısıyla ne söylersen o yöne çekilebilir gibi algılanıyor, affınıza 
sığınıyorum bunu söylerken; ben buna inanmıyorum tabi, öyle değil. Aleviler kendi 
kimlikleriyle buluştuğunda bazıları için bu buluşma bir yüzleşmeye dönüşüyor, bazıları 
için bir yüke dönüşüyor, bazıları için keşfe dönüşüyor, bazıları için yaratıma dönüşüyor. 
Durup dururken yeni bir tarif, sosyolojik olarak teolojik olarak arkası olmayan yeni bir 
inşa yeni bir keşifte bulunuyorsunuz. Bunlar kolay değil, hep trajik. Bunun ayrımını 
Yavuz’a bağlayın, Atatürk’e bağlayın, Başbakan’a bağlayın... ama sonuçta durum trajik. 
Alevilik kimliğini olayı çok ideolojik mecralarda değerlendiren derneklerin sağlaması 
mümkün değil. Bu dernekler belli sembolik bayraklarla insanları indirebilir, acı çeken 
mağdur olan Alevileri kamuya taşıyabilir ama o kadar yani. O yüzden bu çalıştaylar 
Alevileri uzun vadeli anlamaya yönelik bir iyi niyet girişimiydi.  
Şimdi diyelim isteğe bağlı Alevilik dersini açtık. Peki bu Alevilik dersini kim verecek? 
Haklı olarak onlar şunu söylüyorlar; Sünni bir paradigmadan geçmiş bir insan ne kadar 
iyi niyetli olursa olsun kendi dünyasını anlatır. Onun için bu dersleri Alevilerin vermesi 
lazım. Peki ben şimdi mal müdürü bir Aleviyi, Tapu Kadastro’daki bir Aleviyi mi derse 
sokacağım? O zaman bir şey gerekiyor, universal düzeyde bir çalışma gerekiyor. 
Türkiye’de vatandaşların taleplerini nasıl karşılıyorsan, Almanya’da da öyle 
karşılamalısınız.  
Dedeler konusuna bakalım diyorsunuz, bu sefer örgütlü Alevilerin hepsi Dede’yi sadece 
sembolik bir sermaye olarak kullanıyorlar. Hiçbir Dede’ye otorite vermiyorlar, hiçbir 
Dede’nin öne çıkmasını istemiyorlar. Ben şahsen tanık oldum ki, çalıştaylarda da en 
büyük çatışma Dedelerle Alevi aydınlar arasındaydı. Alevi söylemini aydınlar taşıma 
iddiası taşıyor, fakat onların da yine tırnak içinde söylüyorum; ateist, Marxist, 
materyalist, komünist bir çerçevede Aleviliği biraz ideolojik argümanlarla içiçe geçirerek 
kullanma arzuları var. Öbür taraftan Dedelerin de aydınlara bakarsanız, uçuk kaçıklar 
hatta kendi iddialarını din diye yutturuyorlar gibi çok karşılıklı şeyler var. Birbirlerine 
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karşı ortak mağduriyetin getirdiği bir dayanışma duygusu olmakla beraber, masaya 
oturulduğunda ayrı ayrı bir şey görüyorsunuz. Bu çok yadırganacak bir şey olmayabilir. 
Bu Sünni tabanda da, Sünni ulema ile aydınlar arasında yaşanabilen şeyler. Ama orada 
anlaşamamak teolojik bir uçuruma yol açmıyor. Alevilikte ise ciddi bir yöntem sorunu 
var. Bu bizim sorunumuz da değil açıkçası, bu Alevilerin dert etmesi gereken bir şey. 
Orada ortaya çıkan şey şu, binyıllardır üzerinde düşünülmeyen bir konu tüm çeşitliliği ile 
bir anda önümüze geliyor. Teoloji, örgüt, kimlik... hepsi birden geliyor ve bunları da 
paniğe sürükleyecek bir Sivas olayı var, Maraş olayı var. Bir Alevi niye paniğe 
kapılmasın ki? Kapılara konan işaretler mesela, yüzde yüz çocukların yaptığı kanıtlansa 
bile bu anında onları korkutuyor, incitiyor. Bunu anlıyorum ben, insan olan bunu anlar. 
Dolayısıyla önlerinde birikmiş bir yük var. Bu yükle mi ilgilensin, devletle arasındaki 
ilişkiyi mi düzeltsin, Dersim hikayesi ile mi yüzleşsin, CHP ile ilişkilerini mi gözden 
geçirsin... Bunlar o kadar hassas, kalabalık ve karışık konular ki; bütün bunlar birarada 
gelince ortaya tabi toptancı çözümler toptancı arayışlar; tabi ki gündelik gerçekliği 
ıskalayan, gündelik gerçekliği yakalayamayan bir savruklukla karşı karşıya kaldık.  
Ben uzun vadede, en azından birkaç bölgede bu derslerin pilot uygulamasının yapılması 
gerektiğini önerdim. Bu dersleri verecek olanlar belirli bir süreye kadar, yani geçici 
olarak, doğrudan Alevi öğretisini şekillendirecek, üretecek kadrolar çıkana kadar, bilinen, 
saygın, Alevi kamuoyunun da itibar ettiği isimlerden oluşan bir öğretici konseyinin 
oluşması gerektiğini önerdim. Tabi bunlar çok zor. Mesela siz diyorsunuz ki falan 
mahallede çok iyi bir Alevi memur var, öbürü diyor ki o komünist. Yani devlet din 
konusunda belli bir dil ve uslup üretmiş ama Sünnilik üzerinden üretmiş. Mesela İlahiyat 
Fakültesi mezunu bir öğretmen aşağı yukarı makul bir din dilini kullanmayı öğrenir, bir 
üniversiteden geliyor, laiklik devlet geleneği içindeki onun yerini bilir. Ancak Alevilikte 
böyle bir şey henüz oluşmamış.  
AB meselesine gelecek olursak, orada şöyle bir sorun var; çifte bir sorun daha doğrusu: 
AB’ye katılımımız sözkonusu edildiğinde onlar Müslümanlığımız faturasını koyuyorlar 
önümüze. Her dinin kendi içinde yaşayabileceği çatışmaları bir bela gibi koyuyorlar 
önümüze. Bir yandan da kendi bilinçaltlarındaki, bugün İslamofobi denilen bir korkuyu 
canlı tutarak, bunlar gelince bizi düzenimiz bozulur diye düşünyorlar. Ama bir yandan da 
ayar çekiyorlar, şöyleki, Alevilerin sorunları var, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorunu 
çözülmemiş, din dersleri vs. gibi kendi içimizdeki farklılıklarla ilişkilerimizi bir ayar 
çekme modunda değerlendiriyorlar. Toplamda bizimle ilgili dertleri bunlar değil aslında. 
Dert, biz sizi bu müktesebatınızla bu hikayenizle aramıza katamayız... E ne yapalım? 
Siyasiler oyalama diyorlar bu sürece ama ne yapmamız gerektiği konusunda bekledikleri 
şey, bu kimlikle aramıza bariyerler koymak. Bunun çok somut örneğini Almanya örneği 
üzerinden anlatayım. Mesela Alman-İslam Konferansı diye bir organizasyon var. Proje ne 
biliyor musunuz? Orada Almanya’daki Türk Müslümanlara diyorlar ki, Müslümanlığınızı 
sürdürün ama Türkiye ile olan kültürel kodlarınızdan vazgeçin. Yani aynen Faslılar 
Cezayirliler gibi bizi bulunduğumuz yere entegre etmeye çalışıyorlar biraz daha 
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zorlasalar asimile edecekler. Seni bir sistemin içine dahil edecekler ama senin bütün 
kültürel kodlarını, aidiyet duygunu bir mahkumiyet vesilesi haline getiriyor; Türkiye ile 
bağını fantastik bir halı, bir türkü, lahmacun, otlu peynir seviyesine indirmeye çalışıyor. 
Bu insanlar mümkündür ki İslamlıklarını Türkiye özelinde yaşamak isterler. Zaten 
yaşama dahil olduklarında Türkiye’nin yetmediği yerleri görüyorlar. Türkiye’den 
getirdikleri dini argümanların orada işe yaramadığını görüyorlar ve derhal yeni 
yaşadıkları ortama göre bir din dili üretiyorlar. Ama siz onlara dinsel kültürel arka 
planınızdan vazgeçin dediğinizde orada hiç beklenmedik milliyetçi refleksler doğuyor. O 
yüzden yurtdışında yaşayan Müslümanlar Türkiye’dekiler göre daha radikaldir. 
Dindarları da milliyetçileri de daha radikaldir. Bunun sebebi de bariyerler ve 
dışlamalardır. Avrupa’nın dindarlık ile ilgili taleplerini bir taraftan Avrupa açısından 
anlaşılır buluyorum ama bunun kamusal dilinin iki yüzlü olduğuna inanıyorum.  
Türkiye’ye gelince, bu konuda çok iddialı konuşuyorum, Türkiye kendi içindeki dini 
yapıların hiçbirini bilmiyor. Devlet kendi içindeki dini yapıları başından beri kriminal 
olarak tanımlıyor. Yani Cumhuriyet kurulduğunda Kemalizm bir öğreti olarak 
yerleşmeye başladığında karşılaştığı muhalefetin dilini “dinsel” olarak tanımlamış. 31 
Mart Cumhuriyet kurulmadan önce, Şeyh Sait İsyanı, Konya Delibaş İsyanı, Menemen... 
yani bu olayların gerçek tarihsel mahiyeti ayrı bir tartışma ama “yurttaş” olarak inşa 
edildiğimizde bize öğretilen neydi; gerici akımlar. Gericilik dinsellik böyle içiçe geçmiş 
bir bağlamda algılanınca Türkiye’de din dediğimiz şey hep korunması saklanması, 
gözden düşürülmesi ya da bir şekilde takiyyeyle ilişkili sunulması gereken bir olguya 
dönüşüyor. Dolayısıyla dinle aramızdaki mesafe hiç sağlıklı bir mesafe değil. 
Dindarlığınızı açıklamak zorunda kalıyorsunuz. İnsan kendi ülkesinde tercih ettiği bir 
şeyi açıklar mı? Etnometodolojiye göre insan neyi açıklar? Farklı olanı açıklar. Rutinin 
dışına çıktığın zaman açıklarsın. Dindarlık rutinin bir parçası ama Cuma Namazı dışarı 
taştığı zaman bunu açıklamak zorunda kalınıyorsa burada bir ekstrem durum var 
demektir. Yani şunu anlatmaya çalışıyorum: Tükiye’nin devlet olarak şu anda bile din 
konusunda çok çekingen bir algı ürettiiğini, bu algının bir karşıtlığı olduğunu, dolayısıyla 
vatandaşların da devletin bu çekingenliğini farkederek kendine yeni usluplar ürettiğini; 
işte modern Müslümanlar gibi, yani görüyorsunuz İslami moda, İslami söylemler, 
gereksiz yere kendini farklı gösterme arzuları, sınıf değiştirme idealleri vs...  Yani 
Türkiye Alevilere gelene kadar kendi içinde dinin çok çeşitlenmiş unsurlarına nasıl 
davranacağı konusunda yeterince açık yürekli değil. Devlet bu konudaki tavrını 
Diyanet’in Strateji Başkanı olarak çok net görüyorum; görüyorum ki Türkiye din 
konusunda açık değil, çok muğlak. Hatta kalıcılık da yok, ne olacağı belli değil. Din hep 
böyle bir irticai enstrüman gibi yani her an her şey olabilir gibi. Bir bakıyorsunuz asker, 
ordu dinsel olgulara, temsilcilere karşı büyük bir dikkat içinde korku üretiyor; bir 
bakıyorsunuz, bugün okudum gazetede, Bingöl’de Jandarma Komutanı imamları 
topluyor, bizi sizler varettiniz diyor... Hangisi doğru veya aşırı bunu bilemiyorum ama 
Türkiye’nin din konusunda çok açık yürekli olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Bunu, 81 tane 
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ilahiyat fakültesini açmış olmasına rağmen söylüyorum, binlerce cami olmasına rağmen 
söylüyorum, Türkiye’nin en yüksek bütçeli kurumu Diyanet olmasına rağmen 
söylüyorum. Bunlar başka şeyler. Hemen her mahallede cami olması, her ilde ilahiyat 
fakültesi olması, gündelik hayatta çarşaflıların türbanlıların; görünür dinselliklerin 
gözümüze gözümüze batmasına rağmen Türkiye’de dinin hala mahsur olduğuna 
inanıyorum. Niye mahsur? Çünkü özgüveni olmayan, hep kendini açıklamak durumunda 
kalan bir şey. Kendini açıklamak durumunda kalmak bende hep tedirginlik yaratmıştır 
çünkü doğal olan bir açıklamaya muhtaç olmaz. (21:10)           
TG: Polonya’da farklı olan şey de bu zaten, tarihi gelişime baktığım zaman, ben de daha 
önce bu kadar farkında değildim, Polonya’nın taa 1500lerden başlayan işgaller itibarı ile 
Katolikk Kilisesi ve dolayısıyla da din olgusu öyle bütünleyici bir faktör olmuş ki, halkla 
o kadar içiçe ve sırtsırta bir mücadele vermiş ki... Komünist rejim sırasında bile varlığını 
korumasını da zaten buna borçlu, hatta güçlenerek çıkmasını... 
NS: Tabi Komüsnist rejimin baskısına karşı değil mi? Oradaki parçalıı kimlik 
saflaşmalarını birarada tutmuş, onları beslemiş ve onlara aidiyetlerini ve geçici durumu 
yeni bir şey olarak tanımlamış.  
TG: Tabi, tüm bu süreçler boyunca yer altında eğitim sağlanıyor, dil ve kültür muhafaza 
edilmeye çalışılıyor ve bu aşamaların hepsinde Kilise halkın yanında yer alıyor. Hem 
finansal hem de güç olarak halk kiliseyi hep yanında buluyor ve o yüzden de zaten 
kurtuluşu için, ilerlemesi için Kiliseyi olmazsa olmaz kabul ediyor. AB’ye üyelik 
sürecinde de bu böyle; Kilise AB’ye üyeliği destekliyor... 
NS: Türkiye’de durum biraz farklı ama...   
TG: Evet Türkiye’deki gibi modernlik ve dindarlık birbiri ile çelişen olgular gibi 
görülmüyor; hatta birbirine tehdit gibi... Modern Polonya aynı zamanda dindardır 
diyebiliyorlar.  
NS: Benim bununla ilgili bir hikayem var. Milli Kütüphane’de bir bildiri sunuyordum, 
konu da sanal ortamda cemaatler, bildiriyi sunduktan sonra yaşlıca bir kadın yanıma geldi 
sarıldı öptü tebrik etti. Nerdensin diye sordu, üniversitemi söyledim sonra fakülteyi sordu 
ilahiyat deyince bir arkasını dönüp gidişi var... Sonra arada benden yüz çevirmek için bir 
kaçışı var... O kadını böyle aniden yaklaştıran sonra da uzaklaştıran nedir? Nasıl bir 
eğitim, nasıl bir müfredat, nasıl bir insan üretimi var? Aynısını benim annem de farklı 
görüşteki birine yapabilir. Ama niye olsun böyle şeyler? Aynı coğrafyada yaşıyoruz 
sonuçta, herkes bir diğeri gibi inanmak yaşamak zorunda değil ki. Ama biz öyle 
anaforlardan geçtik ki insanlar bu noktalara savruldular. Şu anda hükümet Alevilerle ilgili 
yüzde yüz iyi niyetli bir adım atma niyetinde olsa bile Alevileri buna ikna etmeleri çok 
güç görünüyor. Alevilerde şöyle bir refleks var; kendilerini azınlık olarak gören her grup 
dışarıdan gelen her öneriyi bir müdahale olarak algılıyorlar. Ben bu tepkisel direnci 
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anlıyorum. Herkese de diyorum ki bir tane Alevinin Sünni olma ihtimali yok, böyle bir 
fantaziden vazgeçin. Bir tane Sünninin de alevi olma ihtimali yok. Alevilik zaten böyle 
misyoner bir tavır da sergilemiyor. Usulleri farklı iki tarafın da. Hele kendini marjinal ve 
dışlanmış hisseden biri asla safını değiştirmez. Bizde Alevilere sempati duyanlar 
genellikle sol gelenekten gelen, İslam’la olan irtibatları da yıpranmış, muhtemelen biraz 
Kürt muhalefetinden de beslenen... Olaya tehdit gözüyle bakanlar şunu görüyor, 
vatandaşlar ya da mozaik, bu coğrafyada birlikte yaşamak zorunda. Bu yüzden 
birbirlerine güvenmeleri gerekir. Bunun birbirinin hakkı olduğunun farkına varmakla 
olur. Şöyle bir şey demek gibi; “kızım ben seni ihmal etmişim ben ne biçim babayım, sen 
bunu bunu hakediyordun ama ben sana vermemişim...” Bir insan 80 yaşında Kürt 
olduğunu söylüyorsa, 80 yaşında Alevi olduğunu “itiraf” ediyorsa, bu nasıl bir ülkedir? 
Bugün ben bir Alevi olsaydım, nereden başlanması gerektiğini biliyorum. Ama Aleviler 
bir görüntü gösteriş karnaval içine giriyorlar ama bu hiçbir işe yaramıyor.  
TG: Peki nedenSünnilerde bir Alevileştirilme veya daha çok Alevilerde Sünnileştirilme 
korkusu var? Bunun endişenin hiç temeli yok mu? 
NS: O senin dediğin asimilasyon, o değil korkulan. Devletin Sünnileştirmesinden 
korkuluyor... Devlet kimi Sünnileştirmiş de, onları Sünnileştirsin? Şu anki müfredatla 
Müslüman çıkar mı sen söyle. Bu ders kitaplarını sen de okudun ben de okudum, bu ders 
kitaplarını okuyunca millet böyle heyecanlanıp... Yok böyle bir şey. Türkiye’nin insan 
yetiştirme düzeneğinin ana hedefi din değildir; din bir araçsal bir şeydir. İdeal yurttaş; 
makbul vatandaş üretecek ve o vatandaşın da dinsiz olmasını istemez. Ama o din 
gündelik hayata karışmayacak, o din böyle doğru olacak, vergisini ödeyecek, kırmızı 
ışıkta duracak böyle güvenilir bir tip olacak ama öyle hak adalet falan aramayacak. O 
yüzden böyle ortalama Müslüman vatandaş, eve kapatılmıştır. Biraz yaratıcı sorgulayıcı 
falan oldu mu ondan herkes huylanır, biz de çocuklarımızı ondan uzak dur diye 
tembihleriz.  
TG: O zaman devlet dinden tamamen elini çekip özgür bıraksa bu makbul vatandaş 
projesi çöker mi? Yani Alevilerin bir kısmının savunduğu gibi devletin din alanından 
çekilmesi mümkün mü Türkiye’de? 
NS: Çekmez ki. Çekmez, sadece onlara bırakır. Devlet güvenlikten sorumludur, inanç 
grupları arasındaki çekişmeleri dengelemek zorundadır... Laiklik onun için gereklidir 
zaten; laiklik devletin herhangi bir dini gruba arka çıkmamasıdır, devletin herhangi bir 
söylemini herhangi bir inanca dayandırmamasıdır. Burada hiçbir problem yok ama şöyle 
bir şey var; devlet insanların göğsünü gere gere inançlarını açıklamalarına izin 
vermelidir, sadece izin vermek de değil; rahatlatmalı. İnsanlar bu işin şakasını 
yapabilmeli. Ben niye bir Aleviyle dalga geçemiyorum, niye karşılıklı dikkat ediyoruz 
ağzımızdan çıkana? Amerikan filmlerinde bakın kendi inançlarıyla ne güzel dalga 
geçiyorlar.  
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TG: Ahmet Kuru’nun dediği pasif sekülerlik ortamında dini çoğulculuk da daha rahat 
yaşanıyor, ortam rahat olunca dindarlık da yükseliyor gibi bir bağıntı var. Türkiye için de 
Fransız laikliğindense bunun daha uygun olduğunu öne sürmesinin de en önemli 
nedenlerinden biri bu; Türkiye’de çok değişik dini unsurlar var çünkü. Mesela Polonya 
gibi homojen bir yapı değil tabi. Ortamı rahatlatmak için pasif sekülerliğe geçiş yapmak 
gerektiğini düşünüyor. Yani Türkiye’de dini azınlık olarak tanımlananlar belki görece 
biraz daha rahatlar ama İslam içindeki mezhepler, özellikle Alevilik... 
NS: Aleviler azınlık olarak tanımlanmıyor. Niye tanımlanmıyor? Cumhuriyet 
kurulduğunda zaten Aleviler bir topluluk olarak sistemin içinde bir odak veya kütle 
olarak tanımlanmadılar. 60’lı yıllardan itibaren kendini yavaş yavaş ortaya koyan ve 
80’lerde dünya ölçeğindeki siyasal dönüşümlerden de etkilenen bir şey; insanlar geri 
dönüyorlar; “evi yeniden açıyorlar.” 12 Eylül travması, Marksizmin çöküşü, liberalizmin 
bireyselleştirmesi... Evi açınca ortalığı havalandırıyorlar, topluyorlar ve kendi 
kimlikleriyle ilgili geniş bir repertuar çıkıyor. Aleviler bunu yapıyor. Ama Türkiye’de 
Müslümanlar da bunu yapıyor şu anda, emin olun. Türkiye Müslümanlığı da devletten 
bağımsız kendi dilini, kaynaklarıyla buluşmuş bir İslamı nasıl üreteceğinin hesabını 
yapıyor. O yüzden uzunca bir süre 12 Eylül’ü boykot eden bir kiltle vardı, ben onu da 
yazdım çalışmalarımda. Burada devleti milliyetçi dille, devlete özünde karşı olmayan 
ama devletin de her şeyden elini eteğini çekmesini isteyen bir dindarlık yetişiyor şu anda. 
Devleti kaldıralım, dekanı da rektörü de kaldıralım... Böyle bir şey olmaz. Ama şu olur, 
devlet ne yapacağına vatandaşın rızasıyla karar verir. Şu anda Türkiye’de devlet otoriter; 
kendi yerini, vatandaşın yerini belirler mantığı ağır geliyor. Niye? Dünyayı farkediyoruz 
çünkü, kendimizle yüzleşiyoruz. Devlet de bunu anlıyor ama devlet bu dönüşümünü 
bizim kadar kolay yapamaz. Devletin çünkü aygıtları, kurumları, gelenekleri var. 
Bunların yavaş yavaş yumuşatılması lazım. Aynı devlet yapısını koruyan bir de otoriter 
ulema düzeni var. Bu toplumda otoriteriyenliğe karşı olan gizli bir maya da var, çok gün 
yüzüne çıkmamış... Şimdi Diyanet’te de anlıyorum. Ben kendi kurumumda da 
otoriteriyenlikten yana olan insanların da hiç de az olmadığını da görebiliyorum. Ama 
zamanla dönüşecek bunlar, nasıl dönüşeceğini de biliyorum. Bunların suçu değil ki bu, 
devlet bir insan tipi oluşturuyor, bu insanın kendi uykusundan uyanması bu kadar kolay 
mı? 
TG: Sizce bu yeni eğitim sistemi, bahsettiğiniz insan tipi üzerinde bir etki yaratacak mı? 
Yeni Anayasa ile zorunlu din derslerinin kaldırılması gibi bir beklenti vardı, açıkçası ben 
de bunu bekliyordum; hem AB süreci hem yeni Anayasa süreci bu derslerin zorunlu 
statüsünün değişmesini sağlayacak diye düşünüyordum... 
NS: Şimdi zorunlu din derslerine geldiğiniz zaman, bugün bu dersler toplumun yüzde 
90’lık bir kesimi tarafından desteklenen bir şey. Benim diyor oğlum/kızım dinini imanını 
okulda öğrensin. Hatta bu halk benim söylediğim şekli de kabul etmez. Sorsan, peki 
zorunlu mu isteğe bağlı mı olsun diye; zorunlu diyecekler. Böyle Müslüman bir ülkede 
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dini çekingen bir müfredatla sunmak bile bir kimlik kaybı olarak algılanır. Burada sadece 
dini iyi öğrenmek de değil, bu coğrafyada yaşamaktan dolayı bir özgüven de oluşturur. 
Peki bu ders verilsin ama nasıl verilsin? Bu ders belirli bir otoriteye bağlı yurttaşlar 
yetiştirmek yerine, o yurttaşlığı dinden argümanlarla meşrulaştırmak yerine Allah katında 
iyi bir dinin nasıl olması gerektiğini öğret. Buna doğru bir eğilim, siyasetten de ufak tefek 
destekler alarak ilerliyor. Burada gerçekten kaçak olan Aleviler; bir Alevi kültür olarak 
şifahi gelenek içinde biçimlenmiş formunu nasıl düzeltecek? Bu mesela Sünniler için de 
yer yer geçerlidir, köy yerinde gelenekle görenekle öğrenmiş dinini, bir yerde seküler 
bilgilerle karşılaşınca ne olacak? İnançların bir bölümü hasar görüyor, sonra yeniden 
yapılanıyor. Hepimiz öyle bir yeniden yapılanmanın sonucuyuz. Alevi daha fazlasını 
yaşıyor çünkü Alevinin bir de öğretisel olarak yüzyılları aşan bir dışlanmışlığı var. Şimdi 
bir yandan o  ben de insanım diyor, bir yandan namusunu kanıtlamak zorunda kalıyor; 
ben değil ama o hep kanıtlamak zorunda kalıyor çünkü onu Kızılbaş diye bir cendereye 
sokmuşlar. Bu tabi ki hiçbir şekilde kabul edilemez. Biz de buna katkıda bulunuyoruz. 
Geçen sene Başkan Bey Cemevi’ne giderek, orada yemek yemesinin sembolik anlamları 
var. Yani diyor ki, “ben Diyanet İşleri Başkanı olarak burada canlarla bu lokmayı 
yiyorsam, sen de yiyebilirsin buna dinsel bir şey uydurma; bu dinsel bir şeyden 
kaynaklanmıyor.” Örfi ve kültürel... Bunlar nasıl değişecek? Sorgulayarak... Benim 
çevremde insanlar, akrabalarım bile soruyor; sen gerçekten Alevilerin yemeğini yiyor 
musun diye... Yiyorum diyorum, şaşırıyorlar. Algı bu hala çünkü. Ama bunlar 
düzelecek... 
TG: Nasıl düzelecek peki? Devlet eliyle mi? Diyanet mi çözecek? 
NS: Devlet dediğin burada Diyanet zaten. Türkiye gelenek olarak pek çok şeyi devlete 
bırakmış zaten. Şimdi durup dururken devletten bağımsız, devleti dışında bırakan bir şey 
yapamazsın. Ama bu müfredatla oynayacak olan devlettir. Ama sen ben hepimiz bir 
şeyler yapıp bu vesayet rejimi ile oynayarak çok iyi şeyler yapabiliriz. Müfredata 
Aleviliği koyarak, ders hocası Alevilerden de söz ederek...  
TG: Biraz önce seçmeli Alevilik dersinden, bunu verecek hocanın yetişmesinden 
bahsettiniz. Somut adımlar atıldı mı bu konuda? 
NS: Bak şimdi ben sana bir şey söyleyeyim; ben bugünkü Alevi örgütleriyle, o eski 
Marxist gelenekten gelen algılarla, devleti tamamen yok sayma arzusuyla... Tek tek 
tanıdıklarında seviyorlar; beni seviyorlar mesela, ben de onları seviyorum hiç politik bir 
tarafı yok. Ama kurumsal konuştuğumda; ki aynı şeyi söylüyorum, var bunda bir hinlik 
diye dinliyorlar. Bence burada devletin görevi şu; ayıbı kim ürettiyse o örtecek. Devlete 
ne düşüyorsa onu yapacak. Devlet de bunu diyanet aracılığıyla yapacak tabi. Aleviler de 
biraz süreci takip edip anlamaya çalışacaklar. İnanın birkaç ay sonra Türkiye’nin tek 
meselesi Alevilik olacak. Birkaç aydan bahsediyorum; birkaç yıl değil. Ama ben konuyla 
ilgilenmiyorum, onu da söyleyeyim tekrar. Bunu da bilmenizde yarar var; bu devlet 
bakanlığı himayesinde o süreç başlatıldı. Sürecin sınırları raporun tamamlanmasıyla 
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bitecekti. O rapor tamamlandı, benim görevim bitti. Benden sonra, raporun beklentilerine 
uygun olarak birkaç adım atıldı: Sivas’taki Madımak Otel müze yapıldı, sembolikti o. 
Sonra derslere Alevilik müfredata girdi. Dedelerin statüsüyle ilgili hukuk komisyonu 
Devrim Kanunları’na ters geldiği için işin içinden çıkamadı; yani Dedelere statü 
verilemiyor ama bunun Alevi olmalarıyla ilgisi yok. Mesela ben olsam, Dede soylu 
olanları İlahiyat’ta okuturum ya da Türkiye’de Dede soyluları eğitmek üzere bir İlahiyat 
açarım. Kamuya yaklaştırırım, kamuoyu oluştururum resmi statü veririm. Mesela devlet 
ne yaptı, doğudaki Kürt meleleri aldı imam yaptı aslında onlar farklı geleneklerden 
geldiler, devletin standart müfredatından geçerek gelmediler ama devlet onlar onlara bu 
kendinde varolan statüyü verdi. Dedelerin durumu ama Devrim Kanunları’yla ilgili... 
Zaten Aleviler de Dedelere resmi statü verilmesine çok meraklı değiller, Dedelerin bir 
güç kazanmasını istemiyorlar. Peki ne olacak? Manevi bir erk olmadan, yani toplumun 
çoğunluğunun kendini teslim ettiği manevi bir erk olmazsa iş rant savaşlarına dönüyor. 
Yani yeni dönemde yeniden şekillenecek bir Alevilik varsa, bunun yeni bir sınıfı ve 
hiyerarşisi, hizmet sınıfı olmalı. Buna onlar kafa yoracaklar, hiç yormuyorlar ama. Alevi 
derneklerine git bak, yardıma ihtiyacı olana yardım, çocuklara yurt... Mahalleyi toplama, 
mahallenin kaymamasını sağlama. Ancak işin manevi tarafı eksik kalıyor.  
TG: Siz neden artık sürecin içinde yer almıyorsunuz? İstemediğiniz için mi, görevinizi 
tamamladığınız için mi? 
NS: Ben o görevi tamamladım, sonra üniversiteye döndüm; Gazi İletişim’deydim ben. 
Sonra beni buraya atadılar. Benim açımdan son derece güzel oldu. Diyanet bana da 
dışardan bakınca ürkütücü, sır dolu bir kurum gibi görünüyordu. Öyle değil. Ben burada 
da Diyanet’in söylemleri, kamuoyu önündeki dili, hizmet alanları, hizmet planlamaları... 
bunlara bakıyorum. 
TG: Aslında Alevi Çalıştaylarında moderatörlük yapmış ve Aleviler ile yakın ilişkiler 
içinde olan sizin gibi birisinin Diyanet’te böyle bir göreve getirilmesi manidar değil mi? 
Aleviler de bundan memnuniyet duyuyorlar mı bilmiyorum tabi ama... 
NS: Duyuyorlar. Ben Alevi dostlarımı deşifre etmek ve incitmek istemem. Hepsi buraya 
geliyor, görüşüyoruz. Ama onlarda kamu dili var, kamu dilinde bunları ifade etmiyorlar.  
TG: éDiyanet kaldırılsın” en başta gelen Alevi taleplerinden biri... 
NS: O başka bir şey, olmaz o. 
TG: Peki o olmuyorsa, bahsi geçen diğer seçenek yani Diyanet’in içinde Alevilerle ilgili 
bir yapılanma söz konusu olabilir mi? Mesela Alevilikle ilgili ders verecek hocalar 
yetişecekse, bu Diyanet’in kontrolünde mi olacak? 
NS: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı dediğimiz kategori, bir fikir veya düşünce beyan etmek gibi 
yani kamu dili üretecek insan sayısı yüzü geçmez. Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu önemlidir, 
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bunlar belirler. Herhangi bir imam görüş belirtmez, müftü bir kanaatte bulunmaz. 
Sorarsın işte şöyle yaparsam orucum bozulur mu, namaz böyle mi kılınır vs... 
TG: Ama devlet politikası şekillendirmekte söz sahibi değiller tabi. 
NS: Bu konu ile ilgili devlet politikasının şekillendiği yer burasıdır. Burada da kim var, 
Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu bir, başkan ve üç tane başkan yardımcısı, 28 tane de üye var, 7 
tane genel müdür var; toplamda 40 kişidir. Bunlar da kendi tabanlarından gelen 
refleksleri gözetir, kamuoyunun farklı donelerini dikkate alır, Türkiye’nin siyaysal 
aritmetiğini dikkate alır, devletin yapısal özelliklerini dikkate alır... Sonuçta DİB devlete 
rağmen bir organizasyon değil. Devlet örgütünün belki de en önemli paydaşlarından... 
“Ara Dönem Din Politikaları” kitabım var okudunuz mu? 
TG: Hayır okumadım, kitabı biliyorum ama bulamadım açıkçası. 
NS: Bende de kalmamış. Orada anlatıyorum, hep ideolojik boşluktan oluyor. Bir girdap 
var, o girdap milleti savurmasın... Aslında başından beri doğal olarak olması gereken şeyi 
başka bir amaçla kullandılar. Çok kötü bir şey. Bunlar normal bir süreçte olsaydı; 
olmadığı için İnönü dönemi farklı, Menderes rahatlama, Demirel gevşeme, Erbakan 
radikalleşme... Halbuki bunların hiçbirine gerek yok, dinin olgusal düzeyde bir dehşet 
kanalı gibi yansıtılması iddiaları, bununla ilgili tasarruflarından kaynaklanıyor.  
TG: Bugünkü Türkiye’de Diyanet neden gerekli sizce? DİB’nin din-devet işlerinin 
düzenlenmesinde bugünkü rolu nedir? 
NS: Çok önemli bir soru. Bir kere yasa, ibadethaneleri yönetme görevi veriyor. Bir sürü 
cami var, bu camilerin başında namazı kıldıracak ibadetleri yönetecek birine ihtiyaç var. 
Bunun için bir kere organizasyon gerekiyor, bir tarafı bu. Sonra, toplumun din konusunda 
soruları var. Bu soruların vatandaşlar arasında farklılıklara ve manipülasyonlara izin 
vermeyecek şekilde bir netliğe kavuşması gerekir. Din dediğin şeyde bir otoriteye 
ihtiyacın oluyor ama Türkiye’deki DİB’nin otoritesi manevi bir yetki değil, ruhani bir 
lider yok. Vatikan benzeri bir yapılanma yok. Bir Humeyni değil. Tanrı’dan gücünü alan 
bir lider yok, gayet somut bizim gibi biri. Cumhuriyetin hiçbir döneminde Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanı’nın böyle bir talebi de olmamıştır. Halk bu ayrımları çok bilmez, o kültüründen 
gelen bir alışkanlıkla saygı duyar. Türkiye’de dini hayat son derece dinamiktir. Kamuda 
başörtüsü, helal et tartışmaları, kürtaj...  
Din benim hayatımda da ailemin hayatında da oldukça belirleyici. Ben tercihlerimi dine 
göre yapıyorum. Ben bu ilişkiyi nasıl kuracağım? Protestan mı kuracağım, bireysel? 
Yoksa birilerine güvenip onların sözlerine mi kulak vereceğim? Türk toplumu Hanefi 
olduğu için daha çok ilmihal üzerine gidiyor ve kafa karışıklığını giderecek bir referansa 
ihtiyaç duyuyor. Diyanet bu organizasyonu gerçekleştiriyor. Bunun dışında mesela 
Anayasal bir kuruluş olması, din eksenli her şeyi Diyanet’e sormasını gerektiriyor ister 
Müslüman olsun, ister Hristiyan, Musevi... Çünkü Anayasa size böyle bir sorumluluk 
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yükler; Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ile ilgili bir soru da size gelir, Cemevleriyle ilgili 
ibadethane midir değil midir sorusu da bize geliyor. Biz bu sorulardan rahatsızız. Çünkü 
biz İslam içinde Müslümanların sorunlarını yoğun bir şekilde karşılamak istiyoruz ama 
Cumhuriyet kurulurken tanımlama böyle geniş tutulmuş. Daha bu sabah bana bir şey 
geldi; Türkiye’deki tüm kiliselerin adresleri. Niye bana geliyor, çünkü onların elektrik 
paralarını da biz ödüyoruz. Aleviler o yüzden bazen süreci bilmeden konuşuyorlar. Biz 
Türkiye’de İçişleri Bakanlığı tarafından kaydedilmiş tüm kiliselerin, talep ederlerse 
elektiriğini ödüyoruz. Niye ödüyoruz; ibadethane oldukları için. Tanımlanmış tüm 
ibadethaneler için bu geçerli; kilise, havra, manastır, cami ve mescit. Cemevleri 
ibadethane olarak tescil edimemiş çünkü siyasi; veya İslami gelenekten gelenler 
korkuyorlar bölünmeye yol açacak diye. O yüzden bir Cemevi’nden böyle bir talep 
geldiğinde, Cemevi ibadethane olarak tanımlanmadığı için bu yardımı yapamayız diye 
yazıyoruz. Devlet tanısın, Diyanet zaten gereğini yapar.  
TG: Yeni Anayasa sürecinde Diyanet’in yeniden tanımlanması ve yapılandırılması gibi 
bir ihtimal var mı sizce? 
NS: Hiç sanmıyorum. 
TG: Yeniden örgütlenmeyle Alevilerin Diyanet’te temsil edilmesi formülü?   
NS: Yok, Aleviler bir vatandaş kitlesi olarak yok ki. Dediğim gibi Lozan’ın tanımladığı 
azınlıklar var, Alevilik Müslümanlığın içinde bir kategori. Aleviler diyorlar ki biz sizden 
farklıyız, farklı geleneğimiz var... Söylüyorlar da, bu henüz kamuoyu önünde yarattığı 
güç kadar devlet karşısında etki yaratmadı. Bir gün sabah bir kalkarız, Başbakan 
açıklama yapar; ben buna açığım, Cemevleri ibadethanedir der. Siyasette bunlar olur. O 
zaman işler değişir. Onun için şimdi büyğk konuşmanın, olmaz demenin bir anlamı yok.  
TG: Anlıyorum. Son iki sorum var, çok vaktinizi aldım ama... AB entegrasyon sürecinde 
birincisi, din-devlet ilişkileri; ikincisi de diyanetin konumu ve din dersleri nasıl etkilenir 
sizce? Böyle direkt bir etki var mı sizin gözlemlediğiniz ya da beklediğiniz?  
NS: Sürekli geliyorlar, müzakere heyetleri Ankara’ya geldiklerinde buraya da geliyorlar. 
Ben Müzakere Heyeti Koordinatörüyken, koordinatör olarak görüştüler benimle en az üç 
kere. Genellikle müfettiş edasıyla geliyorlar, yani neler yapıyorsunuz Diyanet olarak 
diye... Bir algı saptaması, bir gözlem yapıp gidiyorlar. Mesela ya Fener Rum Patrikhanesi 
ya Alevilerin sorunları... Müslümanların başörtüsü sorunu, üniversitlerde dini hayata 
yönelik çekinceler, militarizm ve din; bunları sormuyorlar. Türkiye Müslümanlarının 
sorunlarıyla Mazlum-Der ilgileniyor sadece (gülüşmeler). 
TG: AB’nin standart bir din-devlet ilişkisi normu olmadığı için, böyle bir beklenti de 
olamaz. O yüzden de azınlık hakları bağlamında bakıyorlar dini özgürlüklere.  
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NS: Bu da anlaşılabilir bir şey, baktıkları yerden böyle görünüyor. Kimse Türkiye’de 
Müslümanların sorunu ne demiyor, Alevilerin durumu azınlıkların durumu... 
Amerika’nın hazırladığı raporlarda da aynı şey. Ama bizi alacaklar. Ben hiç karamsar 
değilim. Türkiye’yi almaları Türk halkı için de iyi olacak.  
TG: Çok vaktinizi aldım. Verdiğiniz tüm bilgiler ve görüşlerinizi paylaştığınız için çok 
teşekkür ederim. 
NS: Faydalı bir görüşme oldu, ben de teşekkür ederim. 
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Mehmet Aydın: 1940larda Türkiye’de çok ciddi bir boşluk ortaya çıktı. Benim tabirimle 
mollaların ortasında kaldı molla değil de mele. Güneydoğu yani. Oralara pek uzanılmadı, 
dolayısıyla namaz kıldıran işte zorunlu olan şeyleri yapabilecek olan insanlar oralardan 
çıktı.Tam olarak 1949’da İlahiyat Fakültesi kuruldu ama o İlahiyat Fakültesi de aslında 
bir Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi olarak kuruldu. Çok da İlahiyat Fakültesi gibi 
değildi, Kuran-ı Kerim dersi yoktu herhalde var mıydı?  
Nihal Aydın: Vardı da işte hoca yoktu 
MA: Hayır hatırlamıyorum yani ben yazılı olarak var mıydı? Programda var mıydı yani? 
NA: Vardı 
MA: Siz özel olarak çalıştınız, siz özel olarak çalıştınız da Yaşar Hoca’yla falan. Yani 
ilahiyat fakültesi batıdaki anlamda ilahiyat fakültesi değil. Batıdaki ilahiyat fakültesi ilk 
iki senesinde epeyce felsefe ağırlıklıdır sonrasında teolojidir çünkü Papa yetiştiriyor, 
formasyonu belli o formasyonu vermek zorunda. Bizde İlahiyat Fakültesinde artist de 
çıkar, imam da çıkar vaiz de çıkar hepsi çıkar. Belki bu kamu oyu yoklamalarının 
başındaki insanlar şirketleri kuranlar imam hatip mezunudur çoğu, hepsi din dersi almış 
insanlar.. Neyse konunuz tabi ne kadar buralara gidecek ama Avrupa Birliği bağlamında 
çok fazla şey çıkmaz, yani şu anlamda çok fazla bir şey çıkmaz: genelde görünen ve 
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görünmeyen tarafına bakarsanız din konusu ayrı bir konudur ama din eğitimi konusu çok 
farklı bir konudur. Din konusu deyince orada söylenenlerden çok fazla bir şey çıkmıyor 
ama yazılanlar var tabi. Türkiye’nin Müslüman olması ister istemez bir konuyu akla 
getiriyor; ona bazen İslam demezler, bazen kültür derler. “Euphemism” kelimesini dudun 
mu? 
TG: Hayır 
MA: “Euphemism”, yani bir şeyi, daha yumuşak daha parlak bir şekilde söylemek. 
Mesela kültürle ilgili argümanların büyük kısmı dinle ilgili ama din demiyorlar çünkü 
Avrupa din demeyecek kadar laiktir. O yüzden din demezler kültür derler, aslında kültürü 
biraz kazarsan din çıkıyor ortaya. Yoksa öbür türlü bu üniversitenin eğitim öğretim 
kültürü çok farklı değil orada da öğrenciler böyle burada da öğrenciler böyle ama işte 
birkaç kişi başını örtüyor bu onların dikkatini çekiyor. Burada kaç kişi başını örtüyor, 
cumaya gidiyor bu onların dikkatini çekiyor daha çok o tip şeyler yani bir yönüyle nasıl 
derler toplanır bilmiyorum ama her halükarda halihazırdaki durumu da ben bilmiyorum 
mesela o seçimlik dersleri de bildiğim kadarıyla Peygamberin hayatı var birde Kuranı 
Kerim var başka dinle ilgili bir şey var mı mesela Alevilik ile ilgili seçimlik dersler var 
mı ben bilmiyorum.  
TG: Yok 
MA: Mesela o şikayet konusu oldu mu? Neden bir Alevi kültürü dersi seçimlik ders 
konusu olmasın diye itiraz eden oldu mu? Bu Avrupa Birliği ile ilgili konu daha farklı 
yani orada bir bakıma Türkiye o günün şartlarında yani bu din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi 
dersi; din dersi değildir, onu söyleyeyim. Din dersi dediğin zaman o zorunlu olmaz. 
Zorunlu olmasın diye zaten din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi adı kondu ona . Yani Orada kasıt 
şu, bir din var adı İslam onun inanç ilkeleri şunlardır, pratik ilkeleri şunlardır şeklinde 
ders olsun diye bir de ahlak bilgisi şunlar bu toplumda bu kültürde bu inançta iyi sayılır 
bunlar kötü sayılır bilmem ne. Zorunlu din eğitimi yani eğitmek ayrıdır öğretmek ayrıdır 
“teaching is not education”.  
NA: Yani sadece İslam değil. Hıristiyanlık var Yahudilik var.  
MA: Tabi Hıristiyanlık var.  
NA: Diğer dinler var.  
MA: Tarikatlar var. Tarikatlar yok da şeyler var yanlış aklıma kalmadıysa Bektaşilik, 
Kadirilik, Mevlevilik gibi tarikatların da olması lazım. Yani orada Alevilik acaba niye 
girmedi. O kitapları… 
NA: Son senelerde Alevilik de programlarda olacaktı diyorlardı.  
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MA: Kondu, kondu sonra o işin Avrupa Birliği ile ilgili kısmı mahkemeye gitti. 
İstanbul’da oturan Alevi velisi mahkemeye gitti mahkemeye zorunlu din dersidir benim 
inancımla ilgili bir şey yok zaten içinde öğretilmiyor dedi, mahkeme onun lehine karar 
verdi. Aleyhine değil lehinde karar verdi. Ama eminim mahkemeye savunma giderken 
bunun din eğitimi olmadığını da söylemiştir. Dine eğitimi değil bu din öğretimidir. Ama 
o alevi vatandaşı için eminim çok iyi bir dosya hazırlamaları lazım bunun adı hukuki 
olarak din öğretimi olsa da din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi olsa da, uygumla da bunun din 
eğitimi olduğunu o dosyaya mutlaka koymuşlardır. Avrupa Birliği, yani Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Mahkemesi başka türlü karar almaz ve onlar ikna olmuşlardır. Ve doğrusunu 
istersen, biraz tuhaf olacak ama bu eğitim dersi gibi oldu. Yani çok da öğretim olarak 
kalmadı, değil mi? 
NA: Çok teferruata da girmedik. 
MA: Hayır teferruatta değil önemli olan, eğitimde o çocuğun dindar olma arzusu vardı 
öğretmenin en azından niyetinde yani mutlaka...  
NA: Ama konuları öğretiyor. Yahudiliği de öğretiyor.  
MA: Yok 
TG: Müfredatla ilgili dediğimiz çok doğru, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesine giden 
Zengin davasında özellikle bütün ders kitaplarının yani din dersinin okutulduğu din 
kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersi kitaplarının içeriği inceleyip gönderiyor ve gerçekten diğer 
inançlarla ilgili “3 kitaplı din bunlar bunlardır” bu kadar bilgi veriliyor. Onun dışında 
Alevilik Bektaşilik bunlarla ilgili hiç bilgi verilmiyor yani verilen bilgiler de çok kısıtlı 
ve o grupların isteğini yansıtmıyor. 
NA: Böyleydi ama şimdi kondu. 
MA: Tamam. O zaten mahkemeye gittiği zaman hayır hayır ilk konduğu mahkemeye gitti 
o zaten. Gideni de var. Hüseyin Çelik’in Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nda var ama zaten o 
mahkeme öyle karar vermek durumunda bırakıyor seni. Çünkü zaten o dersi koymayı 
arzu edenlerin de o dersin bir eğitim dersi olacağından şüphe ettiklerini zannetmiyorum. 
Yani Evren Paşa ve arkadaşlarını kastediyorum. Yani o çünkü bir İslam ülkesinde 
Müslüman olan hatta Müslüman değil dindar olan, çünkü yüzde doksanı dindardır Din 
Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi öğretmenlerinin, dindar olanların zaten onu bir din dersi olarak 
vermemeleri ne ölçüde mümkün ben de bilmiyorum açıkçası yani büyük ihtimalle o zaten 
bir eğitim dersi olacaktı, eğitim dersi oldu ama burada şu şey önemli; kitabı yazanlar 
Talim Terbiye Kurulu’nun verdiği programa göre kitap yazdılar yani onlar kendi oturup 
da Lise 1 için kitap şu olur demediler. Talim Terbiye, Orta 1-2-3 lise sona kadar o 
kitaplar zaten program olarak tescil edilmişti, öyle geldi ve o kitapları bulabilirseniz o 
kitaplara sempati ile bakmak lazım çünkü o kitaplar 1 ay, 1.5 ay gibi kısa bir süre içinde 
hazırlandı. Yani müderrislerin çok fazla vakti yoktu, onlara o kadar zaman verildi.  
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TG: Bu söylediğiniz hangi tarihte?  
MA: Şey ilk dersin başladığı tarih işte, 82 midir? 
NA: 83’ten sonra. 
MA: Evren Paşa zamanında. Dolayısıyla orada mesela benim birkaç şeye itirazım vardı 
bunlardan bir tanesi mesela, söyledim ben Talim Terbiye’ye söyledim, düzeltin dedim. 
Mesela diyor ki “peygamberimizin özellikleri” bunu kullandığın zaman o zaten kültür 
dersi olmaktan çıkar. S.A.V. Hz. Muhammed diyebilirsiniz; Hz. Muhammed’in 
özellikleri. Peygamberimizin özellikleri dediğin zaman... Sen şey hatırlıyor musun? Bana 
bir gayrimüslim vatandaşın İstanbul’da gelip de, hocam dedi çocuk yazılı sınava giriyor 
“dinimizin insana vereceği önem” diye soru var. Baba demiş, “dinimiz derken ben bizim 
dinden çıkar mıyım” demiş (gülüşmeler). Ben bunu arkadaşlara söyledim, dedim ki bakın 
bunu yanlış yapıyorsunuz; İslam dini diyin dedim. İslam dinin özellikleri diyin o zaman 
kimse itiraz etmez dedim ama oradaki hep “dinimizin” “mukaddes kitabımızın” zaten o 
şekildeki tabirler eğitimin konusudur yalın halde öğretimin konusu değil. İkinci şey şu 
zaten yetişen öğretmenler eğitimci olarak yetişmişlerdi o anlamda bu dersi okutun 
hocalara diyenler başta zaten eğitimciydiler. Eğitimden onların öğretimi ayırmaları zaten 
yapıları icabı zihinsel yapıları icabı mümkün değil. Ve topu topu ne kadar kurs aldınız 
Mehmet Aydın’dan bir hafta mıydı? 
NA: 15 gün... Yok, bir hafta. 
MA: Yani bir haftada ben anlatım eğitimle öğretimin farkını. Yani şöyle yapacaksınız 
böyle yapacaksınız dedim ama...  
NA: Farkı öğrenmek için hocalardan ders aldık, fakülte hocalarından ders aldık.  
MA: O bir hafta dolayısıyla hocası sayılırım. (gülüşmeler) O hocalardan bir tanesi de 
bendim. Bu uzun hikaye. Her ne kadarını toplarsanız toplayamazsınız bilemem ama güzel 
bir çalışma olabilir ama zannediyorum bir sürü yazıldı çizildi bu… 
TG: Bu eksende Avrupa Birliği değil yalnızca tabi, Avrupalılaşma ekseninde AİHM 
kararları da var. Yani Avrupalılaşma genel bir olgu olarak aldığımız zaman bunun 
etkisini bu konu üzerinde değerlendiren çalışmalar var tabi gerek Recep Kaymakcan’ın 
çalışmaları var Talip Küçükcan’ın çalışmaları var falan ama hem karşılaştırma...  
MA: Talip Küçükcan’ın doktora tezimi ? 
TG: Yok ama kitapları var. Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinde din devlet ilişkileri ile ilgili 
olarak... 
MA: Din devlet ilişkisi çok zaten...  
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TG: Din devlet ilişkisi ben zaten öyle çıktım ama din devlet ilişkisini bir de Avrupa 
Birliği bağlamında incelemek o benim master tezim ile biraz alakalıydı, fakat Zaten yani 
sekülerlik, din devlet ilişkisi ile ilgili Avrupa Birliği bir şey demiyor, diyemez de yani 
bütün ülkelerin zaten Avrupa Birliği üyesi, hepsi farklı Türkiye’den de böyle bir 
beklentisi olamaz ama dini özgürlükler çerçevesinde işte dine, dini azınlıklar dini 
özgürlükler çerçevesinde bir takım eleştiriler ve beklentilerde ancak bulunabiliyorlar. 
Zaten din derslerini de seçmemin sebebi oydu. Mesela kürtajı niye seçmiyorsun diyenler 
oldu ama o Türkiye’de bir dönem tartışıldı ama çok tartışılan bir konu değildi en azından 
1.5 yıl önce ben seçtiğimde. Onun için din dersleri özeline indirdim ve bunu sekülerlik 
laiklik ekseni üzerinde değil de dini özgürlükler işte azınlıkların durumu ekseninde 
incelemeye çalışıyorum. Polonya’da da durum dışarıdan bakıldığı zaman çok Katolik bir 
ülke olmakla birlikte din dersleri seçmeli ve “isteyen alır” şeklinde düzenlenmiş, isteyen 
almaz değil de isteyen alır şeklinde ve ahlak dersleri de o şekilde. Karnede de din ve 
ahlak dersleri bir arada. Din dersi aynen din eğitimi şeklinde uygulanıyor, birlikte 
kiliseye gidiyorlar falan ama din dersini almak istemediği zaman öğrenci, yerine ahlak 
dersini aldığı zaman karnede not ikisi bir arada; din veya ahlak, hangisini aldığı belli 
olmuyor. Dolayısıyla dışlanmaya falan sebep olmuyor. Müslüman öğrencilerin durumu 
da orada camiye gidip din dersi alıp notunu alıp okula gelip notunu saydırıyorlar. Yani 
çok rahat bir ortamda, dinlerini öğreniyorlar çocuklar hem Müslüman hem Hıristiyan 
çocuklar çok da çatışmalı bir durum değil. Tabi Türkiye bu kadar homojen bir toplum 
değil. Türkiye’de Alevilerin varlığı özellikle nüfus olarak çok olduklarından, yani 
Polonya’daki Müslümanlar çok az. Bu anlamda çok karşılaştırılabilir değil ama 
Türkiye’de de bu din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersini kültür dersi olmaktan çıkartıp din 
eğitimi dersi yapıp seçmeli yapmak veya zorunlu olacaksa...  
MA: Ama işte bunların arkasında bir sürü kısa zamanda saymak gerekirse, bunların 
arkasında başka türlü şeyler var. Başka sıkıntılar var; o sıkıntı da şu: Türkiye’de zorluklar 
sadece devlet sorunu değil aynı zamanda insan sorunu var Türkiye’de. Yani 
düşünebiliyor musunuz, çocukların seçmeli din dersi almaları için; eğer Konya’ya 
giderseniz problem yok neredeyse bütün çocuklar seçiyorlar. Ama Ankara’ya gelirseniz 
çocuğun bazı okullar bazı liselerde çocuğun onu almaması için her türlü tuzağı 
hazırlarlardı. Her türlü tedbiri alırlardı. Yani çocuğa diyeceksin veline git, orta birdeki 
çocuk nasıl velisine gitsin desin ben din dersi alayım mı almayayım mı? Dolayısıyla bu 
çocuk bu dersi almasın, çocuğumun din dersi almasını istemiyorum şeklinde bir dilekçe 
değil veya ne yapıyor, dersler başlıyor bir hafta geçiyor on gün geçiyor, nice aile karne 
geliyor eline baba bakıyor ki karnede din dersinin karşısı boş... Ya yavrum diyor niye bu 
dersin boş, bilmiyorum diyor çocuk. Yani her sınıfta öğretmen diyecek ki, din dersini 
alacaksanız velinizden yazı getirmeniz lazım. Bu sınıflarda söylenmiyor çünkü o dersin 
alınması istenmiyor. Yani Türkiye 1980’lerden önce çok sık olarak öğretmenler o dersi 
öyle bir saate koyuyor ki... 
NA: Program dışı kalıyor. 
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MA: Saat 12’yle 1 arası. Çocuğun top oynayacağı, oyun oynayacağı, yemek yiyeceği 
bahçeye koşacağı saate koyuyorlar ki sıkıntı olsun. Sınıf vermiyor laboratuar veriyor, on 
dakika sonra öğretmen gelip diyor ki burada deney yapılacak. Yani o öğretmenler o kadar 
çekti ki... O öğretmenlere o kadar çektirdiler ki... Onun da hikayesini yazmak lazım. 
Türkiye’de niye bazı şeyleri böyle birden bire yapıyor, çünkü bakarsanız onun arkasında 
yapılan şeyin bir olumsuz şeyi varsa öbür tarafta yapılan şey 10 kat daha olumsuz. Yani 
Türkiye’deki durum da bu idi. Yoksa şey de değil mesela bu Türk-İslam sentezi ya bu, ne 
Türk-İslam sentezi? Bana sorarsanız buradaki nokta Türk-modernite sentezi. Niye? 
Çünkü bu memleketi modernleştiren en büyük adam kim? Atatürk. Dolayısıyla önemli 
olan burada Müslümanlıkla o modernitenin birbirleriyle gerginlik içinde olmamalıdır. 
Yoksa Türk-İslam sentezine gerek yok ki; zaten o orda, zaten o var. Ben Müslümanım 
Türküm diyor adam zaten ama adı Türk-İslam sentezi oldu. Bütün çıkarsanız son 40 50 
senede çıkan yazıların büyük bir kısmını derleme amaçlı, ben Evren Paşa’nın Türk-İslam 
sentezinin kafasından geçtiğini hiç düşünmüyorum. Evren Paşa’nın niyeti de belliydi her 
şeyi de belliydi. Benim kızım diyor, modern bir ailenin kızı. Ben istedim ki benim kızım 
gitsin dinini öğrensin. Sonra bir hafta geçti iki hafta geçti baktık ki benim çocuğuma 
öğretilen şeyler benim istediğim şeyler değil.. Ondan sonra özel hoca tuttum diyor, din 
dersini çocuğum bilsin öğrensin çünkü bu ülkede yaşıyor.  
NA: Şeyi anlatsana hani Yahudi Hoca da çocuğuna din dersi alsın demişti.  
MA: Teo Grünberg mi? Teo Grünberg’in çocuklarını mı diyorsun?  
NA: İslam ülkesinde yaşıyoruz Müslümanlığı da öğrensin diye iki çocuğunu da din 
dersine yazdırdı, seçmeli olduğu için... 
MA: Teo Grünberg Musevi idi. Felsefe hocası idi haliyle hep gelip gidiyor, ODTÜ’nün 
hocasıydı. Biz 4-5 sene beraber çalışmıştık orada. O çocuklar o zaman işte deneme 
lisesine gidecek yaştaydı. Ama bir tanesi akademisyen olarak babasını geçti meşhur oldu, 
David. Öbürünü bilmiyorum ne oldu da. Mesela o çocuklarda istiyordu kendi de istiyordu 
bu ülkede yaşıyoruz, bu çocuklar İslam dinini bilmezse bu ülkeyi tanımaları mümkün 
değil. Yani zaten dersleri koymalarının amacı öncelikle oydu. Bir defa bugün bana 
sorsanız hala modern kurumlarımızın önemli sorunlarından biri budur; yani o halka eksik, 
eksik olduğu için de bağlanamıyor. Mekanik olarak bir şeyi çalışmak ayrı ama o işin 
biraz derinini bilmek ayrı. Mesela yazıyorlar görüyoruz, memnunuz iyi ki yazıyorlar 
çiziyorlar ama okuduğunuz zaman boşlukları görüyorsunuz, o boşluklar öyle dışarıdan 
bakmayla olmuyor; o da öyle bu da böyle... Mesela benim size bu anlattığımı bilmezseniz 
o ders niye kültür dersi olsun... Din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersinin isim babası benim. 
TG: Öyle mi? 
MA: Öyle. İsim babası benim. Çünkü bir ad konacaktı zaten, o adı ben icat etmedim. 
“Religious culture and moral knowledge.” O zaten batıda bir çok yerde var, batıda birçok 
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yerde din kültürü olarak okutuluyor ama dediğim gibi eğer benim eşimin daha önce 
söylediği (tırnak içinde) “gavur eziyeti” olmasa bekli de bu problem olmayacaktı. Yani 
diğer türlü o ders ya kökten kalksın, çünkü bir çocuğa yetişme çağında yanlış bir imaj 
vermektense hiç vermemek daha iyi. Siz çocuğa doğru düzgün bir sınıf vermezseniz, 
öğretmene doğru düzgün bir sınıf ve saat vermezseniz, o dersin alınmaması için her türlü 
tedbiri alırsanız... Şimdi tamamen geçti mi bitti mi? Şimdi bile bazı sıkıntılar var. Yani 
eşim de biliyor ben de biliyorum, o özel olduğu içim isim falan vermeye gerek yok, bize 
bir tanıdığımız bildiğimiz bir tanesi geldi, dedi ki “ben din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersi 
okutuyorum” dedi. İkimiz de şok olduk. Yani adamın ne bilgisi var ne ilgisi var dedik. 
Allah Allah... Sonra da diyor ki müdür bey dedi ki başkasının derse gelmesindense sen 
gelirsen ben de dersi dolu gösteririm, din kültürü dersi için başka öğretmen tayin 
etmezler. Şu anda bile Türkiye’de bunlar oluyor düşünün. O dersi dolu gösteriyor bizim 
ihtiyacımız yok onun için oraya öğretmen tayin edilmiyor sonra öyle birini getiriyor ki 
dini öğretmesi mümkün değil, zaten çocuklar da görmüş olsa bunun dinle ne alakası var 
diye tekrar tekrar sorar. Türkiye’nin bu gizli damarlarını iyice bilmedikten sonra, bilimsel 
değerlendirme yapmak açıkçası çok mekanik oluyor, yukarıda kalıyor. Okursunuz ama 
bilenler bunun fazla ileriye gitmediğini görürler. O bakımdan, niye mecbur oldu çünkü 
bunun bütün resmi zannediyorum ilgili kurumlara verildi. Perişan hali, öyle diyeyim... 
Öğrenci perişan, kurum perişan, öğretmen perişan vs vs... Onun için bu ders ya kalkmalı 
ya da kültür dersi olarak normal bir duruma gelmeli. Onun sonucudur bu din kültürü ve 
ahlak bilgisi dersi. 
NA: Bir de şu durum vardı; bazı okur yazar veliler hoca ne öğretecek ben bilmem diyor o 
yüzden ben kendim öğretirim dini diyor ama kendisinin de bir bilgisi yok. Kendisi de 
hiçbir şey öğrenmemiş yani mahalledeki hocaya gönderecek hali de yok zaten ona hiç 
güveni yok. Yani çocuk dinle hiç ilgisi olmayacak şekilde yetişiyor.  
MA: Hatta bu şey enteresan bir taraftan Türkiye yeni yeni normalleşiyor, inşallah 
normalleşir ama bu kitaplar çıktığı zaman yine Türkiye ikiye ayrılmış durumdaydı. Biri 
şöyle diyebiliyordu; o kadar akıllıca yazılmış ki bu kitap işte çocuklar evrime değil de 
yaratma fikrine yaratılma düşüncesine inansınlar diye. Dolayısıyla burada çok akıllıca 
çok iyi bir dinicilik dinsellik var diyenler vardı. Yani onlar uğraşırsa kanıtlarlar yani öbür 
taraftan da ismini vermeyim, gazeteci bir arkadaşımız kitaplar çıktıktan sonra ben dinimi 
geri istiyorum, benim dinimi almayın dedi çünkü ona göre bu kitaplar şimdi biri Enver 
Paşa ön ayak olduğu için Türk-İslam sentezi diyor, öbürü diyor ki bu benim dini değil. 
Açıyor içini şimdi diyor ki yani şimdi çocuk bu sınıfa gitti ne öğrendi bundan diyor.  
NA: Yeterli görmüyor. 
MA: Rahmi Beyler’in yazdığı o ahlak ile ilgili kısımlar yeterli değil sadece biraz da şey 
yani hangi kelime kullanılır bilmiyorum İslam’ın özüne sadık kalınmıyor bu yolla diye 
yani kendi çıkardığı lafların başındaydı; ben dinimi geri istiyorum müdahale etmeyin 
diyenler vardı. Yani iki taraf da bir bakıma yaralı. Ama bunlar çoğu tabi ideolojik bir 
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bakıştı tabi o dönemde ama ben iyi niyetli olduğuna inanıyorum. Onun hikayesini sen 
biliyorsun tabi din dersi nasıl akla geldi, sonrasındaki gelişmeler nasıl oldu uzun hikaye... 
Ama yine de hanımefendinin (eşi) kanaatine göre çok yararlı olmuştur ama ben o kadar... 
Benim ölçülerime göre gitmediği için ben çok rahat değilim ama yine de çocuklar epeyce 
şey öğrendi kültür olarak. Öyle değil mi?  
NA: Tabi kıyaslayınca tabi çok farklı 
MA: Tabii çok farklı öbürüne göre. Seçimli olana göre.  
TG: Hocam siz de mi ilahiyat fakültesi mezunusunuz?  
MA: Tabi benim sınıf arkadaşımdı. Benim düşündüğümü o pratik edendir, etmiş olandır. 
Şimdi değil… 
NA: Erken emekli oldum. Bizden sonra neler oldu onları bilmiyorum.  
TG: İlahiyat fakültesinde mi çalıştınız? 
NA: Yok. Orta öğretimde çalıştım. Orta, lise 
TG: Öyle mi? O anlamda da o zaman çok şanslıyım, bir taşla iki kuş… Ne güzel! 
(gülüşmeler) Siz orta öğretimdeydiniz. Hangi yıllarda? 
NA: Ankara Kız Lisesinde çalıştım, 69-70 yıllarında çalıştım sonra Mustafa Kemal 
Lisesi’nde çalıştım Yenimahalle’de. Sonra İzmir’e gittik orada da Balçova Lisesinde 
çalıştım. 
TG: Benim zamanımda da, ben Tevfik Fikret Lisesi’nden mezunum, gerçekten din 
kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersini sevdiren hocalarım vardı. Polonya da hep duyduğum 
mesela denk geldiğim ateistler aldıkları din dersi hocalarından dolayı ateist olmuş, böyle 
bir şey olamaz diyerek ateist olmuş kişilerdi yani tam tersi bir etki de yaratabiliyor. Din 
dersi hocaya çok bağlı. 
NA: Ders hocalarının hakikaten çok iyi bir pedagojik eğitimden geçmesi lazım. Biraz 
öğretmen psikolojisi herhalde disiplinli olun falan diye çocuklara ters davranma 
olabiliyordu, o da tabi dersten soğutuyor çocukları. 
MA: Aslında doğru olan, yapılabilseydi doğru olan şuydu benim kanaatimce; Anayasa 
zaten 29. Maddede onu der: bir; din eğitimi yaparsın ama seçimlik olur, çocuk-veli isterse 
bile bile gönderir bu bir eğitim dersidir, bu bir din dersidir. Ayrıca kültür dersi olarak 
verilirse, o ayrı bir konu yani şimdi bu yeni şeyde zannediyorum bu yine seçimlik olacak. 
Büyük ihtimalle seçimlik olacak ama Anayasa şuna müsait eğer veli arzu ederse okul din 
eğitimini verir diyor zaten. Bu dediğim gibi o zorunluyu görünürde kaldırdı, demin 
söylediğim sebeplerden dolayı olmadı da o, ama en azından hukuki açıdan bakasanız o 
din dersi değil kültür dersi olsun, her çocuk öğrensin. Ama dediğim gibi o gün olan biten 
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tartışmalar yazılı olsaydı bunlar hiçbirini ideolojik şeyleri, Türk-İslam sentezi olsun, yeşil 
kuşağa bağlı olsun, zerre kadar hiçbirinin uzaktan yakından bu işle ilgisi yok. Ne vardı 
orda çocuklarımız ister dindar aileden gelsin ister dinsiz aileden gelsin, ha gayrimüslimler 
yine de gayrimüslimler dese ki bu her halükarda yine de İslam’ı öğretmektir dolayısıyla 
benim inancım öğretmiyor, onlar da yeterli sayıda öğrenci bulurlarsa, Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı onlar için de öğretmen tayin edebilir düşüncesi ile çıktı bu ama dediğim gibi 
yani Türkiye’de o gün ne yapsaydın... Mesela ahlak dersi seküler bir ders olarak başladı. 
Onu bilmez miyim ben, çok iyi bilirim, seküler bir dersti. Hatırlar mısın senin okulda 
merasimle kitap yaktıklarını Erol Güngör’ün diğer üç kişiyle beraber yaktıklarını? 
TG: Hangi kitabı hocam?  
MA: Ahlak, ahlak bilgisi. Zorunlu kültür ve din dersinden önce bir ayrıca ahlak dersi 
vardı. 73’lerde falan zannediyorum o başladı işte onların kitapları yakıldı. Çok ünlü bizim 
toplumsal psikoloji üzerinde olan Erol Güngör Bey vardı. 
NA: Mesela psikoloji ders olarak kondu.  
 MA: Evet kondu ahlak gibi ama o da yaramadı. Çünkü bütün içerik, okula kimin hakim 
olduğuna bağlı; okula sol hakimse, ders olarak ahlak da istemiyor şeyi de istemiyor. Ama 
dediğim gibi, gidersin Anadolu’nun bir yerine orada çocuklar da aile de öğretmen de 
talep üzerine yapıyor, ama o ders de yürümedi. Türkiye zor günlerden geçti.  
NA: Yani dersin şeyi de müsait değildi, içeriği.  
MA: Bana kalırsa o doğru, çocuklar hiç ilgi duymadı. 
NA: Felsefe eksik olarak okutuluyordu. Seviyelerine göre değildi o yüzden çocuklar 
sıkılıyorlardı, konuları sevmiyorlardı. İlgili duyulmadı. 
MA: Sen okuttun mu? 
NA: Okuttum. 
TG: Siz bu yeni Kuran’ı Kerim dersi ve Hz. Muhammed’in Hayatı dersinin içeriklerini 
nasıl buluyorsunuz? 
NA. Ben incelemedim onları. Ama seçmeli ders problem oluyordu. Ders, programın içine 
giremiyor. Çocukların bir kısmı içeride bir kısmı dışarıda kalıyor. Onun idaresini 
beceremiyorlardı. Zorluk çekiyorlar seçmeli ders seçen çocuklar baya perişan oluyorlar. 
Öğle saatlerinde program dışı ya da akşam geç saatlerde oluyor.  
MA: Yani o dönemdeki uygulamanın bazen dokunaklı söylüyor. Çocuğun o dersi 
sevmemesi için her türlü tedbir alınmıştı. Büyük metropollerde küçük yerlerde değil yani 
öğretmen eğer doğru düzgün saati yoksa sınıfı yoksa ve çocuğu oyun saatinden 
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koparıyorsa, çocuk o dersi sevmiyor, o dersi sevmiyor. Yani bence onun için zaten yani 
bu dersin kalkması daha iyi fikriyle gidildi. 
TG: Ben Polonya’yla o anlamda da karşılaştırıyorum. Orada din ve modernleşme o kadar 
el ele gidiyor ki; biraz önce söylediğiniz yani modernleşme ile İslam sentezi, Türkiye’nin 
ihtiyacı olan şey o aslında, dediğinizden yola çıkarak söylüyorum. Polonya’da öyle yani. 
Komünist dönemde bile halk yer altından eğitime; edebiyat eğitimine, din eğitimine hep 
devam ediyor. Yani komünist dönemde bile taa 1500lerden ülke parçalanmaya başladığı 
zaman işgal altındayken bile o kadar net bir şekilde dine sarılıyorlar ki ve orda Kilise 
kurtarıcı bir güç durumunda ki, komünist rejimden kurtuldukları anda, zaten 
kurtulmalarından da yine kilisenin etkisi çok büyük, din ve din eğitimi çok değerli bir şey 
olarak geri geliyor. Yani modernleşme ile din birbiri ile çatışan çelişen şeylerdir imajı, 
Türkiye’deki o imaj orada yok. O yüzden … 
NA: Orada misyonerlik de olduğu için, bu işi çok daha ciddi yapıyorlar. Hem velilere 
ulaşıyor kilise, hem çocuklara kolayca ulaşıp o programı koydurabiliyor. Ama 
anlattığınızda mesela Müslümanların işi biraz zor. Ayrı bir yere gidip oradan dinini 
öğrenecek. Yani okulunda programa giren ders olarak değil ama bir Hıristiyan için ders 
var değil mi?  
TG: Evet ama orda sayı sorunu var. Müslüman öğrenci o kadar az ki; okulda varsa ancak 
bir-iki tane öğrenci. Onun için ayrıca ders açamıyor, bir de zaten camiye gidiyor. Hafta 
sonları gidiyorlar camiye o okulda din dersi olduğu saatlerde Müslüman öğrenciler 
kütüphanede vakit geçiriyorlar hafta sonu camide her her türlü uygulaması ile eğitimini 
alarak öğreniyorlar ve o kadar seviyorlar ki yani mutluklarını, cumartesi pazarlarını çok 
güzel geçirdiklerini söylüyorlar. Demek ki rahat bir uygulama. Evet dışarıda alıyorlar 
eğitimlerini ama onun hiçbir denetimden geçme gibi bir durumu yok o ne öğretti öbür 
camide ne öğretildi, o bir denetime tabi değil mesela yani karışmıyorlar.  
MA: Tabii. Neyi uygun buluyorlarsa odur. Bizim öyle değil. Yani bizim bu sadece din 
dersi din kültürü dersi ile ilgili olarak değil, ben hatırlıyorum liseler için mantık kitabı 
yapıldı, işet Teo Grünberg onun sembolik mantık kısmını yazdı, Necati Hoca klasik 
mantık kısmını yazdı. Yine o da Talim Terbiye’nin hazırladığı programa göre 
yazmışlardı. Kitap yazıldıktan sonra birilerine gönderip okutuyor Talim Terbiye, yani 
nasıl buluyorsunuz diye... Kitabı bana gönderdiler. Felsefe hocasıyım, mantık hocası 
değilim yani mantık ayrı bir teknik konu. Ama neyse, iki hocayı da tanıyorum yakından 
bilindiğim insanlar, fikirlerini biliyorum falan. Şeye itiraz ettim mesela; kitapların 
hepsinde vardır mesela o, lise son sınıfta hemen hemen her şeyde “Atatürk ve din” vardır. 
Burada da “Atatürk ve Mantık” diye. Yani dedim ki mantık kitabında Atatürk ve mantık 
diye bir şey olmaz dedim buraya bir cümle yazılır; “Atatürk mantıklı bir adamdı.” 
Yazacaksanız ancak bu olsun ne demek Atatürk ve mantık. Şeyde de öyle yani lise 
kitaplarında. Atatürk diye din dersinde ayrı bir bahis açmak mı mantıklı olur yoksa zaten 
orada inanç konuları var, ahlak konuları var, samimiyet konuları, değer konuları var... 
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Oraya geldiği zaman mesela diyelim ki vatanseverlikten bahsediyorsun, fedakarlıktan 
bahsediyorsun, ölümü göze alarak mücadele edip bir toplumu tutsak olmaktan esir 
olmaktan kurtaran…Oralarda Atatürk işin içine girse daha doğal olmaz mı? Yani bir 
örgünün içine giren bir nakış gibi… 
NA: Tabii daha doğru olur. 
MA: Yani diyelim ki vatanseverlikle doludur yani Atatürk bütün gençliğini bütün 
ömrünü, fikrini eleştir o ayrı bir konu, ama o kuşak yaşamadı bile gençliğini doğru 
dürüst. Mesela benim babam adam bütün gençliği cepheden cepheye gitmişler sürmüşler 
bilmem ne yapmışlar. O zaman fedakarlık, vatan sevgisi anlatırken orada dahil olsa daha 
doğru olmaz mı? Efendim “hakikate nasıl inanıyorsam dinime de öyle inanıyorum, benim 
dinim en son dindir çünkü o din bilime ve mantığa uyan dindir” tırnak içinde Atatürk’ün 
cümlesi. Hadi bunu söyledin ama o gidecek üstüne başka bir şey işitecek. Böyle değil, 
eğitim daha doğal olması lazım. Aynen şey gibi mesela Yunus Emre gibi, Mevlana 
gibi… Bunlar “Allah Kuran’da buyuruyor ki...” diye başlamazlar. Sizinle konuşurken 
bile mealen bir ayeti kullanırlar, hiç kimse fark etmez onun ayet olduğunu. Böyle bir 
doğallık içinde verilmesi mi daha uygun olur, yoksa şey mi daha uygun olur; bir başlık 
altında mı? Sonunda o başlığa karar verildi. Ama burada da yani neyse sonunda o şeye 
bir faydam oldu Atatürk ve Mantık kısmını koymadılar. Olmaz yani Atatürk ve Mantık 
diye bir şey, her şeyin başına koyacaksın; Atatürk ve Tarih, Atatürk ve Coğrafya, altına 
da iki üç cümle koyacaksın... Yapay bir şey bu. Çocukları etkiler bu. Ne Atatürk 
sevgisine katkı sağlar ne başka bir şeye. Ama Türkiye hep böyle geldi, hep böyle sıkıntılı 
geldi. Onun için bir sıkıntıyı arka plan olarak görmezseniz, öbür o sıkıntıdan sonra gelen 
süreci, uygulamayı değerlendirmekte zorluk çekilir. Kolay değil bu. İlle doktora 
düzeyinde yapılacak bir şey de değil bu daha sınırlı, daha somut bi çalışma olarak... Ama 
Türkiye hakkında konuşacaksak, ki pek çoğu televizyonlara çıkıp konuşuyor, Türkiye 
hakkında konuşacaksak bu çok yalın, çok eksik ve çok yanlış konuşmalardır. Yazılar da 
öyle ben okuduğum zaman gülüyorum, bu böyle değil, ben kendim gülüyorum. O tahmin 
ediyor... Yeşil Kuşak için din kültürü ahlak bilgisi dersi konuldu. Heyet gelmiş 
Amerika’dan aman ha böyle bir ders olsun. Acaba heyet geldiyse eğer heyet onun için mi 
geldi, yoksa aman ha buna yeniden başlamayın bu irtica bilmem ne… Bunu bilmenden 
bunu ne yazıyorsun oraya, ne konuşuyorsun? 
TG: Bunların kayıtları yok ama galiba değil mi? 
MA: Bir kısmının belki vardır. Bir kısmının vardır mesela Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nda 
uzun aylar süren toplantılar oldu din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersi için. Orada heyetler 
vardı o insanlar teker teker hepsinin isimleri var içinde. 
TG: Evet onların kayıtları hep var. Zannediyorum Halis Ayhan’ın yaptığı bir takım... 
MA: Onu kitap olarak demiyorum ama.  
342 
TG: Tutanaklarla ilgili bir şey hatırlıyorum. Din kültürü ahlak bilgisi dersinin tartışıldığı 
toplantıların tutanakları.. 
MA: Ha olabilir. Kitap olarak demiyorum ama oradaki insanların bir kısmı hayatta değil 
zannediyorum açıkçası ben takip etmiyorum ama bu şey için de yani dediğim gibi yani 
bugün ben siyasetten yeni çıktım. Akşam bütün kanalları açarsanız; işte hükümet bilmem 
şu, hükümet bilmem bu bugün bile bakarsanız efendim hükümetin gündeminde şunlar 
şunlar var. Gülüyorum ben çünkü gündemde bunların hiçbiri yok. Gündemi bilmiyor ki... 
Gündemde sadece yolla, köprüyle vs. ile ilgili olanlar bilinir. Bakanlar Kurulu’nun bir de 
özel görüşmeleri var zaten. O özel görüşmenin bir gündemi yok ki zaten. O anda ne ise... 
Mesela büyük bir ihtimalle barış sürecinden konuşuldu, bahsettiler. Ama Batı işte bunu 
iyi bilmeden yazmıyor, Türkiye’de yazıp çiziyorlar. Neyse bir gitsin bakalım bir yürüsün 
bakalım inşallah şey yapılır. Yani şu anda benim bu söyleyeceklerimden daha fazla 
katkım mümkün değil. 
TG: Talim ve Terbiye Kurulunun din derslerinin içeriğine karar verirken nasıl bir süreç 
içinden geçtiğini çok bilmiyorum. 
MA: Ben de bilmiyorum. Benim bildiğim sadece onların hazırladıklarının müderrislere 
ulaşmasıdır. O müderrisleri o günkü Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı şöyle ya da böyle belirledi. 
Onların çoğu da akademisyendir. Tamamı akademisyendir zannediyorum. Onların 
içerisinden hemen hemen bütün kitaplar birden fazla yazarlıdır. Öyle değil mi? 
NA: Evet 
MA: Birden fazla yazarlıdır. Bir tanesi tek yazarlıdır, o da lise son sınıf. Mehmet 
Aydın’ın yazdığı kitap, o tek yazarlıdır.  
NA: İkinci sınıfın da tek galiba. 
MA: Hayır, değil. İkinci sınıfı Rahmi Bey ve Abdülkadir Bey yazdılar 
NA: Yok o 1. sınıf 
MA: Lise 1’i Ruhi Bey yazdı. Yok... 
NA: Lise 1’i Rahmi Bey. Rahmi Bey’le kimdi adı unuttum 
MA: Rahmi Bey değil benim aklımda Abdülkadir Bey kalmış 
NA: Lise 2’nin Süleyman Bey yazdı 
MA: Tek mi o? 
NA: Tek 
MA: Hmm unuttum bilmiyorum. Lise 3’ü? Daha sonrakileri? 
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NA: İşte sonradan da bir farklı kitaplar da okundu, yazıldı yani ilk çıkan kitaplar bunlar 
şeyden sonra zorunlu ders olduktan sonra… 
MA: Aşağı yukarı ilk 10 sene okutulan kitaplar bunlardır. 
NA: Sonra değiştirildi. Öğrenciye ağır geliyordu, mesela senin yazdığın daha felsefi 
dediler ona daha din kattılar. Yeni kitapları ben de görmedim. 
MA: Bilmiyorum ben görmedim, yeni kitaplarla ilgili bildiğim tek şey yarısını yine 
benden alıyorlar copyright olarak bir şey istemiyorum yani. Hayır hayır yani biraz daha 
pratik davranıyorlar. Lise son sınıf biraz şey olabilir. Yani ben o kitabı sadece lise son 
sınıftaki çocuklar için de yazmadım. Anneler babalar içinde yazdım.  
NA: Daha çok genel kültür… 
MA: Daha çok ailelerde okundu. Aynı zamanda dışarıdakilerin de okuyabileceği şekilde 
yazıldı ama dediğim gibi bir ayda yazdım ben o kitabı. Verilen zaman o kadardı, 
oturuldu, yazdık, daktilo edildi. O döneme yetişmesi lazımdı. Evren Paşa Pakistan’ı 
ziyaret etti döndü benim programa ne oldu dedi, hemen toplanıldı, daha sonra 10 sene 
filan okutuldu. Lise son sınıfın sıkıntılı olmasının bir sebebi de, özellikle büyük kentlerde 
lise son sınıftaki çocuklar ikinci yarısını bırakıyorlar, daha çok dershanelere bilmem neye 
ağırlık veriyorlar.Yani lise son sınıfı doğru düzgün okutulmadı. Hocalar ne kadar 
okutacaklar bilmiyorum ama 10 sene 12 sene falan okutuldu o kitaplar. 
NA: Aslında konuların bir kaçını lise 2’ye kaydırmak lazım lise sonun konularını 
hafifletmek lazım 
TG: Şimdi YGS’de filan da din kültürü ahlak bilgisi dersinden sorular sorulmaya 
başlandı mesela o da yeni bir gelişme olarak, onu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
NA: Ders mecburi olduktan sonra öğreniyor çocuk, öğrendiği şeyden de puanı artar. 
MA: Ama orada ben şundan endişe ederim yani gayrimüslimler çocuklarını 
göndermiyorsa, onlar da üniversiteye giriyorlar; o zaman o doğru olmaz ya da belki 
teknik olarak bu mümkündür mesela.  
TG: Evet, evet… 
MA: En az iki üç türlü sorulabilir. Kendi inancıyla ilgili sorulabilir ama o da dönemin 
konusu olmayınca... Ama Teo Grünberg’in çocukları gibi olursa onlar kendi istekleriyle 
gidiyorlar, ben bu kültürü öğreneceğim diye gidiyorlar.Teo Grünberg’in söylediği bir şey 
var, benim cümlemi tekrar ediyor; yani eğer belli bir din kültürün yoksa ben Bektaşiliğin 
yarısını anlayamazsın; gerçekten öyle, anlayamadım yani. Adam Bektaşi girmiş bir yeri 
kazmış ve ya kazılı bir yer bulmuş girmiş içine, açmış şişeyi, IV. Murat’ta tebdil-i 
kıyafetle teftiş ediyor, geziyor, bakıyor orada mezar gibi, bakmış içine; yahu Erenler sen 
ne yapıyorsun burada diyor, o da kafayı çekiyorum diyor. Peki sen IV. Murat’ı duymadın 
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mı diyor, duymaz olur muyum adını duyunca titreyip dururum ben diyor. E peki bu 
yaptığın nedir diyor, o zaten ruhi zeminin padişahıdır. Ruhi zemin, yer yüzü demek. 
Burası yer yüzü değil ki diyor. (gülüşmeler) 
MA: Padişah, “zevkin bin olsun!” diyor. E ruhi zemini bilmezsen, mezarı bilmezsen, 
ölümü bilmezsen, padişah oraya karışamaz bilmezsen bunun şeyini nereden bilecek. 
Bektaşilerin çoğu öyledir. O niye çünkü dinden kaynaklanıyor. Alevi şeyhlerinin, nedir 
sazın nedir hocam söylesene sazla ilgili o türkü. Ne şeytan var ne… bilmem nedir bunun 
adı…  
NA: Ben de hatırlayamadım. 
MA: Alevi kültürü özü itibariyle Sünni kültürden daha dinidir, Alevi kültürü. Niye? 
Çünkü Alevi kültürü aynı zamanda onun inancıdır. Bu tarafta din ayrı bir şey, onun 
kültürde varlığı ayrı bir şeydir. Onların saz çalarken okuduklarının önemli bir kısmı 
şeydir, ilahi niteliğindedir onların genelinde yaptıkları büyük cemevlerinde okudukları 
zaten çok kalitelidir onlar çünkü büyük şairlerin sözlerinden alıyorlar onları. Halk 
türküleri gibi aman aman nerde yaman bilmem ne falan. İçerik olarak da çok şey... 
NA: Felsefi yani tasavvuf var. 
MA: Onun için mesela hakikaten yanlış olmuştur daha işin başından itibaren Alevi ve 
Bektaşi kültürü okutulmalıydı. O sadece Alevi ailelerin çocukları için değil. Sünnilerin de 
onu bilmesi lazım. Bana sorarsanız Sünnilerin onu bilmesi hata yapmamaları için çok 
daha önemlidir. Çünkü nice insan Alevilerden bahsederken, onlarla ilgili konuşurken 
sıkıntılara sebep oldular. Şimdi hatırlıyorsun televizyonda meşhur bir hadise… 
NA. Sunucu...  
MA: Komedyen, sunucu değil de o Erzurum kökenli bir komedyendi. Ama bir daha şey 
yapamadı. 
MA Sunucuydu meşhur bir sunucuydu, neydi onun adı. Meşhur birisiydi. 
TG: Adını ben de çıkaramadım… 
MA: Yani biraz da dediğim gibi o bile o olay bile ondan sonra 4-5 olay daha var 
biliyorum. 4-5 olay daha var bir bakan bir laf etti şeyden sonra meşhur kazadan sonra 
kamyon kazasından sonra ne… 
NA: Susurluk 
MA: Susurluk hadisesi, Susurluk hadisesinden sonra filan. Bunlar hep şeyi gösteriyor, 
eğer yeteri kadar kültürü bilmiyorsanız o ülkede birlikte yaşamanın şartlarını 
zorlaştırıyorsunuz. Yani ben şimdi geriye dönüp bakıyorum gerçekten de Alevi ve 
345 
Bektaşi kültürünün öğretilmesi Alevi ve Bektaşi çocukları kadar, biraz daha fazla Sünni 
çocukları için gereklidir. 
NA:Bimiyorlar, yabancı kalmalarının sebebi biraz da o, birbirilerini tanımları gerekiyor. 
Komşu oluyorlar ama birbirlerinin şeylerini, kültürlerini bilmiyorlar 
MA: Kültür olarak gerekli. Ben hep anlatıyorum ya birinci sınıfta öğrenciyken şubat 
tatildi ya boydan boya, şubat tatilinde memlekete gidiyorum. Kara kış o günkü şartlarda 
otobüslerle gitmek mümkün değil buradan Elazığ’a, dolayısıyla trenle gidiyorum. 1.5-2 
gün sürüyor. Trenle giderken ben böyle bir yer arıyorum üçüncü mevkide, tahta üzerinde 
gidiyorsun zaten. Tenha olursa, kaç istasyon tenha olur onu da bilmem de, bir şeyler 
okuyayım yoksa vakit geçmez. Bir yerde baktım yaşlıca bir amca tek başına oturuyor, 
siyah bir palto üzerinde. Bıyıklar beyaz ama bir kısmı sarı sigaradan... az çok tahmin 
ettim çünkü aşinaydım Türkiye’de dede, insan coğrafyasına. Selam verdim oturabilir 
miyim dedim. Otur bakalım dedi sonra o soruya cevap veririm dedi. Yani seversem 
otururum sevmezsem oturmam. Neyse biraz konuştuk falan ben ha bire konuşma bitsin 
de bir şeyler okuyayım diyorum. İlgilendi, Malatyalıymış. Şöyle yarım saatte bir 
sakosunun, sako diyorlar ona sako palto, paltosunun cebinden çıkarıyor şişeyi, iki fırt 
alıyor bir de limon çıkarıyor, sıkıyor, o epeyce idare ediyor. Duruyor duruyor şey diyor, 
neydi Yezid’in babasının adı... Hah Maviye; ki düşman kabul edilir. Durup durup 
“Maviyenin torunu bir yudum al yoksa geçmez” diyor. (gülüşmeler) Şaka ediyor. 
Muziplik ediyor yani. Sunniyim ya. Ben de diyorum ki, yahu Erenler diyorum, ben 
Türküm, sülalem Türk, o Arap diyorum. “Hadi hadi kaçma kaçma, bir yudum almazsan 
vakit geçmez...” diyor yine. Espri yapa yapa gittik. Daha sonra korkunç kazalar oldu. O 
içtiği şişe de ben bunu evde yapıyorum diyor öbürü şey gibi çay gibi o diyor alkol yok ki 
devletin rakısında. O elinde tam şeymiş yüzde yüz evde yapıyorlarmış. Şimdi evde 
yapılanların bir kısmı problem oldu. Peki arkadaşım hadi kolay gelsin. 
TG: Çok teşekkür ederim. Çok sağolun. 
 
 
Interview with Mr. Ayhan Bilgen, Human Rights Activist 
20.02.2013, Ankara  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Sizin kariyerinizi ve çalışmalarınızı araştırmaya çalıştım tabi ama sizden 
dinlemeyi isterim; Türkiye’de kendinizi ve çalışmalarınızı nerede konumlandırıyorsunuz?  
Ayhan Bilgen: Ben insan hakları savunuculupu yaptım diye tarif edebilirim kendi 
yürüttüğüm çalışmayı. Hala bununla ilgili işlerle meşgulüm. Daha önce Mazlum-Der’de 
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bulundum, İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu’nun kuruculuğunu yaptım, şu anda da İnsan 
Hakları Derneği yönetimindeyim. Barış Çalışmaları içerisinde sivil insiyatif olarak, Barış 
Meclisi Çalışmalarında yine kuruluş sürecinde bulundum. Şu anda daha çok Anayasa ile 
ilgili çalışmalar yürüttük son iki yıl boyunca, yerel insiyatiflerle birlikte bir çalışma 
yürüttük. Anayasa ve toplum-siyaset ilişkisi üzerine daha çok yoğunlaşmamız... 
TG: Bu alandaki yazılarınızı okudum. Ben kendi çalışmamda genel olarak Avrupalılaşma 
sürecinde din-devlet ilşkilerini araştırırken Türkiye ve Polonya’da konuyu din dersleri 
özelinde incelemeye çalışıyorum çünkü konuyu bir noktaya daraltmak istedim. Sizin AB, 
yeni Anayasa süreci, din devlet ilişkileri ve din dersleri ekseninde görüşlerinizi almam 
mümkün mü? Anayasa çalışmalarının bu anlamda nasıl gittiğini düşünüyorsunuz? 
AB: Türkiye’de çarpık olan din-devlet ilişkisi, toplum-din ilişkisi ve bu ikisini belirleyen 
devlet-toplum ilişkisi... yani böyle üç ayağın da ben çarpık olduğu düşüncesindeyim. 
Bunlar birbirini şekillendiriyor, etkiliyorlar. Yani Cumhuriyetin kuruluşu toplumla devlet 
arasında kavgalı başlamıştır. Devlet toplumu dizayn etme çabası içerisinde olmuştur, 
dolayısıyla da toplum hayatında önemli bir belirleyen olan dinle ilgili de insiyatifi 
tamamen devlet üstlenmiştir. Bu hem ayrımcılığı, kayırmacılığı, din inanç konusunda 
taraf olmayı beraberinde getirmiştir ama aynı zamanda belki daha çok gözardı edilen bu 
laiklik tartışmalarında, bu aynı zamanda bir kuşatma ve kontroldür. Yani birini avantajlı 
pozisyonuna getirirken, onu desteklerken, ona dini öğretmeye çalışırken, kurumlarınızla 
ona hizmet verirken, bir taraftan da aslında onu başka kanallarla inanç dünyasını 
örgütlemesini, daha özerk alanlar inşa etmesini bir anlamda yok etmiş oluyorsunuz. 
Devletin kontrolünde bir alan yaratmış olursunuz. Yani ben İlahiyat Fakültelerinin 
açılması, İmam Hatip Liseleri’nin açılması, Diyanet İşleri’nin kurulması, d,n derslerinin; 
tabi daha sonraki yıllar bunlar ama, devlet eliyle ve zorunlu hale getirilmesinin tümüyle 
bu çabadan kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum. Yani toplumun devlete karşı ya da özerk, yani 
bağımsız alanlar inşa etmesini engellemenin önemli bir yolunun da, toplum hayatında 
belirleyici bir dinamik olan dinin kontrol edilmesinden geçtiği algısından hareket 
edilebileceğini düşünüyorum. Burada tabi ki gayrimüslim gruplarla ilgili zaten çok açık 
ayrımcılıklar, yok saymalar hatta... Yani Lozan’ın esasında hayata geçirilmemesi ama 
pratiklte uygulama çok olumlu olmasa da statüleri en azından uluslararası ilişkiler 
dolayısıyla kabul gören İslam dışı topluluklar; yanında daha belki tartışılması gereken 
daha güncel olan Alevilerin, ateistlerin, farklı inanç gruplarının pozisyonudur. Çünkü 
bunlarla ilgili hiçbir statü olmadığı için yani Lozan’da sayılmış bir gayrimüslim 
değilseniz, Sünni İslam kategorisi içerisinde ele alınmaktasınız. Bu davranışın ortaya 
çıkarttığı tabi birtakım toplumsal tutum var, özellikle dindarlar açısından. Bu bence 
Türkiye’deki laiklik ve sekülerlik tartışması açısından ayrı ayrı ele alınması gereken bir 
şey. Yani toplum devlet tarafından dininin desteklenmesini, öğretilmesini; çoğunluk 
açısından söylüyorum, bir sorun olarak görmekten çok, bir kolaylık bir avantaj... dinin 
ancak böyle öğretilebileceği, yani ailelerin, cemaatlerin yani sivil toplumun doğru din 
öğretemeyeceği gibi bir algı var. Aynı şekilde dine dair hizmetlerin de, cenaze töreninden 
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nikaha kadar özel hayata dair birtakım düzenlemelerin de cemaatler tarafından yapılırsa 
toplumun ihtiyacını karşılayamayacağı düşünülüyor. Mesela ibadet yerlerinin giderlerinin 
karşılanamayacağı, bunun devlet tarafından karşılanmasının çok kolay bir yol olduğu 
algısı oluşmuştur. Türkiye milliyetçiliği, dindarlığı, devletçiliği içiçe geçen bir yapı, bir 
toplum yapısını beraberinde getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye’de dindarlık konusunu 
toplumsal hayatın dışında sadece devlet-inanç ilişkisi olarak tartışmak dinin, İslamın, 
doğası açısından da oldukça sorunludur. Pratik açıdan da tamamen sorunludur. Yani o 
“mahalle baskısı” kavramı burada bence bir anlam ifade ediyor. Yani olapan ve yaygın 
olanın dışında farklı bir şey talep ettiğinizde, dinin farklı bir yorumunu savunduğunuzda 
sapkınlıkla veya inançsal terimlerle; fitneyle ve aynı zamanda ihanetle, devletin güvenlik 
terminolojisindeki birtakım kavramlarla birlikte ele alınabiliyorsunuz. Bu konuda örnek 
olarak ele alınması gereken topluluklardan bir tanesi bence Caferiler. Caferiler 
kendilerini İslama referans eden bir topluluk, Şii inancı, Müslüman inancına mensuplar 
ve kendi imamlarının maaşlarını kendileri veriyorlar. Kendi camilerinde de facto en 
azından kendileri, bir kısmı devlet tarafından tanınan/bilinen mekanizmalar olmakla 
birlikte dini hizmetlerini kendileri yürütüyorlar. Şimdi Sünni İslami gruplar da Caferiler 
gibi hareket etseler, yani hem devletin müdahale edemediği hutbesini kendisinin yazıp 
okuyabildiği, hem aynı zamanda giderlerini kendisinin karşılamak zorunda olduğu bir 
tablo ortaya çıksaydı, bugün bence eşitlik kavramı bu kadar sorunlu tartışılmayabilirdi. 
Yani Alevilik Sünnilik arasındaki eşitlik sorunu, gayrimüslimlerle müslümanlar 
arasındaki eşitlik sorunu daha farklı çözülebilirdi. Ben biraz uzattım belki ama özerk bir 
ilişki kurmanın, devletle mesafeli; yani devletle kavgalı değil mutlaka, o inanç 
gruplarının kendi tercihidir ama devletle mesafeli bir ilişki kurmanın hem dini daha özgür 
yaşanması, hem toplumsal baskı aracına dönüşmemesi tabi ki devlet aygıtını da kendi 
arkasına alabilecek beklentiler arayışlar içine girmemesini doğurur diye düşünüyorum. 
TG: Peki Cumhuriyet’in ilk döneminde özellikle dinin devletin yönetiminde olması 
gerektiği aksi takdirde kontrolden çıkacağı ve dinin yanlış şekilde öğretilerek istismar 
edileceği algısının bugün hala korunuyor olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? En azından bazı 
çevrelerce... Bu değiştirilebilir mi sizce? ... AKP iktidarında farklı bir argümanla da olsa 
pratikte yine yapılmakta olan bu; devlet eliyle din... Yani Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında 
Tekke ve Zaviyeler Kanunu’ndaki gibi devleti kontrolsüz dinden koruyalım mantığıyla 
değil hatta tam tersine, dini korumak lazım ve bunu devlet eliyle yapalım mantığı söz 
konusu. Bu değişir mi yakın gelecekte?      
AB: Ben orada korkutarak yasaklayarak aslında kontrolün sağlanması olarak görüyorum. 
Yani Cumhuriyet’in ilk yıllarında Said Nursi ve talebelerini yasaklamak, 
Süleymanağa’nın işte Kuran eğitim çalışmalarını yasaklamak bir tarafta gayet 
modernleştirici, bilimsel bir algının eseridir; yani bunlara bırakırsak bu cahil cühela 
topluma din öğretir ve bu da dinin özünden uzaklaşmaya sebep olur. En iyi dini devlet 
bilir, gerçek dini o bilir yani ne öğretilecekse o “akredite olmuştur” itaatkar vatandaşın 
dinin sınırlarını da devlet belirlemeli. Bu algı, hegemonik devlet algısının küçük bir 
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parçası ama bence bunun kadar; hatta daha etkili, yani sadece bu olsaydı, toplum kendi 
savunma mekanizmalarını kurabilirdi, ısrar edebilirdi bunda ama daha öteye giderek bu 
yönde çok ciddi yasaklar uyguladığında dindar insanlar ya da daha dini hassasiyeti yoğun 
olan kitleler dini tümüyle kaybetme, dinden tümüyle uzaklaşma korkusu içerisinde yani 
yasakçılıkla terbiye edilmiştir, kaba tabiriyle. Bunu Cumhuriyet’in ilk yıllarındaki ezanla 
ilgili camilere jandarma gücü kullanılarak kuşatma yapılması, sonra da Demokrat Parti’li 
dönemde dört elle sarınılacak bir devlet algısını beraberinde getirmiştir. Ya da işte 28 
Şubat, daha yakına gelelim, 28 Şubat dönemindeki yasaklar, engellemeler. Arkasından 
AKP döneminde “bizim devletimiz, bizim ordumuz” yani dindar ordu gibi birtakım 
algıları yani devletle daha mesafeli ve özgün alan açma arzusundan çok, “ya 
dışlanacağım, haksızlığa uğrayacağım” ya da daha çok bu devlete sahip çıkıp yani 
kendini bir biçimde dinimi daha rahat yaşabileceğim bir alan yaratacağım algısı... Bu 
hiçbir şekilde mesafe bırakmıyor bu algı. Yani ya dayak yiyeceksiniz ya sopayı elinize 
alacaksınız, o zaman da başkalarının dayak yemesine seyirci kalacaksınız. Böyle değil de 
daha ilkesel bir pozisyon koyulabilseydi, yani devleti ele geçirmek zorunda 
hissetmeseydi insanlar dinlerini daha rahat yaşamak için ve tabi yasaklarla terbiye 
edilmiş olmasalardı, o zaman bütün inançların kendilerini özgürce ifade edebileceği bir 
hukuk düzeni, herkesin ibadet yerini kendisinin çözebilmesi, kendi çocuklarına kendi 
dinlerini öğretebilmesi gibi yani daha sivil alandan toplumsal alandan bir ilişki 
kurulabilirdi ve “siyasal” bu kadar “toplumsal”ı etkilemeyebilirdi. Devlet bu kada sivili 
şekillendirmeyebilirdi diye düşünüyorum. Orada tümüyle Soğuk Savaş döneminin 
komünist tehlikesi, işte Ruslar işgal edecek din kalkacak... gelenek kültür, din, aile 
kavramları tehlikede gibi korkularla bir sürü pratik yasaklarla birlikte hep ciddi korkular, 
her şeyini kaybetme korkuları... Mevcuttaki sorunları görmemezlikten gelmeyi 
beraberinde getirmiştir diye düşünüyorum. Bunu sorgulama konusunda bugün itibarı ile, 
yani artık o 28 Şubat korkusunun falan zaten aşıldığı çok net hani zaman zaman insanlar 
oraya gönderme yaparak, hatırlatmalar yaparak bakın şunlar olmuştu, başörtülüler şunları 
yaşamıştı, dindar askerlerin başına şunlar gelmişti diyerek sorunları da çözmeyip, yani 
Türkiye’de özgürlükçü bir laiklik yani din özgürlüğü alanı inşa etmediğinizde mevcut 
durumda siz göz yumulan olduğunuz için; varlığı tanınmayıp göz yumulan... ki Tekke ve 
Zaviyeler Kanunu’nda değişiklik yapmayıp ama tarikatlerin varlığını hepimiz biliyoruz; 
cemaatlerin bürokraside varlığını hepimiz biliyoruz. Bu göz yumma ilişkisi aynı zamanda 
karşılıklı bir şeye dönüşüyor. Siz de iktidarın varlığınu sürdürmeye bir biçimde katlanma 
ilişkisi kurmak zorundasınız. Açıkçası bir korku olarak tırnak içinde söylüyorum, CHP 
gelirse ne olur ya da işte başka bir şey olursa ne olur korkusu çok net bir şekilde bugün 
yüksek sesle itiraz edilmesini, kendisi lehine ya da ötekiler lehine, bu adaletli olmayan 
eşit olmayan duruma göz yumulmasını beraberinde getiriyor. 
TG:   Yeni Anayasa çalışmaları din alanındaki hak ve özgürlükler bakımından umut vaad 
ediyor mu? Siz bu çalışmalara katkı sağlayan, sürecin içinde olan biri olarak nasıl 
değerlendirirsiniz?  
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Ben açıkçası din konusunun, etnik kimlik veya kültürel dil gibi konulardan daha sorunlu 
bir alan olduğunu düşünüyorum bu iktidar açısından. Belki dil hakkını bile, kültürel 
hakları bile; ki bunlar da güvenlik ilişkileri için zorlanacak bu iktidar ama inançla ilgili 
alan çok daha içselleştirilmiş bir hegemonik tutum var. Dili yine bir miktar kendi 
dindarlığıyla izah edebiliyor, Allah’ın yarattığı diller yaşatılmalı diyebiliyor Başbakan; 
daha önce anadille bana gelmeyin derken şimdi işte hutbe ihtiyacı olur gibi refleksler 
oluyor. Ama iş dine geldiği zaman, benim için Anayasa konusunun nereye gideceği 
yönündeki en önemli göstergelerden biri Alevi Çalıştayları. Alevi Çalıştaylarında çok net 
talepler oldu. Yedi çalıştay yapıldı yanılmıyorsam... Burada söylenen ne zorunlu din 
dersinin kaldırıması konusu, ne Diyanet İşleri’nin pozisyonu ile ilgili ciddi hiçbir tartışma 
yapmak istemedi hükümet. Dinledi, Alevilerin bu konudaki ortaklaşmasını aslında 
farketti ama aynı zamanda aralarındaki farkları da gördü. Yani tabi ki bütün dünyada da 
farklı laiklik uygulamaları, din devlet ilişkileri adına farklı düzenlemeler var. Ancak 
hükümet gördü ki bu talepleri yerine getirmesi durumunda dindarlık adına bir adım 
geriye düşecek, sanki kazanılmış bir şeyi kaybetmek gibi görerek mevzuyu, din dersine 
karşı çıkmayı dine karşı çıkmak olarak tanımladılar. Yani böyle bir tanımlama yaptılar 
kendileri hatta birkaç kez yaptılar, daha önceki Diyanet İşleri Başkanı buna yakın sözler 
sarfetti. Diyanetten sorumlu devlet bakanları yine benzer şeyler söylediler. Burada tabi 
Diyanet İşleri nasıl bir kurum sorusuna geliyor iş, yani belki din dersleri belki bir miktar 
daha kolay aşılabilir bir şey. Tartışma anladığım kadarıyla, serbest olup isteyenin alması 
şeklinde değil, almak istemeyenin beyanda bulunması; ki bu hak ve özgürlüklerin mantığı 
ve çoğunluk-azınlık ilişkisi bakımından sorunlu bir tercihtir.  İstemeyenin bunu dile 
getirmesi daha zordur, halbuki isteyenin talep etmesidir esas olan. Olağan ve olması 
gereken bu mantığa dayalı bir seçmeli ders konulmasıdır. Bu işte 12 Eylül 
Anayasası’ndan biraz gevşetilerek, “almak istemeyenler beyanda bulunsunlar” gibi bir 
yola gidilebilir; bu kadar ilerleyebilir. Ama DİB’nın yapısında bence hiçbir ciddi ilerleme 
olmayacak. Yani Diyanet içinde temsil, bir karar ilişkisi içinde değil bir kol gibi hizmet 
vermek için... ki ben bunun çok sağlıklı bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Devletle 
mesafesi bir şekilde olan topluluklar; Aleviler ya da diğer inanç gruplarının devlete 
angaje edilmesi, devlete bir bağ ile bağlanması, Dedelerin ya da Papazların, Rahiplerin... 
ya da hangi inanç grubuysa onların önderlerinin “akreditasyon” gibi algılansa da bazı 
çevrelerce, devlet tarafından tanınma gibi algılansa da, fiili olarak tanınma zaten var ve 
meşruiyet devlet nezdinde değil, toplum nezdindedir. Artık bu ülkede Alevilerle ilgili bir 
televizyon programında da kınayıcı ya da aşağılayıcı bir dil kullanıldığında toplum 
refleks verebiliyor, toplumda birileri ben Aleviyim ve bizi böyle tarif edemezsin 
diyebiliyorsa, toplumsal cesaretin bu kadar ilerlediği bir yerde akreditasyonu sadece 
devlet tarafından varlığının kabul edilmesine endekslemek bence sorunlu bir ilişki. Ben 
bundan da AKP’nin ya da genel Diyanet mantığının çok rahatsız olacağını düşünüyorum 
doğrusu. Yani yüz kadar Dedeye maaş vermenin böyle büyük bir tehdit olmayacağı gibi 
kentleşmeyi düşündüğünüzde, Alevilerin kent hayatı ile kırsal hayatı arasındaki 
farklılıpını düşündüğünüzde meselenin böyle bir şey olmadığını; Aleviliğin doğası ile 
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birlikte ele aldığınızda hele, kırdaki Aleviliği yaşatan mekanizmalarla; Cem veya 
Musahiplik gibi bir takım mekanizmaları düşündüğünüzde kentte bu zaten yok, 
dolayısıyla Cem dediğiniz şey folklorik bir şeye dönüşüyor burada. Oysa Cem böyle bir 
şey değil; Cem aslında Aleviler arasında paralel hukuk kurma, yaşatma, varlığını koruma 
yoludur. Yani iç yargılarını, sosyal denetim mekanizması olarak işletmesidir; bir eğitim 
mekanizmasıdır, bir ahlak okuludur, haksızlıkları giderecek bir sivil yargılama 
mekanizmasıdır; gibi bir sürü işlevi varken onların hepsinden yalıtıp işte 
“dergahlarımızda Semah yapabilirsiniz, Cem yapabilirsiniz”e indirgemek, tıpkı İslamı 
nasıl devletleştirerek içini boşalttıysa Aleviliği de bence benzer bir süreç içine 
taşıyacaktır.  
TG: Ben açıkçası çalışmama ilk başladığımda, Türkiye’de din derslerinin konumunda 
olası bir değişikliğin bu yeni Anayasa çalışmaları sayesinde olabileceğini düşünüyordum. 
Yani 24. Maddedeki zorunlu din dersi ibaresi kaldırılacak ve bu da Avrupalılaşma ile 
dolaylı da olsa ilişkilendirilebilir diye düşünüyordum, en azından demokratikleşme ve 
liberalleşme ekseninde. Yani AB üyelik sürecinin Türkiye’yi sekülerleştirmesi değil ama 
hak ve özgürlükler temelinde benzer normları benimsemeye yöneltmesi sonucunda böyle 
bir etkileşim olabileceğini öngörüyordum. Ancak konu bambaşka bir noktaya geldi; 
eğitim sistemi değişti, zorunlu din dersi kalkmadığı gibi seçmeli din dersleri müfredata 
kanunla eklendi. Üstelik AB üyeliği konusunda bir heyecan kaybı var Türkiye’de, 
dolayısıyla karar vericilerin politikalarını buna göre şekillendirdiklerini söylemek 
oldukça zor. O yüzden bir de sizin görüşünüzü almak isterim, siz bir bağlantı görüyor 
musunuz Avrupalılaşma süreci ile din-devlet ilişkileri ve hatta daha özelde din dersleri ile 
ilgili politikalar hakkında? 
AB: Ben şöyle bir boyutu olduğunu düşünüyorum sadece, diğer inanç grupları için, yani 
İlerleme Raporu’nda adı anılan en azından ve böylece sorunları olduğu açık olarak 
tartışma konusu yapılan, mesela Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi, Aleviler, Süryaniler 
gibi, birtakım “öteki” diye tabir edebileceğimiz alandakilerin sorunlarının hatırlanması ve 
gözardı edilememesi. Ki Aleviler “tehdit unsuru” olduğu için onlarınki biraz daha ayak 
direnerek hayata geçiriliyor çünkü büyük bir kitle var, azınlık kategorisine sokmak 
istemiyorsunuz, daha farklı standartlar koymaya çalışsanız bu sefer çok şeyler vermek 
zorunda kalacaksınız vs. Daha böyle AİHM kararlarının uygulanmasında ayak direme 
falan gibi şeyler... Burada bürakrasi direniyor siyaset de bürokrasiyi desteklliyor aslında. 
Yani mesela Süryanilerle ilgili veya az sayıda olan, göç etmiş topluluklarla ilgili 
olanlarda da sembolik bakılıyor olaya. Yani biraz daha Avrupa’yı ikna için... Bakın biz 
şunları şunları yaptık, Medeniyetler Buluşması etkinlikleri, dini bayramlarda birtakım 
jestler gibi bir boyutta tutuyor. Burada bu tip topluluklarda, dezavantajlı pozisyondan 
dolayı korunma ve geliştirme mekanizmaları falan konuşulmalı. Kaybolmaya yüz tutan 
diller gibi kaybolmak üzere olan inançlar sözkonusu, bunlar için artı bir şey sunulması 
gerekiyor. Sadece serbest bırakmak değil, reel olarak kendilerini devam ettirebilecek 
imkanlardan mahrumlar, üçer beşer kişilik insan grupları kalmış muhtelif şehirlerde... 
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Burada benim asıl yaklaşımım şu; din hizmetlerinde Sünni kitleyle devlet arasındaki 
ilişki doğru kurulamazsa diğerlerinin durumu da çözülemez bence. Azınlıklar için 
söylüyorum, siz devlet tarafından eşit bir hukuk da elde etmiş olsanız, bunu pratik hayata 
geçirme konusundaki engelleri aşamayacaksınız. Tabi bunun yasalarla da aşılamayan 
boyutu olduğunu da görmemiz gerekiyor. Yani insanlar sınava alınırken ya da bir ihale 
kendilerine verilirken Alevi olmanın dezavantajlı bir şey olduğunu herkes biliyor, bu çok 
açıkça yapılıyor ama yasal olarak ölçülebilir veya denetlenebilir bir tarafı yok. Burada 
işte Sünni topluluğun devletle olan ilişkisi tanımlamak ve bunu yaparken de batılılaşma 
veya dinden uzaklaşma gibi bir algı oluşmasına izin vermeden, tam tersine daha içten bir 
dindarlık temelinde savunulabilir bir ilişki tanımlanmalı. Dinin özgürlüğü için de devletle 
mesafeli durmanın gerekliliği içten bir biçimde anlatılmalı, bunu ilk dönem İslam tarihine 
referanslarla güçlendirerek dile getirmek gerek. Osmanlı dönemindeki din-devlet 
ilişkisinin nasıl araçsallaştığını anlatmak gerek. Farklı bir din-devlet ilişkisine bir “dışsal 
dayatma” olarak değil de, ki burada tırnak içinde söylüyorum çünkü insan hakları 
sorunları herkesin ortak sorunudur ve AB’nin ilerleme raporunda bu konu ile ilgili bir 
değerlendirme yapmasını bir dış dayatma olarak görmüyorum. Bu konuda da din-devlet 
ilişkileri ile ilgili ABD’nin hazırlamış olduğu raporların da AB’ninkilere göre daha 
Türkiye gerçeğinin farkında bir çerçeve çizdiğini düşünüyorum. Mesela başörtüsü konusu 
bile ne kadar sonra girdi. Bu da tabi toplumda bir benimseme sorunu yaratıyor; benim 
başörtüsü serbestisiyle ilgili sorunum var ama sen bunu yıllardır yok sayıyorsun, 
gayrimüslimlerin sıkıntılarına yer veriyorsun diye düşünüyor toplumun büyük kesimi. Bu 
tutum da Sünnilerle diğer inanç gruplarını aslında karşı karşıya getiriyor. Niyet bu olmasa 
bile taktiksel hatadan ötürü böyle bir sorun ortaya çıkıyor. Ama AB bu raporlarda bunları 
hiç yazmasaydı, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusuna hiç değinmeseydi, Türkiye’nin iç 
dinamikleri bunu aşabilir miydi; bence böyle bir etik olgunluk yok. Çoğunluğu oluşturan 
Sünniler, başka inanç gruplarının özgürlüklerinin korunması beni de daha güvende 
hissettirir diyerek hükümete baskı oluşturacak bir noktaya gelmesi oldukça zor. Burada 
farklı inançlar ve güvenlik algısı hep karşı karşıya geliyor; başka inançlar hep 
misyonerlik faaliyetlerini çağırıştırıyor. Bu konu MGK’ya kadar taşınmıştır.  
Bir de şunu belirtmek isterim, Türkiye’deki laiklik algısının daha çok Fransız örneğinden; 
kıta Avrupası geleneğinden veya ABD gibi değil de, buradan yola çılkılarak oluşturulmuş 
olması dini sembollerin de bir tehdit olarak algılanmasını son derece sorunlu görüyorum. 
İşte bunlar toplumu sembollerine sahip çıkma; dindarlaşma ya da dinsizleşme üzerine 
yoğunlaştırıp, çünkü din biraz da bu sembollerdir, semboller üzerinden kavga etmeyi 
bırakıp dinin özü hakkında konuşmaktan alıkoyuyor. Teolojik bir tartışmaya girmek 
istemiyorum ama bu sembollerin bazılarının dinin özüyle de bir ilgisi yoktur.  
TG: Benim tezimde sekülerleşme teorileri yerine Avrupalılaşma teorilerini seçmemdeki 
en önemli neden Avrupa’nın herhangi bir ülkeden bu yönde bir beklentisinin 
olamayacağından kaynaklanıyor. Avrupa’da din-devlet ilişkisi açısından ortak bir norm 
olmadığından, böyle bir beklenti de olamaz.  
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AB: Ben Türkiye’deki sekülerleşmeyi şu anlamda sorunlu buluyorum; radikalleşme 
potansiyelini tetikleyen bir boyutu olduğunu düşünüyorum. Devlet-din ilişkisini yapısal 
olarak değiştirmediğiniz sürece bir yozlaşma algısının ve buna paralel gelişen bir yabancı 
düşmanlığının, batı düşmanlığı ve azınlıkları tehdit görmekle birlikte felaket 
radikalleşebileceğini düşünüyorum. Bu süreç eğer bir ikna ve içselleştirme süreci ve aynı 
zamanda sırtını devlete dayama şansının olmadığından emin olma süreci olmazsa 
radikalleşme potansiyeli çok yüksektir. Bir anti-Şii, anti-Alevi karşıtlığı şeklinde gelişen 
radikallik çok muhtemeldir. Toplum şu ikilemde bırakılıyor; ya dininize sahip çıkıp 
kavgasını vereceksiniz; kime karşı vereceksiniz, devlete karşı veremeyeceğinize göre 
“ötekine” karşı vereceksiniz. Bunun bir şekilde önüne geçecek bir süreç inşa edilmeli 
diye düşünüyorum. 
TG: Vaktinizi ayırıp görüşlerinizi paylaştığınız için çok teşekkür ederim. 
AB: Ben teşekkür ederim. 
 
 
Interview with Mr. Andon Parizyanos, Head of Rum Vakıfları Derneği, Zoğrafyon 
Rum Lisesi Instructor of “Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi”  
29.03.2013, İstanbul, Zoğrafyon Rum Lisesi 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Azınlık okulunda din ders programı ile ilgili sormak istiyorum öncelikle, 
sizden din dersi programlarınızı Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı denetliyor mu? 
Andon Parizyanos: Bu sene batkılar ki yok program, bizden istediler.  
TG: Daha önce bu konuda bir beklenti yok muydu? 
AP: Daha önce yani çok eskiden vardı yani 50li yıllarda diyelim vardı fakat şimdi bu 
vereceğim program bir taslaktır yani daha bunun üzerinde çalışıyorum. Ben sana yine de 
vereyim yani bazı kısımlar buradan çıkacak. Onu peşinen söyleyeyim, çünkü daha son 
şeklini almadı. 
TG: Siz yani daha netleştiği zaman göndermeyi tercih ederseniz, e-postayla da 
iletebilirsiniz.  
AP: Yok netleşti yani şöyle ben bunu sana izah edeceğim. 
TG: Tamam. 
AP: Bu net gibi fakat bazı bölümleri, hangi bölümleri sana göstereceğim, ki bence bu 
dakikada fuzulidir yani hiç gerek yok. 
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TG: Tabi ben din devlet ilişkilerini Avrupa Birliği bağlamında incelerken devletin 
seküler yapısı ile ilgili Avrupa Birliği’nin bir söylemi olmaz ama dini özgürlükler, dini 
azınlıklar ve azınlık hakları ile ilgili Avrupa Birliği’nin beklentileri yüksek Türkiye’den. 
Bu anlamda size göre hiç değişiklik oldu mu azınlık okullarının durumu ile ilgili 
Türkiye’nin bu Avrupa Birliği sürecinde?  
AP: Mutlaka oldu. 
TG: Sizin kendi gözlemlediğiniz somut değişiklikler var mı?  
AP: Şimdi en başta bir kere tamamen düşünce tarzı, mantalite değişti. Biz eskiden okulda 
mesela din dersi ile ilgili bir şey istediğimiz zaman Milli Eğitim’den, bunun arkasında bir 
art niyet aranırdı. Şimdi tabi bu görüşler farklı çok daha iyi niyetle ve çok daha yapıcı 
olarak yaklaşıyorlar yani herhangi bir düzensizlik yok bu da çok önemli tabi. Derler ya 
hani samanın altında buzağı aramak gibi yani eskiden bir teklifte bulunduğunuz zaman 
acaba bunu niye istiyorlar diye bir hemen şüpheye düşerdi. Yani burada [din kültürü ve 
ahlak bilgisi dersi programında] mesela Atatürk ile ilgili bir kısım var, şimdi bunun bir 
ilgisi de yok amaçla bunları çıkaracağız. Hazırlayan arkadaş bunu bir yerlerden biraz 
bularak almıştır. Fakat diğer konular kesindir. Yani diğer konular yani dini konular 
program kesindir yani bu giriş kısmını ve amaçları ben biraz değiştireceğim sonra Milli 
Eğitim’e göndereceğim ama bu bir taslaktır ben şuna taslak diye de yazayım. 
TG: Daha önce nasıldı şimdi nasıl azınlık okullarında din eğitimi konusu?  
AP: Şimdi biz baştan başlayalım. Baştan başlayalım biraz daha derli toplu olsun  
TG: Tabi buyrun... 
AP: Şimdi ben önce yani tam bir fikir sahibi olman için benim öğrencilik yıllarıma 
gideyim. Benim öğrencilik yıllarımda bizim hocalarımız papazdı. Ama şöyle papazdı 
yani ruhban okulu mezunu, ilahiyatçı papazlardı onlar bu dersi verirdi.  
TG: Burada, bu okulda? 
AP: Burada İstabul’da hem bu okulda hem Kurtuluş’ta yani ilkokulda falan. Ondan sonra 
yani tahminen 1960 yılında diyelim yada 1964 de . Artık din adamlarının bizim okulda 
ders vermeleri yasaklandı yani din dersi kaldı fakat bu ruhani yanı yani papazın, kilisede 
hizmet eden birinin okula gelip o dersi vermesi yasaklandı. Bunun üzerinde sivil yani 
papaz olmayan ilahiyatçı öğretmenler oldu. Fakat 1971’de ruhban okulu kapandığı için 
en benim hocam vardı Esto Forodis diye, Allah rahmet eylesin, en son ilahiyatçı oydu ve 
bizim okullarda din dersi yapıyordu. O da öldükten sonra kimse kalmadı. E yeni yok 
yetişen yok. Kontenjan din dersi için haftada 1 saat e yani 5-6 saat için yurtdışından 
öğretmen talep etmek de doğru bir şey değil. Onun üzerinde işte biraz orda bir sorun oldu 
çünkü o yıllar yani şimdi 1960-70-80 için konuşuyorum biraz zor yıllar. İsteğimiz kabul 
edilmiyor.  
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TG: Eğitim bakanlığı tarafından mı? Genelge ile falan mı? 
AP: Evet. Onun üzerine şöyle bir çözüm bulundu; din dersini artık yazılı mı şifaen mi 
söylendi... din dersini edebiyat, Rumca edebiyat öğretmenleri versin diye bir emir geldi 
artık yazılı mı sözlümü hatırlamıyorum. Ondan sonra edebiyat öğretmenleri din dersine 
girmeye başladı. Ben de bunun üzerine benim branşım edebiyattı ben de burada din dersi 
verdim. Şimdi tabi ki bu beyanı da kabul edersek, pek de sağlıklı bir din eğitimi 
verdiğimizi söyleyemeyiz. Ben şimdi daha yakınım tabi aynı zamanda kilisede 
okuyucuyum biliyorum. Şöyle benim gibi mesela bazı öğretmenlerin dinle ilgilisi 
fazladır. Hem okuyucu olarak ya da başka nedenlerden dolayı uğraşıyoruz yani çocuklara 
örf ve adetleri, dini konuları biraz öğretmeye fakat özellikle lisede tabi ilgi biraz 
azalmaktadır. Tabi çocuklar daha çok bu üniversite giriş imtihanlarına hazırlanıyorlar pek 
de ilgilendikleri söylenemez tabi biz yine de gerekeni yapmaya çalışıyoruz.  
TG: Haftada bir saat mi?  
AP: Haftada bir saat. Bu tabi din bilgisi ve ahlak dersi olarak geçiyor. Bu kadar fazla 
bir... bu konuda şu an şimdi zamanımıza geldik bu buldukları çözümle şu anda din dersi 
konusunda bir sorunumuz yok. Tek sorunumuz, benim yani kanaatim, bunu bir ilahiyatçı 
yani uzman olan birisi verirse çok daha iyi olacak. Yani he ne kadar bazı çocuklar fazlaca 
ilgileniyor bazı çocuklar ilgilenmiyorsa da yani dersin uzman bir kişi tarafından 
verilmesinde fayda var. Şu anda istesek bile bir ilahiyatçı yok öğretmen olarak tayin 
edebileceğimiz biri yok 
TG: Yine ruhban okulu konusuna geliyor.  
AP: Yine ruhban okulu konusuna geliyor. Evet yani bu kadar sene kapalı olduğu için bu 
tabi bu konuda uzman kişiler yetişmedi, olan kişiler yaşlandı. Bu bakımından 71 de 
kapandı okul. 71 den bu güne kadar 40 seneden fazla geçti onun için ilahiyatçı yok e işte 
böyle idare ediyoruz.  
TG: Peki bu din dersi müfredattaki Türkiye’de ki aynen din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi ders 
gibi bir ders. Peki okullarda din kültürü ve ahlak dersi olarak geçiyor Türk okullarında 
içeriğinin daha çok Sunni İslam ağırlıklı olduğu yönünde hep eleştiriliyor. Dolayısıyla 
din eğitimi mi din öğretimi mi veriliyor tartışması oluyor. Sizin verdiğiniz.. 
AP: Bence daha biraz din bilgisine gidiyor. Tabi ki bazen böyle bir gezi düzenliyoruz, 
bazı kiliseye gidiyoruz orada ayine katılmak değil yani kiliseyle ilgili genel bilgi. 
Kilisenin böyle bölümleri var, her birinin anlamı böyle genel bilgiler veriliyor. Fakat 
daha çok din bilgisi, yani din eğitimi diyebileceğimizi zannetmiyorum.  
TG: Diğer dinler de anlatılıyor mu içerik olarak? 
AP: Lise 2’de müfredat, yani biz şöyle biraz da Yunan mütekabiliyetli olduğumuz için 
eskiden Yunanistan’dan gelen, 70li yıllarda tasdik edilmiş kitaplar var din eğitimi 
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konusunda o kitapları tamamen yani ders olarak yapamıyorsak da, çünkü orada 3-4 saattir 
din eğitimi, bazı bölümleri alıyoruz. Lise 2’deki müfredatta diğer dinler yani eski çok 
tanrılı dinler ve diğer dinler programları uygulanıyor. Orada İslamiyet, Hinduizim, 
İbranilik yani bunlar öğretiliyor azda olsa detaylı değil de ama esasları anlatılıyor. 
TG: Burada eğitim ilk okul dahil mi?  
AP: Yok ortaokul- lise. 
TG: Orta okul lise.. 
AP: Aslında ortaokul olmaması lazım yeni şeye göre.  
TG: 4+4+4 
AP: 4+4+4 evet. fakat bizim okullara yapı bakımdan uygulamak zor olduğu için bize özel 
bir izin verdiler. Ortaokullar lise yine devam ediyor. Fakat ayrı yani yönetim olarak ayrı 
ama aynı binanın içerisinde 
TG: Din dersi ortaokulun ilk sınıfından lisenin son sınıfına kadar, değil mi? 
AP: Tabi bizde ilkokulda da var. Bizde ilkokul yok ama ilkokuldan başlıyor son sınıfına 
kadar devam ediyor.  
TG: İlkokul 4’te mi 1’de mi başlıyor? Türk okullarında 4’te başlıyor çünkü... 
AP: Herhalde 4’te yani Türk okulları ile aynı gidiyoruz. Orada neyse, ders programı 
aynıdır.  
TG: Ders programı aynı yani. 
AP: Saatler aynı. 
TG: Ama içerik olarak bugüne kadar siz serbesttiniz içerikte... 
AP: Evet, tabi. 
TG: Yani herhangi bir kontrol bir şey yoktu devlet tarafından.. 
AP: Yok yani şeyde müfettişler geldiği zaman zaten onlar kontrol ediyordu. Bizim 
hazırladığımız zümre müfredat programını ama her okul farklı yapıyordu şimdi bu size 
verdiğim taslakla bütün okullar toplandık ve gelecek seneden itibaren uygulanmak üzere 
böyle bir müfredatta anlaştık.  
TG: Hep bir arada yapıldı yani her okul özerk olarak yapmıyor bunu. 
AP: Yok biz toplandık birarada yaptık. Ama bugüne kadar %60-70 aynı konuları işlesek 
de her okul kendi programını yapıyordu. Şu anda ortak bir program hazırladık ve bunu 
sunduk Milli Eğitim’e zaten onlar istedi. Baktılar ki bugüne kadar böyle bir ders 
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programı yok. Ve bunu sunduk. Herhalde gelecek sene eğitim programında bu 
uygulayacağız. Zaten yani dediğim gibi zaten yüzde büyük bir bölümü zaten yapılıyordu. 
TG: Yani bu son yıllarda denetim falan daha artması azalması gibi bir durum var mı? 
Yani denetime çok fazla tabi değilsiniz anladığım kadarıyla... 
AP: Eskiden çok denetim vardı mutlaka müfettişler gelirdi. 
TG: Hangi yıllarda, yani 90lara kadar falan mı? 
AP: Bakın ben şöyle bir çizgi çekiyorum. Benim de tayinim 1987 de oldu. 72’de okula 
geldim. 15 yıl kütüphane memuru, yok muhasebe bölümünde çalıştım. 1987’de Özal 
zamanında çok şey değişti biliyorsunuz. Gizli kararname kalktı, 64’ün. Bizim okullarda 
yine tayinler başladı, tayin yapmıyorlardı. Oraya çizgi çekiyorum. Ondan sonra hem 
denetimler azaldı biraz daha hoşgörülü davranılmaya başlandı. Ta ki 2000li yıllara gelene 
kadar. Ondan sonra tamamen değişti. Çok müspet yaklaşılıyor. Yani bir isteğimiz olduğu 
zaman müspet yaklaşılıyor. Eskiden tamamen tersi menfi yaklaşılıyordu ve hiçbir zaman 
da çözüm üretilmiyordu böyle sürüncemede kalıyordu.  
TG: Anladım. Avrupa Birliği’nin sizce etkisi var mı? Böyle hissettiğiniz somut şeyler... 
Çünkü bu raporlarda falan sürekli çünkü atıfta bulunuluyor. Hem Heybeli Ada Ruhban 
Okulu’na... 
AP: Heybeli Ada Ruhban Okulu’nu, bakın onu ayırmak lazım. Nedenini ben size 
söyleyeyim. Şimdi bizim bir çok sorunumuz çözülüyor. Şu anda vakıflarımız devamlı 
bizim alınan, yani işte gasp edilen diyelim, mallarımız yavaş yavaş az da olsa iade 
ediliyor. Okullarımızda büyük bir ilerleme var yani bir dediğimiz iki edilmiyor böyle 
basit söyleyeyim. Fakat Ruhban Okulu her nedense kim bilir yani ne gerekçe var 
arkasında bizim bilmediğimiz, orada iş takıldı açılmıyor. Ben bir ara Milliyet 
Gazetesi’nde okmuştum MGK’nın 60lı yıllarda galiba ya da daha sonra bir kararı var; bu 
okulun açılması milli menfaatlere aykırı diye. Milliyet Gazetesi’nde okumuştum. Ama o 
karar hala geçerli mi kalktı mı bunu bilemeyiz. 
TG: Ama din derslerinin orda yetişen ilahiyatçılar tarafından verilmesi daha doğru olur 
diye düşünüyorsunuz.  
AP: Şimdi ben daha doğru buluyorum. Şimdi bazı sorular soruyor çocuklar ben bir 
dereceye kadar cevap verebiliyorum. Ondan sonrasını cevap veremiyorum. Bir de benim 
din konusunda çok bilgim var diğer öğretmenlerin o kadar yok. Yani dinle ancak işte 
gidip kiliseye duasını yapacak bir mum yakacak işte o kadar ilgili. Buna rağmen 
mecburen derse giriyor. Onlar o kadar yardımcı olamıyor. Öğrenciler bazen tuhaf sorular 
soruyor. Onları cevaplamak lazım bir de mantıklı cevaplamak lazım. Bazen ikna 
oluyorlar olmuyorlar. Mesela dün bana cennetle cehennemle için sordular bir sınıfta. Onu 
tartıştık fakat sorular tabi biraz mantık arıyor ancak bazen mantık bazen duruyor. Bunu 
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böyle kabul etmek lazım çünkü din öyledir, bu kadar basit. Orada biraz yetenek ister bazı 
öğretmenler bunlara cevap veremiyor, bocalıyor fakat bir ilahiyatçı olsa herhalde daha iyi 
cevap verir.  
TG: Önce söyle sorayım burada öğrencilerin dışarıdaki öğrenciler tarafından herhangi bir 
rahatsızlığı bir dışlanma falan bir şey din konusunda özellikle... 
AP: Yok bu zamanımızda zannetmiyorum. Benim zamanımda vardı. Ama şu anda yok. 
Zaten bizim çocuklar Türkçeleri mükemmel olduğu için pek sokakta ayırt edilemez ancak 
kendi aralarında konuşurlarsa fark ediyorlar. Pek bugün öyle bir durumlar 
karşılaştıklarını zannetmiyorum.  
TG: Din dersinde mesela hani öğrenmeye başladıkları zaman farklılaşma ayrışma hissi 
oluyor mu? Mesela din dersine girmek istemeyen öğrenci var mı, bu dersi almak 
istemeyen?  
AP: Şimdi bizde mesela bizim okul Rum- Ortodoks mezhebine bağlı öğrencileri kabul 
ediyor. Fakat şöyle bir durum oldu şimdi biliyorsunuz bu medeni kanun değiştikten sonra 
ve ailenin reisi de, tam hukukçu dili ile bilmiyorum, erkek değil artık. Yani kadın da değil 
ama ailenin reisi yok gibi bilemiyorum tam nasıl oldu... 
TG: Evet ortaklaşa oldu.  
AP: Evet oldu ondan sonra bizim okullara annesi rum asıllı olan bizim okullara gelen 
öğrenci Türk uyruklu Rum asıllı. Rum- Ortodoks mezhebinde Türk uyruklu. Ondan sonra 
annesi de Rum olan bir öğrenci de gelebilir yani annesinin mezhebinden dolayı gelebilir 
bu sene şöyle bir durum da oluyor. Nüfus kağıdında din hanesi ya boştur ya İslam yazıyor 
babasından dolayı bu öğrencilere biz soruyoruz, gerçi bugüne kadar bir tane geldi, derse 
girmek istiyor musun diye, istiyorum dedi. Giriyor. Fakat istemiyorum deseydi bir 
dilekçe yazıp dersten muaf tutulacaktı. Böyle bir olanak var. Yani %99’u öğrencilerin 
Ortodoks-Hıristiyan mezhebinden fakat şimdi bilmiyorum diğer okular da daha çok var 
mı. Fakat 2-3 öğrenci olabilir. Onlara da soruluyor.  
TG: Daha çok serbestlik veya hoşgörü üzerine bir uygulama o zaman. Okul idaresinin İl 
Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü’ne, oraya buraya yazması gerekmiyor o zaman... Okul 
müdürlüğüne yazarak halledilebiliyor. 
AP: Evet. 
TG: Eğer girmeme talebi olsaydı... 
AP: Yani böyle bir talebi olsa kalbul olur ama bugüne kadar bize tek bir öğrenci geldi, o 
da girmek istiyordu.  
TG: Anladım. Peki dini uygulamalar, kiliseye gidiyoruz dediniz mesela; ders saati içinde 
mi dışında mı oluyor? 
358 
AP: Bazen şöyle eğer bir eğitim amaçlı bir gezi yapacaksak şimdi ben bazen çocuklara 
buraları gezdiriyorum. O zaman tabi kilise ile ilgili ders saatinde kilisede oluyoruz. Hatta 
ben Katolik kilisesine de götürüyorum orada farkı görmeleri için. Bu ara okulda bazen bir 
kompozisyon şeklinde yani gördüğünüz farkları belirtin yani böyle şeyler yaptırıyorum. 
Fakat bir ayin için zaten bir zorlama yok da mesela bizim okulun günü 21 Kasım. Niye, 
çünkü buradaki kilisenin günüdür 21 Kasım. Bu kilise de bizim okulun cemaatinin 
merkezi. Bizim okul o kiliseye bağlı onun için o gün çocukları götürüyoruz ayine, okul 
olarak ama. Diğer günler kendisi gitmek istiyor ise gider. Ama okul olarak bizim bir 
zorlamamız ya da bir talebimiz yok.  
TG: Anladım. Bunu Rum Vakıfları Derneği Başkanı olarak sorayım, size intikal eden 
mesela Rum bir ailenin çocuğu ama Türk okulunda okuyor; orada din dersi ile ilgili 
yaşadığı sıkıntılar, bir muafiyet durumu var ama işte bu muafiyetle ilgili bazı sıkıntılar 
yaşayanlar olduğunu duyuyoruz, var mı böyle duyumlarınız?  
AP: Bakın bu bizim cemiyetin çocuklarından birkaç tane var. 10-15 tane var. Türk 
okullarına kolejlere gidiyor, Anadolu liselerinde var 2-3 tane. Bu okullarda biraz eğitim 
düzeyi ve görüş çok farklı biraz daha yüksekte. Bunlar din derslerine girmiyor, zorlama 
da yok. Herhangi bir sorun da yaşadıklarını hiç duymadım. Ama şöyle diyeyim size 
buradaki şu andaki yani benim bildiğim mesela Heybeli’de bir çocuk aşağı yukarı 20 
sene evvel oradaki inip çıkmamak için oradaki liseye kaydoldu. Heybeli’deki ve baktım 
ki babası onu birkaç ay sonra aldı ve bizim okullara getirdi. Sordum niye diye, tabi sınıfın 
içinde sataşmalar vardı mecbur oldular onun üzerine daha fazla bir olay çıkmasın diye 
aldılar. Ama bu tabi tek tük misal. Çoğu hiçbir sorun yaşamıyor.  
TG: Peki onlar niye Türk okullarına gidiyor? Bu okulun, diğer Rum okullarının 
üniversite sınavı başarısı durumu nasıl ? 
AP: Başarı baya iyi. Bugünkü şartlarda şu an 2 milyon adaydan bahsediyoruz. Bizim 
öğrenciler...  
TG: Afedersiniz bölüyorum, bu okulda kaç öğrenci var? 
AP: 50. Tabi 50 diyince benim zamanında 67’de mezun oldum 750. Oğlum 94’te mezun 
oldu 250. Şu anda 50 öğrencimiz var seneye bakalım çünkü 13 tane son sınıf öğrencisi 
var. Onlar gitmek üzere ondan sonra herhalde 13 tane geleceğini tahmin etmiyorum. Yani 
sayımız az fakat üniversite giriş sınavlarında bence baya başarılı oluyorlar. Niye bence 
diyorum çünkü bizim toplumda biraz küçümseniyor. Çoğu diyor özel üniversitelere 
giriyor fakat 2 milyon adayın yarısından fazlası birinci elemede gidiyor. Demek ki sırf 
ikinci elemeye kalmak bile başarı. Onun haricinde hepsi örgün öğretime giriyor. Açık 
öğretime giren 1-2 öğrencimiz var. Devlet üniversitelerine giren onlar da 1-2 tane tabi. 
Çoğu özel üniversitelere giriyor. Burs sağlayabiliyor bazısı, bazısının maddi sorunu yok. 
359 
Ama küçümsemek ne oluyor? Özel üniversiteye girdi ama özel üniversiteye girmek de 
bugün bir başarı Türkiye için.  
TG: Tabi ki tabi ki ama şey çok büyük bir rakam 750-250. 250 ile 50 arasında 94 yılı 
dediniz; 2013, 20 yıl gibi bir zamanda yani 5’te 1.  
AP: Bizim toplum şu anda diyelim farz et 3 bin kişiyiz. Bu 3 bin kişiden bin kişi var 
normal aile yaşamında, diğerleri çoğu yaşlı ve tek başına kalmış. Mahmutbey’e gitsek 
orada 100-150 yaşlı var bizim ihtiyarhanede. Bir de İstanbul’un morfolojik durumu 
değiştiği için, çok uzakta oturanlar var. Ben Büyükçekmece’de bile Rum aile buldum ve 
hayret ettim pek oralara gitmez bizimkiler. Oralarda oturan var, onlar haliyle toplumdan 
kopuyor. Yani öyle bir sorun da var.  
TG: Anladım. Peki genel olarak yani toplumda yaşam, sizin de çok fazla vaktinizi 
almayayım. Türkiye tabi sürekli bir değişim içerisinde olan siyasi olarak çalkantılı olan 
bir ülke dolayısıyla azınlıkların durumu da tabi, Lozan’da tanımlanmış azınlıkların 
diyeyim, dini azınlıkların durumu da yasalarla belirli olmalarına rağmen siyasi gündemin 
içerisinde mutlaka etkileniyor. Kişisel deneyiminiz nedir, hem de Rum Vakıfları Derneği 
Başkanı olarak nasıl bir değişim görüyorsunuz? Din dersleri özelinde anlatmış olduğunuz 
değişimi kendi hayat öykünüzde nasıl tanımlarsınız? Mesela Avrupa Birliği’ne üyelik 
süreci bir mihenk taşı mı sizce yoksa ülkenin siyasi döngüsü mü daha temel bir sebep? 
AP: Bakın. Bunu biraz Avrupa Birliği’ne bağlamak da doğru olduğu kanaatindeyim 
ancak biraz da devlet de değişti. Şöyle ki, dediğim gibi Özal’ın zamanına bir çizgi 
çekiyorum hatta 2000 yılında daha da ileri gidiyor. Bir kere Avrupa Birliği’ne giriş süreci 
bunu etkiledi bu çok tabii bir şey, bir. İki, yetkilerin yani devletin görüşü tamamen 
değişti, düşünce şekli değişti. 
TG: Nasıl değişti? Nasıl bir değişim?  
AP: Çok basit şimdi burada İstanbul’da mesela eskiden bir Azınlıklar Tali Komisyonu 
vardı. Gizli bir komisyon. Farz edelim ben Ankara’ya gidiyordum tayinim için, tamam 
diyorlardı sorun yok tayinin çıkacak; İstanbul’a geliyordum buradan ret cevabı geliyordu. 
Ya diyordum bu kadar yalan olur mu? Bir de şöyle enteresan durumlar vardı, bazen 
oradaki memur pek dikkat etmiyordu bir öğretmenin Ankara’dan onayını buradakilerle 
birlikte bize tebliğ ediyordu. Yani bir taraftan bakıyorsun Ankara’dan onay var buraya 
geliyordu, İstanbul Milli Eğitim’den ret. Enteresan tabi. Komisyon varmış gizli biz onun 
varlığını son iyileşmelerden sonra öğrendik. Bu komisyon son sözü söylüyordu. Bu 
devletin gizli olarak kurduğu, kararları gizli bir komisyondu. Bu tabi o zamanlara 
gidersek 94 yılı dedim oğlum mezun oldu o sene beden eğitimi öğretmeni yoktu 
kontenjan da gelmedi. Türk-Yunan ilişkileri pek iyi değildi. Zaten bizim sorunlar hep 
kabak bizim başımıza patlıyor derler ya, öyle. Şimdi ne oldu biz müracaat ettik Milli 
Eğitim’e, dedik ki Yönetmeliğe göre beden eğitimi öğretmeni yok. Yönetmelikte diyor ki 
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2. dönem kurs yapılır, o da yapılmazsa ders yılı bittikten sonra 15 gün beden eğitimi 
üzerine bir öğretmen bulunur, bu dersi yapar 15 gün. O da yapılmazsa başka bir öğretmen 
kurs verir. Yani yönetmelik bu kadar açık. O da kabul edilmedi. Ve bir yazı geliyor bütün 
çocuklar sınıfta kaldı beden eğitiminden. Bir de benim oğlan da son sınıfta. Üniversite 
imtihanları yapılıyor. Biz tabi umut ediyoruz Ankaralara gidiyoruz. Yok tabi diyorlar 
bize söylemeyin Yunanistan’a söyleyin, niye kontenjan öğretmeni yollamadı. Biz nasıl 
söyleyelim? Ne ilgisi var? Onların yaptığI bir hata ise cezasını niye biz çekelim. Her 
neyse üniversite imtihanları oluyor bir çok çocuğumuz üniversiteye giriyor. Benim oğlan 
da Yıldız Teknik’e giriyor. E kayıt zamanları yaklaşıyor ses seda yok. Ne olacak diploma 
alamıyorlar. Mecburen bir hukukçu ile konuştuk, dedi ki idare mahkemesine başvurmanız 
lazım. Fakat bunlar olurken zaman geçiyor. Neyse biz birkaç veli karar verip avukata 
vekalet verip idare mahkemesine müracaat ediyoruz. Ve idare mahkemesinde davaları tek 
bir idare mahkemesi kabul etmedi dağıtıldı. 9 günde bize yürütmeyi durdurma kararı 
verdiler ama nasıl? Önce üniversiteden görüş aldı, hukuk fakültesinden. Oradaki hoca 
dedi ki bakın, idari hukukta idarenin savunması alınmadan yürütmeyi durdurma kararı 
verilmez. Biz tabi biraz tedirgin olduk. Fakat 9 günde verildi karar. Nasıl verildiğini 
sonra söyleyeceğim sana. Karar çıktı fakat tebliğ edilmiyor bize. O kadar büyük bir baskı 
yani mahkemelerin üzerinde bu Ergenekon şeyi var ya... Onun üzerine biz tabi 
uğraşıyoruz. Kanunlar tabi çok yardımcı oldu. Bu tabi çok enteresan bir süreç. Biz tabi 
alınca hocaya dedik ki hukuk fakültesinde, bak aldık. Ya dedi bu bizim literatüre geçti ilk 
defa savunma alınmadan karar verildi. Neyse biz yürütmeyi durdurma kararlarını kayıtlar 
saat 5 de bitiyordu Cuma günü, saat 3 de alabildik. 2 saat içinde bütün veliler çocuklar 
koşa koşa bürolara gittik kayıt için. Ben oğlumu daha önce kayıt etmiştim, rektöre gittim 
buradan da bizim müdür muavini bereket Amerika’ya gitmişti burada da bir müdür 
muavini hukukçu müdür muavini vekalet ediyordu o bana bir yazı verdi. Diploması şu 
anda hazır değil diye... ben oğlanı öyle kayıt ettirmiştim ama söylemiyordum millet beni 
kesecek. Ondan sonra biz avukatla idare mahkemesine teşekkür için gittik. Bir tatlı aldık. 
Bir hakim bayan dedi ki çok baskı gördük bunu ben kendi kulaklarımla duydum, adını 
bile bilmiyorum; çok baskı gördük ama ben dedi, kızım üniversiteye giriyor başka türlü 
karar veremezdim. Yani o kadar... ve çocukları o zaman kaydettirdik. Fakat.. 
TG: Yani olumsuz yönde çok baskı görüyorlar ama…  
AP: Evet ama dediğim gibi 2000’den sonra o mantalite tamamen değişti. Şimdi sizin 
dediğiniz gibi acaba Avrupa’ya müracaat süreci mi onu değiştirdi, işte bu AK Parti’nin 
başa gelmesi ve oradaki… 
TG: Dini özgürlükler arttı… 
AP: Dini özgürlükler arttığı için mi… fakat ondan sonra bugün de dahil böyle 
sorunlarımız çok yok. Ben şu anda, övünmek için değil de, bizi Cumhurbaşkanı kabul 
etti. Bülent Arınç’la 2-3 kere görüştüm. Egemen Bağış’la görüşüyoruz devamlı. Avrupa 
Birliği bürosu ile devamlı irtibattayız. 
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TG: Hangi konularda? Bu vakıflara malların, arazilerin iadesi konusunda mı?… 
AP: Evet özellikle vakıflar konusunda büyük bir ilerleme kaydettik ama daha da olması 
lazım, sorunlar bitmez. Biz şu anda 60 70 yıllık sorunlardan bahsediyoruz. Yani 1925’ten 
başlayan sorunlardan bahsediyoruz bunlar böyle bir günde iki günde hallolmaz ama 
büyük bir ilerleme oldu… 
TG: Bir süreç başladı değil mi? Bu malların, arazilerin iadesinde yol alındı ama daha 
başka talepleriniz de var değil mi? Süreç bu anlamda da devam ediyor… 
AP: Tabii tabii, devam ediyor… bir süreç başladı. Bazı iadeler oldu ikinci üçüncü oldu 
şimdi bakalım belki daha ileride bir süreç daha başlar. Her defasında yeni belgeler 
çıkıyor; yeni mallar talep ediliyor, bazısı iade ediliyor, bazısı iade edilmiyor 
TG: Vakıflara iade ediliyor değil mi? 
AP: Özellikle 3. kişilere geçenler onlar iade edilemiyor. Onlar ancak mahkeme kararıyla, 
tazminat davasıyla. Şimdi bunlar üçüncü dördüncü kişilere geçti tabii geri almak zor… 
TG: Şimdi bu Heybeli Ada konusuna geri dönecek olursak, orada bir gelişme bekliyor 
musunuz kısa zamanda? Bu sürekli İlerleme Raporları’nda bu kadar çok, net bir şekilde, 
dini azınlıkların hakları olarak da değil çok spesifik olarak Heybeli Ada Ruhban 
Okulu’nun açılması gerekiyor diye her sefer her sefer belirttikleri için, mesela bu alanda 
bir ilerleme Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’nin din-devlet ilişkileri konusundaki tutumuna 
direk bir etkisi olduğunu gösterecek. Onun için sizin direk talep eden taraf olarak 
beklentiniz nedir? 
AP: Şimdi bu Ruhban Okulu çok enteresan, bir kere Ruhban Okulu; Avrupa Birliği 
sürecinden sonra başlamadı çok daha evvel başladı. Amerika çok baskı yaptı. Fakat her 
nedense, mutlaka bizim bilmediğimiz bir gerekçe var, bir nedeni var. E açmak 
istemiyorlar, birbirimizi aldatmayalım. Eğer hükümet isteseydi bir günde değil bir saatte 
açardı. Çok basit. Eski statüsünde, yani Milli Eğitim’e bağlı meslek yüksek okuluydu, 
aynı statüde açılacaktı. Hiçbir zaman üniversite olarak kabul edilmedi. Mezunları 
önceleri yedek subay olarak gidiyordu fakat bir tarihten sonra normal asker olarak 
gidiyorlardı. Ruhban Okulu mu bilmiyorum ama arkasında mutlaka bir gerekçe gizli. 
TG: Açılsa talep ne oranda olur? Yani olur mu yani Meslek Yüksek Okulu olarak gidecek 
öğrenciler… 
AP: Ruhban Okulu bütün dünyada tarafından tanınıyordu diploması. Onun için zaten 
oradan mezun olanların çoğu mühtelif ülkelerde ya dini görevli olarak ya öğretmen tayin 
ediliyordı. Ancak Türkiye’de doğanlar Türkiye’de kalıyorlardı. Aynı statüde açılırsa 
bence en bize yaralı olacağı şey; oradan mezun olanlar İstanbul’un yani Türkiye’nin bir 
havarisi gibiydi. Buraya gelen o kadar İstanbul’u beğeniyorlardı ki, benim orada 
tanıdığım ki ben 2 sene kaldım okudum o lisede…  
362 
TG: Nerede? 
AP: Ruhban okulu liselerinde 2 sene okudum. Şimdi yüksek sınıflarda olan yabancı 
ülkelerden gelenler burayı o kadar beğeniyorlardı ki, din adamı olduktan sonra devamlı 
nutuklarında, konuşmalarında burayı anlata anlata bitiremiyorlardı. Yani buranın devamlı 
reklamını yapıyorlardı. Bence bu yararlı bir şeydi ama politika bazı şeyleri farklı görüyor. 
Bizim göremediğimiz bir şekilde. Ben açılmasında bir zarar görmüyorum ama yetkililerin 
muhakkak bir bildikleri vardır. 
TG: Biliyorsunuz, ülkede şimdi dindarlık yükseldi, yükseliyor gibi böyle araştırmalar, bir 
takım anketler yapılıyor. Dini özgürlükler anlamında biraz da bakıyorlar hani dini 
özgürlükler arttıkça dindarlık da artıyor ülkede özellikle Sünni mezhebine dahil olanlar 
için söyleniyor daha çok dindarlığın arttığı... Bu dindarlığın artması ötekileştirmeyi 
getiriyor mu? Yani Alevilerin böyle bir şikayeti var çünkü; zaten hep vardı bugün biraz 
daha gün yüzüne çıktığını söylüyorlar. Sizin böyle bir ötekileştirmeye; arttığına veya 
azaldığına dair bir gözleminiz var mı? 
AP: Valla pek yok, biz eskiden daha zor durumdaydık şimdi doğruyu söylemek lazım… 
TG: O zamanlar sayıca daha çok ve daha aktif olmanızdan sanırım… 
AP: Çoktuk, o zaman çoktuk ve daha çok göze batıyorduk. İşte biliyorsunuz 6-7 Eylül 
olayı oldu, 1964’te sürgün olayı oldu, 74’te Kıbrıs... bunlar bizi o zaman hep etkiledi. O 
zamanlarda “gavur” kelimesi çok günlük konuşmalarda olan çok yaygın bir sıfattı bizim 
için. Bazı dönemlerde hatırlıyorum çocukluğumdan, çan çalmıyordu kiliselerde 
korkudan. Bu ötekileştirme çok büyük. Fakat bizim için bugün tam tersini düşünüyorum 
yani yaklaşım çok olumlu. Böyle bir kötü kelime, kötü bir bakış pek yok gibi. Yani millet 
yadırgamıyor çanı da çalıyoruz. Hatta ben adadayım yazın, çanı çalmayınca niye Pazar 
günü çanı çalmadınız gibi... böyle bir yaklaşım. 
TG: Yani kiliseye gitmeniz, dini yaşıyor olmanız, pratik etmeniz konusunda bir göze 
batma sonucu sataşma ile karşılaşmıyorsunuz... 
AP: Yok yok.. Hatta özellikle Rum’ların eskiden yoğun olarak yaşadığı bölgelerde hiç 
böyle bir tedirginlik yaşanmıyor kanaatimce. 
TG: Bilmediğim için soruyorum, İstanbul dışında yaşayan Rum Ortodoks cemaatine 
mensup aileler var mı? 
AP: Yok, yok yalnız İzmir’de birkaç tane yaşlı kaldı. 10 kişi var mı yok mu bilmiyorum. 
Yaşlı. Biliyorsunuz Lozan’da bir tek İstanbul mübadelede hariç tutuldu, bir de Gökçeada 
ve Bozcaada. Orada zaten 200-300 kişi var adalarda, İstanbul’da da zaten şu anda yani 
başka bunun haricinde Rum topluluğu yok. 
TG: Sayı olarak ne kadar demiştiniz? 
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AP: 2000 2500 3000 kişi civarında kaldık. 
TG: O yüzden de artık bir tehdit unsuru olarak görülmediği içinde bir rahatlama daha hoş 
görülü bir tavır oluşmuş olabilir… 
AP: Hem genel olarak mantalite değişti hem de biz tabii çok az kişi olduğumuz için bir 
tehdit unsuru olarak görülmüyoruz. 
TG: Evet evet, yani işe girerken bu böyle bir engel olarak çıkmıyor değil mi? 
AP: Eskiden çıkıyordu mesela, işe almak istemiyorlardı. Şimdi yok. Pek çok mezunumuz 
Türk firmalarında çalışıyorlar. Bir tek devlet memuru olamıyoruz; olamıyorduk, şimdi 
olabiliyoruz da kimse müracaat etmiyor. 
TG: Nüfus kağıdında din hanesine bir şey yazmak zorunda değilsiniz ama 
yazdırabiliyorsunuz değil mi? 
AP: Hıristiyan olarak. 
TG: Hıristiyan olarak yazabiliyorsunuz ama yazmak zorunda da değilsiniz. 
AP: Yazıyorlar galiba pek emin değilim ama yalnız bu annesi babası başka dinden 
olanların boş bırakıyorlar. 
TG: Anladım. Sıkça duyduğumuz şeyler işe girerken nufus kağıdında din hanesinde 
İslam dışında bir şey yazmasının sıkıntı yarattığı yönünde … 
AP: Eskiden öyleydi ama pek rahat rahat da göstermezdik nüfüs kağıdımızı. 
TG: Evet işte onun için merak ettim... 
AP: Biraz korka korka... 
TG: Ama şimdi çok daha rahat değil mi? 
AP: Rahat, rahat. 
TG: Sizin bu görüşmeler esnasında hissettiğiniz yani devlet büyükleriyle görüşmeler 
sırasında hissettiğiniz? 
AP:Yaklaşım çok olumlu... Cumhurbaşkanı, Başbakan, Başbakan Yardımcısı, çok çok 
olumluydu. 
TG: Peki orada Avrupa Birliği’ne üyelik sürecine hiç değinildi mi? Dönüp dönüp oraya 
bağlıyorum çünkü ne derecede etkili oldu anlamaya çalışıyorum; atıfta bulunuldu mu 
mesela bu varlıkların iadesi konusunda? 
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AP: Zannederim tabii o süreçte bütün bunlar tahlil edildi o; Avrupa Birliği sürecinde. 
Ondan sonra bu gibi talepler başladı yani bize soruldu hangi talebiniz var dedik şu şu 
şu… 
TG: Yani soruldu, ne zaman soruldu? Bu yıl içinde mi?  
AP: Soruldu, birkaç sene evvel. Avrupa Birliği süreci başladığında ben değil ama 
başkaları da buradaki Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu’yla görüşmeler oldu talepler işte, 
Patrikhane’yle konuşuldu şu şu sorunlar var ve devletle de bunların çözüme çalışıldı. 
TG: Komisyon derken, bu Ankara’daki delegasyonu diyorsunuz değil mi?  
AP: Evet hemen bu Ortaköy’deydi, orada hemen Esma Sultan Yalısı’nın yanında. Birkaç 
kere ben de gittim toplantılara. Orada yazılı olarak taleplerimizi sunduk konuştuk hatta 
ondan sonra istişareler yapıldı. Hatta çok enteresan; bu konu çözüldü mü çözülmedi bize 
soruldu. 
TG: Orada hem devleti temsilen birileri oluyor, hem Rum Vakıflarını temsilen siz 
oluyorsunuz, hem de Komisyon biraz ara bulucu gibi oluyor... 
AP: Tabii bir de diğer cemaatlerden de temsilciler oluyor. Sorunlar önce ortaya çıktı, 
kaydedildi, sonra yavaş yavaş çözümler üretildi. 
TG: Sonra da bir araya gelip ne kadarı yapıldı ne kadarı yapılmadı... 
AP: Bence belki Avrupa süreci olmasaydı da belki çözülürdü ama mutlaka Avrupa 
sürecinin de büyük etkisi var. 
TG: Yani biraz arabuluculuk biraz kontrolörlük gibi ne kadar talepler gerçekleşti ne kadar 
gerçekleşmedi... 
AP: Evet evet… 
TG: Benim de anlamaya çalıştığım Avrupa Birliği üyeliği olmasaydı da belki zamanla 
dini hoşgörünün artmasıyla… 
AP: Belki olurdu evet, fakat Avrupa süreci biraz hızlandırdı diyelim ve daha tertipli, 
sistemli bir hale getirdi. 
TG: Evet. Peki sizin söylemek istediğiniz paylaşmak istediğiniz başka bir şey olur mu 
acaba? 
AP: Ben şöyle diyeyim… Biz toplum olarak Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği sürecini bizden 
daha çok savunan isteyen bir kesim olamaz. Yani bu süreç başladıktan sonra hem 
dediğimiz gibi hayatımız biraz kolaylaştı hem de bu sürece inanmış bir toplumuz. Yani 
mutlaka Türkiye’nin bir gün, hakikaten ilerleme yolunda devam etmek istiyorsa, mutlaka 
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Avrupa’nın üyesi olması gerektiğine inanan bir toplumuz. O yüzden Türkiye’de en çok 
olmasını isteyenlerden biriyiz 
TG: Evet olumlu yansımalarını da belki en çabuk gören toplum… 
AP: Evet, o toplum biziz. 
TG: Çok teşekkür ederim. 
 
 
Interview with Mr. Laki Vingas, Representative of the Minority Foundations 
15.04.2013, General Directorate for Foundations, Ankara  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Dediğim gibi ben konuyu, okullardaki din dersleri özelinde incelemeye 
çalışıyorum. Sizin öncelikle bu süreç içinde,yani Avrupa Birliği süreci içinde, hem iç 
hem dış dinamikler söz konusu olduğunda genel olarak azınlıkların durumu ne şekilde 
ilerledi? Sizin görüşlerinizi okudum takip ettim, ama biraz daha din dersleri özelinde de 
ne şekilde gidiyor, nereye gitmesini bekliyoruz düşüncelerinizi öğrenmem mümkün mü? 
Laki Vingas: Ben şimdi bu konuda tam olarak uzman değilim, ben ancak gönüllü çalışan, 
çok uzun yıllar gönüllü çalışan kendi tabirimle biraz daha şantiye insanıyım yani 
dolayısıyla bir teorisyen falan değilim. Din konusunda geçen gün Diyanetin sitesinde 
açıklamalarım oldu okudunuz mu onu? 
TG: Okudum evet.. 
LV: Ne kadar hızlı okudunuz bravo. Şimdi din dersi konusu ben genel olarak din devlet 
veya din cemaat arasındaki benim inançlarımı söyleyeceğim. Tabii ki Avrupa Birliği’yle 
Türkiye münasebetinin son 15 yılda 20 yılda daha hız kazanması söz konusu. Bu 
ilişkilerin daha işte acaba Türkiye’nin zorlamasıyla Avrupa Birliği de bir direnç gösterdi, 
yani Türkiye zorladıkça Avrupa Birliği şartlarını öne koştu ve bu şartlarla da Türkiye 
karşı karşıya kaldı. Bu şartları da bir şekilde uygulamaya çalıştı, çalışıyor ve bazılarını da 
uygulatıyorlar. Şimdi din konusunda tabi ki ben, örneğin ben kendimden anlatayım, ben 
inançlı bir insanım ama kimseye de inanç konusunda baskı yapılması konusunda taraftar 
değilim. Yani kendimle ilgili bir inancım var ama başkalarına da bir zorlama bir dayatma, 
tamamıyla karşıyım. Bu tabii ki okuldan başlar. Böyle bir anlayışın okulda başlaması 
lazım. Din öyle bir değer ki; önce saygıyla karşılamamız lazım. Yani bir insanının 
inancını saygıyla değerlendirmemiz lazım, inançsızları da saygıyla değerlendirmemiz 
lazım. Başka bir inancın tercihini de yine saygıyla…Dolayısıyla bütün bunların olduğu 
bir platformda bir din özgürlüğü söz konusu olması gerekiyor. Hep söylemişimdir; ibadet 
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özgürlüğü azınlıklar için hiçbir dönemde ibadet özgürlüğü sınırlandırılmadı veya çok 
azdı, ama din özgürlüğü yahut ibadet özgürlüğü mütenasip değildir yani farklı boyutları 
vardır, aynı değildir. Bu dini empoze etmek, din dersi almak din dersi mutlaka almak gibi 
konularda bir yerde öyle. Yani din özgürlüğü kapsamında bir insan inanmak istediği dini 
istiyorsa öğrensin, yani adam bir din mensubu değilse başka bir dini öğrenmesin ama 
buna rağmen bütün dinlerin kısa bir tarihçesini varlık sebebini de öğrenmesi lazım, ben 
Müslümansam; bir Katolik, bir Hıristiyan, bir Yahudi, bir Budist nedir bunları bilmem 
gerekiyor. Tersi de öyle… Bir Hıristiyan’ın da Müslüman, Müslümanlığın ne olduğunu 
nasıl hareket ettiğini, tarihsel perspektiften bahsediyorum, onları bilmesi gerekiyor. 
Dolayısıyla çocukların küçük yaşta eğitimlerinde mutlaka baskın olan, dünyada baskın 
olan büyük dinlerin kısa tarihçelerini öğrenmeleri gerekiyor. Bunu öğrendiler mi bir kere 
çok dinli bir dünyada yaşadığımızı biliyorlar bir de saygı anlamında da çok daha değer 
veriyorlar. Dolayısıyla ilköğretim çok çok önemli. Bu yalnız din konusuyla değil biz bile 
bu ülkenin bir toplumu ama küçük bir toplumu olarak bilinmiyor olmaktan çok 
muzdaribiz, tanınmıyor olmamızdan çok muzdaribiz. İnsanlar daha yeni yeni keşfediyor. 
Yeni yeni gelip de diyorlar ki, biz sizi kötü biliyorduk ama siz çok iyi insanlarmışsınız. 
Biz Antep’te çok düşmandık ama İstanbul’a geldik, eğitim aldık, master yapıyoruz 
araştırıyoruz, farklıymışsınız. Belki bizim dedelerimiz de sizin soydandı gibi 
yaklaşımlarla karşı karşıyayız her gün ama her gün. Bu bir realiteyi gösteriyor. Bu realite 
de işte gerekli eğitimin, eşdeğer ve saygıya dayalı eğitimin verilmiyor olmasıdır. Tabii ki 
bu farklı hürriyetlerle farklı dini de kapsıyor. Onun dışında diyanette de bunu söyledim, 
yani diyanet olsun mu olmasın mı? Diyanet gibi kurumlar olsun ama öyle bir olsun ki 
yani bir dini koordine eden, hiyerarşik bir yapı düzenleyen, kaosu engelleyecek olan bir 
merkezi, bir hiyerarşik, bir referans noktası olsun ama öyle bir olsun ki herkes için olsun. 
Yani diyanet olsun, ama Sünni kesim olmayan insanların da bir merkezi olsun ya da 
diyanet daha özgür olsun. Dolayısıyla bütün bunları din ekseni üzerinden bir toplum 
yaratmak benim pek tarzım değildir, ben daha liberal düşünen bir insanım. İnançlıyım 
ama kimseye de baskı olsun istemem ben çocuklarıma bile baskı yapmıyorum. 
TG: Siz Lozan’da tanımlanmış olan azınlıkların haricinde, Türkiye’de varolan diğer 
inançlara sahip toplulukları da temsil ediyor musunuz yoksa…? 
LV: Şimdi bakın Lozan, Siyaset Bilimcisi olarak sizin için çok daha önemli fakat benim 
için pratik hayatta daha az önemli ve her gün de uygulamalarını görüyorum. Neden 
benim için daha az önemli, sizin için çok daha önemli? Çünkü bir Siyaset Bilimcisisiniz 
ve o kapsamda bakmak zorundasınız ve doğrusu odur. Ben ise Lozan’ı hep azınlıklar 
üzerinde var olmuş bir anlaşma olarak algıladığım için, sanki Lozan’ın başka hiçbir 
maddesi yokmuşçasına, Lozan dendiği zaman azınlıklar konusu akla geliyor. Benim 
orada bir sıkıntım var yani koskoca Lozan Antlaşması sanki Türkiye Yunanistan arasında 
bir mütekabiliyet uygulaması var olsun diye imzalanmış ve yalnız bu iki ülke imzalamış 
gibi bir kanaat var. Halbuki oranın altına imza atmış bir sürü ülke var, hiçbir zaman 
Lozan’la ilgilenmemiş, Lozan’ın şartlarının uygulanıp uygulanmadığına bakmamış, onun 
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mesuliyetini taşımamış. Bir de siz azınlıklar dışında Lozan’ın gündeme geldiği başka bir 
konu duyuyor musunuz? 
TG: Türkiye’de evet ne yazık ki öyle bir şey yok. 
LV: O zaman ben bir azınlık mensubu olarak diyorum ki Lozan yüz yıllık bir antlaşma. 
Şartları benim için, sırf benim, azınlıklar, benim gibi insanlar için geçerliyse yüzyıllık 
mirası farklı yerlere gelmiş bir antlaşma. Neden Lozan’ın bütün antlaşma çerçevesi için 
demiyorum ama maddeler için söylüyorum. Çünkü Lozan bugüne kadar Türkiye’de 
Lozan-azınlık, azınlık-Lozan, mütekabiliyet-azınlık-Lozan; bu üçgen içinde çırpınıyoruz. 
Dolayısıyla benim için Lozan ne kadar önemli, bilmiyorum artık 2015 -2020 şartlarında 
çünkü İnsan Hakları derdi çıkıyor öne. O zaman bir ulus-devlet kavramı vardı şimdi 
İnsan Hakları Beyannameleri var, İnsan Hakları gelişimleri var. Bunlar öne çıkıyor. Öne 
çıkınca o zamanki oradaki sınırlar da cemaatler için, azınlıklar için olan sınırlar da 
gelişiyor. Bugün 1923 olsaydı; Türkiye’de üç tane cemaatten bahsediliyordu, o da şüphe 
ediyorum yani bazı Müslüman ve Rum, Yahudi, Ermeni antlaşma da belirliyor, antlaşma 
da bir sınırlamıyor. O kadar çelişki var ki Lozan’ın taraftarlarıyla yani eski taraftarlarıyla 
günün şartları arasında o kadar büyük çelişki var ki... Örneğin Lozan’ın üç tane 
tanımladığı azınlık var onun dışında çok iyi hatırlarım çocukluğumda gerçi Demirel öyle 
derdi, onun dışındakiler hepsi Türk milleti derdi. Bir bütün millet bir ulus devlet derdi. 
Bu bugün geçerli değil. Hepimizde kabullenmiş vaziyetteyiz.Başka bütün devlet 
hiyerarşisi başta olmak üzere. Artık böyle bir şey yok. Bir taraftan üç cemaat var dedik 
yani başkaları yok dedik bir taraftan da Süryanilerin, Keldanilerin, Bulgarların 
vakıflarının tüzel kişiliği var. Bir tarafta Katolikler tanımlanmış değiller, bir tarafta 
Katoliklerin merkezi olan Vatikan’la siyasi ilişkilerle karşılıklı elçilikler var, bir tarafta 
Katoliklerin tüzel kişiliği yok (00.10.00). Bir tarafta Patrik’in şahsını tanımlıyorsunuz, 
Patrikhane ile koskoca devletler arası ilişkiler oluyor; başbakan yardımcıları gidiyor, 
Davutoğlu gidiyor ama… Patrikhane diye bir kurumun tüzel kişiliği yok. Yani o kadar 
çok çelişki var ki. Ben bu çelişkilerin içinde yaşamaya zorunda olan bir insan olarak 
Lozan’ın ne kadar önemli olduğunu bilmiyorum açıkçası. Bugün Lozan bunu bunu diyor, 
bir taraftan Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne gidiyorsunuz farklı kararlarla 
geliyorsunuz. Dolayısıyla evet ben 166 tane vakfı temsil ediyorum. 2009’un Ocak 1’i 
itibariyle görevim başladı. Yanılmıyorsam 2008’in sonbaharında ya da o dönemde Hayati 
Yazıcı vakıflardan sorumlu bakandı. Parlamentodan Vakıflar Kanunu geçerken çok 
büyük ıstıraplarla geçti. Çok büyük kavgalarla çelişkilerle ve kötü yorumlarla geçti. 
Hayati Yazıcı 161 tane vakıf var 1 tane daha olmayacak yani TBMM’ye garanti 
veriyordu, ki böyle bir daha bir şey olmayacak yani 161’le sınırladık bir yerde içiniz 
rahat olsun diyordu. Ve bugün 166 tane var. Anlatabildim mi? Bugün 166 tane var. 3 
tanesini bu kurum tanımladı, 1-2 tanesi de mahkeme yoluyla geldi. Demek ki değişmez 
diye bir şey yok. Ben sorunuzu böyle cevaplandırdım. 
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TG: Günün şartlarına uygun olarak yani tabii Türkiye’de bu kadar cemaat vardır diyerek 
yukarıdan tanımlanabilecek bir şey değil bu. Yani günün şartlarına ihtiyaçlarına, 
toplulukların ihtiyaçlarına, cemaatlerin ihtiyaçlarına uygun olarak her gün düzenlenmesi 
gerekebilecek yapılandırılması gerekebilecek bir şey . Bana da böylesi çok daha mantıklı 
geliyor yani bu sürecin… 
LV: Ben burada Ankara’da çok uğraşıyorum, tüzel kişiliklerle ilgili bir panel yapmaya 
çalışıyorum. Açıkçası burada bir STK yani Ankaralı olmadığım STK falan da çok 
bilmiyorum için Sema Hanım’a sordum Levent Korkut Bey diye birini tavsiye etti. Tanır 
mısınız? 
TG: Hayır… 
LV: O burada çok aktif bir STK yöneticisi falan. Bir türlü onunla ama anlaşamadık. Yani 
çok yoğundu hep sıkıştırdım sıkıştırdım bir türlü yakalayamadım istediğim gibi. Baktım 
iki ay geçti, yön değiştirmek zorunda kaldım sonra Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi’ne gittim. 
Orada da hiç tanımadığım Kerem...  
TG: Altıparmak... 
LV: Evet, Kerem Altıparmak’la tanıştım. Kapısını çaldım, tanıştım. Dedim ki böyle 
böyle yapmak istiyorum, dedi ki ben bu okulun uzmanı değilim ama İnsan Hakları 
Enstitüsü diye bir enstitüleri var o çerçevede yapabiliriz. Çünkü ben ortak istiyordum, 
Ankara’da. Netice itibariyle biraz biraz ilerliyoruz. 13 Mayıs’ta yapmak istiyorum. Yani 
isimler üzerinde sıkıntımız var, konuları biraz belirledik artı bir sürü de denge konusu 
var; bütün cemaatlerin katılımını sağlamaya çalışacağım. Burada ne yapmak istiyorum, 
amacım nedir hedef nedir? Bu tüzel kişilikleri irdelemek, örgütlenme sistemini 
irdelemek, ihtiyaçları gündeme getirmek, çelişkileri irdelemek… Bir taraftan buna yok 
derken bir taraftan buna var diyoruz. Mesela bir tarafta buna var derken var olan siyasi 
iradenin iyi yönde bir çabasının sonucudur. Demek ki öteki bugüne kadar var olduğunu 
iddia ettiğimiz tabular, engeller yıkılabiliyormuş. Böyle imkanlar var olduğuna göre var 
olanlara da çözüm getirelim veya onlara yeni bir anlatım getirelim, yeni bir çözüm 
getirelim. Mesela Vakıflar Kanunu 1936 Beyannamesinde varsa diyor, taşınmazlar... ‘36 
Beyannamesi bir şekilde tüzel kişilik veren bir beyanname. Belki de dünya da ender 
hadiselerden biri; Beyannamenin tüzel kişilik olarak söylenmesi. Biz günümüzde bile 
yazışıyoruz bankalarla, hesap açmak istiyoruz. Adam yazı gönderiyor diyor ki lütfen 
tüzüğünü getir, tüzüğün yoksa diyor imkansız. Şimdi hiçbir çağdaş hukukçu Türkiye’de 
tüzüksüz vakıf bilmiyor, anlayamıyor varoluş sebebini. Demek ki diyoruz ki bütün 
bunları bir Rönesansa girmemiz lazım. Şimdi bizimkiler vakıf sayılıyor; beyannameye 
göre sayılıyor. Ama ben size iddia ederim 166 tanenin belki 15-20 tanesi ’36 
Beyannamesi vermemiş veya vakıf olarak tanımlanmıyor sayılmıyor. Biz 2012’de vakıf 
kurduk hani ‘36 Beyannamesi? Demek ki ‘36 Beyannamesinin hukuki bir boşluk içinde. 
Ya yeni bir tüzük oluşturacağız, ortak bir tüzük oluşturacağız, farklı bir sistem 
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oluşturacağız. Yani söylemek istediğim şey, tekrar ediyorum Katolik olayını anlatıyorum 
size; siyasi olarak birbirini tanıyorsun ama tüzel kişiliğini vermiyorsun, bütün yükleri 
havada; koruyamıyorsun. Bir tarafta cemaat vakfı 161’den fazla olmaz diyorsun ama 
daha sonradan 5 tane daha oluyor. Bir tarafta ‘36 Beyannamesi diyorsun ama en az 15-20 
tane ’36 Beyannamesi olmayan vakıflar var onları kabul ediyorsun sen kuruyorsun. Yani 
bir şekilde tezatlar çelişkiler oluşturuyorsun. E bir tarafta diyorsun ki önüne dosyalar 
çıkıyor, 36 Beyannamesi vermemiş, kabul etmemiş tüzel kişilik tanımlanmış, 
taşınmazları talep ediyor burada ve diyor ki ben ‘36’da beyanname vermemişim veya 
bilmiyordum fakat ‘36’da vergi beyannameleri verdim devletime. Şimdi burası o vergi 
varakalarını kabul etmesi gerekiyor mu gerekmiyor mu? ’36 beyannamesiyle vergi 
beyannamesinin bir ortak tarafı var mı yok mu? Şimdi bütün bunlar havada o kadar boşta 
ki bunların silinmesi temizlenmesi gerekiyor kanaatindeyim. Yoksa bütün problemler hep 
böyle gerçeklerden kaçarak, gerçeklerden korkarak ilerleyemeyecek. 
TG: Peki bütün bu tezatlar ve çelişkiler ortamında size ne kadar bu sıkıntıları özellikle 
din derslerinde, oraya geçiyorum çünkü konum daha özelde o olduğu için, okullardaki 
din dersleri konusundaki muafiyetle ilgili mesela Lozan’da tanımlanmış olan azınlıkların 
muafiyet hakkı var ve çok daha geniş bir bu zorunlu din dersine maruz kalan ama 
Lozan’da tanımlanmamış bir topluluktan da bahsetmek mümkün. Size bu cemaatlerden 
sıkıntılar sorunlar ne ölçüde yansıyor? Bir de sizce bu ne şekilde düzeltilebilir? Yani 
mesela Alevilerle ilgili durum ortada ama bir de hiç sesi duyulmayan, çok daha az sesi 
duyulan, Süryaniler var Caferiler var… 
LV: Şimdi bakın din dersi konusu ben tabii ki şahsen, din üzerinden sorunları çözmek, 
din üzerinden siyasi bir yapılanma içine girmek konusunda çok büyük endişelerim var. 
Çünkü bugün aldığınız kararlar dinle alakalı kararlar bir bakıyorsunuz 20 yıl sonra artık 
geçersiz oluyor. Buna rağmen gelelim din dersine; tabii ki adam Hıristiyansa veya 
Yahudiyse yahut hüviyetinde öyleyse buna rağmen din dersi almak istemeyebilir. Yani 
adam Hıristiyansa ve Hıristiyan yazıyorsa hüviyetinde ve istemiyorsa, ailesi de 
istemiyorsa, o çocuğa zorla din dersi vermek bence doğru değil. Dolayısıyla oraya kadar 
sıkıntı yani din dersi tamamıyla isteğe bağlı olması gerekiyor. Hıristiyan okullarında 
herkes Hıristiyan sayılır dolayısıyla Hıristiyanlığı öğrenmek zorundadır, değil mi, Yahudi 
okullarında da böyle. Ben oraya kadar özgürlük gitsin istiyorum. Yani yalnız Müslüman 
okullarda Hıristiyanlara muafiyet değil, Hıristiyan okullarında da Hıristiyan diye gözüken 
toplumunda seçme hakkı olsun istiyorum. Aynı şekilde Müslüman okullarında da… 
Bizim okulların yani cemaat okullarının çok az biliyorsunuz sayısı da az öğrencisi de az. 
En büyük sıkıntılarından bir tanesi, temel sıkıntılarından bir tanesi, önlerinde “Özel” 
bilmem ne okulu “Özel Ermeni Okulu” özel özel…Özel fakat Özel Bilkent Koleji gibi 
okullar değil ama devlet okulu da değil. Özel Okullar Müdürlüğü’ne bağlı bir yasayla da 
tanımlanmış değiller. Yasayla tanımlanmadıkları için bütün bunlar da bir yönetim 
boşluğu da oluyor. Şahısların ya da siyasilerin o günkü yapısıyla, iyi niyetiyle, lütufkar 
zihniyetine bağlı kalıyor. Dolayısıyla bir kere ondan başlamak lazım. Bir kere derse 
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gelmeden önce işte bu okulların tanımlanması hangi yasaya göre. Hep öyle okullarımız 
diyince... Ben üç tane çocuk yetiştirdim, üçüncüsü daha ortada; ben üçünü de yabancı 
okula gönderdim. Benim gibi 27 senedir özveriyle çalışan bir insan, cemaat okuluna 
göndermedim. Bunun tek sebebi de işte sizin sevdiğiniz Lozan ve Mütekabiliyet 
Antlaşmasıdır. Ben çocuklarımın özgür yetişmesini istedim. Birilerinin onların üzerine 
siyasi patronluk etmesini istemedim. Biliyorsunuz her iki ülkede okullar üzerinden çok 
baskı yapmıştır toplumlara ve bundan da utanacaklarına iftihar ediyorlar bazen. Yani her 
iki ülkede de böyle yapılanmalar var. Çok kazanmış olmakla birlikte yani 20 sene 
öncesiyle mukayese bile edilmiyor ama buna rağmen insanın bir köşesinde kalıyor. Ben 
yakın zaman da yaşadım; Bakanlıktan bana bir yazı geldi bunun şeyi Trakya’da alternatifi 
var mı bir bakalım dediler... O anda dayak atmışlar gibi hissettim hiçbir şey 
konuşamadım. Dolayısıyla bunların buradan da başlaması lazım. Ne özel ne tüzel, ne özel 
ne devlet. Yani devlet olursa böyle yapardık ama özel dediniz adınızda “özel” yazıyor 
diyor. Dolayısıyla bir kere azınlıklardan bahsediyorsunuz orayı bilelim. İkincisi 
Süryanilerin işte başka bir boşluk ana dillerinde eğitim yapamıyorlar. Neden 
yapamıyorlar? Çünkü Lozan’da tanımlanmış tanımlanmamış bilmem ne bilmem ne. Yani 
bugün artık Kürtçe de bile eğitime nerdeyse başlanacak üniversitelerde şurada burada 
yapılıyor. Aşalım artık yani zaten nedir bir iki üç beş bunlar konu olmaktan çıksın. Geçen 
gün Diyanete de söyledim resmi dil bir tane olsun yani kaosa gerek yok. İnsanların ana 
dillerini öğrenme imkanı da onlarda olsun, onların böyle bir hakkı olsun. Bir de din, 
eğitim diyorsunuz; işte size eğitimin boşluğu, işte size Süryanilerin ana lisandaki 
boşluğu, Mor Gabriel’de veya Ruhban Okulu’nda dini eğitim hürriyeti. İşte dolayısıyla 
size dini eğitim verebilecek alt yapı yok. İşte Mor Gabriel’de devlet isterse orayı anında 
kapatır. Orada Aramice ders veriliyor işte herkes biliyor; Aramice ders verilen bir yer. 
Dünyada sanırım Süryanilerin tek merkezlerinden bir tanesi. Ama ders veremez bugünkü 
eğitim sistemi anlayışı içinde, kanunlara bakarsak. İşte Gökçeada’da bir okul açtık zarla 
zorla, önümüze 1927 Adalar Kanunu çıktı. Takip ediyorsunuz onları? Dolayısıyla din ve 
eğitim konuları aşırı hassas olmakla birlikte bir sürü başka alt yapısal eksiklikler konular 
da var. Ben şahsi görüşümü söyledim dolayısıyla şu anda bütün boyutlarını 
değerlendirmeniz için de onları da gündeme getirmiş oldum. 
TG: Yani hep aslında daha azınlıkların haklarının işte bu Varlıkların İadesi konularında 
biraz daha falan böyle sanki daha olumlu bir hava en azından gündeme gelmeye başlamış 
oldu… 
LV: Kesinlikle öyle, kesinlikle… 
TG: Daha olumlu bir hava oluşurken birazda tabii mutlaka siyasi iradeyle birlikte Avrupa 
Birliği’nin de bunda bir etkisi olduğunu özellikle Komisyon Raporları’nda atıfta 
bulunuyor olması; en basiti Cemevlerine, Ruhban Okulu’na atıfta bulunuluyor olması 
bunların hepsinin bir itici güç olduğunu düşünüyorum… 
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LV: Kesinlikle evet bu konu tartışmasız ben burada olamazdım sizi de burada kabul 
edemezdim. Yani 5 sene evvel ne ben bu odadaydım ne de 3 sene evvel ben sizi burada 
kabul edebilirdim. 3 sene evvel. 5 de değil 5 sene evvel ben yoktum 3 sene evvel de sizi 
burada kabul edemezdim. Bütün bunlar Türkiye’nin gelişmesi ve toplumun 
bilinçlendirilmesi, bilinçlenmesi, araştırmacı bir toplum olmaya başlaması, en azından 
araştırmacı nitelikli insanların artması, kendilerini daha rahat ifade ediyor olması bir 
otokritik algısının gelişmesi vs vs… Bunu Sayın Arınç da geçen sene zaten söyledi. Bunu 
ulu orta söylediği için söylüyorum; siyasi geçmişiyle şu anda duruşu tamamen farklı. 
Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü geçen sene toplantı da dedi ki ben 6 sene evvel bu makamda 
bunun tam tersini uyguluyordum şimdi tam tersini uyguluyorum vs. Bütün bu 
bilinçlenmedir. Bunun tabii ki en büyük hedefi, sıfır noktası Anayasadır. Anayasa 
olmadığı takdirde; anayasal eşitlik, anayasal haklar tanımlanmadığı sürece bir muğlak 
veya bir kanun ve ya bir maddeden sonra o madde hakkında ikinci gizli bir madde 
olmayacak ve bütün temel sorunlar çözülecek çünkü çözümlenmediği takdirde bizim 
vatandaşlık statümüz, çözümlenmediği sürece biz kendimizi, ben başta olmak üzere, bu 
ülkeyi sizin kadar sevemeyeceğimiz intibası pekiştiği ve böyle bir doktrinle üstümüze 
gelindiğini hissediyorum. Yani dolayısıyla yabancıymış gibi veya dayatılmış veya 
kaderin cilvesiymiş ya da bir şekilde burada odak noktaları temsil eden biri gibi 
hissetmek zorunda kalıyorum. Bunun için de ben çok mücadele ediyorum bu 
hissiyatlarım olmasaydı ben bu kadar kendimden vermezdim. Bu kadar haksızlık 
etmezdim özellikle aileme ve arkadaşlarıma…  
TG: Anayasa da mutlu musunuz peki yeni Anayasa sürecinden? 
LV: Ben her Türk vatandaşı gibi Anayasa’nın topluma soruluyor olması tabii bu bir iddia 
Türkiye’nin bir iddiası. İnşallah becereceğiz. Anayasa’da ilk defa bu kadar topluma halka 
gidiyor Türkiye. En azından artık gücün halkında olduğuna inanıyor. En azından 
söylemlerde veya Parlamentodaki oylamalarda. Halkın da gücünün olduğuna inan bir 
ülkede sanıyorum böyle bu umut içinde ben de hareket ettim. Cemaatleri 
hareketlendirdim, anayasa konusunda toplantılar yaptım ruhanilerle sivilleri birlikte 
topladım ve böyle bir refleksle bu ülkenin vatandaşıysak bizimde bir mesuliyetimiz var. 
Bu mesuliyete bizimde bir taslakla gitmemiz gerekiyor. Bunları bu anlayış çerçevesinde 
yaptık yoksa bizim isteklerimiz de çok farklı değil genel toplumdan, özgürlükçü, eşit 
vatandaşları öne çıkaran, çoğulcu, demokratik bir yapı istiyoruz… 
TG: Ama ortaya daha somut bir şeyler koymak adına da çalışmalarınız oldu… 
LV: Oldu daha somut, yani somut dediğimiz bunlar; bizim ısrar ettiğimiz, dayattığımız, 
bütün halkın da dayatması gereken değerlerdir. Yani bunlar özgürlükçü, çok sesli, 
demokratik vatandaşlığı öne çıkaran, anayasal vatandaşlığı öne çıkaran bir yapıdır. Yani 
ırkçılığı, ulusalcılığı değil de daha çok böyle vatandaşlık kavramlarını çıkaran aNAt 
vatandaşlığı öne çıkaran, din özgürlüğünü, işte nefret söyleminin yasaklandığı, eğitimin, 
örgütlenmenin serbest olduğu… Bütün bunların temelinde şayet Anayasayla birlikte 
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bizlerin varlığını veya küçük toplumların çocukları da Bahailer kimler bilmezler, Alevilik 
ve Sünniliğin arasında farkı da bilmez bütün bunları eğitecek bir eğitim sistemi 
oluştururlarsa, bu yalnız çoğunluk için değil azınlık toplumlar içinde geçerli.. Benim 
çocuğum Fransız okuluna gidiyor. Yüzde yüz Fransızca metinler okuyorlar hepsinde bir 
sayfa veya 2 sayfa, mutlaka Ortodoksluk için tarif vardır, Katoliklik için vardır, 
Müslümanlık için vardır işte Budistler için vardır. Yani orada temel bazı değerleri, temel 
bazı tarihleri alıyorlar.  
TG: Tabii bu aslında zorunlu din dersleri, şeyi çok net algılıyorum, yani okullardaki din 
dersleri ve ya işte azınlık okullarındaki din dersleri, devlet okullarındaki din dersleri bu 
işin çok daha küçük bir kısmı yani bir parçası olarak görüyorsunuz, yani sorunu bunun 
üstüne oturtup bunun üstünden bir şey üretmeyi çok manalı bulmuyorsunuz, anlıyorum. 
Peki sizin çocuklarınızın Fransız okulunda okuyor olması ve dolayısıyla devlet 
okulundaki o zorunlu din dersinin bir şekilde dışında olmasının da etkisi var mı 
kararınızda? Yani çok daha liberal bir ortamda eğitim alıyor olabilmelerini sağlıyordur 
çünkü… 
LV: Ben açıkçası sözünüzü keseceğim ben çocuklarımı din özgürlüğü için o okullara 
göndermedim ben daha çok siyasi özgürlük için gönderdim. Ben arzu ederdim ki kendi 
kültürümüzü dilimizi daha iyi öğrensinler, bizim bir okulumuza gitsinler yani orada 
isterim ki torunlarım gidebilsin. Ama benim yaşadığım lise dönemleri ve sonraki yıllarda 
gördüklerim ve sonra cemaatin ardından dolayı gelişmiş olan böyle yani şey yapılar, yani 
cemaat içi oluşmuş olan o antagonizmalar okullar arası eğitmenler arası, çok sağlıklı 
olmadığı için ben çocuklarımı üçünü de Fransız okuluna gönderdim. Ama benim tercihim 
keşke iyi bir okulumuz olsaydı ve o okula gitseydi. Ben kendi okullarımızı o anda 
destekleyemedim şu anda iyileştirmek için neler yapılabilir diye çalışıyorum. Tabii 
bunların getirmiş olduğu birikimler, antagonizmalar var cemaatler, küçük toplumlar 
arasında. Çünkü küçük toplumlar arasında bir elit kesim olmak çok kolay ve her kimse de 
bunu kaçırmak istemiyor. Ama keşke bu eğitim konusunda daha iyi bir yapılanmamız 
olabilseydi. Ve tabii ki orada bir din dersi çocuğum alırdı diye düşünüyordum. Ama yine 
de aileyle birlikte çocuk da istemiyor olsaydı zorlanmasını istemezdim, yani zorla 
yaptırılsın istemezdim. Genel kültür anlamında bahsettiğim iki sayfalık kültür olarak 
gelişsin ve ailenin de tercihiyle din derslerine girsin isterim. 
TG: Azınlık okulunda… 
LV: Tabii tabii isterim. Ama ben aile olarak hayır kardeşim çocuğum öğrenmesin yani 
kültür olarak kesinlikle Katolikliği de, Ortodoksluğu da, Müslümanlığı da, Aleviliği de 
öğrensin ama derinlemesine kendi diniyle ilgili bir şeyi aileye bırakılması taraftarıyım… 
TG: Dolayısıyla Türk okullarına giden, devlet okullarına giden çocuklar için, farklı dini 
inançlara sahip çocuklar çok doğaldır ki aynısı beklersiniz… 
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LV: Kesinlikle kesinlikle… 
TG: Şu anki içeriliğiyle okutulan din derslerinin anladığım kadarıyla sadece başka 
dinlere, başka inanışlara, değerlere mensup kişiler tarafından değil Sünni İslam inancına 
sahip ailelerin çocuklarının bile bu şekilde bir dini eğitime tabi tutulmasını bu bağlamda 
doğru bulmuyorsunuz… 
LV: Evet evet. Çünkü din bir vicdandır. Böyle ailenin arzusuysa, yani ailenin 
geleneğiyse, arzusuysa tabii ki. Ama aile itiraz ediyorsa ve istemiyorsa böyle bir hakkı 
olsun istiyorum… 
TG: Seçmeli olsun istiyorsunuz… 
LV: Seçmeli olsun istiyorum. Tabii ki burada da yine o çocuğun ayrımcılıkla yani ret 
sebebiyle kalmaması şartıyla. Çünkü biliyorsunuz geçmişten bugüne kadar hala şu an 
kendini özgür hissetmeyen insanların kitapları var ortada; bağlı olduğu olmadığı ve 
inanmadığı veya taraf olmadığı inancı öyle göstermesi gerekirken; mecbur kalıyor 
bulunduğu ortama uymak zorunda ve o ortamdan endişe ettiği için de, korktuğu için de 
öyle bir taraf gibi gösteriyor, evinde farklı şeyler oluyor ve bunları çok görüyoruz. 
Konumuzla çok alakasız bir şey, kayınvalidemde çalışan bir Gül Hanım vardı. Gül 
Hanım Artvin’de başı örtülü bir kadıncağız, meğerse bu Müslüman değilmiş ama bütün 
Ramazan boyunca uyanır, sahurda ışıklarını yakar, gün boyunca hiçbir şey yemez. 
Sahurdan sonra ışığı söndürür herkes öyle bilir. Şimdi 30 yıl 40 yıl öyle yaşamış. Kızı da 
öyle, çevresi de öyle. Şimdi bu öyle bir eziyet ki bu insanlar için. Hatta benden bile 
korkuyor. Bir kere Ramazan’da gittim hemen kayboldu ne oldu dedim, yemek yiyordu 
kaçtı, utandı dediler. Şimdi böyle korkularla yaşayan yaşatılan insanlar var. Bu insanlar 
kendilerini böyle eğitmişler. Bir köymüş, köyün adetiymiş Anadolu’da ve böyle 
yaşamışlar, ve şimdi dağılmışlar. Ama böyle realiteler var, bu realiteleri gördükçe, yani 
bugün o realitelerin ileride tepkisel realite olmaması açısından şimdiden daha özgür 
bırakmak lazım.  
TG: Tabii yani bu söylediğiniz din dersinde muafiyet hakkı için de geçerli; azınlıklara 
verilmiş bir hak ama orada bile o muafiyette bile işte söylemiş olduğunuz o örnekteki 
sebepten ötürü muafiyet talep etmeyen...  
LV: Çok. 
TG: …evet muaf ama muafiyet almasak daha iyi belki diye düşüldüğü, muafiyet 
alınmadığını 
LV: Mesela ben kadınlar hatırlıyorum kara kara gözlüklerle, başörtülü tabi ki tamamiyle 
taşra usulu giyinmiş insanlar, ücra kiliselere gelirler, buğday okuturlar ve giderler 
Müslüman mezarlığına önce bir su dökerler. Veya adam evlenmiştir İslam kaidelerine 
göre... yani hep böyle insanlar kendilerini ifade edememekten, gelenekleriyle veya 
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duyduklarıyla değerleri arasında sıkışıp kalmış bir sürü insan var. Tabii bütün bunları 
özgür bırakırsanız göreceksiniz ki toplumun çok büyük bir yüzdesi değil. Ama bunlar var 
oldukça hep böyle hava sıkışıyor bir yerden.Tahmin ederim ki Türkiye bu süreci şu anda, 
şu anda Türkiye bu yönde de geliştirmeye çalışıyor ama biraz zaman alacak, belli bir 
zaman alacak…  
TG: Evet özellikle bu yeni anayasa sürecinde beklentiler zorunlu din derslerinin 
kaldırılması yönündeydi özellikle bu AİHM kararından sonra iç hukuka olan yansımalar 
öyle bir beklenti oluşturdu. Mesela bir muafiyet talebi olduğu zaman bunun çok daha 
yolu açıktı bir dönem Danıştay kararıyla. Avrupa Birliği’nin de verdiği o itici güçle 
birlikte daha demokrat daha liberal bir ortam oluşmaya başlamıştı. Dolayısıyla yeni 
Anayasa sürecinde beklenti, zorunlu din dersinin kaldırılması yönündeydi. Fakat şimdi 
bir de zorunlu din dersinin içeriğini biraz değiştirmeye yöneldiler. Dediğiniz gibi din 
kültürü dersinden zaten beklenen oydu, isminin de o olması nedeniyle biraz içeriğini 
değiştirmeye yönelik adımlar atıldıysa da şimdi gelen seçmeli derslerle birlikte bir 
şekilde defacto uygulanan şey aslında o. Seçmeli derslerle ilgili sorunlar size iletiliyor 
mu? Mesela Diyarbakır Pastörünün kızıyla ilgili olarak haberlerde çıkmıştı zorunlu din 
dersinden muaf oluyor ama seçmeli başka ders seçemediği için 3 tane din seçmeli 
dersinden birini almak zorunda kaldığı... 
LV: 3 tanesi de dinle mi alakalı? 
TG: Evet 3ü de dinle alakalı 
LV: Nedir onlar ? 
TG: Temel dini bilgiler, Peygamberimizin Hayatı Hz. Muhammed’in de değil, ve Kuran 
Dersi 
LV: Tüm Türkiye’de böyle mi bunlar? 
TG: Evet evet. Yani dolayısıyla benim bu anlamda çok daha olumlu beklentiler varken 
yani Anayasayla din dersi artık zorunlu olmayacak diye beklerken, seçmeli derslerle daha 
da karıştı. Yani bu hak ve özgürlükler çerçevesinde güzel gelişmeler olurken azınlık 
haklarıyla ilgili... 
LV: Zaten ülke politikasında herhalde o eksende birleştirecekler yani… 
TG: Evet evet, başka yerden etnik farklılıklar o kadar korkutucu tanımlanmıyor aslında 
ama dini anlamdaki, yani dini farklılıklar daha ayrıştırıcı görünüyor anladığım kadarıyla 
şu anda. Ama hem etnik, kültürel, din, dil bunların her birini eğer ayrıştırıcı unsur olarak 
görmek isterseniz, görürsünüz yani eğer böyle bakmak isterseniz bakmak çok 
mümkün.… 
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LV: …farkındasınız yani evet bir devlet okulundaki gayri-Müslimin seçmeli olarak veya 
muaf olması ama aynı şekilde yani kendi okulunda da muafiyet hakkının geçerli olması… 
evet ama ben şimdi kendi okulumda muafiyet hakkımı muhafaza etmek istiyorsam kendi 
gideceğim okulumda da o hakkın geçerli olması lazım…  
TG: Tabi 
LV: Çünkü ben saygı arıyorsam saygıyı da vermek zorundayım tanımlamak zorundayım 
tanımak zorundayım…Yani ben kendim için saygı istiyorsam sistemden, benim 
kontrolümde olan sistemde başkasına da saygılı olmam lazım. Belki cemaatler bile bana 
tepkili olacak ama demokrasi budur.  
TG: Anlıyorum, Türk devlet okulunda bir Sünni öğrenci için bu dersleri seçmeli yapmak 
zorunlu diyorsak bir cemaat okulunda da bu derslerin seçmeli olması çok mantıklı 
görünüyor. 
LV: Tabii alt toplum diye nasıl olsa çok sıkıntı olmaz diye düşünürsünüz... ama problem 
orada, bazen röportajlarımda da söylüyorum. Yani lütfen bizi azız diye lütuf yapar gibi 
korumak zorunda olduğumuz antikalarımız gibi, veya lalelerimiz gibi, çok az kaldılar vah 
vah koruyalım carettalar gibi... böyle değerlendirmeyelim evet buna itiraz edelim. Yani 
benim şahsi yapılanmama ve duruşuma aykırı geliyor. Ben vatandaş olarak 
değerlendirilmek istiyorum. Adım ve hüviyetim bu. Sizin kadar hak istiyorum, sizden 
fazla istemiyorum. ANAt haklar istiyorum. 
TG: Evet çok doğru yani insan otomatik olarak diyor ki, zaten cemaattense o din dersinin 
zorunlu olmasını istiyordur. 
LV: Tabii ki isteyecek yani yüzde yüz sorarsanız hepsi evet diyecektir 
TG: Ama.. 
LV: Ama prensip olarak yani bir demokratik haktan bahsediyorsak kendimize bir şey 
yapılmasını istemiyorsak kendi sistemimiz içindekinde de onu korumak zorundayız, o 
dengeyi korumak zorundayız. 
TG: Peki, çok teşekkür ederim 
LV: Ben dediğim gibi hukukçu değilim… 
TG: Yok, çok farklı bir açıdan bakmış oldum yani hukuki açıdan da bakıyorum, Alevi 
davalarıyla ilgili hukukçularla da görüşüyorum ama bu bakış açısı benim için çok çok 
değerliydi.. 
LV: İyi güzel bir şeyler katabildiysek yani inşallah zamanınızı boşa harcamadık… 




Interview with Prof.Dr. İştar Gözaydın, Doğuş University, Department of 
Commnication Sciences 
30.03.2013, İstanbul  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Konu ile ilgili değerlendirmelerinizi Avrupalılaşma sürecinin din-devlet 
ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisiyle başlayarak almam mümkün mü? Sonrasında da din dersleri 
özelinde değerlendirebilir misiniz? 
İştar Gözaydın: İki taraflı düşünürüm; birincisi, çok önemli bir süreç, birçok Türkiye’deki 
insan hakları kategorisinde diyebileceğimiz meselenin yön alması bakımından, birtakım 
yasal düzenlemelerin yapılması bakımından çok önemli bir süreç. O süreç ne kadar eski 
gayretine sahip; o “soru işareti” ama belli ki son dönemlerde yeniden hafif bir ısınma 
sürecinde. Dolayısıyla özellikle bu azınlık; azınlık kelimesini kullanmak istemiyorum 
çünkü Türkiye’de azınlık malum Türk hukukunda çok sınırlı bir kavram olarak kullanılır 
ama onun dışındaki azınlıkların da birtakım hakları bakımından fena bir süreç olmadı. 
Özellikle vakıfların, vakıf mallarının bunların düzenlenmesi bakımından AB sürecinin 
ben çok önemli olduğu kanaatindeyim. Başka birtakım düzenlemeler bakımından da, 
Cemevlerinin ibadet yeri olması gibi mesela, o bakımdan da... Ama orada da başka 
düğümler var bir türlü çözülemeyen, oysa AİHM’in üç dört tane kararı var ki eğer 
“wording”ine bakacak olursan, o meselenin çözülmemesi düşünülecek bir şey değil. 
Çünkü Mahkeme, eğer bir inanç grubu kendini şu şu şu şekilde tanımlıyorsa ve kalkıp da 
bu benim ibadethanem diyorsa kimseye, başta devlet olmak üzere kimseye bir şey 
düşmez. Bu manaya gelecek, bu ciddiyette bir şeyler söylüyor. Dolayısıyla onun 
çözülmemesi hukuken değil, siyaseten başka düğümler olduğunu gösteriyor. Nasıl 
çözülür bilmiyorum. Aynı şekilde tabi orada da aynı mesele var, çözülmesi çok kolay bir 
konu değil; Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu.  
TG: Dün o konuda Başbakan’ın bir açıklaması oldu; onlar Atina’da bizim iki camimizi 
açarlarsa biz de ruhban okulunu açarız diye... Dün Andon Parizyanos Bey’le görüşürken 
de dedi ki, bizim bir dediğimizi iki etmiyorlar son dönemde ama bu Heybeliada 
konusunun başka bir yönü var demişti. Sanırım aynı görüştesiniz.  
İG: Karşılıklı pazarlık. 
TG: Evet karşılık ilkesi ön planda bu konuda sanırım.  
İG: Muhtemelen kapalı kapılar arkasında bununla ilgili başka konular da konuşuluyor vs 
vs... Gelelim eğitim meselesine... Eğitim meselesinde, yani kararlardan sonra da bırak 
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AB’ye katılım sürecini, AİHM kararlarından sonra da bayağı bir yol alındı. Alındı ama 
yine de o bir sürü ortak komisyonlar var vs., ne kadar gerçekten istenilecek düzeye 
ulaşıyor, hala soru işaretlerim var. Ama bir şeyler yapılmadı mı, yapıldı. Dolayısıyla, ne 
fazla şikayet ederim vah vah hiçbir şey yapılmıyor diye, ne de aman aman ne güzel şeyler 
yapılıyor diyebilirim. Bir süreçtir, bakalım nereye gidiyor diye düşünürüm. 
TG: Din dersleri konusunda, okuduğum, yapmış olduğunuz incelemede de insan hakları 
açısından bakıyorsunuz, zaten orada AİHM’in vermiş olduğu karar da çok net bir şekilde 
vurguluyor ki, bu içeriğiyle din dersinin zorunlu tutulması imkansız. 
İG: Ama ondan sonra değiştirdiler yani ondan sonra komisyonlar kuruldu, çeşitli 
komisyonlar tarafından belirli kavramlar çıkarıldı, belli bölümler çıkartılıp yeni bölümler 
konuldu ama onlar bile yetersiz. Benim derdim o. Yani gerekli ama yetersiz.  
TG: Evet zaten Aleviler de aynı şeyi söylüyorlar; hiç bize danışılmadan yapıldı... 
İG: Orada haksızlık var çünkü komisyonlarda Aleviler de vardı, Bolu İzzet Baysal 
Üniversitesi’nden hatta Alevi kökenli bir akademisyen de vardı, adını çıkartamadım 
şimdi... Şimdi bize danışılmadı demek... Haksızlık şuradan geliyor; monolitik yapılar 
olmadığından bunlar, bir grup bize danışılmadı diyor, bir grup bizim görüşümüz alındı 
diyor. Bir grup evet ona danışıldı ama o bizden sayılmaz diyor. Oralardan çıkıyor 
tartışma. Yani kimle konuştuğuna bağlı. 
TG: Aynen öyle. İçeride bütünlük olmaması, karşı tarafta devletin elini güçlendiriyor.  
İG: Hem de nasıl... 
TG: Şimdi bir de yeni seçmeli din derleri var biliyorsunuz. 
İG: Yaa onlar da ayrı felaket.  
TG: Bu iki seçmeli ders konurken Alevilikle ilgili de bir ders konması gibi bir adım 
atılsaydı belki süreç biraz daha yumuşatılırdı ama bunu Aleviler istiyor mu tabi, bir de o 
durumda da sayı yetersiz o yüzden ders açılamıyor gibi tartışmalar olacaktı. Bu seçmeli 
dersleri müfredata eklerkenki sav da Sünni ailelerin çocuklarının din eğitimini yeterince 
alamadığından şikayet etmesi... Yani öyle görünüyor ki, DKAB dersi kimseyi tatmin 
etmiyor... 
İG: Tabi. Bir de aklıma geldi, bu eğitim meselesiyle ilgili çalışan bir kişi daha var, 
Sakarya Üniversitesi’nde şimdi. 
TG: Recep Kaymakcan mı? 
İG: Evet Recep Kaymakcan.  
TG: Çalışmalarını inceledim, evet. Bu alanda oldukça yoğunlaşmış. Bir de Talip 
Küçükcan var. 
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İG: Evet ama onun konusu biraz daha geniş, yabancı ülkelerde Müslüman azınlıkların 
durumunu falan da inceliyor.  
TG: AB’nin etkisini de inceliyor sanırım. Buradan Avrupalılaşma konusuna dönecek 
olursak, belki siyahla beyaz gibi bir fark yaratmıyor süreç aday ülkelerde ama etkileri de 
azımsanmayacak ölçüde bence. Polonya’da komünist rejimin yıkılmasıyla birlikte 
modernleşme süreci Avrupalılaşma ile çok elele gidiyor, dolayısıyla ayrıştırmak da 
oldukça zor ama orada daha çok “sosyal öğrenme” yoluyla sürecin içselleştirilmesi 
sözkonusu gibi görünüyor. Türkiye daha rasyonel aktör modeline yakın duruyor, biraz 
ödül-ceza sistemi ile ilerliyor gibi.  
İG: Türkiye’de bu konuda riyakarlık vardır, ikiyüzlü bir tutum vardır; onun için de 
paralel gerçeklik vardır. Bir kağıt üzerindeki durumla bir de onun arkasından yürütülen 
şey. O çifte nitelik hem bir yandan müthiş bir esneklik sağlar, öyle de bir hoşluğu vardır 
ama bir yandan da çok kaypak bir düzen getirir. Dolayısıyla bütün onların da hukuki 
olarak değil ama sosyolojik olarak aklın bir köşesinde bulundurulması lazım.  
TG: Tabi mesela Alevilik ders kitaplarına girdi diye bir önceki düzenlemede çok ciddi 
haberler yapıldı, ama Alevilerle konuştuğunuz zaman bu kadar nümayişin tek bir cümle 
için yapıldığını öğreniyorsunuz. Tek bir cümle, tek paragraf... ama Alevilik var mı ders 
kitabında; var. O yüzden dediğinizi çok iyi anlıyorum, gerçekten kağıt üzerinde olanla 
uygulama çok farklı olabiliyor. Dolayısıyla Türkiye bu süreçte söyleneni yapmak, kağıt 
üzerinde en azından, ama yapılanı sindirmemek üzerine kurulu bir yolda yürüyor gibi. 
AB üyeliği için yaptığı pek çok şeyi aslında sindirmeden ilerliyor.  
İG: Çok doğru. Çok yazık ki demokrasi ile ilgili süreç de insan haklarıyla olan ilişkisi de 
o şekilde yani “under the skin” diye bir şey söz konusu değil. Dolayısıyla, üstüne cila 
olarak yapışıyor, cila sıyrıldığı andan itibaren de gidiyor. Sonuçta 1000’lerden başlayan 
İngiliz siyasi kültüründen bahsetmiyoruz ki burada. Sonunda çok daha çifte sistemlerin 
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Interview with Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Turkish Ambassador to Warsaw  
12.11.2012, Turkish Embassy in Warsaw 
 
Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan: Ben henüz bu eğitim konusunu inceleyebilmiş değilim, siz 
belki YÖK Başkanlığı yaptığım için bu konuyu derinlemesine inceleyeceğimi 
zannediyorsunuz, bakmak da istiyorum ama daha henüz fırsatım olmadı. Bu çok öncelikli 
konulardan bir tanesi değil bizim için. O yüzden çok derinlemesine bakmadım ama 
bildiğim burada Müslüman öğrenciler için ve diğer dinlerden olan aileler için bir 
uygulama olduğu ve tarafların da bundan memnun olduğu. Mesela buradaki Türkler 
bundan son derece memnunlar çünkü çocuklarına kendi dinlerini öğrenme fırsatı 
veriliyor. Onlar Katolikliği falan öğrenmiyorlar ama İslam dinini öğreniyorlar, onun için 
çok hoşlarına gidiyor. Bana da sitayişle bahsettiklerini hatırlıyorum; “Hocam, çocukları 
sabah camiye bıraktık, öğleden sonra gidip alacağız” diye. Ben de sordum, tamam da 
okul başka bir yerde, cami başka bir yerde; buradaki hoca buradakileri tanımıyor 
bilmiyor, nasıl oluyor da birbirlerine güveniyorlar diye. Nasıl oluyor; işte böyle bir güven 
var. Din dersi olduğu için, cami olduğu için güvenmişler o yüzden çocuğun burada aldığı 
nota itibar ediyorlar. Nasıl burdaki çocuklar Katolik dersini alıyorsa, bizim çocuklar da 
gidip camiden İslam dini dersini alıyorlar, bu dersi de saydırıyorlar yani geçerli sayılıyor 
notu. Bir tek bunu biliyorum, başka da... yani dini bir baskı olduğunu din dersleriyle ilgili 
duymadım. Yani dini öğretmekle ilgili bir şey yok ama onun dışında bir şey oluyor mu 
bilemiyorum yani retoriklerde bir şey var mı, ritüellerde bir şey var mı, onu bilmiyorum. 
Belki de esas önemli olan onlar. Böyle söyleyince gayet kolay... Sen Müslümansın git 
kendi dinini camide öğren demek kolay, ama belki onun dışında bir şeyler oluyor onu 
bilmiyoruz. Siz bence birazcık çocuklarla konuşun. Başka bir dersin ortasında dinle ilgili 
bir şey söyleniyor mu veya çocuklar başka derslerde bir şeye zorlanıyorlar mı; onu 
bilmek önemli. Ama derse zorlamıyorlar yani.  
TG: Yani okulda din dersini seçtiği zaman Müslüman öğrenciler gidip o dersi camide 
alabiliyorlar... 
Prof. Özcan: Evet ama bu bizim çocuklar için böyle. Kendi çocukları okulda alıyorlar din 
dersini, onu biliyorum.  
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TG: Bu anlattıklarınızdan Türk öğrencilere karşı bir dışlama veya kötü muamele de 
olmadığı çıkarımını yapıyorum çünkü öyle bir durum olsa bununla ilgili mutlaka şikayet 
alırdınız diye düşünüyorum. 
Prof. Özcan: Kesinlikle, kesinlikle duyulurdu. Bundan şikayet ederlerdi ama bence ondan 
önemli olan şey o ritüeller, ritüellere bakmak lazım. Sabah hoca sınıfa geldiğinde dini 
içerikli herhangi bir şey söylüyor mu, o hitap tarzı bile çok önemli, davranışları çok 
önemli... Belli şeyleri Katolikliğe dayandırmaları önemli, işte onları öğrenmek lazım. 
Yani çocuklara fark ettirmeden kendi dinlerini empoze ediyorlar mı etmiyorlar mı onu 
anlamak mühim.  
TG: Anladığım kadarıyla günlük hayatın içinde çok fazla dini öğe bulunduğu için açık 
açık din dersinde öğretilenlerden daha derinine bakmak gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz. 
Prof. Özcan: Tabi “deep inside” bakmak lazım. 
TG: Peki Polonyalı çocukların aldığı okullardaki din dersinin içeriği hakkında bilginiz 
var mı? Katolik dinini mi öğretiyorlar yoksa dinler hakkında genel bilgi şeklinde mi? 
Prof. Özcan: Yok, bildiğim kadarıyla Katolikliği öğretiyorlar, kendi dinleri ile alakalı bir 
ders. Bunlar hakkında çok bilgim yok, henüz okuyup araştıramadım. Size dört ay 
içerisinde gözlemlediklerimi aktarıyorum. Mesela ben buraya gelmeden önce bana tasvir 
ettikleri gibi bir Polonya dindarlığı yok Hocam, öyle bir şey yok. Mesela ben gençlerin 
çok daha dinlerine düşkün olduklarını sanıyordum, öğrendiğim kadarıyla 16-17 yaşından 
sonraki gençler kiliseye bile gitmiyorlarmış. Yani belki biraz da uzaklaşmadan 
bahsetmek lazım, bırakın böyle çok Katolikleşmeyi falan, dindarlaşma eğilimini... 
Hakikaten bazen böyle Pazar günleri falan kilisenin önünden geçerken o ayin çıkışında 
falan bakıyorum orada çok genç insanları görmüyorum. Siz de keşke gitseniz de bu 
Cumartesi falan bir baksanız... 
TG: Ben dün gittim aslında, bir ayin sırasında girdim kiliseye... 
Prof. Özcan: Hah çok iyi yapmışsınız. Çok fazla genç görülmüyor değil mi? 
TG: Evet genç pek yoktu.  
Prof. Özcan: Daha çok orta yaşın üstündeki insanları görüyorsunuz. Orada bunlar çok 
doğru olmayan bir şehir efsanesi gibi geliyor insana. Bize öyle çok dindar falan diyorlar 
ama... Bir de tabi gençler arasındaki ilişkilerden anlıyorsunuz yani Katoliklikte de 
kızlarla erkeklerin çok samimi olması evlilik öncesi çok beklenmezken, burada tam tersi 
şeyler oluyor. Çok da sık olduğu için insan kaçırmıyor. Yani çalışmadığı belli; çok koyu 
bir din eğitiminin verilmediği, verilse bile gençlerin o eğitimden çok az şey aldıkları veya 
yaşamlarını ona göre şekillendirmedikleri çok belli. Yani bu ülenin Katolikliiğinin çok 
koyu olduğuna inanmayın.  
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TG: Peki siz bu durumun AB üyeliği ile bir bağlantısı olduğunu düşünür müsünüz?  
Prof. Özcan: Tabi tabi 89’dan sonraki, 90ların başından sonraki olaylarla birazcık alakalı. 
O zamana kadar hani işte Rusya’nın, Komünist rejimin baskısıyla insanlar böyle bir 
patikada yürümeye doğru zorlanmışlar. Serbesti geldiği zaman her şey değişmiş, sadece 
dinle olan ilişkiler değil... Bir serbesti gelmiş, ekonomik faaliyetleri çok çeşitlenmiş artık 
insanlar her türlü ekonomik faaliyet içine girer olmuşlar. Yani liberalizm, bizim 
kllandığımız tabirle, burada bayağı bir kendisine yer bulmuş. Tabi başta bu çok şaşırtıcı 
olmuş; öyle sıkı bir rejimden otokratik bir rejimden çıkıp da böyle serbest bir rejimle 
karşılaşınca insanlar bocalamışlar başta, ne yapacaklarını şaşırmışlar. Şimdi şimdi 
oturuyor artık, eskisine nazaran her şey çok daha “smooth” işliyor bence. O serbestiyi 
dini alanda da kullanmış olabilirler. O kadar rahat hissediyorlar ki şimdi kendilerini 
eskiye nazaran... O yüzden birazcık uzaklaşmış olabilirler yani dinden. Gençlerde olan 
özellikle fenomen bu. Yaşlılar öyle değil; yaşlılar her dönemi de bildikleri için, başka bir 
terbiye aldıkları için hala öyle dindarlar yani. Konuşmaları, davranışları, hareketleri öyle. 
Onu gözlüyorsunuz ama gençlerde böyle bir şeyi gözlemek çok zor.  
TG: Bu soruları Polonya üzerinden sormamın nedeni tabi biraz da AB üyeliğinin 
Türkiye’de din-devlet ilişkilerini nasıl etkileyebileceğini anlamaya yönelik. Polonya bu 
bağlamda bir örnek teşkil edebilir mi diye düşünüyorum açıkçası. Burada Komünist 
rejimden sonra yeni bir kimlik oluştururken AB üyelik süreci biraraya gelmiş ve 
Polonya’da her şey çok paralel gitmiş. Öğrenme ve yenilenme sürecinde, “nation-
building” sürecinde Avrupalılaşma yol gösterici olmuş. Türkiye’de nasıl bir etki 
yaratıyor, yaratabilir, siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Polonya için bahsettiğiniz bu liberalleşme 
süreci, Türkiye’deki din-devlet ilişkileri için de geçerli olur mu?  
Prof. Özcan: Ben pek bir şey olacağını zannetmiyorum Türkiye’de... Zaten herhalde bir 
elli yıldır bu Avrupa Topluluğu’na katılmayı bekleyen bir ülkeyiz. Mevzuatımızda pek 
çok şey değişti zaten buralarda istenen standartları Türkiye’de yaratmış durumdayız. Pek 
bize benzer bir tarafları yok gibi geliyor bana ve bize de Avrupa Topluluğu’na (AT) 
girişin öyle bir etkisi olacağına inanmıyorum. Bizim dinamiklerimiz birazcık daha başka, 
zorunlu din eğitimi meselesi başka bir şekilde devam ediyor bizim ülkemizde... 
Problemlerimiz burdakilerden başka. Ayrı ülkeleriz sonuçta ama o ortak parametre 
Avrupa Topluluğu’na giriş bizde de böyle etkiler yapar mı, zannetmiyorum. Bizi kendi 
içimizde düşünmek daha iyi sanki, kendi tarihi yapımız içerisinde... Özellikle buradaki 
gençlerin o serbestileri Avrupa Topluluğu’na girmekle alakalı bir şey, yani oradan 
kaynaklanan.. Ama Komünizm baskısından kurtulmak daha önemli gibi geliyor bana. 
Avrupa Topluluğu’na giriş yeni bir şey zaten 2004’te olan bir şey ama öbürü 1989’dan 
beri gündemde. Etkileri ayırmak da zor tabi, ne neden kaynaklanıyor vs...  
TG: Elbette. Avrupalılaşmanın etkisini tabi sekülerleşme ekseninde incelemek de 
mümkün ancak bu konuda herhangi bri kriter olmadığı için değerlendirmeyi insan hakları 
ve Avrupa normları ile sınırlandırmayı daha doğru buldum ben. Mesela Türkiye’deki din 
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dersinin varolan içeriği ile zorunlu tutulmasının AİHS’nin ihlali olduğunu belirten AİHM 
kararı var. AB ilerleme raporlarında bu konuya sıklıkla atıfta bulunuluyor, Polonya için 
durum pek de öyle değil...  
Prof. Özcan: İşte o yüzden de etkileri ayırma konusu önemli. Her ülkede AT’a girişin 
ekonomik etkilerini görebilirsiniz ama iişte bu din konularında falan bunu ölçmek 
oldukça zor. Bir anlamda başka bir dünya inanç dünyası... Bazı politikaları takip edip şu 
şu  değişiklikler olmuş diyebilirsiniz ama bunun sebebini bilmek de çok zor yani. Şimdi 
bunlar daha çok mu dindarlaştılar, daha az mı dindarlaştılar bu AT’na girişten sonra, onu 
söylemek çok zor Hocam.  
TG: Yapılan çalışmalar, sizin de dediğiniz gibi, kiliseye gidiş sıklığında gitgide bir düşüş 
olduğunu gösteriyor. Ancak sekulerlesme teorileri kapsamında incelenince dindarlığı 
ölçmenin tek yolu bu değil; kiliseye gidiş sıklığı azalmakla birlikte bireysel dindarlık aynı 
kalıyor olabilir. Bunu ölçmek için de araştırmalar anketler yapılıyor ama bu kurumsal 
dindarlıkta bir azalma olduğu kesin. O azalmanın da neden kaynaklandığını anlamak zor, 
yani AB üyeliği ve onun getirdiği liberalleşmenin yaygın etkisi mi yoksa Komünist 
rejimden çıkmanın getirdiği bir etki mi olduğunu ölçmek oldukça zor. 
Prof. Özcan: Bilemezsiniz. Ancak bakılacak bir başka boyyut da Hocam, her iki 
toplumda dinin etkisi olabilir. Mesela burada o etkiyi biraz daha iyi görebilirsiniz, 
Türkiye’de henüz böyle görülebilir bir şey yok. Ama burada nereye gitseniz diyorlar ki 
bir şeyi papazlar kararlaştırır, siyasiler şu insanla görüşüyor genellikle, onlar 
şekillendiriyorlar bu fikirleri... gibi bizde çok olmayan, yani eskiden olmuş Osmanlı 
döneminde... 
TG: Ulema.. 
Prof. Özcan: Evet, böyle dinin bir ağırlığı var. Din adamlarının ağırlığını burada birazcık 
daha görüyorsunuz. Bu okul işlerinde falan kilisenin parası çok olduğu için 
zannediyorum Milli Eğitim Bakanlıklarıyla daha bir yakın ilişki içindeler. Açılışlarda 
mesela, ben görüyorum, oralarda varlıklarını hissediyorsunuz. Türkiye’de yoktur bu 
mesela Diyanet İşleri Başkanı dışında, üniversite açılışında falan, bir kongrede 
konferansta düşünebiliyor musunuz Türkiye’de dini kıyafetli birini? Ama burada daha sık 
görüyorsunuz böyle şeyleri. Burada daha görünür durumdalar, daha fazla isimleri 
geçiyor. Türkiye’de o kadar fazla adı geçmez. Ancak dini günlerde falan konuşma 
yapılırsa... Ama burada gündelik hayatın içerisinde pek çok şekilde görmek mümkün. 
Biraz daha ağırlığı farklı galiba dinin, öyle bir şey var iki ülke arasında. Ama bu durum 
din dersleriyle nasıl ilişlkilendirilir bilemiyorum açıkçası... 
TG: İşte dinin bu kadar ağırlığının olduğu, gündelik hayatta görünür olduğu bir ülkede 
din derslerinin pozitif deklarasyona dayalı seçmeli olması, azınlık dinlerine kendi dinini 
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öğrenmek için imkan tanınması ve bunun notunun okullarda saydırılması oldukça 
demokratik ve liberal bir yaklaşım gibi görünüyor.  
Prof. Özcan: Evet orası öyle. 
TG: Kilise bu kadar önemli bir aktörken, din adamları günlük hayatta dini sembollerle bu 
kadar görünür olabilirken, aynı zamanda dini hoşgörünün bu denli sağlanabiliyor olması 
ve bu hukuksal çerçevede yer bulmanın ötesinde pratikte de sorunsuz uygulanabilmesi, 
Türkiye’dekinden farklı dinamiklere dikkat çekiyor. Bu fark nereden kaynaklanıyor, ben 
biraz buna da cevap arıyorum aslında. En önemli öne çıkan faktör burada toplumun hem 
etnik hem de dini açıdan oldukça homojen olması gibi görünüyor. Türkiye’de azınlıkların 
din eğitimi içerisindeki konumu, azınlık olup da Lozan’a göre azınlık sayılmayanların 
statüsü ve bunların yaşadıkları sıkıntılar olaya ayrı bir boyut kazandırıyor. Azınlıkların 
zorunlu din dersinden muafiyeti de ancak ailelerin dinlerini beyan etmeleri ile mümkün 
olduğundan her şartta ayrımcılık söz konusu oluyor. 
Prof. Özcan: Türkiye’de bildiğim kadarıyla bu zorunlu din dersi dinler tarihi gibi 
okutuluyor.  
TG: İsim olarak öyle tabi, Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi dersi. 
Prof. Özcan: İşte onda tüm dinleri öğretecekler, seçmelilerde daha çok İslam dinine dair 
bilgiler verilecek.  
TG: Şu anda iddia edilen bu ancak zaten bu zorunlu ders konulduğu günden beri dinlere 
eşit uzaklıkta bir ders olup hepsi ile ilgili bilgi vermesi gerekiyordu, öyle kurgulanmıştı 
ama uygulamada öyle olmadı. Şimdi yeniden söylem bu yönde, yani dinlere eşit 
mesafede bir ders olacağı söyleniyor. 
Prof. Özcan: Öyle olsa iyi olur.  
TG: Bu tabi çok yeni bir gelişme, uygulamanın ne şekilde olacağını görmek zaman 
alacak ben de takip ediyor olacağım. Ama anladığım kadarıyla, Polonya’daki uyguluma 
daha liberal görünüyor. 
Prof. Özcan: Tabi burada sayılara da dikkat etmek lazım. Bildiğim kadarıyla burada 
Müslüman öğrencilerin sayısı çok az. Türkiye’deki gibi bir durum yok burada. On 
milyonun üzerinde bir Alevi nüfustan bahsediliyor, onların meselesi ile bizim buradaki 
Türkler’in veya Araplar’ın meselesi biraz farklı. Onu da gözönünde bulundurmak lazım. 
Küçük bir sayı, siz de gidin öğrenin dininizi biz de onun notunu sayalım gibi bir anlayış 
var. Çok da büyük bir şey değil aslında, biz de yapabiliriz böyle şeyleri. Mesela 
İstanbul’daki Hristiyan çocuklar gidip kilisede öğrensinler dinlerini biz de onların notunu 
kabul edelim, bu yapılmayacak bir şey değil. Artık bunları yapmak zorundayız. Bir 
alanda bir kabiliyet, bir başarı, bir bilgi varsa onu yukarılara taşıyabilirsiniz. Dışarıda 
öğrendiğiniz bir dersi gelip okulda saydırabilirsiniz. Hayat boyu öğrenmenin önemli 
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kriterlerinden bir tanesi o çerçevede düşünmektir böyle şeyleri. Siz bu konuları kimlerle 
konuşacaksınız burada bir de ona bakalım isterseniz... 
TG: Çok memnun olurum yönlendirebilirseniz, çok teşekkür ederim... 
(Orientation about experts and contact points) 
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Tuğba Gürçel: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to do this interview 
with you. Let me please start directly with the Case of Grzelak vs. Poland. As your 
institution, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, intervened as the third part and you 
have been one of the lawyers who took part of the process. So may I request you to 
comment about the judgment of the ECtHR? 
Dorota Pudzianowska: You are very welcome. Sure, let me first tell you why we were not 
satisfied with the judgment. The problem with the judgment was that it missed to state the 
obligation of Poland to introduce systemic changes concerning ethics instruction. 
Because the judgment was restricted to the issue of the mark on the school report, so the 
judgment does not say that the whole law concerning ethics instruction is bad in some 
parts. But there was the expectation that after the judgment, Polish government would 
look for some solutions. It is still the case that just small number of primary and 
secondary schools teach ethics and the reasons for this are still the same; the government 
says that there is small number of teachers. You know, it is a way of getting out of the 
problem, they can find teacher if they want so. The main problem is that there is no clear 
procedure on how to organize these classes.   
TG: Yes, that was actually one of the questions I was going to ask: the threshold for 
opening the ethics courses has been subject to the Grzelak case, am I right? Why does 
this cause controversy? Is not there sufficient number of students willing to attend ethics 
courses?  
DP: Here it is worth comparing with minority religions. For the minority religions, the 
number of students at the level of one school that needs to be gathered in order to 
organize a class is three people. But for ethics it is seven people. So ethics is organized 
either in one class or at the level of school they have to gather seven and it is a lot of 
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students. If you think more about not schools in Warsaw but the ones in small cities and 
villages, the number of seven is a big number which is difficult to achieve. For minority 
religions, as I said, the number is three and thus it is easier for minority religion classes to 
be organized. The threshold changes from seven to three for ethics when you start to 
think of inter-school groups. So if you want to organize inter-school groups, according to 
the law it has to be organized for three people but the practice shows that these inter-
school groups are not organized. So there is still ethical possibility but the practice shows 
that it does not work.  
Why it is difficult to gather seven people in a school, in one class, it is also related to the 
way the Ordinance is formulated. The Ordinance is not clear, parents do not know who is 
responsible for organization of ethics instruction. For the religious instruction, for 
instance, these are priests. Priests are responsible for the particular community. For 
minority religions, it is more or less the same; the religious leaders are responsible for 
religious education. In the case of ethics instruction, of course, this is more dispersed. 
The law should say that the records should be kept for gathering the declarations from 
parents and submitting them to the regional government. But it does not work in this way. 
For example, there are problems of how and especially when the declarations, asking for 
the opening of ethics class, should be gathered. As the end of the year? As the year is 
proceeding?  When the instructions should take place? Normally, the declarations are 
gathered at the beginning of the school year. But at the beginning of the school year, the 
classes are already planned so no one in the schools has interest to push for the 
organization of ethics instruction. It is a problem for the schools. Then, who is 
responsible for gathering the declaration? Should the school administration ask or should 
the parents take initiative? You don’t know this. So, there are places where teachers ask 
openly who wants his/her kid to attend to ethics course and who does not want his/her 
child to go religion class. 
There are for sure problems about openly asking about religion in class. This influences 
parents who do not want to say openly that they do not want their children to attend 
religion classes. 
TG: In a sense, this is not an overt act of discrimination but it is more like a moral 
pressure; something sentimental where you feel the pressure of “otherness.” As far as I 
understand, you say that it is not just because it is something different than what majority 
does but mostly because the way it is practiced and declared. 
DP: Yes, exactly. One of my colleagues, for example, she has three children and one of 
them is now attending a school at Warsaw in a very wealthy district. Even in that school, 
they are suffering from all the things I talked to you, the pressure coming from other 
parents. He is now nine years old, and this is the age where Catholic children receive the 
first Communion, pressure from peers from the class or other children who take part of 
the religion class, as the majoritarian religion in public schools is Catholicism, it is 
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experienced by the whole class. So, children attending to the ethics class do feel bad and 
outsider. This is also the case for parents. The point is that the Ordinance must be clear at 
this point where parents who do not want their children to take religious instruction have 
the opportunity to do so without being faced with discrimination. This is the minority 
here that you must take care of. When you look at the Ordinance different religious 
minorities are treated in a better way because the whole Ordinance concerns religious 
instruction. So it is prepared in a way that it is easier for the use of different religious 
denominations than for parents who want their children to get ethics instruction. Its 
provisions apply only for analogium and not all provisions are easier for analogium. One 
the one hand this is a complicated situation was the context where 95 percent declare that 
they are Catholic in Poland which is opposed to the reality. On the other hand the law is 
not precise enough to guarantee to provide ethics instruction.  
TG: So you are mainly criticizing the Ordinance for not being clear enough, am I right? 
DP: Yes, sure. Because this is at the level of the Ordinance where the class of religion 
and ethics are organized. If you look at the title, it is “Ordinance about the religious 
instruction at school” and when it comes to ethics, it is not written with the aim of 
allowing children to go to ethics class. It is visible even at the level of title of the law.  
I would like to highlight that there were no discussions to change the situation after the 
Grzelak judgment but recently, I think five or six months ago, there was a proposition on 
the part of Ministry of Education to organize ethics instruction on internet. They really 
attempt to introduce ethics instruction via internet. Because they see the problem as the 
problem of finding teacher. 
TG: Is this a positive step in your view? Is the government act in good faith and try to 
find ways to provide ethics instruction? 
DP: Not really. They are thinking about changing this Ordinance or to deal with all these 
points that I have just mentioned and that are problematic, but they decided in this way 
because the main problem in their opinion is lack of teacher. So internet will solve all 
these problems, in their view. But for sure, it is not how ethics instruction should look 
like when this is organized with internet. Ethics is not like language or mathematics 
classes; it is something more.  
TG: You are right. If we turn back to your point about adherents of minority religions 
being in a better position compared to the ones who would like to get ethics instruction, 
could you make clear the crux of the problem? 
DP: The requirement for written declaration is indicated in the law but it is not clear who 
transfers the declaration to whom, when and so on. The declaration is needed but I should 
check whether it should be in the written form or not. 
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TG: Actually the way that declaration is made matters since this is one of the issues 
raised in the case brought before the ECtHR. The fact that a declaration should be made 
in order to get exemption from religion course in Turkey is decided to contradict with the 
relevant provision of the ECHR. So I am wondering about this point. 
DP: Here you do not need to declare your religion or denomination. You just say “I want 
my kid to get ethics instruction” and that is all. 
TG: So the fact that you do not want your child to attend religion class but rather ethics 
class shows that you are not religious, and that is all… Is that the case? 
DP: De facto, yes. This is what we defended in Grzelak case, it was about the school 
report containing a mark. One may not see the problem and understand the reality and 
can just consider this as an artificial problem. They do not understand why the fact that 
you do not have a mark on school report for religion/ethics instruction would be a 
problem. Well, it is quite clear, if there is no mark there it means that you are not 
Catholic. Because in every school there is a religion class, if there is no mark there it 
simply means that your kid did not attend the religion class, so you are either atheist or 
someone who protests and it ends up with changing school. This is what happens all the 
time especially in the small villages, in small schools. There are different kinds of 
attitudes of the teachers, this affects the practice. 
TG: As far as I could read, due to the application of the Ombudsman, the Constitutional 
Court made a verdict that if it appears a (/) between religion and ethics, the discrimination 
could be prevented since it will be unclear which class the kid attended. However, you 
are saying that, it is also what you defended in the Grzelak case; since the ethics class is 
not opened in many schools, no grade appears on the school report and it ipso facto 
displays what you have just indicated. 
DP: Yes and in fact it shows that the student did not attend religion course.  
TG: So you are claiming that it was not a real solution to the problem as long as they do 
not manage to arrange an ethics class. That makes sense. Let me ask about the European 
side too; is there any pressure from the EU? Do you perceive such an impact of the EU 
membership on this issue? I am asking this because Turkey 
DP: In the context of Grzelak Case, it is difficult to use this judgment to make an 
argument stating that we need to make changes about how ethics should be thought at 
Polish schools because the judgment was not touching upon these issues. They were 
raised but the judgment considered them in a very narrow way. It is only indicated that 
you cannot a school report in that format. So thinking of how to comply with the 
judgment was in terms of changing the form of school report. But which finds to use this 
as an argument in the discussion. When I was in the same commission for the execution 
of ECtHR judgment, I was mainly criticizing the judgment in the sense that Poland needs 
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to change laws, regulations and directions. About the Grzelak case, many argued that the 
judgment is not about how the ethics is thought here. So this shows that the ECtHR is not 
criticizing the educational setting. They ignored the high pressure about attending 
religion courses. They rather dealt with the practice that if the pupil does not attend 
religion course, as a rule, the school provides him or her surveillance and it was enough 
for the ECtHR. They did not make any pressure to Poland to make a systemic change, 
only some minor problems were highlighted. So in this discussion, this was not a strong 
argument in this judgment. Now in the context of the Ministry, you cannot find very 
strong arguments from the European side. This is a very general argument and therefore 
there is no other argument concerning the EU. 
TG: Yes, it can be because the ECtHR does not consider the situation of Poland as a case 
of violation human rights. So that is why they are not asking for a systemic change… 
which is not the case for Turkey, for example. 
PD: Yes, here it is difficult to talk about violation of human rights in the sense that here 
no one is indoctrinated. If we talk about other issues linked with wide topic of religious 
issue, there is an interesting case where there had been pressure from the EU. There was a 
case about the teachers in Catholic school. The directions, the EU rules concerning the 
school treatment are imposed in a concrete way in Poland. In 2011, it was imposed to the 
Polish law on the school treatment and this law forbids discrimination on the grounds of 
religion and on other grounds. It makes exceptions for denominational schools. It says 
that at the denominational schools, the religion or convictions of the teachers can 
contradict with the Church grounded schools. There was a case of teacher who was 
lesbian. There had been quite important discussion; the law does not allow this kind of 
discrimination even for those denominational schools. The law is only for someone is 
from different denomination and it is not bound with if that person’s sexual orientation. 
So the law cannot be interpreted as such because sexual orientation is not about your 
conviction. In general terms, if we think about those Europeanization issues, I would say 
that the law of equal treatment is important.        
TG: Actually, I am wondering why this law entered into force in Poland many years after 
the EU membership. Why did it take that long? Is it because local authorities were 
reluctant since it comprises equal treatment expectations for teachers from other 
denominations? 
DP: No, as you know, there is no law at the European level concerning the equal 
treatment at schools. There are directives and there are deadlines to transform them in 
line with the international system. It was transposed as a law which is called something 
like “law transposing certain directives on equal treatment into the Polish law.”  
TG: I see, it is clear for me now. I would like to ask your comment about the recent 
developments. I think it was almost three months ago, the right-oriented opposition party 
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in Poland, as far as I could follow, criticized the party in charge, which is again a right-
oriented party, for not supporting enough religious education at schools. Is there also 
such a dimension? Do you think that Polish people would share this complaint? 
PD: In what sense they are expecting a support for religion courses?  
TG: As long as I could understand, religion courses are “secondary” courses since they 
are elective and they do not have an impact on passing to the next grade and the 
opposition party wants to change this status. They would probably prefer them to be 
obligatory, and if not, these would affect passing to the next grade… 
DP: Making religion courses compulsory will challenge at first the Polish Constitution, it 
will an infringement of freedom of religion.  
TG: This would also contradict with the related European directives, I guess. 
DP: Yes, in order to better understand the general image envisaged by the Polish law, you 
can read the European Directive on equal treatment because the transposition means that 
the minimum standards are now met. So the directives are important in that sense. There 
were several discussions concerning this issue. In the cases where there are no direct 
applications of the directives, the general context now differs since the transposition of 
the directive into the Polish law. There had been changes compared to the past.   
TG: To be precise, what kind of changes you are talking about? 
DP: The law on equal treatment or the directives, in a sense, once again raise our 
awareness or we once again discuss the problems but in a bit different legal environment. 
For example, the case of Lautsi vs. Italy was deeply discussed in Poland. The issue was 
about whether the crucifix in the classroom infringes the Article 9 of the Convention. 
When you ask me the cases that are important for Poland in the Europeanization context 
in terms of the religious issues, Lautsi was the most prominent case in the recent years. 
All cases that concern the reproductive rights, mainly abortion, I can talk about a case 
which I think might be in your interest and which was judged according to the Article 9. 
You know, all these cases are actually going against Church. Two weeks ago we had a 
case in Poland: a girl was raped at the age of fourteen and according to the Polish law, 
she can have abortion.  The problem was that she could not receive this service at public 
hospitals. For almost twelve weeks she traveled with her family to find a public hospital 
where she can have abortion because the consent of the physician is also required. She 
has legal rights to do that. The judgment is very space forward, if you have a law, which 
says that in certain cases abortion is allowed, it should not be just on paper; it has to be 
practiced for sure. Now the discussion is based on how the abortion law should be 
changed to ban abortion in any case. It is very linked with Catholic morality. 
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TG:  It is still a positive thing that Poland did not make a reservation during the 
membership process for its right to ban the abortion like Malta did.  
DP: Yes, but it is not enough. The context is that there are problems in the practice. From 
the legal point of view the argument is very similar; you have the right to do that. We 
raise that there is no clear procedure for so at the end of the day, we have the ethics 
courses but pupils do not have access to that course. This is the same context we are 
talking about.  
TG: Actually, that was what I understood while reading the judgment of Grzelak case; as 
the third part, HFHR raised the issues stemming from the problems in practice for the 
ethics courses. But when read the final judgment, I realized that the Court did not make a 
clear reference to that point. Am I right or did I miss something? Because if I am right, 
then the verdict seems to ignore the general context… 
DP: The main problem with the judgment was that even though there were several 
complaints, the major complaint was that there was no grade on the school report for 
religion/ethics or having it cropped out revealed in the Polish context your religious 
convictions. The Court said this infringes the Article 14 in connection with the Article 9.  
TG: Okay, but did Grzelak family get what they wanted? Or as the third part, was the 
HFHR satisfied with the judgment? Because as far as I can understand, the judgment did 
not address the major points raised by the applicants or by the third part.  
DP: There was no infringement in this case; the Court found infringement of Article 14 in 
connection with Article 9. The applicants were not satisfied of course, because not all of 
their complaints were taken into consideration. For example they were complaining about 
the lack of ethics instruction in schools; in fact, the obligation to go to religion class in 
the Polish context is seen as a kind of indoctrination but the Court did not agree with this. 
They were also complaining that Mateusz was mocked by his peers at school and that the 
school authority did not react. Also during the religion classes he stayed at the corridor, 
no one took care of him and other children saw him. So he had to change school several 
times because of this but the Court did not agree with this and not found evident as well. 
Thus they were not completely satisfied, there was infringement but most of their 
complaints were not addressed at all. In that sense, the judgment goes narrow. I can 
understand that you might have some difficulty in understanding the scope of the 
judgment; it starts with very general descriptions of the problem, with ethics instruction, 
the denominations etc. and it gives you the promise of very important judgment but the 
judgment does not say that important things. It does not say that in Poland there is a 
systemic problem with ethics instruction. That is why I said that it is difficult to use this 
here in Poland in discussions about reforming ethics instruction. It can be used as an 
argument but not as to the merit.  
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TG: I was also going to ask whether the Grzelak case set a precedent, but according to 
what I retrieve from what you said, I think it did not… 
DP: No, I do not think so… Actually it is complicated.  
TG: In the Turkish context, the case which was brought before the ECtHR set a precedent 
for other cases in the domestic law. And when the judgment of the ECtHR is started to be 
applied in the national law, many families applied to the domestic jurisdiction.  
DP: But the Court decided that that there was an infringement because of the 
indoctrination, right?  
TG: With that content of the course, yes. 
DP: In the Grzelak case, it is complicated. The Court said that this is not about 
indoctrination not to organize ethics instruction; which means that this is de facto 
obligation or pressure. This could be an important argument to use in the Polish Court. 
You could make a case about the infringement in terms of dignity and indoctrination but 
Poland has a good law in terms of standards. The difficulty is in operation or in 
procedural details that make things problematic. Because the judgment is not 
straightforward about for the main issue which was raised here, when I read the 
judgment, I say “Okay, but where is the rest of our argument?” Where is the place where 
the Court says that it is wrong and the state is responsible for making it possible for the 
ethics classes to take place? Where is it? In that sense, it is a very narrow judgment.  
TG: You are right, I had difficulty in understanding the judgment of the Grzelak case 
because of the point you have just mentioned. Lots of systemic issued were raised but no 
general measures were foreseen for Poland, only individual ones… 
PD: The finding of violation is just for satisfaction but it does not mean that the Polish 
state was not found guilty of the violation. It was found, it was just for satisfaction 
adjudicated. The Court said that Poland is guilty for violation but it is not guilty for a 
systemic violation for the ethics instruction in schools. It is only responsible for making 
the school reports in a form which does not reveal the personal convictions of a person. It 
is also the case for the identity cards indicating different denominations. The Court 
solved the problem at this level: this is a public document so it should not reveal your 
conviction and the Court did not set a form for all the issues which we raised. How the 
religious instruction is defined and regulated and how the ethics instruction is regulated 
are the positive obligations of the state and it should set a rule that enable effectively the 
implementation and not only on the paper. There was conviction that it was not just for 
satisfaction, it only showed that the Court did not feel the necessity to adjudicate that 
there was a violation – not clear! 
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TG: I also would like to understand whether it is a common problem in Poland and I am 
wondering whether there is great number of students who are faced with the difficulties 
you have mentioned in taking ethics instruction. Are there similar cases brought before 
domestic courts?  
DP: What I observe from my colleagues for example is that they are asked to raise hands 
for those who want their child to attend ethics class. They say that that the declaration 
should be made hidden. Then the class is organized but no one wants to raise hand. As 
the HFHR we receive letters stating different problems and concerns about organization 
of the ethics instruction. They say that the classes are not organized beforehand but at the 
last moment whereas the plans for the classes are made before. When the declarations are 
asked right at the beginning of the school year, there is no time to make the arrangements. 
The directives are not clear, as I already said, there is no time determined for 
declarations. Regional government is responsible for organizing these interschool classes 
and they generally organize it in the evening. On the other hand, the religion class is 
always organized in the middle of the school day. This point itself is an evidence of 
unequal treatment because it discourages students. For example the math class is always 
the first or in the middle of the day and school authorities are very careful about that in 
order not to let the students miss out. But the ethics classes are always at the end of the 
day or students have to wait three of four hours. So your kids are spending extra hours at 
school if you do not want them to attend religion classes and if they go to ethics class, 
they will spend more hours in addition to the logistical problems. This is a problem in 
almost every school. Today I know that if I want my kid to take ethics instruction, I will 
be the one who creates problem.  
TG: Do you have any statistical data for the number of students who would like to take 
ethics instruction, in Warsaw for example? 
DP: You mean those who declare for ethics? 
TG: Yes. 
DP: No, I do not know such data but there are the numbers of ethics classes organized, as 
far as I remember. Not at the level of declaration but the classes organized.  
When we advise these parents to know how many of them they are and to make sure that 
they have made declarations, they say that they do not want interschool classes. They say 
that either the ethics class should be organized in the same school or they would resign 
from asking for ethics instruction. I think that it is the reason why the interschool groups 
do not exist in practice.  
TG: Such problems do not exist for minority religions, right? For other denominations I 
mean… 
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DP: Yes, you are right. I have not heard of any problems from minorities about the 
religious instruction. The major problem is the organization of ethics classes in practice; 
the majoritarian thinking is at work in that case.  
TG: The lack of clear directives for organizing ethics classes can also be explained by 
this majoritarian thinking, I guess. For the organization of those classes the state initiative 
seems necessary in the form of clear directives or pushing school authorities to provide 
ethics instruction. But for minority religions, I think, there is no expectation from the 
state. There seems to be a widespread freedom and responsibility for those denominations 
in that field. That is what I observed for the Muslim students in Warsaw.  
DP: Yes, for ethics instruction the will of the school authorities is important. For 
example, teachers do not know the procedures, when the threshold of seven pupils is not 
reached; they do not say that there is an option of interschool group. They would do this 
if you ask them explicitly. Personally, I was lucky to go a school where ethics instruction 
even for one person. 
TG: Are there such schools? 
DP: There are, but it depends on the director. At that school there was high level of 
consciousness about the rights and freedoms. When you go to schools where the children 
of the professors, of the academia, of the judges; you can see that the school authorities 
are keen on implementing the directives. But these schools are rare and they are in 
general big schools in the big cities. However this should not be like this, these should be 
written in law and be clear in the directives.  
TG: Now I understand the crux of the problem and the difference with Turkey. Here the 
problem mainly stems from the ambiguity of the legislation and the subjectivity of the 
practice. But Turkey the law itself about the compulsory religious education is 
problematic.  
DP: Yes, the indoctrination problem. I think here there is a link with the Communism; 
there is a persuasion that indoctrination is bad. If the law somehow tries to introduce 
some kind of indoctrination, religious indoctrination formally at the level of education, in 
the political context we have now, with these political parties it would not be approved. 
Obligatory religion classes I do not think that it would go in line with the Constitution. 
Now there is a deep democratic mechanism in Poland and the Polish Constitution is in 
such a way that it is impossible to pass a relation. I think that how we interpret the 
Constitution is linked with the persecution of religion during Communist time. Certain 
kind of sensitivity is present. This is at the end a homogenous society where there is no 
remarkable immigration. There is an inclination to make the majority religion even more 
powerful but the discourse is now is very liberal.  
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TG: This is one of the points which make it difficult to measure the impact of 
Europeanization in Poland; it is because after the fall of Communism, liberalization, 
modernization and democratization of the country are in parallel with the membership 
accession. So it is hard to understand whether the situation, for example about the 
religious instruction, would it be the same if Poland had not become a member of the EU. 
DP: Not for every field, but for this matter, I think Europeanization had an impact. For 
the discrimination laws, there is a pressure from the EU and we introduced these laws at 
the very last moment when there was a threat of infringement in Poland from the part of 
the European Commission. Why we did not want this law, because it is seen as a threat to 
the traditional life style since the discrimination law is about the sexual orientation and 
many other issues that would bother the Catholic morality in the country. I remember the 
discussions about the discrimination law in the Polish Parliament where there were 
representatives of priests; it was not only about banning discrimination on the grounds of 
disability but also on the grounds of religious convictions or sexual orientations. So the 
impact of Europeanization in terms of the discrimination law is obvious.  
 
 
Interview with Dr. Michal Gierycz, University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, 
Warsaw 
13.11.2012, Vaticanuum II Conference at University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński 
 
Dr. Michal Gierycz: The Bologna Process is the most significant change. Each level 
education is now transferred and connected to European competence and framework. The 
changes however are artificial. When you look at the universities the whole structure of 
the studies is changed. We have this frame of preparing programs, the idea of this 
competence, outcomes and so on. We will see some changes but for now I am not sure 
about the outcomes for the theological education.   
Tuğba Gürçel: Actually, I am also wondering the impact of Europeanization in the formal 
education in public schools… In gymnasium and liceum, specifically; is there and 
increase in the number of students who would like to attend ethics courses for example? 
Do you know such surveys conducted?    
MG: Here the point is that there is a secular debate in Poland. There is great number of 
Catholics, so they quite often say that there is no enough possibility for students to 
choose ethics instead of religion and then children attend religion because there is social 
pressure. It is the point of view of the some part of… 
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TG: Leftists? 
MG: Yes, leftists for sure. But is not only the question of secular representation of… I do 
not know the English translation of the movement but Janusz Palikot is the leader, and 
the organization’s name is basically the name of the leader. It is quite crazy… They are 
really popular, for sure they are supporting that issue but I would say there are many 
groups outside politics like media and this question also appears. But in reality we do not 
have such statistics which clearly says it is problematic and that show which amount of 
students…  
TG: So you are saying that there is no reliable data that would enable us to make the 
comparison between before and after Europeanization. So we cannot say whether after 
the EU membership the number of students who want to attend ethics course increased.  
MG: I think this is a chicken and egg question. In fact, we have to say because there are 
some secularists obsessed but we have to say that I think that it is not a clash. They say 
that religion will disappear in Poland in the first yeas of accession. This kind of 
predictions is made and they are false. But at the same time we see a decrease… 
TG: For example in the Church attendance, you mean?  
MG: In Church attendance, yes; in number of seminary schools but it is not radical. It is 
slowdown. It is not to say that it is a clear outcome of the accession. What can be, what 
people say, the emigration from Poland. The number somehow fell because young people 
left. I do not know any clear research, I can try to find such articles but sociologists point 
out that it is emigration… 
TG: Is that article in English? 
MG: I can check it. You can look at the Institute for Statistics of Catholic Church they 
publish each year. The second one is our faculty, the Chair of Sociology of Religion; 
there are their value tests. There are also such things in Krakow, some groups who focus 
on religion research. 
TG: For the statistical data, may I send you an e-mail requesting that information? Maybe 
you could write the names…  
MG: Yes, sure I can do it. There are also some NGOs making research on public opinion. 
It is about religious opinion. I think there is one thing very important for you, they made 
a very good research about the tendency. And here you can also meet experts. Did you 
see Father Mazurkiewicz? 
TG: No, not yet but I wrote him and he accepted to talk to me. Maybe in the second break 
he would have time to talk.  
MG: Yes it would be great. 
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For the relation about the state and religion, it means that there are other people who are 
believers. It is a tactic. The Prime Minister in Poland, because some people are connected 
with his beliefs. If the religion course was obligatory, it would be contradictory with 
some people. 
TG: Actually, in Turkey the religious courses are obligatory but since the name is 
“religious culture and knowledge of ethics” and it should be ideally free from 
indoctrination and recalls such kind of a secular course.  
MG: Turkey is a very interesting country and its idea to cover the very religious society 
with fully secular institutions; I think it has to be changed during the time and I think it is 
also the case in Turkey right now with the current government. There is a consent 
challenge between some kinds of Islamic groups and secular institutions. I think it is very 
important to take into account religion and the state-religion relations and we would try to 
understand how it works and how the implementation with the universal rights can be 
done. 
TG: Yes, that is right. The tradition of state-religion relations specific to each country is 
very important. I think the break is over, so thank you very much for sharing your views. 
MG: You are welcome. 
 
 
Interview with Prof. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Priest and General Secretary of the 
Commission of the Conference of Bishops of the European Community 
13.11.2012, Conference of Vaticanuum II at Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Let me please start with asking your views about the impact of the EU 
membership as well as the Europeanization process on Church-state relationship in 
Poland. Would you comment on that please? 
Prof. Piotr Mazurkiewicz: Regarding primary law of the EU, in the Lisbon Treaty, Article 
17 which inspiring the relationship between churches, religion and the EU. In the first 
chapter of the Article, it is granting a kind of recognition of the status quo but also it 
states the competence concerning church-state relations. So we should not expect direct 
activity in this domain from the EU. So we should expect that accession to the EU 
process having no impact on state-religion relationships. This is true to certain extent in 
the sense that there can be an indirect impact in this social meaning. For example we 
observe that after the accession, calling at the moment after eight years around two tier 
Poles they booked to some Western countries to work. This is the general context that 
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people talk about the issue. So when they are coming back, they are different in terms of 
how people are thinking, how they are behaving also in the Church.  
There are kind of influences concerning for example some ethical issues which again in 
the EU mostly are in the competence of the member states. Some of the decisions which 
are concerning the ethical impact are taken by the EU. I would say, the moment where 
what kind of researches will be supported is decided for the Horizon 2020 program, it is 
important to know what is the place for Church and for religion. EU till now, was 
subsidizing researchers. 
Education is regarded as a kind of service by the EU, and the services are in the 
competence of the EU. In this sector, which is professional education, in a broader sense 
there was the EU law and policy in charge and these should be applied also in Poland. 
When we see a challenge in the field education for the Catholic Church, one element is 
just the religious education, but this one is more or less in the competence of the EU. 
Here we could say issues falling under faith and conscience are organized years ago 
within the competence of the countries. When we are looking at other countries, in some 
members it is very linked with the question of morality and so how the schools decide 
within this education moral issues are organized. One of the most controversial issues 
within this context is the sexual education and even this is organized still under the 
competence of the member states. There is also indirect impact coming from in the form 
of “soft law,” kind of declarations and regulations but also by some kind of activities that 
are subsidized by the European Commission; they are granting financial support so they 
are becoming stronger. 
TG: I would like to specify on the issue of religious education. Has there been or is there 
any influence from the EU for the preparation of the content of the religion courses at 
schools? The way that these courses are being taught for example, is it subject to any 
kind of regulation or standardization? I know that there are no determined rules for the 
religion courses in specific but while becoming an EU member, did Poland faced with 
any kind of expectations? 
Prof. Mazurkiewicz: Actually, there was no conflict on this issue which is provoked by 
the EU law. There were some conflicting issues, most of them you can find by looking at 
the cases brought before the ECtHR. There are such cases for Poland but there are also 
cases sued against Turkey as far as I know. It is because, I suppose, we are looking at 
different particular cases  
I would imagine that on the one hand we are just looking at the Polish law, it will 
describe the relationship between the Church and the civil authorities concerning the 
content of religious education concerning the competence of the teachers.  
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Teachers of religious education comply with other teachers. What traditionalists assume 
concerning the fact that they are competent to teach religion; have to receive a special 
mission from the Church authority.  
So we have this secular competence checked by the ministry and the religious 
competence checked by the Church authority. That is more or less concerning the 
content; the curriculum of this course. We have also some risky initiatives, for example, 
one of the possible conflicts could be the wrong conception of non-discrimination 
policies. In this sense, on the one hand, conditional schools at that moment religious 
authority has the right to decide who has right to attend those schools. Catholic schools 
are open for everyone but still, this decision should be taken by the school authority. And 
then it might be problems in entering to the school.  
TG: Is it the case for teachers or students who would like to go to that school? 
Prof. Mazurkiewciz: It can be teachers, students… If you are looking at some cases, they 
are involved teachers; professors from universities were employed and then fired. So 
there was the question if there is… 
TG: The equal treatment? 
Prof. Mazurkiewicz: Yes. Concerning the content, when you are looking at the soft law, 
the debate also in Poland, some deputies for example, stick on Catholic teaching on 
sexuality, also on moral practices; some call these deputies as homophobic. This is 
official Catholic teaching which you can find grounded in the Bible, and you can find this 
in the catechesis. So if one attempts to introduce any kind of obligation for the Catholic 
Church or change teaching in moral issues but when we just observe the debate at 
political institutions. That is what I would like to say about this issue.    
TG:  Okay, thank you for sharing your views. May I ask about other denominations and 
adherents of other convictions? As far as I am concerned, Muslims for example, can 
make their children learn their religion and there is no restriction or problems stemming 
from the practice. Do you think that it is related to the EU impact, or Catholic morality? 
Prof. Mazurkiewicz: I think it is much related to the Polish history. Now, here in Poland 
there is probably around 93 percent of Catholics 3 percent of other Christians; 96 percent 
is Christian. But this homogeneity is there after the Second World War. Poland in the 
history has never been homogeneous. In the Polish Commonwealth, Poles and Catholics; 
they are not always the same groups by the way, formed about 70-75 percent of the total 
population. You can imagine for example also Muslim community in Poland, which was 
invited by the Polish King, six hundred years ago and they were real Polish citizens. Also 
they accompanied Polish King in Vienna against the Ottoman Empire and they were on 
the Catholic side. This is a part of the history and what was the understanding of the state, 
of the state constitution was first in the Western world in Poland, the word “tolerance” 
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appeared. This, you will find also in the Second Polish Republic, between two wars, a 
great diversity. If I remember correctly, we had around 16 laws concerning relations 
between Church, religion and state. So there was the main model which was established 
by the Catholic Church should be valid to all communities. As the main community 
established at the bottom, then other communities established. 
This mindset is part of the Polish culture… When we consider the principle of equality 
you will find it reflected in the present Polish Constitution, which is called “proportional 
equality.” This is concept which means, for example when you are treating the Catholic 
Church in a way, you should treat in the same way to the Pentecosta Church, which is a 
very minority church. What does it mean? It means that all religions have the same right 
to organize religious education at schools formally. But when you start to organize 
religious education, it means that to a great extent this will be Catholic education and 
only to a very small percentage it will be by Pentacosta Church. So they are treated in the 
same way but this is giving a different result because of the proportions of the 
communities. At this moment you cannot just apply exactly the same rule but you should 
reflect what the equal treatment means, so that this is the model and you have to initiate 
with the Church, the respected churches, how they would like this law to be applied.  
The framework, which is the legal framework, it would be very interesting for you just to 
look because there is the debate of religious education. This is something that you should 
consider because we have this for years in Poland, because we had different history. Also 
different philosophy; just to explain it to you; when you look at the map of Europe at the 
15th century there were two borders of civilization, one was the Islam and the Catholic 
religion was de facto mobilization insight against Islam. In Poland, what was specific, 
because it was also at the border of civilizations, the main obstacle was that Catholic…. 
this was the main danger for the state of Poland. At that moment, the Polish King decided 
to organize a state with a union with Lithuanians and this union was created with two 
nations and with different convictions, in the sense that one from Catholic faith and the 
other from Orthodox faith. At the beginning there was also a Jewish community who had 
the old parliament in Poland. There was also a Muslim community that cannot vote but 
protects that border… So this was a heterogeneous state and tolerance was the main 
reason to preserve the state because if it starts a conflict among citizens, the state would 
disappear. This was a challenge, in a sense unique in Europe how to construct this 
multinational community but in a sense multi-cultural but there were the communities 
acted themselves. 
TG: You are highlighting that Poland respected the existence of those communities in the 
past and that it is in a sense tradition to preserve different cultures even though it is much 
more homogenous than ever. Actually, this is one of my main remarks while 
investigating the state-religion relations in Poland; the evidence is much linked with its 
history than its Europeanization process.   
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Prof. Mazurkiewicz: When you reflect about the Polish culture, you can find two lines; 
one which is coming from the 16th century, and is called as Jagiellonian tradition. Pope 
John Paul II was one of the witnesses of this tradition. In the 19th century, foundation of 
Polish nation state was the second tradition which is new also.  
When we look at why it was easy for Poland to become a member of the EU, this was 
also the expectation of John Paul II, it was because we had this experience from the union 
with Lithuanians, that we lived in the union which was possibly unique in Europe of that 
time, because that was a different union. We had many unions 15th and 16th centuries in 
Europe but these were unions of diplomacy, due to the marriages between the monarchs. 
In Poland, this was a union of nations with a contract between two nations.  
TG: Thank you very much for sharing your views about religious education and Poland’s 
EU membership.   
 
 
Group interview with Muslim students and their parents of Turkish origin  
13.11.2012, Residence of Turkish Embassy to Warsaw 
(Kindly arranged by Mr. Ambassador Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan) 
 
(Eda: 3rd class, Nihal: 4th class, Ahmet: 7th class, Sima: 4th class, Samet: 5th class, 
Kerem: 12th class)  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Şöyle bir soruyla başlayayım; şimdi mesela Katolik olan arkadaşlarınız 
din dersini okulda seçmeli olarak alıyorlar. Siz deseniz ki ben hiç almak istemiyorum din 
dersini, ne okulda ne de dışarıda camide. Böyle bir imkanınız var mı? 
Öğrenci 1: Var. 
TG: Yani siz kendiniz veya aileleriniz istediği için camide din dersi alıyorsunuz...  
Öğrenciler: Evet. 
TG: Peki sizin camide aldığınız bu dersin belirli bir müfredatı var mı? Biliyor musunuz? 
Yoksa daha çok Hoca hangi konuyu işlemek istiyorsa o mu işleniyor?  
Öğrenci 1: Ben size bizim durumumuzu genel olarak anlatayım. Kardeşim 5. sınıfa 
gidiyor burada, ben lise sona gidiyorum. Bugüne kadar, ya din dersi ya filozofi dersi var, 
bu ikisinden birisini seçmek zorunlu. Burada bir avukat byle bir zorunluluk olmadığını 
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söyledi. Bir kağıt götürüyorsun, veli diyor ki oğlumun ne bu ne bu dersi almasını 
istiyorum, bunu imzalıyor, sonra dersi almıyorsun. Okul müdürüne bunu ilettikten sonra 
bir sorun kalmıyor. Yalnız ekstradan not gelsin diye, ortalama yükselsin diye mesela biz 
ekstradan din dersi zaten alıyoruz bu da karnemize geçiyor. Bu şekilde hem okulumuzda 
resmi bir şekilde başka bir yerde ders aldığımız gözüküyor hem de ortalama yükseliyor. 
TG: Anladım. Bahsettiğin okul bir devlet okulu değil mi? Yani sen özel bir okulda 
okumuyorsun? Devlet okulundaki uygulama bu şekilde... 
Öğrenci 1: Evet ben direk Polonya devlet lisesindeyim.  
TG: Yani senin dışarıda camide aldığın dersin notu direk olarak karnene yansıyor, öyle 
mi? Din/etik dersi yazan kısmın karşısında, Hoca’nin verdiği notu okul yönetimine 
götürüyorsun onlar da karnene ilgili haneye yazıyorlar, öyle mi?  
Öğrenci 1: Evet. 
TG: Notun yazdığı kağıdı direk alıp götürüyorsun, kimse denetlemiyor, onaylamıyor; 
öyle mi? 
Öğrenci 1: Kağıdı alıyorum, burada Müftülüğün kaşesiyle direk, yani her şey resmi bir 
şekilde oluyor. Okul da bunu kabul ediyor, kabul etmek zorunda zaten.  
TG: Peki derslere katılma zorunluluğunuz var mı? Mesela camide yoklama alıyorlar mı? 
Öğrenciler: Hayır... Yok... 
Öğrenci 1: Buranın cami ortamı öyle diğer Avrupa ülkelerindeki Türkler’in cami ortamı 
gibi değil çünkü burada bir avuç olduğumuz için... Fazla çocuk da yok gördüğünüz üzere. 
Yani böyle bir ortam, şu anda gördüğünüz gibi. Öyle çok büyük bir topluluk değil, o 
yüzden çok da fazla sorun da olmuyor.  
TG: Hepiniz Arap Camii’ne mi gidiyorsunuz? 
Öğrenci 1: Yok ben başka yere gidiyorum. Burada Arap Camii var, Fethullah Gülen 
Hoca’nin Camii var, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan Hazretlerinin Camii var; o cemaate ait 
cami var. Üç tane cami var Varşova’da.  
TG: Bir de galiba bir Türk Camii inşa ediliyormuş... Duydunuz mu onu? 
Öğrenci 1: Türk değil; Türkmen. Tam bilmiyorum ama minaresiz cami yapmaya kalktılar 
hatta bayağı olaylar oldu burada. Müftü’ye sorduğun zaman 2012 Temmuzun sonunda 
açmayı düşünüyorlar ama yetişemez zaten.  
TG: Sen lise sondayım demiştin değil mi? Türkiye’deki gibi mi sistem? 
Öğrenci: Burada sıfırıncı sınıf var, o zaman Türkiye’de okula gitmiyorlardı ben 
gidiyordum. Sonra 1-2-3-4-5-6, ilkokul 6 sene; 3 ortaokul, 3lise.  
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TG: Bu durumda 12 yıllık eğitim var ama 6+3+3 şeklinde demek burada. Anladım. 
Aranızda hiç okulda Katolik dininin öğretildiği din dersini alan var mı? 
Öğrenciler: Yok. Hayır. 
TG: Hiçbiriniz bu dersi almıyorsunuz ama mesela öğretmenleriniz bazen dinden 
bahsediyor mu başka derlserde? Veya haç takıyorlar mı? Sınıflarda haç var mı? Yani 
genel olarak okulda dinle ilgili dikkatinizi çeken bir şeyler var mı? 
Öğrenci 2: Şey var mesela, böyle girerken kapının üstünde haç var. 
Öğrenci 3: Bizim sınıfın içinde var. Tahtanın üstünde. 
Öğrenci 2: Evet, orada da var.  
TG: Başka? 
Öğrenciler: Yok.  
Öğrenci 2: Ha bir de öğrencilere o kolyeden veriyorlar, biz hariç.  
TG: Peki siz diğer arkadaşlarınızdan farklı hissediyor musunuz bu durumda? Dışlanıyor 
musunuz? Size kötü davranıyorlar mı? 
Öğrenciler: Yok. Yok. 
TG: Hepiniz burada mı doğdunuz? 
Öğrenci 1: Ben bir yaşımda gelmişim. 
Öğrenci 2: Ben ve kardeşim öyleyiz, diğerlerini bilmiyorum.  
TG: Hepiniz gayet güzel Türkçe konuşuyorsunuz... 
Öğrenci 1: O da işte ailelerimiz sağolsun, onlar çok dikkat gösterdiler buna. Hepimiz 
önce Türkçe sonra buranın dilini öğrendik.  
TG: Kendinizi farklı hissediyor musunuz peki? Mesela duyduğuma göre okullarda 
Katolik din dersleri günün ortasında, diğer derslerin arasında oluyormuş, var mı böyle bir 
şey? 
Öğrenciler: Yok. 
TG: Yani son ders de olabiliyor, ilk ders de, ortada bir saat de...  
Öğrenciler: Evet. Aynen. 
TG: Ama okul saatleri içinde oluyor, siz o saatte ne yapıyorsunuz? 
Öğrenci 2: Biz de o saatte, şey... ne deniyordu o derse Türkçe’de? 
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Öğrenci 3: Ben kütüphanede bekliyorum hep.  
Öğrenci 2: Bizi o saatte bir yere gönderiyorlar orada bekliyoruz biz. 
Öğrenci 4: Orada bir öğretmen var, oyuncaklar var, çocuklar falan oynuyorlar. Kim 
gelirse bekleyebilir orda sonraki ders başlayana kadar.  
Öğrenci 3: Ben bazen koridorda bekliyorum. Bazen ailelerini bekliyorlar ders bitince. 
Öğrenci 4: O sınıfta oyuncaklar var. Senenin başında yazılıyorsun ya da yazılmıyorsun, 
ayda bir para veriyorsun, orada oynayabiliyorsun, öğretmen de var. Bazen orada boya 
yapabiliyorsun, öğretmen sana veriyor.  
TG: Parayı ne için ödüyorsunuz? 
Öğrenci 4: Orada öğretmen bizi bekletiyor diye, bizi koruyor diye. Yemek de oluyor. 
Kim istemiyorsa yazılmıyor.  
Öğrenci 2: Yazılsak da yazılmasak da din dersi süresince bekliyoruz zaten.  
TG: Mutlaka bir öğretmen gözetiminde oluyorsunuz yani... 
Öğrenci 4: Mutlaka birkaç öğretmen oluyor.  
TG: Peki okullarınızda bu din dersine katılmayan kaç kişi oluyor sizden başka? 
Öğrenci 2: Bizim okulda Madagaskar’dan gelen biri var bir de Ukraynalı var.  
TG: 3-4 kişi oluyorsunuz o zaman mesela derse girmeyen, dışarıda bekleyen... 
Öğrenciler: Vietnam’dan var. Afrika’dan gelen biri var bizde.  
TG: Kendi okulunda tek başına bekleyen var mı hiç? 
Öğrenci 1: Ben.  
TG: Bir sıkıntı yaşıyor musun peki? 
Öğrenci 1: Yok yaa... Ben alıştım artık. Yani sonuçta sıkıntı yaşayacak bir şey yok, her 
şey resmi. Hekes benim ne olduğumu biliyor, ne olduğumu herkese göstermiş bir kişi 
olarak bir sıkıntı yaşamıyorum.  
TG: Senin yaşın daha büyük olduğu için, net bir şekilde souyorum; hiç dışlandığın oldu 
mu din derslerine girmediğin için... Müslüman olduğun için... Arkadaşlarından, 
öğretmenlerinden? 
Öğrenci 1: Yok, öğretmenlerden kesinlikle öyle bir şey yok. Ama şöyle diyeyim, küçük 
yaşlarda; bunlar daha yaşamazlar, inşallah da hiç yaşamazlar ama be yaşadım yani öyle. 
Büyüdükçe, zaman ilerledikçe, dediğiniz gibi farkındalık fazlalaşınca arkadaşlar 
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arasındaki bağ da değişiyor tabi. Araya başka şeyler giriyor... yaşadım, yaşamadım değil 
ama bunların üstesinden de bir şekilde gelmeyi başardım. Şu anda bir sıkıntı yok yani ya 
da alıştım bana öyle geliyor. Üstüne gitmeyi de deniyorsunuz, bir zamandan sonra 
yetmiyor. Üstüne git nereye kadar, kendini yormaktan başka bir şey değil.  
TG: Bir de tabi bu yaşlar biraz öyle yaşlar, herkesin biraz kendini kimliğini ortaya 
koyduğu; lise dönemi özellikle, en ufak farklılık göze çarpıyor. İlla konunun din olması 
da gerekmiyor, Türkiye’de veya başka bir ülkede de aslında yaşıtlarınız benzer kimlik 
belirleme çatışmaları yaşıyorlar.  Fakat anladığım kadarıyla sistemik bir baskı veya 
dışlama sözkonusu değil.  
Öğrenci 1: Şöyle söyleyeyim, bizim için Almanya, Belçika, Hollanda; oraları toplarsak 
burası oralardan daha rahat. Çünkü orada insanların kendilerini kabullendirme gibi bir 
dertleri oluyor. Burada yok. 
(Bir öğrenci daha geliyor) 
TG: Öyle bir farklılık görüyorsun. Peki. Siz her haftasonu camiye gidiyorsunuz değil mi? 
Bir saat mi?  
Öğrenci 1: Değişiyor. Yani ben yeri geldiğinde sabahtan akşama kadar orada kalıyorum. 
Öğrenci 2: Evet ben de öyle. 
Öğrenci 1: Yani oradaki ortam nasıl müsaitse, genellikle müsait oluyor.  
TG: Camide sadece Türkler olmuyor tabi... 
Öğrenci 1: Tabi. Bizim gittiğimiz yerde sadece Türkler var.  
TG: Nereye gidiyordun sen? 
Öğrenci 1: Biz Süleyman cemaatinin camiine gidiyoruz.  
Kıvılcım Metin: Hepiniz o camiye mi gidiyorsunuz? 
Öğrenciler: Yok biz Arap Camii’ne gidiyoruz.  
Öğrenci 2: Suriye’den bir Hocamız var bizim.  
TG: Nizar Şerif Hoca değil mi? 
Öğrenci 2: Evet Nizar Şerif Hoca.  
TG: Peki ne kadar zaman geçirmek istiyorsanız orada, o kadar geçirebiliyorsunuz ama en 
az ne kadar orada olmanız gerekiyor? Yani ders kaç saat? 
Öğrenciler: Üç. 
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TG: Neler öğretiyorlar? 
Öğrenci 2: Din, yani Kuran’dan. Bir de Arapça.  
TG: Din olarak sadece İslam dinini mi öğreniyorsunuz yoksa başka dinler de anlatılıyor 
mu? 
Öğrenciler: Sadece İslam. 
TG: Bir de tabi pratiklerini öğreniyorsunuz değil mi? Mesela namaz nasıl kılınır, abdest 
nasıl alınır... İlk önce bunları öğretiyorlardır, sonra da her sefer pratik ediyorsunuzdur. 
Öyle mi? 
Öğrenciler: Evet. Öyle oluyor. 
TG: Peki oruç tuttuğunuz zaman mesela, arkadaşlarınızdan öğretmenlerinizden tepki 
alıyor musunuz? 
Öğrenciler: Yok hayır. 
Öğrenci 2: Oruç tuttuğumuz zaman öğretmenlerimize söylüyoruz, dikkat ediyorlar 
yanımızda yememeye.  
TG: O kadar hassas davranıyorlar yani. 
Öğrednci 2: Evet, bizden bile çok dikkat ediyorlar.  
Öğrenci4: Ama bazen öyle insanlar oluyor ki, bilerek yanında içiyorlar... Benim bir kere 
arkadaşım yapmıştı. (gülüşmeler) 
TG:  Onu Türkiye’de de tutmayan biri tutan birine yapabilir, biraz kişiyle alakalı sanki. 
Peki din dersi notlarınız nasıl? Düşük not alan var mı aranızda? 
Öğrenciler: Yok hayır. 
Öğrenci 5: Ben 3 aldım 6 üzerinden. (gülüşmeler) 
TG: Bu dersten aldığınız not direk not ortalamanıza dahil oluyor değil mi? 
Öğrenci 2: Biz gösterirsek aldığımız notu dahil oluyor, göstermezsek olmuyor.  
Öğrenci 1: Yok yani dersi almışsan not kağıdını okula vermek zorundasın yoksa sıfır 
almışsın gibi olur. 
TG: Peki okulunuzda etik dersi için sınıf açılıyor mu? Var mı o derse katılan 
arkadaşlarınız? Mesela Polonyalı ama din dersine gitmek istemiyor okulda, etik dersine 
gitmek istiyor. Var mı öyle? 
Öğrenci 5: Benim sınıfımda bir tane var.  
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TG: Bütün sınıflardakiler birleşip bir etik sınıfına giriyorlar değil mi? Mesela 10 tane 6. 
Sınıf öğrencisi? 
Öğrenciler: Evet. 
Öğrenci 2: Bizde öyle değil. Bizde din dersine girmeyen herkes o diğer sınıfa gidiyor.  
TG: Etik dersinin açılması konusunda Polonyalı arkadaşlarınızın şikayet ettiğini 
duydunuz muu peki hiç? 
Öğrenciler: Hayır. 
TG: Din hakkında rahat konuşabiliyor musunuz arkadaşlarınızla? 
Öğrenci 1: Bana soruyorlar mesela sen niye din dersine girmiyorsun burada oturuyorsun 
diye. Ben de açıklıyorum, belirtiyorum durumumun ne olduğunu. Camiye gidiyorum 
oradan aldığım notumu da getiriyorum diyorum. Arkadaşlar ondan sonra daha çok merak 
edip soruyorlar, ben de açık bir şekilde sordukları soruların cevabını veriyorum.  
Öğrenci 3: Bazıları anlamıyorlar hep soruyorlar niye öylesin niye böylesin...  
Kıvılcım Metin: Demek ki konuşuyorlar aralarında... 
TG: Merak ediyorlar demek ki birbirlerini... Dışarıda alındığı için bu ders, ne yapıyorlar 
orada diye daha çok merak ediyorlardır.  
Öğrenciler: Evet 
TG: Sizin bana anlatmak istediğiniz başka bir şey var mı din dersleri ile ilgili? 
Öğrenci 3: Bir düşüneyim... (Gülüşmeler) 
Öğrenci 1: Ben şöyle söyleyeyim; burada din dersine girenler aslında çok da inançlı 
oldukları için değil. Polonya’da dine bağlılık gün geçtikçe azalıyor. Gençler daha çok 
dinlerinden ayrılıyorlar. Daha çok böyle hayatı yaşamak dediğimiz hayat tarzlarını tercih 
ediyorlar. Buranın yaşlıları genellikle dinlerine sahip çıkan insanlar, gençler de zorla 
kiliseye gidiyorlar. Sorduğum zaman, yani senin dinin sana bunu yapmayı emrediyor sen 
niye kiliseye gitmiyorsun dediğimde, ben şunu şunu kabul edemiyorum diyor. Yani 
kendilerine göre din yapıyorlar. Yani bir dine inanacaksan, o din ne diyorsa onu 
yapacaksın, kendine göre din yapamazsın. Benim eklemek istediğim bu.  
TG: Evet önemli bir noktaya temas ettin, bu bahsettiğin Polonya’da dindarlığın azalması, 
gençlerin kiliseye gitme sıklığının azalması falan yapılan istatistiksel çalışmalarda da 
gözlenebiliyor. Gençlerde neden azalıyor acaba dindarlık? Okuldaki din dersleriyle ilgisi 
olabilir mi mesela? Sizin okullarınızda din adamları mı gelip bu dersi veriyorlar? 
Öğrenci 1: Evet tabi.    
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Öğrenci 3: Bizimki kız. 
Kıvılcım Metin: Bir de Hoca Hanım var, Hoca Hanıma gidiyorlar; onu demek istiyor 
herhalde. Kızlara Hoca Hanım veriyor dersi camide, değil mi? 
Öğrenci 3: Evet. 
Öğrenci 1: Onlarda öyle bir şey yok tabi; erkeklere erkek hoca kızlara bayan hoca gelip 
anlatmıyor. Bizim dinimizdeki gibi bir özen yok bu konuya.  
TG: Sizin camide işlediğiniz dersin içeriğini kontrol eden kimse var mı? Ya da katılıp 
katılmadığınızı? 
Öğrenciler: Yok hayır. 
Öğrenci 1: Benim yok, diğer arkadaşları bilmem. Not kağıdını alıp direk okula 
götürüyorum. Derse girdim mi girmedim mi, ne öğrendim haberleri olmuyor. 
TG: Sizin din dersiniz kaçıncı sınıfta başlıyor? 
Öğrenciler: Birinci sınıfta. 
TG: Peki din dersini almasan etik dersini mutlaka alacaktın değil mi not için? 
Öğrenci 1: Tabi.  
TG: Ailen nasıl bir beyanda bulundu hatırlıyor musun? Yazılı mı sözlü mü?  
Öğrenci 1: Benim durumumda yazılı beyanda bulundular, hem çocuğumun etik dersine 
gitmesini istemiyorum diye hem de ben din dersini dışarıda aldıracağım diye.  
TG: Bu beyanlar her yıl yenileniyor mu? 
Öğrenci 1: Tabi her sene başında bunu yazıp veriyoruz. 
 
(Veliler katılmaya başlıyor.) 
TG: Benim veli olarak size de sormak istediklerim var, sorabilir miyim? 
Veli 1: Tabi ki. 
TG: Biraz önce arkadaşlarla da konuştuk; çocuğunuz okulda din ve etik dersine girmesin 
diye ayrı ayrı dilekçe veriyorsunuz değil mi? 
Veli 1: Evet doğru, tercihi size bırakıyorlar yani mecburiyet yok. İkisine de girmek 
zorunda değil ama iki dersi de almazsa ortalamaları düşüyor. O yüzden dışarda bu dersi 
alması hem dinini öğrenmesi açısından iyi hem de notu yükseliyor. Biz öncelikle 
dinlerini öğrensinler diye yaptık. Kerem mesela ilk iki yıl gitmedi bildiğim kadarıyla. Biz 
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de mesela ilk başta camiden alınan notun sayılacağını bilmiyorduk, sonradan öğrendik de 
okula vermeye başladık not kağıdını. Bizim için öncelik çocuklarımızın dinimizi 
öğrenmeleri, not sonradan öğrendiğimiz artı bir şey oldu. Yani çocuğumuzu hiçbirine 
vermesek de olur. Mesela benim çocuğumun sınıfında bir Yehova Şahidi var. Başka 
derslerde, mesela el işi dersinde, müzik, resim dersinde Paskalya yaklaşırken bazı şeyler 
yaptırıyorlar. Mesela o aile çok katı bir şekilde çocuklarının o tür etkinliklere bile 
katılmasına izin vermiyor. Bu konuda öğretmenlerle çok ciddi tartıştığını da hatırlıyorum. 
Öğretmenlerin de bunu bilinçli bir şekilde yaptığına inanmıyorum, o anda böyle sürü 
psikolojisi gibi... Bir etkinliği yaptırırken bir çocuğu ayırt etmek istememekten dolayı 
yapılan bir şey; ondan dolayı resim çizdirebiliyor, yumurta boyattırabiliyor, çam ağacı 
süslettirebiliyor... İsterse katılmayabiliyor da çocuk, öyle bir zorlama falan yok.  
TG: Bizim Türk kökenli Müslüman ailelerin pek bir şikayeti yok gibi anlıyorum; çok 
fazla dışlanma şikayeti duymadım... 
Veli 1: Benim çocuğum daha ilkokulda, bizim eve çok yakın bir yere veriyorum ben. 
Küçük bir okul, her seviyede bir sınıf var. Orada nasıl oluyordu Erhan? Papaz mı 
geliyordu sınıfa? 
Erhan: Öğretmen geliyor. 
Veli 1: Peki kiliseye de gidiyorlar mı? 
Öğrenciler: Evet bazen gidiyorlar. 
Veli 1: Pratik zamanında herhalde...  
TG: Okul saatleri içinde yani? 
Veli 1: Tabi tabi, din dersini bazen kilisede işliyorlar.  
Öğrenci: Kiliseler zaten okula çok yakın, yürüyerek hemen gidiyorlar.  
Veli 1: Çok dindarlar. Mesela okulların açılışında kapanışında burada mutlaka Papaz 
vardır. Ama bizim çocuklara bu yönden bir baskı uyguladıklarına ben şimdiye kadar şahit 
olmadım. Dolaylı oluyordur belki, bizim de fark etmediğimiz... Ama bir baskı, ayırım, 
zoraki bir şey ben görmedim şu ana kadar. Aksine bir de bizim okul ufak olduğu için 
müdüründe öğretmenine kadar pozitif bir ayrımcılıkla karşılaşıyoruz, bizim çocuklarla 
daha fazla ilgileniyorlar daha fazla onları tanımaya çalışıyorlar. Mesela bizim 
çocuklardan Türkiye hakkında bilgi ediniyorlar. Mesela dinle veya farklı bir şeyle alakalı 
olsun... Size bir şey yaptırmışlardı çocuklar hani saraya gittiğinizde... Sen kapanmış 
mıydın? Berke sen de nasıl namaz kılınır onu mu göstermiştin?  
Öğrenciler: Evet. 
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Veli 1: Artık bizden de bir şeyler öğrenmeye çalışıyorlar. O bakımdan ben bizim okulda 
bir baskı veya ayrımcılıkla karşılaşmadım.  
TG: Size de camideki din derslerinin içeriği ile ilgili bir sey soracağım, bu içerik 
herhangi bir kurum tarafından onaylanıyor mu? Eğitim Bakanlığı mesela? 
Veli 1: Yok hayır kesinlikle. Ama dersi saydırabilmeniz için Müftülüğün onayladığı 
camilerden birine göndermeniz lazım çocuğunuzu. Mesela Türk Camii de var burada ama 
Müftü onu onaylamadı dolayısıyla çocuğun oradan alacağı not geçersiz olur okulda. 
TG: Kendi içinde denetleniyor farklı dinler yani... 
Veli 1: Evet. Siz hangi açıdan inceliyorsunuz? 
TG: Ben devletin dine karşı tutumunu din dersleri üzerinden anlamaya çalışıyorum. 
Elbette pek çok gösterge var ama din derslerinin düzenlenmesi oldukkça fikir veriyor. 
Veli 1: Son yıllarda liberalleşti burada toplum. Haç sembolünün Parlamentodan 
çıkarılmasını istiyorlar mesela. Bir de şey var, Katolik Kilisesi burada ev ev dolaşıp 
yardım topluyorlar. Yardım gördükleri evin dış kapısına da tebeşirle Üç Kral’ın isminin 
başharfini koyuyorlar işaret olarak. Bu sefer yardım yapmayanlar da şöyle tepki 
gösteriyorlar, bizi ifşa ediyorlar diyorlar. Bu işaretin olduğu evler dindar olmuş oluyor. 
Kilisenin öyle bir ağırlığı var. Kilisenin burada hala yoğun bir ağırlığı var devlet 
politikasında. Liberal kesimle gerginlik var. Hatta hükümet de bu kiliseye yapılan 
yardımı da ya kesmeye ya azaltmaya doğru bir adım attı ama sonuçlandırdı mı 
bilmiyorum.  
TG: Bildiğim kadarıyla tepkiyle karşılandığı için sonuçlandırmadı. Hükümetin hatta 
izlediği politikalar bakımından biraz daha liberal eksene doğru kaymaya başladığını 
söylüyorlar. 
Veli 1: Evet çok doğru biraz sola kayma var, aslında sağ menşeli, ortada durmaya çalıştı 
ama liberal tarafa kayabiliyor. Karşısındaki muhalefet partisi de çok milliyetçi aşırı 
dindar ciddi potansiyeli olan bir muhalefet. Din konusunda aslında Türkiye’yle benzer 
şeyler yaşıyorlar ama tam tersi; din burada ağırlığını biraz kaybetmeye başlıyor devlet 
politikası olarak; devlet onu ayırmaya çalışıyor. Bizde de din sanki şimdi biraz 
kazanmaya başladı.  
TG: Sizin deneyiminiz üzerinden gidecek olursak, siz kaç yıldır buradasınız? 
Veli 1: 20 sene olmuştur.  
TG: Ne amaçla gelmiştiniz? 
Veli 1: Bir sene yurtdışında çalışıp askerliği bedelli yapmak istiyordum. Arkadaşın 
fabrikasında çalışmaya geldim. O bir sene oldu yirmi sene...   
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TG: Size bunu rahatlıkla sorabilirim öyleyse, 90’lı yılların başından beri burdasınız, 2004 
AB üyeliği öncesi ve sonrası olarak bakacak olursak, din ve din eğitimi açısından bir 
değişiklik görüyor musunuz? Mesela bu bahsettiğiniz dini sembollerin tartışılması...     
Veli 1: O konu çok yeni, yaklaşık birkaç senedir tartışılıyor. Daha öncesinden çok 
aklımda kalan bir şey olmamış. Kürtaj meselesi de çok tartışılıyor. Bu liberal sağ kanat 
açılınca, bu hükümetle birlikte özellikle daha liberal bazı kararlar alınmaya başlandı. 
Hatta geçenlerde Palikot, parti başkanı, esrar kullandı meclisin içinde. Liberal kanat 
özellikle dini hedef alarak, din karşıtlığını kullanarak bir potansiyel oluşturmaya 
çalışıyor. Bunlar 2004’ten sonra çıkmaya başladı ama esas son 2-3 senedir özellikle arttı. 
Burada bir de şey var devlet politikasında etkili olan, bir rahibin kurmuş olduğu radyo, 
televizyon kanalları ve çok ciddi potansiyelleri olan bir cemaat önderi; onun çok ciddi bir 
belirleyiciliği var mesela parti kuracak kadar, hükümeti ayıracak kadar... Kilisenin hala 
daha çok büyük bir ağırlığı var devlet politikasının belirlenmesinde. Benim 
gözlemlediğim burada dindarlık daha çok yaşlı kesimde; gençler o kadar dindar değil. 
Pazar günü kilisenin yanından geçerken bile fark ediyorsunuz bunu.  
TG: Dini sembolleri konuşurken hep Hristiyanlığa ait sembolleri konuştuk, başörtüsü 
sorunu oluyor mu burada? Mesela öğrenci başörtüsüyle okula gidebilir mi? 
Veli 1: Tabi tabi sorun olmaz. 11 Eylül’den sonra biraz etkilendilerse de burada yaşayan 
Müslümanlara karşı çok hoşgörülüler. 
TG: Sayı olarak nasıl peki? Varşova’da yaşayan Türk kökenli Müslüman aile sayısı 
nedir?  
Veli 1: Çok bekar yaşayan da var ama 100 hane var mıdır bilemiyorum... 
 
(Tüm veliler (babaları) geliyor ve öğrenciler diğer salona geçiyor) 
TG: Varşova’da kaç tane cami var? 
Veliler: 3 tane ama cami değil de mescit denebilir daha çok. Resmi olarak 2 tane var ama.  
(Kendi aralarında konuşmalar) 
Yusuf Ziya Özcan: Tuğba Hanım siz sorun sorularınızı velilerimize... 
TG: Tamam, teşekkür ederim. Merak ettiğim bir şeyi sorayım hemen, hiç çocuğunu din 
dersi yerine etik dersine gönderen veli var mi aranızda? 
Veliler: Yok.. Yok. 
Veli 2: Benim çocuğum gittiği okulda tek Müslüman. Bunlar da yüzde 99 din dersini 
alıyorlar. Benim çocuğum etik dersini alsın istemedim, bu ders sırasında 45 dakika bir 
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sınıfta stajyer öğretmenle duruyor, matematik falan çalışıyor. O yalnız kalmasın diye 
stajyer öğretmen veriyorlar. Bu bir devlet okulu. Onun o 45 dakikasını değerlendiriyorlar.  
Veli 3: Bu arada şuna da bakmak lazım; ilkokul, ortaokul ve lise eğitimlerinde bu oranlar 
çok farklı. Mesela bizim ufak oğlan özel okula gidiyor, bir mahallede bir Polonyalı’nın 
açtığı Polonya özel okuluna gidiyor. Genel olarak benim gördüğüm, aileler eğer ateist 
değilse, çocuklarına bu dönemde din dersi aldırmak istiyor çünkü bunlarda vaftiz töreni 
yapılıyor. Eğer çocuk din eğitimi almamışsa o yaşa kadar, papazlar vaftiz töreninde ters 
gidiyorlar. Yani hayatın boyu camiye gitmemiş namaz kılmamışsın imam nikahı 
istiyorsun gibi bir durum oluyor. O yüzden aile ateist değilse mutlaka çocuğuna din dersi 
aldırıyor vaftize kadar. Ama mesela şimdi Kerem’in sınıfında, lisede, 25 kişilik sınıfta 8 
kişi din dersine girmiyor. Bu ciddi bir rakam.  
Veli 4: Polonya tüm Katolik ülkeler içinde en ağır Katolik olanı. Bunu en başta belirtmek 
lazım. 
Veli 3: Evet ama buna rağmen, kanunlar önünde, çocuğunu din dersine göndermek için 
kağıt yazmak zorundasın göndermemek için değil. Yani ben göndereceksem 
imzalıyorum. Çünkü ben öyle bir sıkıntı yaşadım burada. Araştırdık, Avrupa’da, bu AB 
içerisinde bir şey var; aile isterse ben imza verirsem gidiyor. Fakat bunlar tabi böyle 
söylenmiyor. Ben tabi sıkıntı yaşadığım için avukata sordum, avukat söyledi bana; 
kanunen zorunluluk yok, attığımız imza izin aslında. İmzalamazsan senin çocuğunu ne 
din dersine ne etik dersine sokabiliyorlar.  
Veli 5: Şöyle ki, bizim çocuklara burada zorlama yok. Biliyorlar ki bu çocuk müslüman, 
rahatsız olmuyorlar. Ama Polonyalı çocuklar için mahalle baskısı var, Katolikse ve din 
dersine girmiyorsa biraz şey bakıyorlar. Bir de bunların din dersi çok serttir. Papaz girdi 
mi sınıfa sınıftan çıt çıkmaması lazım. Son veli toplantısında iki tane veli şikayetçi oldu 
bizim öğretmene; dediler ki papaz çok baskı yapıyor çocuklara.  
Veli: 15 sene sonra burada din diye bir şey kalmayacak göreceksiniz. Hollanda gibi 
olacak buralar.  
Veli: Burada 18-40 yaş arası insanları kilisede göremezsiniz. Daha çok 60 yaş üstü ve 5-6 
yaşında torunlar...  
TG: Az önce Cevdet Bey’e de sordum, sizce Polonya’nın AB üyeliği ile keskin bir 
değişiklik oldu mu yoksa Komünist rejimin yıkılması sonrası yavaş yavaş yaşanan bir 
değişim mi var bu konu ile ilgili? 
Veliler: Öyle siyah beyaz gibi bir fark yok. Hiç yok.  
Veli 2: Komünizmden sonra çok ciddi bir dindarlaşma oldu tabi. Ama burada kırsaldaki 
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Mr. Konstanty Gebert: I find comparing Poland and Turkey fascinating because I think 
that there are actually very serious analogy in the way that religion functions and political 
parties. And also in the recent political history of being governed by non-democratic 
militarist secularist regimes which immediately put religion under cache for being 
opposition but at the same time it had pushed some people normally against the regime, 
into the arms of the regime out of the fear of the priests and mollas. I remember years 
ago, we had a day long conversation with Orhan Pamuk explaining Polish case; I said 
look, how is it possible for people together with mollas against the generals that was 
really disastrous for him and he saw that the mollas are the biggest threat to the freedom 
than the generals. From our perspective, the opposite is true. I think it is evident. As a 
person from Turkey, you can immediately see, it is not really about religion. It is about 
political identity, it is essentially about provincial conservative middle class that demand 
to be respected. It usually happens, it is looked down the middle class or the provincial, 
and they are becoming as in any normal democratic society an important element of the 
social makeup. And if you are very uncomfortable with the criticism media because they 
take it personal, and say that I want to be respected for what I am. If I want to wear a big 
cross, or if my wife wants to wear a headscarf, we expect respect for that. I certainly did 
not seen how the classical liberal position can give offense but it is not theological. That 
is the same conservative provincial middle class will probably not encourage the mosque 
or church takeover of the state because they want anybody medaling this policy. Right 
now, it is the state that does it so they oppose it. I do not think that they would let mollas 
of the priests have a word on their sex lives for example, or education opportunities for 
their children. So here the analogy I think is very strong and very often misread. So at 
least this is my contention.  
TG: What was very interesting  to me while comparing the countries in terms of religious 
education at schools, I realized despite the image of Poland of being very religious 
country, the way that religion and ethics courses is organized at least in the legal 
framework, seems to be very liberal compared to Turkey.  
KG: You see, all depends on the perspective. From our perspective, the religion courses 
in school are major problem. We did not have them until the end of Communist regime, 
the Church worked very hard to bring back the religious instruction at schools. And then, 
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not only liberals like me were unhappy but many Catholic parents said; okay we had 
those parish schools already, and most if not all Polish students who wanted to get 
religious instruction, got it in parish schools. If it was not to bring religious instruction 
that was previously unavailable we would be in favor of it but to bring it into the state 
schools as yet another subject to be learned and that what we are against. Not the law 
actually is locally civilized, the school authority is not obliged but can organize religious 
education, it is supposed to take place as the first class or the last class and all these are 
lacking answers. The schools all organize religious instruction, and religious instruction 
takes place only in the middle of the day. The one or two kids who do not take religious 
instruction are excluded. Religious instruction is being assessed and the grade you get is 
part of your general grade for graduating to pass the class. Crucifixes are now fixed in the 
classrooms and in occasional cases like recently we had in Warsaw; a school headmaster 
organized a referendum amongst parents whether to have crucifixes or not. And the 
crucifixes one two to one, no surprise. This is a method; asking people people’s opinion 
at folk. From my perspective, that is a very unhealthy practice.  
One issue about Poland even more than Turkey, we are religiously homogenous. In 
Turkey at least there are Alevis. Poland declared itself to be 90 percent Catholic, which 
means that religious instruction means Catholic instruction. The school of course feels 
obliged to organize religious instruction if there are seven or more kids who want it but to 
have seven or more non-Catholic kids of the same religion is practically impossible. 
Furthermore, in serious schools have the obligation to organize classes of ethics but the 
school does not because it has no teacher and does not have the money to hire them so 
kids that do not take religious instruction, take no instruction.  
TG: Last evening I could come together with Muslim families of Turkish origin and they 
said that they can easily send their kids to the mosques to get religious instruction and 
that the grade given there is accepted by the school administration and counted towards 
the cumulative. They added that it is the case in most of the schools in Warsaw but that 
they are not sure about the rest of Poland. They were not sure whether ethics classes are 
arranged for the students who choose it and do not want to attend religious instruction.  
KG: No, they are usually not arranged. But kids of foreigners taking religious instruction 
mostly are not a problem. Turkish part is not considered to be a part of the national 
community so it is not a problem if they take religious instruction, Islam, Buddhism or 
ethics or whatever else. But if you are a Polish citizen, by not taking the classes of 
Catholicism you depart the consensus. There is an expression in Polish language: 
“Pollack Catholic;” it means that a Pole is a Catholic, the two were identical. For most of 
them if you are not Catholic you are not really Polish. So if your Turkish parents apply 
for Polish citizenship, and receive it, and then I think it would be expected to prove that 
they really become Polish… 
TG: And Catholic… 
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KG: Eventually, the practice of religion not in the Catholic religion, it is religion. In 
public opinion polls they ask; “are you a believer?” and they do not ask you what 
religion. Because there is the understanding that if you are a believer; then you are a 
Catholic believer. I say to the pollster when they ask “are you a believer?”, “you mean 
am I Catholic?” they say yes, I say no, then they say “oh you are an atheist!” I say no, 
and they say but you said that you are not a believer.  
TG: You are Polish citizen, right?  
KG: Yes. 
TG: So your situation is different than the Muslim Turkish families and the Catholic 
Poles… 
KG: Yes, except that Polish society has by now accepted the idea that Jews are a 
legitimate part of the national fabric. (17:00) Weird, different but they are somehow 
others. Because I am explicitly religious as a Jew, actually I can imagine people being 
happy to see that I am religious Jew, Christian, Muslim or whatever… If I were a secular 
Jew, I would be expected to attend Catholic religion class like everybody else, because I 
do not have the excuse of my own religion to prevent my children about religion. So it 
does get complicated.  
TG: Do you have children? 
KG: Four. 
TG: Did you have difficulties during their education lives? 
KG: Yes. There had been difficulties for some more and some less. My elderly daughter 
is thirty six. So they started their education under deep Communism and there had been 
some problems but not because they were Jewish, the system in this sense was color-
blind. But religious instruction reintroduced in schools in 1992, and the school refused to 
do anything about it and then we went to another state school but the problem was 
evident. On the personal quality of the people who are teaching, they had masters. My 
youngest son was lucky enough, young enough to be able to go to the Jewish school and 
he liked it a lot. He also discovered that there are kids who are not actually Jewish and we 
were surprised. So he did not have the experience that my other kids had, which is being 
Jewish means being alone.  
TG: So now there are Jewish schools in Poland… 
KG: We have three now, one in Warsaw and two in Wroclaw. The one in Warsaw, 
Lauder – Morasha School, has all the classes from kindergarten to junior high. These are 
great schools. 
TG: When they were founded, do you know? 
417 
KG: 1993 or 94. We do not still have senior high but we are in cooperation with few high 
schools in the state system that have a special program of multi-culti. They are happy to 
accept other kids because they expand their program.  
TG: Your other kids who attended to state schools, did they take ethics courses?  
KG: No, they did not take religion or ethics classes, they experienced the whole way, 
there was nothing else proposed. These classes were in the middle of the day. The school 
actually made some half-hearted efforts for opening ethics class for one semester I think, 
so there was a class of ethics, but this did not continue, nobody was really very serious 
about it. 
TG: I learnt that Muslim students of Turkish origin take religion education outside of the 
school; at mosque actually and then the grade they bring to the school is counted in the 
cumulative. Did you do a similar thing? 
KG: No, we do not have a Jewish education system that was functional.  
TG: So did your kids have lower grades in terms of cumulative? 
KG: Until they graduated, grade from religion was not included in the general grade. So 
they had a school certificate with all the subjects listed where it says: Religion; no pass or 
fail but a straight line, which technically indicates that my kid is not taking that class. 
Now there is a grade. 
TG: Okay, I see. Do you think that there had been any change after the EU membership; 
in terms of state-religion relations at first, and then for religious education? 
KG: Yes, there has been a change in the sense that they are legal. The Polish judicial 
system is slanted in favor of the Catholic Church. In part, by virtue of the law, for 
instance, electronic broadcasters are bound by law to observe the Christian system of 
values. No other system of values is protected but the Christian system of values. In no 
other law but the one on the electronic broadcasting… and this is never detected in courts 
because… I am very curious about the Christian system of values, or the Muslim, or the 
Jewish, or humanist or whatever… I guess it would be all the same thing, just the 
dedications might be different but I do not think that Christians follow a different system 
of values than I do or you do. But we had such cases of people saying that their religious 
sentiments are insulted by artwork, for example. A glamorous case which was 10-12 
years ago, we had an exhibition in the most important modern art gallery in Warsaw, it 
included a famous sculpture by Castellani, a famous Italian artist. A MP stated that this 
image of John Paul II offended his religious feelings. In other cases we had people go on 
trial and in the most cases be sued. There are such cases of long trials, people are 
sentenced for offending religious feelings. In practice it is much easier to go to the court 
in defense of religious feelings than in defense of non-believers’ or other believers’ 
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rights. But it functions not in the direct sphere of implementation of religious affections 
but in the consequences of it. For example, Poland has a very severe anti-abortion law; 
abortion is only permitted in the cases of rape, great danger of self of the mother or the 
fetus and that is it. There are two cases about it; one a very ill woman who was pregnant 
and could not get an abortion even though a medical documentation was there. And in 
another even more dramatic case, a fourteen year-old girl got pregnant as a result of rape 
and the hospitals refused to perform the abortion. The doctors, as good Catholics, they 
refused to perform abortion. Both cases show that abortion could not be performed 
because of ethical reasons even though there was a medical necessity. The first woman 
could not find a hospital but she gave birth to a healthy child and she survived too. But 
both cases were brought before the ECtHR, for non-implementation of a legal obligation. 
In both cases the Court found Poland guilty and it paid the applicants remedy. This is as 
far as it goes. When the Court ruled in the famous Italian case about the crucifix, the 
Polish Parliament promulgated resolutions condemning that decision. But clearly, the EU 
does not want to rule on cases of conscience and prefers to leave it to individual 
jurisdictions; what it wants to prevent is discrimination based on religious convictions 
and it was clearly seen in the two abortion cases.  
TG: There is also a case which was brought before the ECtHR concerning the religion 
and ethics courses at schools in Poland… 
KG: I do not remember that case. 
TG: Grzelak Case.  
KG: Yes, true but I do not remember the details of that case but the problem is, the Court 
will of course agree that the religious correlation is not acceptable but whether the 
presence of crucifix, is acceptable is a matter of opinion not a matter of legal… I believe 
that the cross should not be practiced at schools but can be practiced at hospitals because 
the need of believers in the institutions of suffering, to have a comforting sign objectively 
is bigger than my need not to see a sign certifying that this is space that belongs to 
another religion. So at hospitals, I do not mind it at all. In schools, if there is a separate 
class where there is the symbol of Christianity but at the same time the school is ready to 
provide classes for other religions and put the sings of them, it is acceptable. But in 
general class, no, because crucifix has low-bearing. Does a state employee have the right 
to wear religious symbols? Yes. Does s/he have the right to practice in the middle of the 
day? No. What I wear or I do not wear is within limit of reason and is about my personal 
freedom and I do not want the state regulating headscarves. I should be able to wear 
kippa but I certainly would not request to put a Jewish religious symbol at the door of my 
office because it is a public place, not my private religious space.  
TG: So in Polish state schools all the religious symbols are allowed; students can wear 
crucifix, kippa or headscarf…  
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KG: Yes. Although it is very infrequent among Jewish kids to wear kippa at schools, 
especially because Jewish students coming from religious families do go to a Jewish 
school. I heard the cases of Muslim students being harassed for wearing headscarves.  
TG: Is it different inside and outside of Warsaw? 
KG: Yes, but not dramatically. But the problem is that as this is a very homogenous 
society people are still astonished when they see someone different on the street. It is 
even more astonishing that the one who is different is living like the rest of us; taking the 
tram, in the classroom… And there is also the general image of Muslim as the threatening 
other; the terrorist. In that sense wearing a headscarf may seem more dangerous than 
wearing a kippa.  
TG: Yes, this is understandable given the image produced as a result of 9/11 in all over 
the world… Turning back to my starting point where I compared Turkey and Poland and 
said that in Poland there is a more liberal environment for the conduct of religious 
education compared to Turkey, I just meant that here in Poland the problems are 
stemming mostly from the practice.  
KG: Yes, you are right. 
TG: In Turkey, on the other hand, there are much more structural deficits in the conduct 
of religious education, the problems are mainly stemming from… 
KG: Ideology… 
TG: Ideology and laws actually. As you are an expert on Turkish politics, you might be 
familiar with the fact that religious courses are compulsory and this is guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  
KG: Yes, I know I know…  
TG: So the situation is very different than Poland in that sense. I was wondering whether 
the EU membership would open a path to… 
KG: One of the things that you would have to do is to include into your legislation the 
separation of church and state and it is impossible to do that in the Constitution. The EU 
does not regulate how your Constitutions should treat in the field of the separation of 
church and the state. I think Polish Constitution is a very good example because we had 
serious war about the position of religion in the Constitution. It was solved, I think, in a 
very brilliant way that is the Preamble to the Constitution. The Preamble is not a legal 
part, it is not law so we cannot draw legal consequences from it. It says; “we those who 
draw our belief from true, good and beauty from our relation with God and we who draw 
these beliefs from other sources, all the citizens of the Republic together, we here do 
promulgate this Constitution….” So the basic demand, it is for sure a religious demand, 
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for Catholic believers that God be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, there was a 
majority requesting this, and it was met. But God was not mentioned in the religious way 
on a legal context. At the same time, it is mentioned that the difference is in the source of 
our values but not in the nature of our values. We share the same values, only we may 
draw these values from the different sources. I find this as a beautiful compromise where 
the objective is to satisfy all legitimate demands. I think it is a good example. 
TG: Yes, I agree but Turkish case is much complicated I think. We do not have a 
reference to religion or God in our Constitution and it is accepted that we are practicing 
secularism in the French version; laique. But at the end of the day, we have the religious 
education in the Constitution. It is advocated that this is because the state shall not leave 
the religious instruction in the hands of religious communities and that providing this 
education is among the positive responsibilities of the state. But then the content of the 
religious culture and knowledge of ethics courses are criticized for not being impartial. 
KG: We solved this issue in the Jewish schools by adding a separate course about Jewish 
religion and all kids take that course. There is another course about the practicing Jewish 
religion and parents who want their kid to learn how to pray so on send their child to that 
class. This class always takes place after hours so Jewish secular kids would not look for 
alternatives. Learning about religion; it is legitimate and learning religion should always 
remain optional. I cannot imagine Poles accepting that the government dictates the 
sermons. People do not believe me when I say that the Polish Catholic Church does not 
have this authority even though it is the majority religion in the country, it is the 
responsibility of the individual priests. The idea that the government regulates the 
sermons or governments appoint priests this is unthinkable.  
TG: Could you please clarify this point?  
KG: For example in turkey, you have Diyanet gives instructions about the content of the 
Friday sermons, right? This is unthinkable in Poland. Not only the government does not 
have this right but even the leadership of the Catholic Church does not have this right. 
What will be in the Sunday sermons is in individual decision of each parish priest and 
nobody can regulate that; not the government, not even his Church superiors. The 
government does not appoint priests of course, as opposed to the situation in Turkey. 
Although there may be informal consultations between the Church and the authorities 
about appointing high level Church authorities; bishops, archbishops etc., these are 
informal and non-binding. In principle, the Church wants to go along with the state, so if 
the state has legitimate claims against the candidates, these would be listened to. But the 
decision remains to Church. 
TG: Is it also the case for religious instruction at schools? The instructors of religion, are 
they appointed by Church? 
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KG: Religion education is given by the Church personnel paid by the state but the state 
has even no right to appoint them. They are appointed and dismissed by the Catholic 
Church. They teach what the Catholic Church tells them to teach and the government has 
no influence over the content of the teaching.  
TG: And the Ministry of Education does not approve the content… 
KG: No. 
TG: It is interesting, I knew that the content of religion instruction that for example 
Muslim students get does not need to be approved by the Ministry but for the Catholic 
instruction at schools, it is not approved either.  
KG: No that is universal. We, in the Jewish school, we teach the state curriculum and 
each additional subject like the history of Jews or Judaism, we need to fulfill the legal 
requirements of the state curriculum and we can be inspected for that but nobody can 
check the way we teach our religion. I think that it would be unacceptable in Poland for 
state to supervise any king of Church activities. The principle is that the state and the 
Church are autonomous in their mutually exclusive spheres of action. The Church is for 
sure very active in the public sphere and the government has no word to say about this.  
TG: That is why, I think, the field of education is controversial because the sphere of 
education is in state’s rule and the field of religion is in the autonomy of the Church in 
Poland. When it comes to religion instruction, things may get complicated but as far as I 
can see, it is not the case because it is left in the autonomy of the Church. 
KG: Yes and this is being criticized. For example, the property taken from the Catholic 
Church during the Communist regime as well as properties taken from other communities 
was matter of legal inspection and the Catholic Church received huge amounts of 
compensation whereas other communities did not get such compensations. Because they 
are minor in number and weak against the state which is not the case for the Catholic 
Church. There is also an observation that the attendance to the Church declines but I 
prefer to argue rather than the moral values with the Church, that the invisible hand of the 
market is in place.  
TG: Yes, I see. There is also empirical data and observations that display that the overall 
religiosity of Poles is declining and that the young generation is less religious than the old 
generation. Do you have such observations?  
KG: It is certainly less religious than the older generation and certainly less religious than 
the young generation of 20 years ago. It was still a cross section of the society. Yes, the 
percentage of people going to Sunday mass declined, the people of medium age going to 
Church rises, the number of people who want to go to seminaries declined; all the 
sociological factors are in agreement that the Church is losing its effect over the Poles. 
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But all these indicators, compared to the rest of Europe are very higher. Hungary is like 
France for example in terms of secularism but Poland is still like Ireland or Spain of one 
generation ago. Part of the decline is because the Church gone stupid. In 1970s and 80s, 
me, raised in a Jewish family I was in democratic opposition and the parishes were the 
only spaces of freedom available. On those years, it was the best practice of the Church, 
you had an area of freedom there which in today’s Church, could not function. Church 
was a place where artistic performances were taking place and I cannot believe today’s 
Church. After 1989, Church was just able to adapt to democracy, it was one of the many 
competitors on the market ideals. But if goes in this way, in 15-20 years time it will 
become irrelevant.      
TG: Thank you very much 
KG: You are welcome 
 
 
Interview with Imam Nizar Sherif and Teacher Rashid, Arab Mosque, Warsaw 
14.11.2012, Warsaw 
 
İmam Nizar Sherif: People who came here for business, after that they stay here in 
Poland and work in Polish companies, schools, universities. Then they have children, 
those children are going to Polish schools every day but on Saturday, we have some 
activity here. We teach Arabic, Koran and religion at the same time.  
Tuğba Gürçel: How many hours on Saturdays? Three hours? 
NS: Yes, three hours. Here, in our mosque, we have two hours and twenty minutes. There 
is another school, there is one lady, her name is Nur, and she is making for every class 
one hour. For first class one hour, second class one hour, for third class it is the same. 
There is also one sister; her name is Sulata. She has five hours and I do not know how 
many group she has; maybe two or three groups she has.  
TG: Are all of them in Warsaw? 
NS: All of them are in Warsaw but in different places. And all three teachings are on 
Saturday.   
TG: How do you decide on the content of the courses? What you teach, for example is it 
approved by the Ministry of Education?  
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NS: No, in this time we put our programs, we have our own program. Every school has 
its own program. Sister Sulata has her program and Sister Nur has her own and we have 
our program of course. These are not the same program, they are different. 
TG: The other two teachers from whom you are talking about, are they of Polish 
nationality? 
NS: Nur is Polish, she was Christian and then she embraced Islam. Sulata, she is from 
Sudan, she was Muslim from the beginning. Here, in our mosque, we have three teachers; 
Farida, Rashid and Lidia. Rashid is Polish. You already know each other right?  
Teacher Rashid: Yes, we have just met.  
NS: He teaches Arabic, because he finished Arabic at university, teaches also Koran and 
religion. Second teacher is Sister Farida, her mother is Polish and her father is from 
Sudan. So she knows Arabic very well and Polish at the same level. She has also one 
group. The other teacher, Lidia, she is Polish also and she embraced Islam. She is 
learning Arabic at university, this is her third year. 
TG: But you and the other teachers never go to schools and teach there, right? Always 
students come here all Saturdays… 
NS: Yes, they come here all Saturdays.  
TG: You also give a grade to the students for their participation to religion class and it is 
accepted by the schools, am I right?  
NS: Yes yes. 
TG: (5:00) How do you give the grades? Before that please let me ask whether they have 
to participate every Saturday; do you take attendance?  
NS: They have to come but sometimes we have free times because you know, in Polish 
system they are also free. When they are free, we are free. When they are at schools… 
TG: In school time you mean, when they are not on holiday… 
NS: Yes we follow the same system. But here there is (Muslim) Islamic Union, Sulata 
has funding… Nur, I do not know what she has… 
Teacher Rashid: I think she is member of Islamic League; among organizations there 
Islamic League in Poland and Islamic Union. This mosque is the property of the Islamic 
Union.  
TG: So you are funded by the Islamic Union, right? You are receiving nothing from the 
state…  
Teacher Rashid: Yes, exactly. 
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TG: And with the Church, you have no ties at all… 
Teacher Rashid: No no… We are getting funds from other sources, other sponsors. There 
are some embassies as well but yes, mainly from the Islamic Union.  
TG: Okay, I see. So turning back to the students who come here, last night I met with 
some of those students and their parents, and I asked whether they are discriminated in 
the school since they are Muslim and they do not attend to religion classes but instead 
come here, to the mosque, on Saturdays. They said, no. What is your view about that? Do 
you think that Muslim students are having difficulties in Poland?  
NS: Some of them yes, some of them no. It is dependent on the vision of other students. 
There are always some people doing this. I am living in Poland for 15 years and we are 
very happy, nobody attacked me, nobody disturbed me. My wife is in hijab, we go 
together everywhere with these clothes and everybody respect us in everywhere. On the 
street how we look to other people determines how they look to us. We are okay for other 
people and we have no problem.  
Teacher Rashid: I also want to say that many Polish children who do not attend religion 
lessons at schools because their parents are atheists and they do not want their children to 
learn about religion. So not attending religion lessons is very common, especially in 
Warsaw and big cities.  
TG: They attend perhaps ethics courses, right?  
Teacher Rashid: Yes, they can choose. They can attend religion lessons or ethics.  
TG: Yes. Turning back to the grading of the students, what are the criteria in giving 
grades? By the way, do you teach practice here? 
NS: Yes yes. 
TG: Every Saturday? 
NS: Yes, because this is mosque and we pray. We also want parents to come he to pray 
because children must also see mother and father during praying. So we pray together 
with boys and girls pray upstairs with Farida and Lidia. Some others come also people 
come together for praying.  
TG: Last night, when I talked to Muslim students, I realized that they are willing to come 
here. How did you achieve this?  
NS: I think we have three very nice teachers, Mothers and Fathers here, and a very nice 
place. They can play here.  
TG: Do they play here? 
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NS: Yes. 
Teacher Rashid: Yes we play. Even though Imam Sharif does not accept, we sometimes 
play football here, in mosque. It is because they are young people and of course, I can 
teach two hours three hours without any break but you know, for young boys it is really 
difficult to concentrate for more than half an hour or forty minutes; in one hour they have 
no concentration at all. So we should give them some breaks, some physical effort in 
order to make them concentrate afterwards, so that their mind can go back to the lesson. 
They can come back with fresh minds and relaxed. So it is just in order to make them 
concentrate and also to encourage to come here. 
TG: Yes, they talked about that but I better understand it now. They said that they can 
play here and that they like it.  
Teacher Rashid: Yes, it is encouraging them to come to mosque.  
TG: May I ask how you became a teacher here; you and the two sisters? Are you 
appointed by someone or anyone who says that I can teach Islam, Arabic and the rituals 
can become a teacher? 
NS: This is my secret (laughing). I observe through lessons, I come and I look what they 
are teaching. Rashid is good Alhamdulillah… 
Teacher Rashid: It is because I am here right now (laughing) 
NS: Sister Farida, when she started at first, I used to come here time to time to the class. I 
bring some chocolates but I observe them. Both of Sisters are also nice teachers. I have to 
do that because for example, we had a teacher, I used to see many mistakes on the board 
and children take note and they bring them at home and when mother and father see those 
mistakes, they can think like “what kind of people are teaching our children.” So I should 
come and look.  
TG: I understand your method and does the Polish state have supervision over the 
religion education in the mosque? Do they come here to observe what you teach? Do not 
they control you? 
NS: In this time no, because we do not ask for money from them. Because usually they 
restrict the school about there are how many teachers, how many students and how many 
hours… And they give for every teacher some money. In this case, they have to come and 
to control everything; program, teachers, conditions of the classes and place, every time.      
TG: But for you, they do not control because you do not receive funding… 
NS: Yes, we have not registered our school there. 
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TG: What do you think about the religion education in Poland for Catholic students? Do 
you have any observations? Do you think that there is too much pressure on them, as 
some argue, or do you think that it is successfully conducted?  
NS: I think that Rashid can talk more than me. 
Teacher Rashid: Actually, I have not attended when I was at voluntary school. You could 
choose religion course or ethics and my parents chose ethics because they are not very 
religious, they are Catholic but not very religious. So actually I had no experience about 
Catholic religion. As I know, many students did not like it, they do not like because of the 
pressure. Maybe the attractive part is that the level of the amount of people who are 
strictly keeping the Catholic religion is getting smaller and smaller in Poland. So the 
lessons are getting less popular and as know, many students did not like it. But maybe 
this is not the principle, maybe there are many cases in which students like. It depends on 
the attitude of the teacher. Usually the teachers are priests, so maybe, I don’t have 
experience but what I heard is that there was too much pressure. So many of the parents 
prefer [their children] not to attend religion lessons but to ethics, for example.  
TG: This will be a personal question, so if do not want to answer it is very understandable 
but I would like to ask how you made your decision about religion? You did not attend 
religion courses, you attended ethics… 
Teacher Rashid: Yes, since my parents were not religious… Actually first four classes I 
attended not in Poland but in Belarus because my parents lived there and there were no 
religious schools because these were just classes of the Soviet Union. When I got back, I 
was at fifth or sixth class as far as I remember, I went to the lessons of ethics. I do not 
remember whether it was my choice but I think my parents chose that, only because they 
are not very religious and I accepted their choice. Then in the secondary school there was 
no religion and no ethics, it was was not on the program so it was not a dilemma for me.  
TG: Then how did you meet Islam?  
Teacher Rashid: I had no Muslim friends, it was by media. It was after the attacks of 
September 11 and media started to speak about Islam a lot; some good things but many 
bad things too. I was just curious about this religion and I just wanted to know because 
you know, it was a very popular subject in media. So I wanted to get an opinion about 
this religion. Of course, I did not imagine that I could embrace it but I just wanted to have 
my opinion, to be able to be part of the discussions or when somebody asks my statement 
about this issue. So I began to read about Islam, mostly from internet because as said, I 
had no books on Islam, no Muslim friends, so the only source of knowledge about Islam 
was internet. I read the Polish translation of Koran, of hadiths, about dogmas of the 
religion and I got deeper and deeper. When I learnt the principles of this religion, I saw 
that they are logical and that the basis of this religion is very strong. Then I went to a 
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mosque and get know to other people who were Polish and embraced Islam. It was not a 
very soft process because I had many doubts at the beginning and to change religion is a 
very serious decision. It took almost six month but I realized that this is the real religion; 
religion of truth and only this religion can give happiness in this life and after. So six 
months after getting interested in Islam, I decided to embrace this religion.  
TG: It is impressive… Your decision to change religion I mean…  
Teacher Rashid: No, I think that there are much more fascinating stories.  
TG: I am sure but what I meant is that the way you did is impressive because no one 
directed you; you found it, made research about it and embraced it… 
Teacher Rashid: Yes, that’s right no one guided me.  
TG: Yes, that is the most interesting part I think. 
Teacher Rashid: When I came here, I was interested that they were very friendly here. 
For example, the first time I came here I was in a very short trousers; I did not know that 
it is forbidden in Islam, but some men saw me and they did not shout at me, they kindly 
told me that you are welcome here and come here as much as you can but make your 
trousers next time a little bit longer. So maybe this attitude attracted me as well and also 
when I talked to people and said that I had an interest in Islam, they did not force me. 
They said that it is your choice, your decision… So it was my pre-decision, nobody 
forced me to do this and I was free in this decision. 
TG: You are of Polish nationality, so how is being a Polish citizen and Muslim at the 
same time? How did your family and your friends react when they learnt your decision? 
You said that your parents are not very religious but how did they react? It is just for 
understanding how other people perceive this situation… 
Teacher Rashid: Yes I see… Actually, the mentality of Islam and the mentality of most of 
Polish people they are very far from each other. I see many people maybe they like me, 
they accept me… but there can be intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, there 
can be some examples but they are not really common. But if people really accept and 
understand, they have no problems. But they do not understand how some Polish people 
who are Christian can embrace such a religion which is intolerant; where there are so 
many limits like not drinking the alcohol, fasting; not eating and drinking during the 
Ramadan, not going to discos, not meeting with the girls… for many it is difficult, they 
accept you but they do not understand you. I was at the age of eighteen so people thought 
that it was not a serious decision, they thought that I am a young man and I am looking 
for the truth and they thought that I would change my decision, but when I continued this 
they saw that this decision was serious. I think that they do not understand me one 
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hundred percent but they accept me and I have no conflict with them and this is the case 
for the majority of Poles who embraced Islam. 
NS: I have to leave, it is time for praying. 
TG: Okay, thank you very much for all those information and the personal experiences 
you shared with me. I have taken too much time. 
NS: No, you are welcome. 
Teacher Rashid: You are welcome. 
 
 




Tuğba Gürçel: Thank you very much for doing this interview. As I wrote you, I am 
studying state-religion relations but more specifically religious education at schools in 
Poland in the course of Europeanization. I will compare it with Turkey. Could you please 
give information about how this relationship evolved in the recent past?  
Mr. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz: People would write for underground newspapers and this was 
especially popular with some bishops, most notably by John Paul II, who was the 
archbishop of Krakow and who basically made this reach out to the people have been 
disillusioned with the real socialism. So since mid-60s the secular intellectuals came 
closer to the Church and by the mid-70s they basically found the Church to be a refuge. 
The crucial shift came around 1990, when the Church reasserted its material rights; for 
example, return of property that was taken away by the Communists, return of the 
religious education to schools. It is noteworthy that the religious education in the schools 
was available until 1960. Even under Stalinism, you know, the Communists had the 
salami tactic which is they would not go outright anti-Church action because they had to 
deal with other political parties and then they were only strong enough around fifteen 
years after taking power. In the 1960, they had a very strong anti-Church action which 
was symbolic in the dual celebration of the one thousand years of Poland in 1966; when 
the Church had its own celebrations and the Party had its own celebrations. In 1989 or 
1990 the Church signed a Concordat which was the official diplomatic agreement which 
regulated the return of Church property, of compensation for Church property where it 
could not be specifically done. Also return of religion to schools, and also a compromise 
on abortion which limited abortion, which until that time since Communism had been 
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basically freely available. In 1993, I think the new abortion law was signed. At that time, 
the consensus within the Solidarity broke down. The people who had been the secular 
intellectuals became alarmed at the return of the Church to the public space and at what 
they saw as the union of the altered and the thrown as we call it. So a kind of very close 
relationship especially the first one headed by the Catholic intellectual and also another 
conservative wing of the Solidarity while the secular intellectuals went into opposition. 
Then it came the very interesting period of 1993 to roughly 2005, when the left-wing 
Prime Minister and the government, post-Communist; then we had a 1995 Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, who was an atheist; an acknowledged one, and he became the President. 
Ironically, the whole controversy was gone because one of the strategies of the post-
Communists was to legitimize themselves with the much conservative society. So their 
way was basically to live with that compromise and they decided not to bring up the 
value-laden questions and Kwasniewski did not do this until the end, until 2005. In fact, 
right now, there is a big discussion within the left whether that was a mistake; that many 
of the changes could have happened earlier in Poland. And this compromise in the left 
which indeed is marginalized, now let’s say, alliance of the left is may be 10 percent, and 
this further left liberal Palikot Movement is around 6, so maybe let them 20 percent but 
they used to have around 40.  
In 2005 comes another crucial moment when the right-wing comes back to power and it 
is trying to undertake fundamental reforms of the state and a part of the movement is 
trying to also push more conservative agenda; for example into education which was the 
time where Roman Giertych from League of Polish Families184 became the Minister of 
Education, when he introduced for example uniforms for students, he introduced greater 
controls over teenage crime and school.... 
TG: Sorry, which year we are exactly talking about? 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: 2006-2007. However, there was a very strong split between the two 
parts of this new conservative agenda; one party was pro-European; which was Civic 
Platform, and one party was more nationalist, more sovereignty-based, which was Law 
and Justice. This is interesting that the whole is still taking place between the right-wing 
parties. However, I would call them Law and Justice is more of this old time let’s say, ... 
barbarian style which is you know, social, democratic and economic sense conservative 
based on religion, whereas Civic Platform, I would call them more liberal in terms of, for 
example, they would allow in-vitro, they would allow civil partnerships for gays, they 
would also be more open to European integration. However, they are not for the moment 
going against what the left cooperate legitimate the Church.  
                                                            
184 National conservative political party in Poland 
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Of course, 2004 was a crucial moment because for the liberals and for the left, the 
agreement to join to the EU was also the social mandate to change this consensus which 
was drafted in the mid-90s. They said that the Polish society had become much more 
liberal than the political system which is in place. There is another view which says that 
Poland has been going for the last five years an economic growth and the economic 
questions are not separating the parties. Therefore we see many more social issues on the 
table. The crucial question is the place of the Catholic Church because 95 percent of the 
believers are Catholics and also because of the traditional role of the Catholic Church in 
the public space. For instance, people who would oppose this consensus would be 
opposed to having crosses in the schools, hospitals, in the Parliament… Using the 
Christian symbols in the official oaths, such as the Presidential oath, the MP oaths; which 
is optional, however they want to get rid of that.  
The debate over the education has been usually about technicalities rather. There was 
nobody except for 10 to 15 percent of the voters who would want to see religion out of 
the public schools system, but there is a question: Should it be counted towards 
obligatory grade, how much do students have access to optional to religion classes of 
ethics. If we have obligatory grade in religion which some people believe is one of the 
easy courses so you could easily get an (A) and all the students abstaining should have an 
option to go to ethics classes. Another question is how much should the teaching of 
religion be in the hands of the Church or how much should it be religious studies, which 
would show different belief systems.  
So this is the debate, and of course there is the debate over issues which are also 
controversial in Western Europe but where Poland by the left and liberal seen as standing 
behind, issues like gays and in-vitro… Here we have also a split within the Church, and 
that is also very notable that is there is the group which is associated with Archbishop 
Dziwisz of Krakow, and then there is the group with Archbishop Michalik who is the 
head of Bishop’s Conference coming from Przemysl, and he is often associated with the 
Radio Maria Station.  These basically are divided by two aspects; one aspect is political 
affiliation and one is more pro-EU, the other one is EU-skeptics, and another one is 
exactly this relationship with the so-called modern world; that is “should we take a more 
identity-stance we Catholics as a separate group” or “are we trying to have influence over 
the public space but be seen as one of the groups playing within this even field.” So that 
is also something being debated all the time.  
TG: Religious education does not seem to be among the debated issues in Poland right 
now. Why is it so? Is it because there are other moral issues like abortion or in-vitro, 
which are more controversial at the moment? Or the problem about religious education 
totally solved? 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: No, I have a more cynical view of the political class in Poland, 
which says that politicians are basically preoccupied with ratings and the group that 
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decide rating these issues solely decline. That is the reason why the dominant two parties; 
Civic Platform and Law and Justice which are still fighting over the middle ground, are 
not going to take it up. So Palikot was not able to move the discourse far to the left and I 
feel that it is also important to see religiosity of Poles; that is we are more of the 
conventional Church-goers and we are also very much convenient looking people. That 
is, okay you know, kids do not have to go to a separate place, they already have evident 
school. It is that simple, I think. Very few people care deeply about religion one way or 
the other, frankly. Most people look warm, and then they do not care. Let me put in this 
way, so far I have seen that people who would be trying to push the discourse either to 
the right or to the left would get the label of, let’s say, Taliban or fighting atheists and so 
on, and you do not want to be seen. I think it is a little bit similar to the American 
scenario in which let’s say abortion, it is an uneasy compromise but both big parties are 
not trying to really raise this issue because they would raise hell. You would find people 
from the extremes dominating the discourse and I think this was very clear with the vote 
on abortion law which happened just a few weeks ago. Donald Tusk almost lost the 
control over his party because this issue was brought in and his response was not like 
“this issue should be solved in this way or in another” but that regardless of your beliefs, 
there are more important questions. Most of the government talk now is about the crisis 
and that is during the crisis time, not a good idea to multiply issues. For the Law and 
Justice, I think the big problem would be to have a split over the details in these issues. 
Now we are generally speaking conservative which allows us to have both the people 
who disagree on this issue. So I think for the moment, the Church is also happy with this 
solution.  
The real concern of the Church is now the financing system which the government is 
trying to change from the system in which they would have lump-sum donation from the 
state to basically a tax deduction. Yet there are concerns that actually the number of the 
people who are going to Church is much lower and certainly the number of people who 
would be paying is much lower; we are generally having a problem in collecting taxes 
from people. So this is the problem.  
Especially the left is against religion in school in a very interesting ground that we are 
paying out of the state money for salaries. This is not a question of, you know, the French 
Revolution ideals or socialist ideals are at stake. No, this is like “guys we are paying 
several tens of millions Zloty” which is very little in the budget but I think for the people 
is this idea of privileges for the Church. 
TG: So the salaries of the teachers of religion courses at schools are paid by the taxes 
collected by everyone and you are saying that this is the main reason for going against 
these courses for the leftists? The priests who are teaching religion at schools, you mean? 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: Yes, the salaries of the priests or not priests, because you know all 
of them are not priests, there are also kind of secular teachers as well. Whereas the 
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Church is basically arguing that okay, we have so many charities; we do so many public 
things and that is how it justifies its public activity, and for instance the tax preferences…  
TG: I am interrupting but just to make sure, are both the priests and the secular teachers 
appointed by the Church? 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: Please ask to specialists but I do believe that it is not settled on the 
law on religious classes. In general terms, any teacher is hired by the manager of the 
school which is under the local government. Whether religious classes are an exception, I 
do not know, frankly speaking…  
TG: I would like to ask lastly, if we have time, whether you perceive that 
Europeanization had a remarkable impact on religious education in Poland because the 
process coincides with the fall of Communism and right after that Poland wanted to 
become a member of the EU. So the whole process of modernization, is it related with the 
prospect of modernization for itself; for its national identity or was it the impact of 
Europeanization; influence of European norms? 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: Rather than modernization, it is better to call it the secularization of 
the society due to higher incomes and due to greater mobility. EU as a political process 
has not had that much impact because Poland is a relatively big state and actually I would 
say that you might see a big controversy in Poland over its own place in Europe. You 
might actually see more of the sovereignty talk, close to the UK position. That is exactly 
why we are at the crossroads but it is not related I think Poles are much less religious than 
Turks are and the best indicator is the countryside. That is, in Turkish countryside you 
probably do have very strong traditions which are being eliminated day by day in Poland 
because of very high emigration because of the breakup of the social ties. But this has 
been going on since about the 70s. So EU is only accelerating this process… 
TG: The emigration is then not basically based on Europeanization if it is taking place 
since 70s… 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: No, people are basically allowed to go, EU membership only 
creates opportunities.  
TG: Thank you very much, I think you have to go back to class. 
Mr. Karmierkiewicz: Yes I have to go now. I hope that it has been useful for you… 
TG: Yes, it was very informative. I am grateful. 
Mr. Kazmierkiewicz: Ok, let’s keep in touch. Wish you good luck with your thesis. 
TG: Thank you. 
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Interview with Dr. Agata Ladykowska, Anthropologist, Researcher on religious 
education in Russia. 
15.11.2012, Warsaw 
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Could we start with your personal experience about religious education in 
Poland, especially about the fall of Communist regime?  
Agata Ladykowska: Yes, I was born in 1976 and as a young person I was living in a 
small city next to the German border. I got religious education with the encouragement of 
my grandmother. It was part of the education system but it was provided by Church so 
the education was taking place in the parish physically but the building was divided into 
classes with exactly the same structure as school was adapted in the Church. Once a 
week, on Wednesday or Thursday, all of us were going to the Church.  
TG: All the students? 
AL: Except one girl. At that time it was a reason for us to be very mean towards her then 
it was a norm… In the generation of elder, not going to the Church was meant to be in 
opposition, it was a matter of being in a moral infringement. It was not looked as a matter 
of being a religious person but a matter of having a moral position against the 
Catholicism. Not for the children but for the parents. It was about sharing the common 
moral sense. So it was not incorporating directly to what we did in the classroom but it 
was translating into this moral state. Our relationship with a friend of mine was really 
suffering because of this pressure. It was not because she was not religious or something 
but it was a moral tradition. So coming back to the religion classes, it was so… the 
Catholic Church was so… 
TG: Sorry, you said you were going to the parish once a week and was it after the school 
hours? 
AL: Sometimes it was earlier…   
TG: But before the school hours right? So before or after but not during the ordinary 
school hours… 
AL: No, not during the school hours. The core of the education was about the teachings 
of the Catholic Church and the religious education was organized around on how to grow 
up or be admitted to the certain levels of Catholicism. At the age of nine you get the first 
Communion and… I forgot the word in English… So anyway this was the religious 
education about. This was for the primary education and then I went to the high school, it 
was after 1991 and the situation changed.  In the country, it started an anti-clerical trend. 
Only until recently I realized my real position towards religion. My parents are not very 
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religious, yes they enforced me to go to the Church and they sent me to the religious 
classes… this was kind of education and I did not like it just in the same way I did not 
like math classes. When I went to the high school, I knew that I did not want to learn this 
and I knew that I did not like the Church anymore but I could not say morally that I did 
not want to go to those courses even though they were not compulsory. I could not. So I 
was attending these classes with the feeling of resentment and it was very challenging for 
me, I was trapped in a sense. Until very recently that I could tell that I should not to do 
much with this. I redefined my position towards religion. 
TG: There is also a general view that the young generation of Poles are less religious; 
they do not go to Church very often… 
AL: Yes, but you mean by young generation? In my generation people were grown up 
where the religious education was a moral position of a good citizen. There was this 
thought as a part of the national identity. When I grew up, I could not think of myself in 
another way that I am a Catholic… But today, I think I am not. I do not think I am 
religious, I am afraid I am an atheist! But it was not so easy in Poland. 
TG: I understand but do you think that it is an individual transformation that you can now 
confess that you are not a believer or is it sociological phenomenon? I am trying to ask, 
now I am 30 years old and I now that things are changing by age but do you think that the 
religious atmosphere of the country is also changing?  
AL: I think that I had an unusual trajectory. My work as anthropologist and making 
research on religion and living on abroad for professional reasons, living in Russia for my 
research… so I had a different trajectory. It is not very usual for a woman so I have been 
affected by the things happened in my life. So I think it is more related to my experience 
and age… 
TG: Yes, age is an important factor but… 
AL: But also people around me were anti-clerical… they were anti-clerical but not anti-
religious; I am not anti-religious either. 
TG: Can you express yourself easily while stating that you are not a Catholic or that you 
are an atheist? Can you tell this to your friends and to your family for example? It 
depends on the environment you are living in for sure but in today’s Poland, in Warsaw, 
is it easy to express your religious conviction? I am trying to understand whether there is 
a change in the recent years in the religious atmosphere of the country… 
AL: Let me say that there are pro-religion and pro-secular camps in Poland. Somehow I 
do not have very religious friends and family. Pro-religion camp is mostly constituted of 
older people who are conservative and I rarely meet young and pro-religious people. 
Whether I am okay with the conservatives, no I am not okay, I feel that we are under 
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occupation. There is this separation of the Church and the state and thus we have to 
follow this separation in the public space. We have to follow this ideology. This is more 
prevalent for women… It is not about religious education for me now because I do not 
have children and it does not affect me but the regulations concerning your sexual life…  
TG: Regulations concerning the abortion rights or in-vitro… 
AL: Yes. Every norm is defined according to Catholic religion and not according to 
human rights. It is not acceptable for me. It should not be like this. These rules should be 
secular at least. If you want to have abortion you cannot and you have to endure a 
regulation imposed on you. When it comes to the religious education, yes religion course 
is not compulsory at schools but as the grade you get is included in the average, this leads 
to discrimination among students. So this leads to a predetermined discrimination since 
those grades are decisive in university entrance. This is the problem in Poland. In Russia, 
for example, the problem is much more complicated. It is not optional; you have to take 
either ethics or religious culture. The problem is that this is the first generation in Russia 
who has something to do with religion so it is really hard for them to determine the 
standards of this education. How do you define religion and how do you define religious 
culture? These are new issues for Russia. People who were raised within the Soviet 
ideology have different concepts about religion. And now they are trying to figure out 
what religion and culture mean to Russians… 
TG: That is an interesting remark and good point of comparison with Poland… Thank 
you very much for this interview, you kindly shared your own experience… 
AL: You are welcome; it was nice to tell my experience from this perspective.  
 
 
Interview with Ms. Paulina Wawrzyńczyk, Assistant to MP Robert Biedron, Palikot 
Movement (Your Movement) 
Skype meeting: 20.11.2012  
 
Tuğba Gürçel: Hello, thank you for accepting this Skype call.  
Paulina Wawrzyńczyk: You are welcome. 
TG: You are assistant of an MP from Palikot Movement right? 
PW: Yes, I have been working with him for two years. 
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TG: As I wrote to you, I am mostly concerned about the state-religion relations and the 
religious education at schools in Poland. Could you please tell me about the stance of 
Palikot Movement about these issues?  
PW: Actually, we are fighting for the sex education at schools. 
TG: As far as I can understand, sex education is a more controversial issue right now in 
Poland, some of the interviewees raised this issue. 
PW: Yes, that’s right. 
TG: I think that the two issues are interconnected in the sense that they both are the fields 
were you feel the very presence and the power of the Church. So do you perceive any 
change in the mentality or the practice of the both educations after the EU membership or 
during the Europeanization process? Do you think that it is becoming more liberal? 
PW: No. Unfortunately, there is no change because as every country can decide and there 
is no universal program, so unfortunately this issue has not changed. I have been working 
on this topic for seven years now, and nothing is better. But the public debate, the media, 
they always stand for good sex education and the real problem is about the politicians and 
the Church is the main problem. But more and more people support the idea. I think this 
is crazy and is changing for the better.  
TG: I hope so because from my perspective, by the way I am not an expert on Polish 
politics and given the limited time I spent in Warsaw my observations are restricted but 
still, I would like to say that the picture that I saw was different than the one portrayed. 
People do not seem that religious and are not hesitating to talk about religion, they can 
freely express their opinion and even say that there are atheist. Actually, in Turkey it is a 
bit difficult to state that I think. So, yes, it is religious, I have been to churches during the 
Sunday Mass and I saw that they were crowded but mostly, elderly people were there 
with their grandchildren, rather than young people. But as I said, people are very open to 
talk about religious issues. 
PW: Yes, I think that there is no strong discrimination against atheists but many people 
are still afraid, I think, to say that openly. This is also changing, now the apostasy, it 
means going out from the Church in the legal way, is possible but it is of course 
completely not supported by the Church and they do everything to put you off, to make it 
more difficult for you to obtain that you are not a member of the Church anymore. But it 
is possible and every year more and more people want to do this procedure. 
TG: Okay, thanks a lot for your contribution. 
PW: You are welcome. 
